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RUSSIA AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *This study is an analysis of how Russia enhanced, through its geopolitical dynamics, the regional security environment, specially focusing on the Pontic area. For this purpose, the analysis period spreads over the last quarter century since the end of the Cold War, a long enough period in our opinion, to outline precisely the geopolitical instruments used by Moscow to move from the “survival” defensive, imposed by the geopolitical setback which followed the implosion of the USSR, to the aggressive offensive recovery of the “near neighbourhood” and redefinition of its sphere of influence. Among the instruments used, both geopolitical concepts, some already grounded and others in the process of crystallization, we mention: geoeconopolitics, hard energy, separatist region, buffer zones, frozen conflict, geopolitical “transnistria” etc. Applied results of the study are clear, both theoretically and practically, for any future research or for any international civil servant working in adjacent area to the analyzed issue.*

Keywords: *Russia, West, regional security environment, geopolitical border, geopolitical “transnistria”*

Introduction

After nearly a quarter of a century since the breakup of “socialist camp” and the implosion of the USSR, an event described by Vladimir Putin as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”, Russia – the legitimate “successor” of the Soviet colossus –, after a short geopolitical and geostrategic retreat, advances again on the vast Eurasian scene, providing opportunity and analysis substance to the academic circles and beyond.

Everything seemed to change after the Cold War: the concepts, the games, the players.

The *traditional geopolitics* was in a state of metamorphosis, hybridising, getting a touch more sophisticated as *neogeopolitics*, where the favourite concepts were: *geoeconomy* (power is manifested not by force, but by the market), *geopolitical axis*¹ (instead of *spheres of influence*, ie multiple membership, instead of gravitating around a single center of power, “both ways” instead of “either this or that”, territorial shifts vs. territorial continuity, strategic partnerships vs. military alliances), *soft/ smart power* at the expense of *hard power*², and what is essentially a *bipolar world* turns, after intermediate *unipolarity* of American hegemony into one more complex *multipolar world* etc.

Post Cold War games seemed to come out from *winner take all game* logic (my gain, the loss of the ideological opponent), giving way to the “win-win” *games* (we all win), and *the state*, no longer the only player and depository of power, felt its sovereignty being

¹ See also Marius-Cristian Neacsu, Constantin Diaconescu (2011), *Geopolitical stakes and games on the North-West – South-East axis (Western World – Turkey)*, in “Papers of the <<Dimitrie Cantemir>> Geographical Seminar”, No. 31, pp. 131-143.

² Silviu Neaguț, Marius-Cristian Neacsu (2012), *From “hard power” to “soft power”. Intelligent power*, The International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI, The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, Bucharest, November 22-23, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing house, pp. 216-226.

threatened and eroded by a whole host of *non-state* „players” (TNCs, some of them genuine instruments of government foreign policies – relevant example is Gazprom, but not only –, international financial institutions – some of them true “empires” –, global terrorist organizations, who had armed forces, gained territorial control – see the “Islamic State” –, regional blocs – the EU, NATO, others – etc).

The reality of this first quarter of the 21st century has shown that the theory was gentle and idealistic, failing to capture the pragmatism of the land. In particular, the events that began in 2014, centering the Ukraine issues, showed that it is not only a transformation and a superficial change in the classical geopolitical concepts and theories, but rather, it is successor hybridization, because the old ones were not outdated and replaced by new ones that better capture the reality, but were used in the most profound and classic sense and well mixed in with the new ones.

So, geopolitics, proved to be a *geoconopolitics*³. Economic weapon has become more lethal than conventional military threat; “the march to the East of Europe”⁴ – extending the Euro-North-Atlantic structures to the east or re-Europeanization of the eastern part of the continent – being brutally interrupted in Ukraine. First delayed by using the gas valve – “the gas war” with Ukraine (2006, 2008, 2009), then at the pipeline (*Blue Stream* pipeline vs. *Trans-Caspian*, *South Stream* vs. *Nabucco* etc.)⁵, which meant no less than replacing the military instrument, with the economic one, that involved using the new concept of *hard energy*⁶ or *energetik*⁷ –, then interrupted by using tanks and territorial annexations (Crimea, 2014)⁸. Not even the war in Ukraine is a usual one: it is held with soldiers, but not with armies; “rebels” in uniforms but without military insignia; in cities, in guerrilla forms, without a well defined frontline; with supply as humanitarian relief convoys etc.

Therefore, the aim of this synthetic study is to *outline those theoretical concepts that best illustrate the disturbances that Russia poses to regional security environment* and which she maximized for the past 25 years.

1. Complexity of the regional security environment

Why is the security environment in the European border with Russia so complex?

a) *Eurasian destiny of Russia*. First of all, the complexity results from the intrinsic geopolitical metabolism of Russia which has a unique geography – the largest country on Earth (just over 17 million km²), located between Europe and Asia – and which always has imposed a geostrategic and geopolitical development and a specific destiny: the *Eurasian superpower*⁹. From here comes the permanent blend of Russia between the two different

³ Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2014a), *Geoconopolitica*, in “Economistul”, no. 49-50, 15-31 december, pp. 11-13.

⁴ Oleg Serebrian (2009), *Despre geopolitică*, Ed. Cartier, Chișinău, p. 172.

⁵ See also different articles and scientific researches realized by the Geography staff from Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, such as: Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Damian Florea (2013), *Nabucco. The end?*, in “Terra”, year XLIV (LXIV), No. 1-2, pp. 90-95; Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Damian Florea (2012), *Project NABUCCO in the Power Games*, in “The International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI”, November 22-23, Bucharest, pp. 426-440; Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț (2010), *Gas pipelines War*, in “Romanian Review on Political Geography”, 12th year, No. 1, pp. 29-46; Silviu Neguț, Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2009), *Gas War*, in “Romanian Review on Political Geography”, 11th year, No. 2, pp. 176-189; Silviu Neguț, Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Viorel Mionel (2007), *European Union’s Dependency on Russian Energy. Geopolitical considerations*, in “The Romanian Economic Journal”, no. 25 bis, pp. 265-284 etc.

⁶ Silviu Neguț, Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁷ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Damian Florea (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 438.

⁸ See also Silviu Neguț (2014), *Conflictete înghețate. Studiu de caz: Transnistria*, in “Economistul”, no. 47-48, 1 december.

⁹ See also Alexandr Dughin (2011), *Bazele geopoliticii și viitorul geopolitic al Rusiei*, Ed. Eurasiatica.ro, Bucharest.

directions – Europe or Asia (2015 – Russia is not an European country and does not want to be one, but does not see herself as an Asian country either, where she would face giants such as China, India, Japan) – leaning towards consolidating its Eurasian position.

Vital in this regard is to consolidate the two *geopolitical clips*¹⁰ that give her the imminent presence in Europe: *northern clip* – the Baltic Sea and the *southern clip* – the Black Sea. Both were immensely vulnerable, with the USSR implosion: at the Baltic Sea, “Kaliningrad” becoming somewhat entangled within the Euro-Atlantic structures; and the Black Sea has greater losses: Ukraine, with the two strategic points in the Black Sea, Crimea and, partly, the end of the Danube.

It seems clear now, after 25 years of post Cold War geopolitical development, that the Russia geopolitics regarding Europe was held to revitalize the two assets that would have brought Russia back to “The Great Chessboard”. Reduced to “its Asian bed”¹¹, as Oleg Serebrian well pointed out (2006), Russia was only a “regional power”.

At the Baltic Sea, there are still Russian territories – Kaliningrad –, which Kremlin managed to disentangle both from an energy and a geopolitical point of view through the *Nord Stream* pipeline construction, part of the “energy pincer”¹²(although its southern arm – *South Stream* – was not made, being temporarily suspended, Moscow abandoning it after Bulgaria left the project in 2014, at EU pressures, but also after having reached its goal to block the Western pipeline construction, *Nabucco*¹³, in 2013, operating as a “preemptive pipeline”¹⁴). Obviously, the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline was a reason for the demilitarization of the Baltic Sea.

At the Black Sea the problem was more complicated. While Moscow has succeeded in keeping Ukraine under control (gas delivery at lower preferential prices¹⁵ vs. political concessions) and thereby keeping away the Euro-Atlantic structures, it was quiet on the “Eastern Front” of Europe. 2004 was the year when the shy “orange revolution” in Ukraine gave the signal for change and precipitated the events at the Black Sea, in 2008 at the NATO Summit in Bucharest: Kiev has not received “green light” on the issues of adherence to NATO (under Russia’s pressure), in 2009 officially giving up at this objective; *Euro-maidan* from 2013 to 2014 (a continuation of the “orange revolution” of a decade ago), turning into a *Russian-maidan* (since March 2014). This means that Moscow was never at Ukraine’s mercy, given to (military) action: she re-attached Crimea (using Western arguments: Russian minority rights in the peninsula, the right to referendum etc.), making it insignificant at the Black Sea, and thereby cancelling its function as a geopolitical pillar, fragmented Ukraine, creating the circumstances and negotiating power positions with a too weak West, too fragmented and too much in crisis.

b) The geopolitical multiple function of the Black Sea. A quick look on the Pontic riverains lead to the image of a cultural mosaic, which means different local geopolitical systems, with a strategic geometry and different geopolitical gravities. This gives the Black Sea the role of “hinge” or, in other words, makes her the *maritime pivot* between local, regional and global geopolitical systems and which, as previously mentioned, works differently: on the one hand is the pole between the West and Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO and EU) and Russia (and its Eurasian positioning) and secondly between Ukrainian (*continental pivot* between Russia and the West), Turkey (*continental pivot* between Russia,

¹⁰ Neacșu, Marius-Cristian (2014b), *From the “Euro-Maidan” to the “Russian-Maidan”*, in “Terra”, Year XLV (LXV), no. 1-2., p. 94.

¹¹ Oleg Serebrian (2006), *Geopolitica spațiului pontic*, Chișinău, Ed. Cartier.

¹² Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹³ See also Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Damian Florea (2013), *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Damian Florea (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 429.

¹⁵ 50\$ per 1.000 m³ when the “market price”, in Europe, in 2000 was 300\$.

the West and the fundamentalist Islamic world) and Balkan (an area also extremely complicated)¹⁶. To all of this we add local geopolitical systems.

The events of 2014 from the Pontic area have solved too little, or complicated more the problem. The re-enclosing of Crimea and the attempt to create a land corridor to it (reason of the active front in eastern Ukraine – Donbass and Lugansk/Luhansk) cancelled the Azov Sea geopolitical function and, moreover, Ukraine's advantage as a *continental pivot*, the latter reduced to a mainland territory, fragmented, with a diminished geostrategic significance, at least within the Pontic area.

Black Sea is not only a *maritime pivot* that connects the two *continental pivots*, but also retains its function from an exclusively maritime axis, as it is situated on the axis of seas and straits, respectively Caspian Sea – Black Sea – Mediterranean Sea¹⁷.

On the other hand, the Black Sea is located on the *geopolitical rift* between the West and Russia, a kind of “last frontier”, important for the former but vital for the latter. The significance of the Black Sea has been proven by hundreds of years of historical reality and recently by the *reversal of the Russian geopolitics from a passive-defensive one into an active-aggressive one*, as the Euro-Atlantic structures reached the Black Sea. Russia could afford to lose from its geostrategic sphere Romania, but not Ukraine.

The geographic location of the Black Sea on the geopolitical rift between the West and Russia also gives it a high potential to generate “buffer zones” or “gray areas” and since the of the USSR until now, we have been able to see a very interesting developments of those¹⁸.

The Black Sea is the “southern clip” of Russia, a real “geopolitical anchor” which keeps it active in European affairs. If up till 2014, these three Pontic geostrategic points – *Crimea, the end of the Danube and the straits* – were distributed, i.e. the Crimea was in Ukraine (keeping her both as an important pivot and actor in the Pontic area), the mouths of the Danube was connected to Euro-Atlantic structures and the straits were controlled by Turkey, also in western gravity, after the re-attaching of Crimea by Russia (2014) the situation is changing. Russia has Crimea (and thus it resolves “the issue” of the Black Sea fleet); at the same time it is leaning towards the end of the Danube and to the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean (the Syrian file, the support given Greece), somehow blocking Turkey's role in the Pontic region.

2. Russia and the dynamics of regional security environment

From the above analysis we can see the complexity of the regional security environment, but the geopolitical development of the past 25 years revealed also an interesting dynamic of it boosted by Russia which, it is obvious, was able to play well, not only counteracting the West's strategic advance, but passing to the re-attaching of “near neighbourhood” in its goal to rebuild, if possible, her former sphere of influence.

In this way, it used a foreign policy tool that permanently disrupted regional security environment, enrolling him in a near permanent dynamic instability, which Russia was able to make full use of in the relationship with the West, especially with the European players. And this tool, we can individualize and define today as the *geopolitical “transnistria”*¹⁹, concept which crystallizes and culminates with the development of a whole class of concepts that

¹⁶ Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2014b), *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁷ Marius-Cristian Neacșu, Silviu Neguț (2013), *Black Sea Area – A New <<Grey Area>>?*, in “Strategic Impact”, no. 2, pp. 38-39.

¹⁸ *Idem*, pp. 37-47.

¹⁹ Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2015), *Conceptul de “transnistrie geopolitică”*, in “Terra”, Year XLVI (LXVI), no. 1-2 (forthcoming).

revolve around the one mentioned before, in other words, it represented its evolutionary phases – *separatist region, buffer zone, frozen conflict, geopolitical “transnistria”*.

The entire evolution of these last 25 years since the implosion of the USSR showed that Russia surrounded the Black Sea with “geopolitical transnistria” by freezing and unfreezing them as appropriate, counteracting the West and readjusting its influence area.

But what is “geopolitical transnistria”? Is a concept that has a territorial expression, physics, Transnistria itself²⁰, but from whom it has detached, constituting a generalized model of geopolitical developments around the Black Sea. Latest “transnistria” areas created by Russia are Donbass and Lugansk areas. As a result, “geopolitical transnistria” is “*a region of high strategic significance used by a great power (Russia) for disrupting ongoing geopolitical trends (advance of the Euro-Atlantic structures towards present borders of Russia) or to recover influence in former ideological space*”²¹.

This involves a number of components, such as: geographical “edge” space, of small sizes, with an obscure historical identity or pieced together, with a soviet past covered with an ethnic mix and with a significant proportion of Russians or russified population, which can easily escape the reach of a central authority. The interesting thing is that, most of the time, in such situations, Russia’s intervention was made possible by the very same reasons employed by the West (protecting the weakest – the Russian people, in the face of adversity – the faulty administration by the capital; human rights, the fight against international terrorism, the preceding Kosovo incident etc.).

“Geopolitical transnistria” followed, from a progressive standpoint, this algorithm:

- the claiming by Moscow of legitimate rights of the region, either by virtue of situating in the past inside the soviet sphere of influence, or through some soviet reminiscences: the former Red Army troops (Transnistria situation, the Caucasus), Russia's Pontic fleet (Crimea) etc;
- economic dependence and servitude policy: supply of gas and electricity at preferential prices or absorb local productions by Russian market versus staying in the Kremlin's political gravity (Belarus situation, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia etc);
- any attempt of pro-western policy made by the newly formed ex-soviet republic was sanctioned promptly, economically and politically by the “big brother” (see for example, “gas war” with Belarus and Ukraine);
- if pro-western orientation persists, the territorial fragmentation of the country concerned is initiated, initially as a breakaway region which no longer recognizes the central authority, even if a certain autonomy of the region already existed, and which declares its independence (Transnistria, Crimea, Donbass, Lugansk etc.);
- escalation of an armed conflict is catalyzed or freed by Moscow, where appropriate, seeking the internationalization of the conflict and ensuring its negotiating power position and its presence for negotiating in any format future peace solution;
- using “western” arguments and solutions – self-determination by referendum, federation (trap of asymmetric federation – see “Kozak plan” for the transnistrian conflict settlement) –, Russia is involved in solutioning it to keep out western structures;
- in extreme situations as “Euro-aidan” and the potential loss of Ukraine and, by Crimea, the Black Sea strategic access, Kremlin reserves the right to resort last step: territorial annexation.²²

²⁰ See also Silviu Neguț (2014), *op. cit.*

²¹ Marius-Cristian Neacșu (2015), *op. cit.*

²² *Ibidem.*

Conclusions

After analyzing the way in which Russia imposed its emphasized dynamic to the regional security environment the following conclusions have resulted:

- the last 25 years since the end of the Cold War have shown a Russia that is no longer in geopolitical recoil and that is using *new geopolitical hybrid* tools – *geoconopolitics, hard energy, separatist region, buffer zone, frozen conflict, geopolitical “transnistria”* etc –, adapted to the current international context, a Russia which has switched to pursue an active, aggressive braking/blocking the Western and the action to recover the in the “near neighbourhood”;
- all these “geopolitical tools” were used in direct relation with the Black Sea;
- it also underlines the *vital role that the Black Sea plays in the Kremlin strategy*, fully in line with Russia's geopolitical status, that of an *Eurasian power*;
- of all the concepts mentioned above, detach the *geopolitical “transnistria”*, providing a model of geopolitical evolution being outsourced by Moscow, wherever needed, especially around the Black Sea;
- considering its effects – delay or even block the manifestation of certain geopolitical trends (such as the Euro-Atlantic structures eastward expansion) –, the analyzed concept has, from geostrategic point of view, prevention value (*preemptive geostrategy*).

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THE TRANSISTRIAN CASE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE UKRAINIAN CRYISIS AND THE SECURITY OF REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA, UKRAINE AND ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Annexation of Crimea by the Russia, military escalation in Eastern Ukraine produced a change in region. In this new geopolitical context the influence of Transnistria on security of Moldova concerns the scenario that it can trigger a new war on the Dniester, in response to the statements of officials from Chisinau about the need to withdraw Russian troops and the replacement of them with civilian observers. In the event of bloodshed, Moscow could argue that keeping Russian peacekeepers in Moldova is still necessary.*

Transnistria influences Eastern Ukraine by example, by some cadres of the leadership in Donetsk and Lugansk. There are possible challenges to destabilize the situation in Odessa region. To reduce the possibility thereof, Kiev has proceeded to dig a trench along the Moldovan – Ukrainian border.

The influence of Transnistria on Romania's security is less pronounced, taking into account the fact that Romania is under the protection of NATO umbrella.

Keywords: *Security, Frozen Conflict, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Romania.*

Introduction

Transnistria is a region that formally (*de jure*) is part of the Republic of Moldova, but uncontrolled (*de facto*) by the authorities from Chisinau. 2/3 of the population of the region is Russian speakers. The region occurs "in more and more political and security analysis as one of «serious and dangerous conflict outbreaks» in NATO and EU proximity"¹. De facto Nistriian Moldovan Republic (Transnistria) functions as a stand-alone state: it has an area of about 4,100 sq km (as a county of Romania), and a population of half a million people. It is a region located between Bessarabia and Ukraine, landlocked, without an exit to Black Sea, with its capital in Tiraspol city. Transnistria has its own currency, its own passports and car specific registration plates, although not recognized by the international community. That is why "current importance (...), in fact, is due not to its intrinsic value, but to the new geopolitical situation created in South-Eastern Europe"².

The current importance of Transnistria for the Russian Federation is in the fact that Moscow is using it as an instrument of its foreign policy in Eastern Europe – both in post-Soviet space (*close proximity*) to influence, to pressure on Moldova and keep in check Ukraine, but also in relation to the Euro-Atlantic area. Thus, the importance of the Transnistrian region is reflected in its use by Russia as a "bridgehead and important node in

¹ Constantin – Gheorghe BALABAN, *Conflicte înghețate și crize la limita de est a NATO și a Uniunii Europene – obstacol major în calea cooperării și stabilității regionale*, în *GeoPolitica*, Anul VI – Nr. 28, București, 2008, p. 10.

² Inesa BABAN, *Republica Moldova între Est și Vest, între Rusia și comunitatea euro-atlantică*, în *GeoPolitica*, anul VI – Nr. 28, București, 2008, pp. 74-75.

the context of geopolitical and geostrategic EU and NATO borders at Black Sea"³. Especially in the context of US military base deployment projects at Deveselu, where have to be placed antimissile systems, Russia relies on its military base in Tiraspol as a means of countering the threat emanating (as it is perceived by Russia⁴) from Romania (it is considered also the US military base in Dobrogea – in the village Mihail Kogălniceanu). Basically, the Russian military base, kept illegally in Transnistria (despite Russia's commitment at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, in 1999, to withdraw the army until 2001), performs the functions that the 14th Army of the USSR had during the Cold War – which was a counterweight vis-à-vis NATO's southern flank, respectively to military capacities from Turkey and Greece. For the Russian Federation military base in Transnistria is a guarantee of stopping NATO expansion Eastward, over the Prut River. Meanwhile, the Russian base marks the border between the two civilization spaces: Latin – Western and Slavic – Oriental.

So, it can be said that in the context of the USSR collapse, Moscow has used the Dniester conflict (which it did create and manage) in order "to take advantage to maintain its military presence in the area"⁵. Formally, according to Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation and to the Russian military doctrine, the Kremlin has assumed the role of defender of the Russian-speaking population in *close proximity*, offering to the Russian speakers from Moldova Russian citizenship – Russian passports. However, there are a few causes of conflict from the Transnistrian region of Moldova. It openly emerged on 2 September 1990, when the Nistriian Moldovan Republic (NMR), known in the media and in security studies Transnistria, was proclaimed, but was not recognized by any state until now, even by the Russian Federation that supports it totally (between 70-80% of Transnistria's budget consists of financial aid from Moscow).

However, the origins of the conflict can be identified in the "change of borders in the last century"⁶, which created "ethnic differences"⁷ by changing ethnic composition of the population of Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), which during the collapse of the USSR (1990-1992) led to ethnic tensions. Within the borders of the Moldovan republic, created on 2 August 1940, did not entered southern and northern parts of Bessarabia (most of the counties Ismail, Akkerman and Hotin), but was incorporated western half of the Autonomous Republic of Moldova (MASSR), created on October 12, 1924 on the left bank of the Dniester River. The final version of the Ukrainian – Moldovan border was adopted by a decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 4 November 1940 and those boundaries are the today's interstate Ukrainian – Moldovan border.

In order to understand the origins of conflict in the Transnistrian region of Moldova and its essence (after its hot phase, occurred between period from March 2 to July 21, 1992, where recorded over 1000 deaths) may be identified another 12 causes:

1. Political forces in Moscow (the head of the Soviet Parliament A. Lukyanov, etc.) instigated and supported the imposition of the regime that usurped power structures, as a means of blackmail on Chisinau, Moldova to maintain the USSR, and authorities Chisinau to sign the new union treaty;

2. The Moldovan Parliament adopted the law on use of languages and the state flag – the tricolour, without taking onto account the reality from Transnistrian region – the reaction

³ Constantin – Gheorghe BALABAN, *Idem*, p. 11.

⁴ Daily Telegraph: *Rusia amenință România cu rachete din cauza scutului de la Deveselu!*, <http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/daily-telegraph-rusia-ameninta-romania-cu-rachete-din-cauza-scutului-de-la-deveselu-597440.html> access 26.04.2015.

⁵ Tudor BLÂNDU, *Crizele identitare în conflictele înghețate ale spațiului est european*, în *GeoPolitica*, Anul VI – Nr. 28, București, 2008, p.25.

⁶ Constantin – Gheorghe BALABAN, *Idem*.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

from there. Because in the region where located a major Russian-speaking population of settlers and Russified people who did not use Romanian/Moldovan language until 1989, these people were scared and began to take defensive measures which have led to unrecognized NMR;

3. A large number of settlers were part of the state governing bodies (district, town) and state enterprises. Being afraid to lose their jobs and privileges, such persons proceeded to create structures of Nistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (NMSSR). They did not want to share the profits of enterprises' of "union subordination" with the budget of the Republic of Moldova;

4. The existence of a large mass of Russian settlers in Tiraspol, Bender, Râbnîța and other Transnistrian cities, who did not want to be part of Moldova, which started on the path of independence and detachment from Russia;

5. Moldovan rural population, and not only that, was apathetic, confused and frightened, with a few exceptions: the villages who opposed armed resistance – Cocieri, Molovata Noua, Cosnita, Pohrebea, Pârâta, Doroțcaia etc.. Apathy was the consequence of the fear inoculated by Cossacks and "guardsmen" (the Transnistrian military forces);

6. Fear induced to the population on the left bank during the Stalinist terror – from 1917 to 1953, except for the years 1941-1944, was still felt in 1989-1992 – the period of the collapse of the USSR;

7. Some people in the Transnistrian region were more sovietised in mentality and in 1989 saw their way of life, constituted decades, ideological belief, and system of organization of life, threatened. In 1989, part of the population in the Transnistrian region was not yet ready to recognize the need for radical changes that were made in Chisinau: waiver single-party political system and communist ideology, emerge of germs of market economy, the introduction of Moldovan language in state institutions and enterprises (before was used Russian);

8. The left bank was not part of the Romanian state in the period in which Bessarabia was united with Romania (1918-1940). Consequently, there was a gap on the national consciousness of the Bessarabian and Transnistrian population; while Bessarabians pronounced for independence and freedom, many local Transnistrian Moldovans neither even did not conceived such a thing;

9. In the Soviet period, the Moldovans in Transnistria did not have enough kindergartens and schools with instruction in their mother tongue; children are forced to learn Russian language, especially in towns and villages with mixed population. Being Russified, they formed another cultural consciousness (a regional one) different from that of Moldavians from Bessarabia. The degree of Russification of Moldovans was much higher on the Left bank of the Dniester River and in Bender;

10. Soviet authorities exaggerated by propaganda and manipulation the Romanian government abuses from 1941-1944 in Transnistria. To the Transnistrian population was induced hatred and fear of Romania (Românophobia);

11. The Soviet 14th Army, stationed till now in the Transnistrian region, participated in the action of usurping power and imposing a regime of Russian military occupation;

12. Cossacks from the banks of the Don River, Russian mercenaries, soviet army reserve officers who received housing and settled in the cities of Transnistria region of Moldova before the conflict, people from force structures from other republics (especially from the Baltic) that were sheltered in Tiraspol after the putsch of August 1991, contributed significantly to the usurpation of power and imposition Russian military occupation regime.

In conclusion, regarding the Transnistrian conflict, it can be found that although there was an ethno-political motivation, it is less important than the geopolitical motivation, since it is about a Russian-Moldovan dispute concerning a region of Moldova. Its value is linked with

its positioning towards Moldova, Ukraine and proximity to the border of Euro-Atlantic area. Since 1992 "Transnistria became a black spot of the post-Soviet space"⁸. Transnistria has entered into list of a number of territorial conflicts (can be nominated Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia), control over which "allowed Russia to keep" its means of influence, its role as arbiter and saviour in conflicts in post-Soviet space, thereby justifying military presence in all parts of the CIS". As a result, the conflict in Transnistria was within the logic of maintaining Moldova in the Russian sphere of influence and prevented achieving union with Romania according to the "model of two Germanies"⁹. Thus, the Kremlin used "Transnistrian region in order to strengthen its control over Moldova, which is a constant in the Russian strategic political behaviour in post-Soviet space"¹⁰.

In the context of the annexation of Crimea by Russia and of the conflict in the regions of Eastern Ukraine – Lugansk and Donetsk, is worth exploring the influence of unrecognized Nistrrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) – Transnistria – on the security of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Romania.

1. The Transnistrian case within the context of Ukrainian crisis

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014, as well as the military escalation in Eastern regions of Ukraine (Lugansk and Donetsk), between Ukraine's state forces and pro-Russian rebels, produced a significant change in regional geopolitical context. By 2014 the two mediators and guarantors of the 5 + 2 negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict – Russian Federation and Ukraine – generally acted jointly to protract the conflict from Moldova, supporting the self-proclaimed republic. It is known that alongside Russian mercenaries (Cossacks and other categories) in the 1992 war against Moldovan police fought also several battalions of Ukrainian nationalists. After the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation the Ukrainian-Russian relations deteriorated and Kiev authorities attempted isolation of Transnistria, primarily in economic field, also imposing restrictions on persons from the Transnistrian region, crossing Ukrainian – Moldovan border on Transnistrian segment: Russian male citizens, aged 18-65 years, were banned in Ukraine. But there was attempted also a physical isolation by digging a trench on the Transnistrian segment of the Ukrainian – Moldovan border; the project was not yet completed.

There are several issues that are worth mentioning with regard to the current state of Chisinau – Tiraspol relations. In the context of seeking a solution to the Transnistrian conflict should not be underestimated the need and the importance of a high standard of living, a better state of socio-economic conditions of Moldova – factors that can make attractive Moldovan state for the population from the Transnistrian region. However, given that Moldova remains the poorest country in Europe because of corruption and bad governance of state affairs by the Executive, it is harder for the elites and for the population from the Nistrrian strip to want to reintegrate into the Moldovan state with the boundaries of MSSR up to 2 September 1990. On the other hand, there are some doubts regarding the Moldovan authorities' willingness to reintegrate the Transnistrian region. Till now Moldovan officials have not developed and have not proposed for discussions in the 5 + 2 format any settlement plan. So far such plans developed and proposed the OSCE (2002), Russian Federation (Kozak plan, 2003), Ukraine (Yushchenko plane, 2004). The lack of Moldovan initiatives may be a result of the current balance of political forces in Republic of Moldova. At the last round of parliamentary elections on 30 November 2014, 56% of voters who opted to vote approximately 50% to 50% for pro-Western forces, and for the pro-Eastern parties. Voters

⁸ Inesa BABAN, *Idem*, p. 78.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 77.

from Transnistrian region would clearly tilt the balance in favour of the pro Customs Union (Eurasian Union) parties, so it is understandable a hypothetical hesitation of Moldovan government regarding the political will to solve the Transnistrian conflict, before accusing some lack of professionalism.

With the integration of Crimea into Russia can be admitted that the Transnistria partially has lost its geostrategic importance the Kremlin. Even by 2014 the fact that Transnistria has not an exit to the Black Sea made it vulnerable in the event of deterioration of Russian – Ukrainian relations, namely the closure of access of the Russian military forces to the area, by Ukraine and Moldova. However, it is expected that the presence of a large community of Russian citizens in the Transnistrian region will be fully exploited by the Kremlin to keep their positions on Dniester River by maximal plan is the preservation of military contingent – which has declared mission to protect the deposits filled with ammunition of the former 14th Army in Colbasna village.

2. Influence of Transnistria on security of Republic of Moldova

The implosion of the USSR in 1991 and the formation of the 15 post-Soviet states did not reduce the ambitions of the Russian Federation to promote a foreign policy "based on the idea that all the former Soviet space represents its sphere of influence, thus seeking «international recognition of its fundamental interests in this region»"¹¹. After the three Baltic republics broke away permanently from the Russian sphere of influence through their integration into NATO and the EU, the Kremlin takes various measures to preserve other post-Soviet republics in its sphere, under its control. One of the tools used by Moscow in this respect in Moldova is undoubtedly the Transnistrian conflict. Basically, the stake of keeping the Transnistrian conflict in a frozen state aims keeping Moldova within the sphere of influence of Russia. The resolution of the conflict, the withdrawal of the Russian military contingent from Moldova, would be the equivalent of raising the main obstacle to Moldova's European integration; it would open up the possibility of accession of RM to the EU.

In the context of actions of approach of Republic of Moldova to the European Union, Transnistria as an uncontrolled Moldovan territory is an obstacle on the path of European integration and EU accession of the country (even more so – to NATO).

The Transnistria tool can be used by the Russian Federation in various ways. One of the scenarios considered in the last period with a negative influence of Transnistria on the security of Republic of Moldova concerns the possibility of starting a new war on the Dniester (or defrost the existing conflict) in response to the statements of several officials from Chisinau (in first of President Nicolae Timofti) on the need to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Moldova and the replacement of military peacekeeping mission with one of civil observers. This initiative was rejected by the Foreign Ministry from Moscow. In the event of bloodshed, the Russian authorities could argue that keeping Russian peacekeepers in Moldova and the military contingent providing security to deposits of ammunitions from Colbasna is still necessary.

Transnistria has a negative influence on Moldova also in terms of economic security. The debt of the company "Moldovagaz" to "Gazprom" is currently \$ 5 bln 500 mln. 11% of this amount is the RM debt, and the rest – the debt of Transnistria. Since "Moldovagaz" is an economic entity registered in the Republic of Moldova, Moscow systematically requires Chisinau to pay the debt of Transnistrian region, which is a burden for the Moldovan state, and this is part of the strategies of Kremlin to weaken RM.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

3. Influence of Transnistria on security of Ukraine

Transnistria has an undeniable influence on the security of Ukraine. Located on the Western Ukrainian border, the Transnistrian region is a part of a belt of the Russian-speaking and Russophile regions alongside Lugansk, Donetsk and Crimea, thru which Ukraine is caught in a quite disturbing embrace. Since there is no a direct connection with Russia, the Nistriian strip is not a military threat comparable to that attested in Lugansk and Donetsk. However, being awared of the possibility of an attack from the Russian army in Transnistria on Odessa region, to reduce the possibility of such a scenario, the Ukrainian authorities proceeded to dig a ditch along the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan – Ukrainian border (450 km). This trench would function as a obstacle to any attempt to invade Ukraine by Russian military contingent stationed in Eastern part of Moldova. Yet, the trench excavation project has not been completed. The fear of some possible challenges of the Russian military from the Transnistrian region to destabilize the situation in the Odessa region is based on consideration of the scenario to create the republic "Novorossiia" – from Lugansk and Donetsk to the Danube River. That is why Ukraine has placed military forces on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan – Ukrainian. These military forces could be used during the war in Donetsk and Lugansk regions. The mere presence of Russian troops in Transnistria managed to distract forces that were kept in West, while they could have been used in East – in the conflict zone.

Unrecognized NMR (Transnistria) influences Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk and Lugans), both by example and by some staff who worked in Tiraspol and have been co-opted to the management of the two self-proclaimed republics on Ukrainian territory (officials from Tiraspol offers *Know Haw* to structures from Lugansk and Donetsk). President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko said in one of his statements to the media that he will not allow "the Transnistriization" of Eastern Ukraine¹², i.e. Russian troops in the two unrecognized "republics".

Events in Crimea and Donbas (Lugansk and Donetsk) have changed the attitude of the political elite in Kiev and of the Ukrainian society towards the Transnistrian conflict. If by 2014 some Ukrainian nationalist politicians declared that the Transnistrian territory is Ukrainian and in case of unification of Moldova with Romania it should be reincorporated into Ukraine, Transnistria, now their concerns to regain that strip is reduced. However, the Transnistrian authorities have taken steps to secure the area for a possible attack from the Ukrainian Nationalists formations (Right Sector, etc.) that would try to get revenge on the Russian army in Transnistria, before which suffered defeats in Donetsk and Lugansk.

4. Influence of Transnistria on security of Romania

Regional status of Romania suffered substantial improvement in 2000 years, with the country's accession to NATO (March 2004) and to the EU (January 2007). Accordingly the influence of Transnistria on the Romania's security is less pronounced, given the protection afforded by NATO umbrella (according to the Article 5 of the Treaty). It is known that the self-proclaimed NMR (Transnistria) is primarily a tool of Russia to influence the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. But it is clear that a military conflict in an active phase, at NATO and EU border would affect Romania. In such a scenario should be taken into account the possibility of refugee flows to Romania, which will request from the Romanian authorities

¹² *Poroshenko: Pe teritoriul Ucrainei nu vor fi trupe de menținere a păcii, experiența Transnistriei este un argument,*
http://www.diacaf.com/stiri/international/porosenko-pe-teritoriul-ucrainei-nu-vor-fi-trupe-de_14145356.html
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expenses for accommodation and maintenance. Also, in the event of hostilities on the border of Romania and NATO, can not be excluded challenges regarding Romania's involvement in the conflict to destabilize the situation in the Euro-Atlantic (EU and NATO) space.

For these reasons the Romanian state must do everything possible to prevent the resumption of the frozen conflict on the Dniester. This requires both diplomatic efforts to help to resolve the conflict – possibly contributing to the elaboration of settlement plan – and strengthening defence capabilities. In the context of a special brotherly Romanian – Moldovan relationship, Bucharest can not exclude, if the field situation would demands it, the event of humanitarian interventions, to aid the civilian population and to secure the border area.

Conclusions

Although the conflict in the Transnistrian region remains frozen, Transnistria is still a source of instability for both Eastern Europe and throughout Europe. In the event of a wider conflict between NATO and Russian Federation, Transnistria can be involved.

Paradoxically, the Transnistria provides a geostrategic value to the Republic of Moldova from Western perspective. Thus, US and EU support to the Republic of Moldova is also considering countering Russian influence in the region, reflected in the presence of Russian military contingent in Eastern Moldova. In addition, there is a strategic interest of both of Euro-Atlantic community and of Russia vis-à-vis Moldova, including Transnistria, because the country is located in the Black Sea area, in the space of transit gas pipeline to the EU.

There are several scenarios that can be considered regarding the evolution of the Republic of Moldova, respectively of the evolution of Transnistrian conflict:

1. In the case that Ukraine will hold its territory in South East region, in conflict with pro-Russian rebels, and will join the Euro-Atlantic space, Moldova can move decisively towards European integration and Transnistria, being isolated from Russia, will accept a status of autonomy within the Moldovan state, and its integration into the European Union, because of the economic benefits offered by the EU (outlet, investments) for the Transnistrian economic agents (outlet, investments). It is acknowledged that Russia could make this concession – could accept the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova – in exchange of a Chisinau authorities commitment to maintain the status of permanent neutrality of the country. Thus, Moldova could become a buffer zone between the Euro-Atlantic space and the Eurasian one.

2. In the case that pro-Russians rebels, in battles with the Ukrainian army, would arrive in Odessa region, the Russian Federation could recognize the independence of Transnistria or either simply could integrate Transnistria into "Novorossiya" – a state structure which Moscow would intend to create the South-East Ukraine.

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THE “UKRAINISATION” OF EASTERN EURO-ATLANTIC BORDER – A NEW BERLIN WALL?

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***Abstract:**The collapse of the Soviet Union have had a negative impact on international security and therefore believe that the Cold War ended, could be a mere illusion. Among other arguments, the crisis in Ukraine could be probably the most important evidence of this, and a return to operational strategy of "Cold War" seems to be unavoidable. In such circumstances, this paper analyzes the growing tensions between Western governments and the Russian Federation on the conflict in Ukraine and explores possible options to avoid a direct military confrontation. The paper uses the concept of "Ukrainization" to indicate that the crisis in Ukraine has a significant impact on current strategies of Euro-Atlantic security and on discussions regarding long-term future of European security. What could the West answer be? Penalties have proved quite ineffective and may lead to unpredictable developments and a war between Russia and the West would be catastrophic, therefore, we must look to diplomacy as the only way out of this crisis and the only way to avoid transforming Ukraine into a new "Berlin Wall".*

***Keywords:** ucrainisation, security, Ukrainian crisis, world worder*

Introduction

The crisis in eastern Ukraine dominates the current discussions or debates with regard to the evolution of the contemporary international security environment. Even if these discussions are not focused on this crisis, Ukraine issue will inevitably come up. However, this is a paper focused on Ukrainian crisis and my intent here is neither to give you a perspective of how this evolved nor to assess who is wrong but my intent here is to analyze the rising tensions between Western governments and Russia over the conflict with the Ukraine and explore the options to avoid a direct confrontation. In answering the question “what should the West do?” the analysis looks at diplomacy as the only way to manage this crisis. However, there are alternatives to diplomacy as sanctions, but the analysis consider them ineffective – or war, which would be disastrous for everybody involved. In such circumstances, could the new East-West rivalry over Ukrainian crisis be considered the renaissance of a new Berlin Wall?

1. The international system in the post Col War era – a theoretical perspective

In the history of international politics, 1989 has become a turning point significance. It is obvious that this meaning is given by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the series of "revolutions" that marked changes that followed in Central and Eastern Europe. John Mueller argues that the Cold War has created a situation reminiscent in many ways of the end of the two world wars of the last century¹.

Of course, the analogy seems to have sufficient grounds, as happened at the end of the two world wars of the last century, when the disappearance of the Cold War has left in its

¹ John Mueller, *The banality of ethnic war*, International Security, Vol. 25, No.1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42–70.

wake an international system marked by power relations profoundly different from those that were previously in force. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the new structure of the international system, dramatically changed, is one that promotes strong pacifist relationships or one prone to war.

Such a curiosity is perfectly natural if we consider the effects strikingly different produced in the international system by the Allied victories in the two world wars of the early last century. From the ashes of World War I resulted in a short time, a new war which was even more disastrous than the first, while after World War II resulted in what John Lewis Gaddis called "*The Long Peace*"². In fact, the Cold War reached, very often, a maximum voltage that seemed to culminate with the outbreak of World War III. This makes long-term peace to sound a little strange, however Gaddis uses it to emphasize that the international system of the Cold War was a "peaceful" in the sense that it has not fallen into any military confrontation between the great powers of the time.

Gaddis seems to be right, some feedback of the contemporary history records the Cold War international system as a historical period that has coincided with the longest period of peace between the great powers. However, the structure of the contemporary international system, produced by Cold War antagonisms, has changed profoundly, and in these circumstances it seems natural to ask whether peace can be maintained, at least in the sense that a report Gaddis Cold War. The law of "cyclical evolution" of history, appears to be favorable to such a result. Certainly, after such a prolonged period of peace, pressures for new wars not surprise anyone. In any case, most of the great powers of the contemporary international system are still European (even if Russia is not entirely a European country), and the US is so deeply involved in European international politics that can be rated as quasi-European power. So, the preservation of peace among the great powers of the contemporary international system could be simplified to the preservation of peace in Europe. But, the analysis of peace among the great powers coincides, to a large extent, to the purpose of this paper which deals with the question of the future of peace in Europe through the Ukrainian crisis.

In attempting to answer this question, we can use different theories. For example, we can use the Francis Fukuyama's argument "the end of history" or Samuel Huntington's theory "the clash of civilizations", however, for the purposes of this paper we use John Mearsheimer's neorealist approach that we put in contrast with the theory of democratic peace.

J. Mearsheimer believes that the structure of the bipolar Cold War era, as theoretically has been introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz in 1979³, was the main determinant of peace for that period. But now the bipolar structure of the international system was radically changed, so, Mearsheimer concludes quite reasonably, that peace is in danger of collapse. On the other hand, supporters of democratic peace have provided a strong counter-argument to Mearsheimer's theory based on the idea that democracies are not likely to initiate international wars between them. According to them the peace was kept in Western Europe, at least in part, because the West has become uniform democratic after World War II, and now since democracy has spread in Central and Eastern Europe, and even (at least temporarily) in post-Soviet space peace should be even more stable⁴.

² John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 216.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill, 1979, p. 106.

⁴ James L. Ray, *Anarchy versus democracy in post Cold War Europe*, in *Democratic Peace for Europe: Myth or Reality?*, Brussels, VUB University Press, 1999, p. 152, available on Internet at: <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/myth/10Ray.pdf>, accessed at 10.04.2015.

The views of these two schools of thought provide us with a new theoretical controversy (with clear political implications) as to whether, in the near future, anarchy and democracy will prevail in Europe. This question can be interpreted in at least two basic ways. The first interpretation would be based on the assumption that both democracy and anarchy, will continue to exist in Europe. But if both will continue to exist the question is which phenomenon, anarchy or democracy, will have greater impact on the future of international relations in Europe. In simple terms, if anarchy prevails over democracy, then war is likely to become an option between great European powers. However, whether democracy prevails over anarchy, then peace should become more stable as democratic peace theorists predict.

2. Is the new world order into chaos or under democratic control?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union bipolar world has become more complicated than previously invoked theories can explain. The ability to maintain control of the two superpowers in their spheres of influence declined. If until 1991 the US and the Soviet Union were much stronger than their closest competitors and in an almost equal balance of each other, after 1991, only one power - the US - remains the most powerful to its closest competitors⁵. Only Russian nuclear parity relative to America continues to play an important role in Russia's attempt to stem America's "unipolar" ambitions.

2.1 The current status of the former Soviet Union

The current state of the former Soviet Union is marked by intense competition between Russia and the West for the increasing influence among the former Soviet republics. Undoubtedly, this competition manifests itself differently in each of the former republics of the Soviet Union. However, there are three main categories in which the former Soviet republics can be grouped: the pro-Russian, pro-Western ones (countries that are members of the European Union and NATO countries seeking to join Western blocs) and among those who prefer to avoid alignment with either⁶.

The countries that seem to remain firmly in the camp of the Russian Federation are Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan⁷. All these countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military bloc invented by Russia, in response to NATO's transformation. Also, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members of the newly established economic bloc of Russia, Customs Union, currently Eurasian Union. These states are integrated with Russia in the economic, political and security sectors and, and seems to avoid any significant links with the West in these areas.

The second group of countries - Western oriented - can be divided into two categories: countries that joined the European Union and NATO (the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and states that try to integrate into the Euro -Atlantic (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia)⁸. The latter have territorial dispute with Russia or are caused by pro-Russian forces in order to block their efforts to integrate with the West. In this context, the crisis in Ukraine has pushed pro-Russian countries closer to Moscow, while the pro-Western countries began to seek greater support from the West.

⁵ Timofey Bordachev, *Multipolarity anarchy and security*, in What does Russia think, published by European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, pp. 61-67.

⁶ *** *The Former Soviet Union Two Decades On*, Stratfor analysis, published at 21.09.2014, available on Internet at <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/former-soviet-union-two-decades>, accessed at 04.04.2015.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

Finally, there is a group of former Soviet republics aligned to Moscow: Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan⁹. Probably not a coincidence that all these countries are major producers of energy, which allowed a higher degree of economic independence and greater freedom of maneuver in their foreign policy (pro-Russian Kazakhstan is also an energy producer, but has a long and open border with Russia and, in addition, has a significant Russian ethnic minority). Each has a developed energy reserves and economic ties with Russia but also with other powers - Turkey and Europe in the case of Azerbaijan, China, in the case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Also, each state has avoided both participation in military alliances and the presence of foreign troops on its territory - Uzbekistan go so far as to want to close a NATO base on its territory used for transit and logistics troops in Afghanistan, due to the Western criticism over the repression of demonstrations in Andijan in 2005.

In conclusion, although the current crisis in Ukraine increased polarization between blocks pro-Russian and pro-Western and Western, the current situation cannot be considered long-term fixed. For example, due to internal political division and poor economic development, pro-Western orientation Moldova could reverse or could become neutral. In Georgia, there is a broad consensus among the population of Western integration, but the economic opportunities from Russia and the lack of Western support have attenuated public enthusiasm. Finally, Ukraine could mitigate or even abandon the Euro-Atlantic integration efforts, given the challenges faced in the eastern provinces.

2.2 SUA, Europe and NATO

Old and new world order agonizes behind the arrogance of the Russian Federation over the crisis in Ukraine. To maintain the image of "winner" of the Cold War, the Western world has tended to treat Russia as a "*second hand*" partner, applying some kind of Versailles policy (such that applied to defeated Germany after World War I). Self-perception of "*winner*" seems to have determined the US to extend its network of allies to Russia's borders, which, obviously, in the eyes of the Kremlin leaders, especially those of Vladimir Putin was perceived as a threat. Furthermore, given historical experience and strong national pride, Russia, in direct rivalry with the United States, is not a country willing to accept the status of "*loser*". Despite conciliatory rhetoric, the US, displaying an air of arrogant superiority, is seen in Moscow as a threat to Russia and to the entire world.

From 2000 to 2005, the US has supported a series of "*democratic*" transformations, which resulted in the cosmetics political regimes in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Serbia in the so-called "*color revolutions*" – *Color Revolutions*. These revolutions are part of US policy to promote democracy. Based on internal factors - such as poverty and corruption - West resorted to its standard mechanisms: financial and military support, media propaganda, financing civil society groups and local leaders of counseling etc. This policy is seen in Russia as an attempt to install pro-Western political leaders, aimed at isolating Russia and even blocking its influence in the post-Soviet era.

Among other reference causes of the current crisis in Ukraine, Russians have found bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 - without UN Security Council approval and support of the West for Kosovo's independence unilaterally. What matters is that Russia considers that the Kosovo declaration of independence has become the "*fatal blow*" to the Helsinki Accords, with regard to the principle of territorial integrity in Europe. This is the main reference used in the West when accusing Russia of Crimea "*annexation*". In this regard, the "*return*" of Crimea to Russia is illegal in the same way that Kosovo's independence is illegal. Therefore, both the West and Russia lost the moral call, using the language of international norms.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

During the Cold War, the territorial control - from Norway, across Central Europe to Greece and Turkey – ensured America's strategy and provided the motivation behind the creation of NATO in 1949. In 1996, shortly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Bill Clinton violated a clear commitment made by his predecessor to NATO's expansion, and thus, the Alliance reached tsarist Russia's borders. In 2004, with the inclusion of the three Baltic republics, NATO has expanded again almost reaching the suburbs of St. Petersburg. Thus, to the American "chessboard", Ukraine remained the most important strategic point, the key to limit Russia's access to the Black Sea and in its geostrategic south.

Washington's obsession led to policies that resonate with former "*clients*" of Russia in Warsaw, Tallinn or Bucharest, but they are ultimately detrimental to the security of both Europe and the United States. Also in Ukraine geopolitical game resonates with many Eastern Europeans who have their own anti-Russian perceptions. We can understand, even if we disagree, why residents of western Ukraine and Latvia have an acute psychological perception in treating Russia as an enemy. We cannot understand why both America and Western Europe excessive feed their obsessions.

2.3 Ukraine and its strategic options

Treating Russia as "enemy" is nowhere more truly than in Ukraine. On the other hand, Western politicians and journalists refer to "Ukrainian people" as a unified nation, but there is no unified Ukrainian nation. Linguistic gap between eastern and western Ukraine reflects a fundamental division both cultural and emotional, not just a difference of opinion on the question of Western integration or remaining the sphere of Russia's influence.

Thus, Ukraine remains a divided country, both by territory and population, more than could be homogenized by a civil war. Western ultranationalists, marked by a visceral hatred towards Russia cannot hope to subjugate the pro-Russians in the east and to convert them to the image of a "united Ukraine" as pro-Russians in the east will not convert Western Ukrainians to a friendly-Moscow paradigm.

Ukraine has been an independent for only 23 years. Half the country is pro-European and Ukrainian speaking; a very important minority is pro-Russian and Russian-speaking. The current government was installed following the uprising against the elected government. West spoke much of legality. Legality current government of Ukraine is not no doubt. But legality will not solve the current crisis. Pragmatism, diplomacy, consensus and recognition of history are essential to ensure the situation does not lead inevitably to war between Russia and the West.

For the main powers of the European Union, Ukraine is a peripheral problem unless it is seen purely in terms of a zero-sum geopolitical game. For USA, Ukraine has always been, and still is, an optional event. For Russia, however, as for her fans in eastern and southern Ukraine, the future status of the Black Sea is an existential question¹⁰.

The way forward should be clear. The two factions within Ukraine must be told clearly that they must learn the art of compromise and the way to live together if they want one united country. This attitude requires greater accountability from the European Union and the US with regard to their past rhetoric. EU and US should abandon the art of seduction and promises of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and begin to teach Ukrainians how to negotiate and how to learn to live together. There is no refuge in the European Union. Also, Ukrainians should be told that the current united Ukraine should not become part of NATO.

Russia, in turn, should take measures equivalent in terms of pro-Russian elements in Ukraine. They must learn to live with the people in the west, learn the art of diplomatic compromise, and to lay the basis for a new constitution and new elections. The perceptions

¹⁰ George Friedman, *Viewing Russia From the Inside*, Stratfor analysis, published at 16.12.2014, available on Internet at: <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/viewing-russia-inside>, accessed at 15.03.2015.

that Europe can support one of the factions to achieve total victory, or that Russia could guarantee victory the other factions should be abandoned. If the war is to be avoided, and if it is to be a way out of this crisis, then these actions should be followed.

3. Ukrainian crisis – a new Berlin Wall?

The conflict in Ukraine has brought relations between Moscow and the West to the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. In the context in which the conflict between Russia and the West on Ukraine broke out with renewed vigor in 2013, some researchers reiterated the argument according to which the Cold War would not be cured completely.

Perception that the Cold War wouldn't have ended really could be an illusion. NATO expansion to Russia's borders was motivated by the attitude of the Cold War, and naturally, Russia opposed. The last soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev thought he had a firm agreement with regard to NATO's eastward enlargement. Very likely he have erred in this regard, but it was his belief that he held a firm agreement.

Reading the Western media regarding recent events in Ukraine and Crimea, with few exceptions, the commentators say that Putin is the one who is wrong, and West is correct, that all problems were caused by Putin and the Western attitude is reasonable and constructive. Therefore, mistrust between Russia and the West is higher than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. NATO also took steps to strengthen its defense along the new "Iron Curtain", especially in defense of former members of the Warsaw Pact which now became NATO members. As Ukrainian crisis evolved, the US has increased its presence and stepped up military exercises in Romania, Bulgaria and the Black Sea, Poland and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Other NATO countries, including Canada, UK, France and Germany have deployed additional air capabilities in the region.

North Atlantic Treaty envisages also to establish quasi-permanent facilities in Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. Such a program would lead to a constant rotation of NATO forces in bases within the region to facilitate their rapid deployment when needed.

NATO is found, thus facing a new *raison d'être*. Currently, this "*reinvention*" of NATO lies more in activities and tasks extended, not only in the permanent stationing of NATO troops along a new "*Iron Curtain*". Commitments focus more on establishing frameworks controls and logistical hubs to support the potential deployment of forces in the area, as well as interoperability and rapid reaction force rotation.

Moscow announced refocus its military doctrine and identify NATO as the main threat to Russian security. This could mean that Russia could lead more conventional military exercises as those conducted in March 2015. It also could mean that Russia will focus more on developing its external security issues, mostly prioritizing its military power in Western districts.

Conclusions

The conflict in Ukraine is far from its end and in seeking possible solutions both the Russian Federation and the West must renounce to their mutual accusations like "*Russia has caused this conflict*" or "*the West bears full responsibility*". In our view, NATO moved near Russia's borders somewhat imprudent and Russia reacted first invaded Georgia in August 2008, and then attaching Crimea in 2014. This events became the current reality which Russia will never give up. However, the conflict in Ukraine can still be resolved through diplomacy, through a responsible analysis of what needs to be done to rebuild Ukraine as a unified country.

Beyond the conflict in eastern Ukraine, was born and continues to manifest disagreements between Russia and the West. Russian accusations relate, in particular, to NATO's decision to extend nearby its borders, and to the recently adopted measures to strengthen the defense of NATO's eastern flank. On the other hand, Russia's accusations are targeting the US intentions to deploy additional forces throughout Eastern Europe. In this context, the establishment of a NATO multinational task force with a very high level of response (VHRJTF - Very High Readiness Joint Task Force), which can be deployed in a few days¹¹ to meet the new security challenges and the establishment of an appropriate command and control system and a NATO Force Integration Units in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States¹², are major concerns for Moscow. Regardless of how the conflict will develop in Ukraine, the West seems determined to increase the capacity of Allied defense in Eastern Europe, including through infrastructure, pre-positioning of supplies and equipment and means of designating specific deployment bases¹³.

The disagreements between Russian Federation and the West on the conflict in Ukraine has a special echo in almost all former Soviet republics. The crisis accentuated the polarization of the former Soviet states in pro-Russian, pro-Western and neutral. However, given the dynamics of political, economic and security situation in these countries since their independence from the Soviet Union and the evolving demographic and cultural landscape of the region cannot be said with certainty what will be their long-term foreign policy orientation.

In this context, it is interesting to observe the statement US Army commander in Europe, Lt Ben Hodges, after his visit to Kiev in January 2015. He announced that the United States is preparing to pre-position military equipment, vehicles and materials, including logistical support in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, and a small number of military instructors will be sent to Ukraine¹⁴. Since the pre-positioning of military equipment was a key element of American strategy during the Cold War, can we say that the US intent is to recover the Cold War operating system in Europe?

Maybe it would be appropriate to remember an old system called "*Intermarium*" first proposed by Jozef Pilsudski a Polish leader after the First World War. Intermarium had to be a defensive alliance directed against both the Soviet Union and Germany and was named that way because it would be stretched between two seas - the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. Pilsudski proposal would have been supported and guaranteed by France¹⁵, but the historical context after the World War I did not favor the formation of such an alliances, so Intermarium was never possible.

However, with Russia reinvent as a great power of the international system, the crisis in Ukraine could reinvent Intermarium project, but not guaranteed by France, by the United States instead, as a barrier to the expansionist tendencies of the Russian Federation. If we consider this possibility in the context of statements made by Lt Hodges on the pre-positioning of equipment and technology of US combat in Eastern Europe, we might think

¹¹ *** *Walles NATO Summit Declaration*, adopted by heads of states and governments participating at Nord-Atlantic Council meeting, Waller, 4 - 5 september 2014, available on Internet at http://presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=15622&_PRID=arh, accessed 06.04.2015.

¹² *** *A Reinvigorated NATO Looks to the Future*, Stratfor analysis, published at 03.09.2014, available on Internet at <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/reinvigorated-nato-looks-future>, accesat la data de 04.04.2015.

¹³ *** *Walles NATO Summit Declaration*, adopted by heads of states and governments participating at Nord-Atlantic Council meeting, Waller, 4 - 5 september 2014, available on Internet at http://presidency.ro/index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=15622&_PRID=arh, accessed 07.04.2015.

¹⁴ *** *Washington returns to a Cold War Strategy*, analiză Stratfor, publicată la data de 27.01.2014, available on Internet at <https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/washington-returns-cold-war-strategy>, accessed at 03.04.2015

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

that essentially this decision covers the old member of Intermarium project. In addition, these decisions send a clear signal to Russia that whatever happens in Ukraine, the following line is within NATO countries.

The evolution of the crisis in Ukraine raises many questions. Although diplomacy is the only viable way to resolve this conflict, it is not yet clear how it will proceed. There are, however, much clearer military decisions that make us wonder whether we are witnessing a return to the operational strategy of the Cold War. Hopefully the dynamic of future events will not find us on one side of a new "iron curtain".

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SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINE CRISIS

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Abstract: *Ukrainian crisis evolved due to incompatibility between the objectives of the European Union, established by the Eastern Partnership and geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation. It generated considerable repercussions on European security system, constituting, simultaneously a renunciation of the use of International Law as a tool for regulating the conduct of states in Eastern Europe. Ukraine suffered dramatic consequences as a result of the annexation of the Crimea peninsula by the Russian Federation and the outbreak of armed conflict in Lugansk and Donetsk. Ukrainian crisis leded Republic of Moldova to review its security system to eliminate internal and external risks that increase the lack of security of the state. Moldovan security system must be adapted to the new regional geopolitical context because Ukrainian crisis outlined a number of worrying trends for Moldova.*

Keywords: *crisis, security, attachment, conflict, risks, vulnerabilities, geopolitical context, neutrality.*

Introduction

XXI century is marked by two processes on the European continent and namely, NATO expansion and EU enlargement. At the same time, it is observed a tendency of increased involvement of the Russian Federation in the policy of the European continent, namely its desire to establish the basis for a supranational structure (Eurasian Union), its core constituting Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan where they will try to attract other countries of the former Soviet Union.

Both NATO and the EU have got extended up to the borders of the former USSR (three countries of the Soviet Union are already members of the EU and NATO - Baltic countries). The mentioned countries adhered to NATO in 2004, and to the EU - in 2004 and 2007. The Alliance does not show clear trends extending to the East, so that other former Soviet states also to be attracted into this structure. Change in attitude has produced as a result of Russian-Georgian conflict from august 2008; even though clear messages were expressed during NATO Summit in Bucharest in April of the same year, anyway Ukraine and Georgia were not offered a real perspective towards accession.

The trend of Georgia to join NATO had as a result the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia this thing leading to a war with the Russian Federation in August 2008. In its turn, the EU launched in 2009 in Prague the Eastern Partnership project, which provides for attracting the six former Soviet countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) in a strategy of Brussels, based on which they are offered the opportunity to join the community through political and economic dimensions.

Moscow considers these states as exclusive area of its geopolitical interests and does not accept the six Eastern Partnership countries to join the EU. The mentioned approach of Moscow contains primarily geopolitical reasons. This follows from the statements of the

Kremlin officials.¹ The way Moscow treated Ukraine and Armenia on the eve of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius constitutes the most important argument, as well as the subsequent actions of the Russian Federation undertaken in Ukraine, in conjunction with the annexation of Crimea and separatist challenges in south-eastern Ukrainian territory, Moscow doesn't accept orientation of Ukraine towards euroatlantic direction. More clear actions of Russia towards Moldova will be carried out only after Moscow will strengthen its position in a certain number of regions of southern Ukraine.

1. Regional security approach in the framework of the Ukraine crisis

Through its enlargement policy, the EU has developed a real soft power in tandem with NATO, not only for the former socialist countries, but also for those of former Soviet Union and by the norms, rules and institutions in Western style, That reform substantially recasts the ground core state domains (political, economic, social, military, security, etc.). EU Enlargement and transformative processes have played an important role for neighboring states. Countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, located at the eastern border of the EU, which were then included in the Eastern Partnership were attracted by the EU, but not given a clear perspective for integration. The offer of the Eastern Partnership is more consistent with the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade EU Agreement, that includes visa liberalization, access to common market, visa-free travel, where security rules are respected and there is no excessive immigration.²

The European Neighborhood Policy was launched in 2003 and Russia was invited to be part of this policy, but Moscow refused, because it considered that it held a too important role to be treated like the other countries. Russia opted for separate bilateral relations with the European Union. Since then Moscow has increasingly focused on the strategy of building its own integrationist project as an alternative to the European one. With this strategy and by using the soft power, Moscow envisaged to reinstate full control over the former Soviet countries, namely through the Customs Union Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan (2010), the Eurasian Union (2014), and Ukraine could not be seen as absent from these projects.³ The last waves of NATO and EU extension up to the borders of the former Soviet Union have triggered a competition that, at some points, generated confrontation between the models launched by both parties in the states that were then included in the Eastern Partnership and the Ukrainian crisis is a powerful example.

Specifics of the Eastern Partnership states is different comparing to former-socialist or Baltic states, but vulnerabilities they face with became more clear for EU. Although the EU is a strong attraction to certain countries of the Eastern Partnership, their vulnerabilities are very high in relation to Russia and Ukrainian case proved it. Ukrainian crisis produced changes in international relations approach, and paradigm of power politics became a key vision in relations with Russian Federation.⁴

The Ukrainian crisis, through both of its components – annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Luhansk and Donetsk – has raised legal discussions related to the viability of the principles that underpin the European Security System, namely the respect for the countries' sovereign equality, their territorial integrity, inviolability of the borders, non-use of

¹Angela Gramada, *Parteneriatul Estic - momentul pentru o politica externa estica a Uniunii Europene?* <http://www.cseea.ro/ro/publicatii/printare/brief-analysis/politica-europeana-de-vecinatate>, (Access 10.03.2015).

²Iulian Chifu, *Geopolitica regiunii extinse a Mării Negre după criza ucraineană*, Impact Strategic, Nr.3[52]/2014, București p. 8.

³Leonid Litra, *Viitorul Parteneriat va trebui axat pe o dimensiune de securitate și de cooperare în domeniul energetic*, <http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/26889156.html> (Access 10.03.2015).

⁴ Iulian Chifu, Op.cit, p. 9.

force or threat to use the force, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for human rights, etc.⁵ At the same time, there are questions regarding the guarantees for the functionality of all the agreements concluded between the states that provide a legal basis for regulating the conduct of states on the European continent, namely the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Paris Charter for a New Europe of 1990, the Lisbon Declaration of 1996, the European Security Charter of 1999, etc.; therefore, a normal question emerges: if the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on ensuring the integrity of Ukraine by Moscow has not been respected, can Russia guarantee the observance of all the agreements and treaties it signed with other countries?

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow tried to assume a considerable and very important role in Europe's political and economic issues, especially, in the post-Soviet countries. If we look at the current European security architecture, we see that its pillars are the NATO, as a political-military structure; the European Union, as a political-economic structure; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as a political and security forum.⁶ While the first two pillars are complementary structures that synchronize each other, the third pillar is intensely disputed, because it is related to the OSCE role in the region that is not covered by the two pillars. So, for the European Security System the OSCE must prevent and manage the crises and conflicts, and promote a common security space.

The events in Ukraine interpret Russia's behavior as a revisionist one aiming at dividing Europe by reallocating the spheres of influence. This revisionism is not reflected strictly in the events on the Euromaidan in Kiev, as some think, but has its origins in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the non-acceptance by Moscow of the fact that the former Soviet countries integrate in other regions than the Russian one. This derives from the statements made by the representatives of the Russian political elite, including the Russian president Vladimir Putin, who qualifies the collapse of the USSR as the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century.⁷

Russia's revisionist behaviour was manifested by: failure to comply with the agreements of the Final Declaration of the OSCE summit in Istanbul (signed in 1999) (that stipulated the withdrawal of military forces from Moldova and Georgia); refusal to respect the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (signed in 2007), Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. These actions require a rethinking of security in Europe, namely in the post-Soviet territory and the liberal paradigm of international relations is replaced by that of Realpolitik, because international law collide with the interests of the Russian state, military restored after the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact with its socialist bloc. Thus, Russia has not abandoned the idea of spheres of influence and its neighbourhood geopolitical strategy that is applied to States with limited sovereignty to protect its geopolitical interests. As a tool to achieve them, the protection of fellow Russian-speaking citizens and compatriots from the former USSR is used.⁸

The reasons used by Moscow to justify this revisionist behavior are linked with the integrationist processes that occurred in Europe with the successive extension of NATO, EU and the launch of the Eastern Partnership project, which was designed initially for six states from the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). The Kremlin could not afford to lose the influence on six states in addition to the three Baltic countries that joined the EU and NATO, if the six states joined the community

⁵Cornel Ciurea, *Criza din Ucraina și impactul ei asupra sistemului de securitate al Republicii Moldova*, Asociația pentru Politică Externă, Chișinău, 2015, p. 3.

⁶Cornel Ciurea, *Op.cit.*, p. 7-9.

⁷<http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-10726616-vladimir-putin-urss-fost-marea-rusie-destamarea-uniunii-cea-mai-mare-catastrofa-geopolitica-din-secolul-trecut.htm>, (Access 28.04.2015).

⁸ Iulian Chifu, *Op.cit.*, p. 10.

space. Of 14 states that became independent from the USSR in 1991, i.e. became independent from Moscow, only 5 remained in Moscow's dominant structures – the countries from Middle East (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan). The geopolitical pressure exercised by Moscow on some of the Eastern Partnership member states determined some of them to give up signing the Association Agreement (Armenia and partially Azerbaijan).

The biggest dissatisfaction of Russia however is the successive extension of NATO.⁹ The Ukrainian crisis represents the most charged moment of Moscow's relations with the West and has, at the same time, eliminated the trust of the USA, NATO and the EU and of most of Russia's direct and indirect neighbors in the Russian Federation. The mechanisms for ensuring regional security have been challenged. Moscow's most paradoxical situation is that, in its vision, the annexation of Crimea is not a violation of the international law, but the fulfillment of a historical right. Because of the tense situation in Ukraine, a state of regional insecurity and profound cooling of the East-West relations has settled.

As a result of sanctions imposed by West, Russia is being marginalized and even excluded from various dialogue structures of the important powers like G7, previously G8; the NATO-Russia Council, etc. In the long run, such lack of dialogue can influence Moscow's further behavior in the neighboring region. Before the Ukrainian crisis, it was believed that there are no contradictions and geopolitical competition between the EU and EAU model and the states were suggested that they can enjoy collaboration opportunities. Nowadays, the Eastern Partnership countries must decide which structure they want to be part of while they are under strong pressure by Moscow not to join the EU.

The 2014 events brought in the forefront again the concern related to the defense by all the states. The East-European region has become militarized as a result of Russian military concentration in the Crimea peninsula, but also in Eastern Ukraine that is not controlled by Kiev. At the same time, there is a concentration of NATO forces in the countries located at the Eastern edge. Military exercises at the border between NATO/EU and Russia have also been intensified by both parties. Moscow's key concern is the future status of Eastern European countries and, according to its interests, these countries, especially Ukraine should maintain their neutrality fulfilling the function of buffer countries and the further extension of NATO and EU should be endorsed by Russia. This means the elimination of the EU presence in the region and the control on these countries' domestic and foreign policy by the Kremlin.¹⁰

Currently, Russia is the second military power in the world after the US and will remain, at least in the foreseeable future, the main military power in East European space. Russia has an important historical, cultural and economic presence in most former Soviet countries, but the factor that goes the least noticed is the image capital it still has in all these countries, due to domination in informational space.

Settlement of all "frozen" or "smoldering" conflicts in East European area will not be possible as long as there is an east-west antagonism. I think the best part crises now facing both Western Europe and Eastern Europe, due to the lack of clarity regarding finality of extension of EU and Eastern Partnership, and North Atlantic Organization.¹¹

A quick resolution of this crisis for Ukraine is not possible, but we can't exclude a radical change in the geopolitical conjuncture in a decade or a quarter of a century. Eastern European region has a very unstable "geopolitical climate". Although the three countries that have signed Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade EU

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, „*Why the Ukrainian Crisis is the West fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin*”, in *Foreign Affairs* Sept - Oct 2014.

¹⁰ Cornel Ciurea, *Op.cit.*, pp.7-9.

¹¹ Petru Bogatu, Oleg Serebrian, *Suntem într-o situație de cvasi-dependență de structurile de securitate regionale și internaționale*, <http://www.europalibera.org/articleprintview/26901712.html>, (Access 16.03.2015).

Agreement with the European Union: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, each faced separatist movements fuelled by Moscow, Georgia and Ukraine have lost territories to Russia, only R. Moldova has a conflict with a still unclear finality.

If the EU wants to reach its objectives in the Eastern Partnership area, it is necessary to amend the strategy. By using only the soft component of power it is not possible to ensure maximum efficiency in an area where the competitor on the other side uses hard tools.¹² It is now obvious that the EU must adapt its tools to the realities in the Eastern European space.

2. Security of the Republic of Moldova in the context of changes appeared at the regional security environment level

A realistic vision on Moldovan security must be elaborated taking into account its geographical and geopolitical position. However, geopolitics Moldova is specific, if we take into account all aspects and regional variables (Ukrainian territory, the Black Sea, Caucasus, Middle East etc.). In the same time, Republic of Moldova is situated at the border of the power centres, having direct border with EU and NATO, and indirect with Russian Federation. The geographical position of the Republic of Moldova is disadvantaged on the grounds that it is located within the vital geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation and also near other areas listed above.

The declared neutrality policy of Moldova influences on Ukraine and on the Russian Federation's behaviour towards Chisinau and Kiev. As a result of recent events in the regional context, it was shown that the Moldovan state security is directly influenced by the Ukraine's security and vice versa. Moldova's interest is that Ukraine does not come under the control of Moscow, although it lost Crimea and is struggling with separatists in the southeast. Ukraine's fall under Russian control will lead to Moldova's fall under the same control. The degree of geopolitical pressure on Moldova depends on the strength of Ukraine against Russia. Although Ukraine and Moldova are two countries with different characteristics (territory, population, economy, state power), they are seen from Moscow as a block (jointly), because surrender of one country will mean assumed failure for the other and due to the position it holds, Moldova feels protected in some way by Ukraine.

As a result of the continued geopolitical pressures from Russia, there is the possibility that Ukraine might resist, but there is also the threat for Moldova to give in (as a result of the change of government, elections or as a result of challenges); than Moldova's territory could be used to increase pressure on Ukraine, decreasing Kiev's degree of resistance. Currently, Moldova and Ukraine are two states that depend on each other in terms of national security. A Russian downward pressure on both states could be countered with the support of NATO, EU, USA etc. Both states perceive Russian threat directly, but there is a small advantage for Moldova because it has no direct border with Russia. Both Chisinau and Kiev are seen by Moscow as belonging to its sphere of interest, even if they maintain political neutrality, as was the case during the Cold War with Finland, but maintaining a balance between NATO and Russia, using the policy of neutrality by Chisinau and Kiev becomes ineffective if Russia does not comply with international law and other agreements that it has assumed, affecting directly the security of Ukraine and Moldova.¹³

The regional context shows the vulnerabilities Moldova is exposed to, both outside and inside, and forces Chisinau to take quick and effective measures to deal with security risks. External and internal policy of Moldova should be within the minimum "margin of error".

¹²Leonid Litra, *Op.cit.*

¹³ Vasile Croitoru, *Republica Moldova – NATO, între politica neutralității și necesitatea cooperării*, Revista Militară nr. 1 (11) 2014, Academia Militară a Forțelor Armate „Alexandru cel Bun”, Chișinău. pp. 26-28.

"Margins of error" consists of two parts: the types of hazards a state must cope with and the amount of power that a state possesses.¹⁴

Moscow interprets the relations of Moldova and of the Eastern Partnership states that have concluded Association Agreements with the EU not as technical and commercial relations, but as agreements with geopolitical effects, very much in line with its typical style to ensure its political and economic supremacy over these countries. So, from the perspective of the geopolitical dimension, Russia qualifies these agreements with the EU as methods of leaving the comfort zone and entering the European Union's sphere of influence and, later on, NATO's sphere of influence.¹⁵

Moscow uses all the geopolitical tools to preserve its influence in the ex-Soviet countries, but its recent actions in relation to Moldova (such as putting a ban on Moldovan products on the Russian market) have determined the Republic of Moldova to redirect a considerable share of its trade to the European Union countries.¹⁶ If the Moldovan economy faces a difficult situation at present, then the prospect of association brings beneficial effects as the commercial monopoly with the Russian Federation that is used as a method of pressure on Moldova will be eliminated.

Both the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis on the European Security System and the change of the political map in the European East have determined the Republic of Moldova to reconsider its security system. The current regional context gives the opportunity for a profound analysis of the neutrality policy that Moldova undertook in 1994 through the Constitution.

Neutrality was a geostrategic interest of Russia rather than a need for Moldova. Russia's interest is that Moldova maintains neutrality. Moscow has been insisting on neutrality, because this is how Moldova is kept in its sphere of influence, because neutrality is a guarantee for Russia that Moldova will not sign political-military agreements with other states or organizations, such as NATO. Russia uses Moldova's neutrality to use it as a "buffer zone" that has been fulfilling a geostrategic function for Russia eliminating the influence of other states or stakeholders, providers of security. Throughout Moldova's independence, the external policy has had a margin of flexibility, which resulted from the degree of pressure put by Moscow on Chisinau. The relations between Chisinau and Moscow have evolved since 1991 till now in a rather conflicting way and the main reason was the Transnistrian conflict and Moldova's tendencies of integration in the European community. It can be considered that, with the neutrality policy imposed to Moldova, Russia controls Moldova's foreign policy, controls the political and economic relations and applies different tools to prevent independence from Moscow.

The situation in Ukraine determines Moldova to have a different perspective on the approach regarding the neutrality policy (considering also Russia's involvement in the domestic issues of Moldova since 1992). Neutrality must be reshaped from the perspective of all the risks coming from outside, especially, from Russia. Moscow imposes false neutrality to Moldova by maintaining its military forces in the Transnistrian area.

The change of the political map in the Eastern area of Europe by Russia implies a different approach to the neutrality policy that must be based on security reasons by intensifying collaboration with NATO, as well as with states that have capacities to provide security in the region. Moldova is not able to ensure its security by itself, because the principle of power is applied in the region and the international law, constitutional provisions and agreements Russia signed at international level are flagrantly violated (it must also be

¹⁴ George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI*, București, Litera, 2009, pp. 48-49.

¹⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *Op.cit.*

¹⁶ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *De ce este atât de deranjată Rusia de apropierea Moldovei de Uniunea Europeană*, www.europalibera.org/articleprintview/25451536.html, (Access 10.07.2014).

stressed that the power disparity between Moldova and Russia is huge). The Republic of Moldova wants to foster its stability by maintaining neutrality, but the current circumstances force it to reconsider this policy as a result of the major changes that took place in the Eastern neighborhood.

In a tense regional context, Moldova needs the intensification of the collaboration with NATO, because Russia has sufficient levers to influence the situation from inside according to its interests. The situation in the region will remain tense therefore Moldova must obtain security guarantees by joining Euro-Atlantic structures.

Even if it maintains its neutrality, Moldova still needs to prepare its army to be able to defend itself in case of external aggression. Under the current circumstances, Moldova needs more foreign support from the West to develop its security policies. At the moment, NATO is not ready to offer Moldova the possibility to join, but Moldova is not available to say YES to this offer either. There are requirements that the Moldovan party needs to fulfill.

The adequate understanding of the geopolitical context through the development of intelligent and efficient security policies can minimize the external risks and maintain regional geopolitical balance. Moldova has undertaken neutrality, it follows a non-adherence policy rather than a neutrality one. Both the EU association and the further joining will lead to the fact that neutrality will be only on paper.¹⁷

To eliminate the domestic and external risks that increase the country's insecurity, the Moldovan security system must be adapted to the new regional geopolitical context, because the Ukrainian crisis has shaped a number of tendencies that are worrying for Moldova. The authorities are concerned about the condition of the national security system (institutions, legislation, human resources, logistics, funding, etc.). First, it is necessary to create a specific regulatory framework on aspects related to the country's domestic security; then, it is necessary to reform the institutions whose duty is to provide state security and adapt the institutional duties to the specific realities of Moldova.

A separate aspect that influences the security of Moldova is the separatist regime of Tiraspol. The Ukrainian crisis demonstrates that Transnistria does not represent the same objective for Russia as Crimea, but acts as an obstacle for Moldova. In 90th transnistrian region was instrumented as an obstacle for approach of Moldova with Romania, after, as an obstacle to orientation towards EU. With manifestation of ukrainean crisis, not only Transnistria, but also Gagauzia are used as brakes in the process of association of Moldova with EU. In the same time, it is not excluded that those-two regions of Moldova will be instrumented by Russia to destabilize also ukrainean region Odessa, that has a direct border with both moldavian regions, transnistrian and gagauzian.

After the Kiev changed its attitude to the separatist regime of Tiraspol and secured the Moldovan-Ukrainian border on the Transnistrian segment because of the conflict with Russia in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Chisinau had a moderate response trying to maintain the dialogue in the negotiation process.

But the Transnistrian problem that was previously perceived as a domestic inter-ethnic conflict is currently placed in the category of geopolitical disputes. There is a reduction of the attention to this issue at international level. At the same time, there are discussions on whether this conflict can still be solved peacefully. This translates in the lack of efficiency of the international format 5+2 of regulating the Transnistrian conflict since the attention of the international community is focused on the conflict in Donbas region in the South-East of Ukraine.

Despite the aggravation of relations between Kiev and Moscow, the relations between Chisinau and Moscow have not worsened. Chisinau has maintained a moderate policy with

¹⁷ Vasile Croitoru, *Op.cit.*, pp. 29-30.

Moscow avoiding direct Moldovan-Russian confrontation as compared to Ukraine even though the actions of Kremlin were hostile and it blocked Moldovan exports or interfered with Moldova's domestic affairs through provocative actions of destabilizing the situation in various regions. Moldova has not conceded to the provocative actions of Russia avoiding warlike statements and has made efforts to prove that it wants normal collaboration with Russia while the European integration desire does not block the intentions to collaborate and does not stop the relations with Russia. Moscow however has not expressed any interest in preserving a positive agenda with Moldova and applied economic sanctions to it.

Avoiding a conflicting relationship with Russia can be seen as an effective policy. There are countries that, at least before the Ukraine crisis, had good relations and openness with Russia and did not have any clogs in their European itinerary. Moldova also tries not to enter in a conflict with Russia and wants to reduce Moscow's excesses in the process of Moldova's getting closer to the European Union. The Moldovan authorities make efforts to avoid Moscow's traps to be attracted in the conflict. Such prudence is also determined by the fact that a significant share of Moldovan migrants work in the Russian Federation.¹⁸ Apparently "neglected", Moldova, by maintaining its European direction, is subjected to geopolitical pressure by Russia through economic sanctions and provocations in the security area and in other regions of the country. I think that for Chisinau and Brussels, these challenges are expressed by Moscow as a sign of disagreement with the implementation of Eastern Partnership.

Conclusions

The Ukrainian crisis has determined the European Union to review the content of the Eastern Partnership strategy. Currently, only three of six states continue to stay on the line of the Eastern Partnership (Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia), and the continuation of association processes is a tough exam that is full with provocations by Russia. The annexation of Crimea and the war in the South-East of Ukraine have reduced confidence in the international law functioning mechanisms.

The conflict in Ukraine imposes the European Union to improve the tools it applies on its Eastern border and, in the future, to focus on the security dimension which is missing in the current context. By the way it responded during the Ukrainian crisis, it could be seen that Brussels has demonstrated that it has only limited capacities to intervene in the region to participate in the crisis management. In addition, it was obvious that the relationship between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union cannot be seen any longer as a cooperation or competition one, but as a geopolitical rivalry of two systems of political and economic values.

It is necessary that the Eastern Partnership states resist Moscow's pressure and are supported by the Western countries, members of NATO and EU to avoid being transformed into Russia's geopolitical satellites. An important aspect is to provide a clear prospect of joining the Euro-Atlantic structures. Ukraine and Moldova are forced to deepen the European integration process and the conclusion of the EU Association Agreement must only be a transitional stage.

Republic of Moldova can't identify a military solution to ensure its own security, as it is the country with the lowest military budget. Therefore, Moldova is in a situation depending on the structures of regional and international security. The solution should bear a diplomatic character. There do not exist military solutions for other neighbouring countries, even for those that are part of the North Atlantic Alliance. Most of them have no military solution.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

Moldova can count only on Euro-Atlantic solidarity. Russia demonstrated to Ukraine that it is not a veritable strategic partner and doesn't respect neutrality status neither of Ukraine nor of Moldova. Neutrality is a formality if no international guarantees do exist. Ukraine had indeed guarantees that were flagrantly violated, if we refer to the Budapest Memorandum.

Republic of Moldova can count only on a bilateral relationship with the Western partners. Now there can be no question of its accession to the North Atlantic Alliance from the practical point of view this accession is simply impossible to be done. However, a bilateral relationship with the United States, with some European countries and not lastly with Romania could solve the security problem, moreover, it could provide some security to Moldova, it could help secure the borders of the state.

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LACK OF SOVEREIGNTY' EXERCISE AS A POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (CASE OF UKRAINE)

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Abstract: *The XXI century is characterized by the proliferation and diversification of international threats and vulnerabilities of the international security. If until now, the state was the only one who held the monopoly of legitimate violence, the major global player and the only one who could threaten the international security, currently, non-state actors, internal crisis, cyber attacks and economic crisis play an equally important role in terms of power relations between states.*

In this context, and given the tense situation in Europe, the current crisis in Ukraine, we will analyze the extent to which the lack of sovereignty exercise over a territory involves effects on the existing balance of power and if it represents a risk of vulnerability for the international security.

Using in this regard the security complex theory of B. Buzan and O. Waevre, that argue that interdependencies between states are so important that their security domain cannot be analyzed separately, as well as K. J. Holsti's theory, which considers that the main causes of war (crisis in this case) are found in the essence of the state (failed state, weak state, strong state), this paper aims to identify the extent to which the absence of Ukrainian sovereignty over parts of its territory is a risk of vulnerability for the international security.

Keywords: *sovereignty, Ukraine, regional security complex, conflicts, international security*

Introduction

Conflicts, security threats, rivalries, crisis, balance of power, national and international security, vulnerabilities are just some of the current topics familiar when we speak about international relations. The conflict in Ukraine, Syria's crisis, the conflict from Libya, ISIS threats to the international peace, bomb attacks in Yemen, South Soudan crisis or the situation in Somalia are many and different aspects that a conflict could take. Even if, apparently, there is nothing that could relate all of these crises considering their geographical position, the differences related to ethnicity, religion, goals, used means, conflict causes, we may note that some theoretical concepts are common to many of them.

Even if in different way and without having a causal connection, these theoretical concepts help us to better understand the realities offered by the international stage and represent a useful tool which helps us to get a theoretical framework for these conflicts. The concept that we will use in this paper in order to make a different analysis of the crisis in Ukraine is *sovereignty*.

1. State. Sovereignty. Nation.

Sovereignty is a very complex concept, having different meanings, which offers us a different perspective of analysis, that we will detail in the following lines, keeping in mind only those aspects related to the Ukrainian crisis.

What we are trying to do is to explain the role of the state's sovereignty for the international system, using in this perspective the complex of security of Barry Buzan. In this respect, we will apply the principles promoted by J.K. Holsti concerning the internal causes of war or crisis, trying to estimate the importance of the Ukrainian crisis for the international stage.

1.1. Sovereignty-Two perspectives: realism and liberalism

Sovereignty is the main attribute of the state. It supposes the idea of territory, population and an effective government¹. If we take these aspects into consideration, we will notice that we can find these attributes of the state to all of the 193 members' states at the United Nations, this membership being the goal of every state.

What is important to note and the aspect on which we will focus is related to the sovereignty's evolution over the time and the different meanings that it can have.

The two options disputed nowadays are: the *state sovereignty* versus the *national sovereignty*. The result of this analysis will be applied to Ukraine, as the conflict that leads to the death of thousands of people is related to secessionist movements, territory annexations, affecting the sovereignty of Ukraine and its territorial integrity.

In this respect, the analysis of S. Barkin proved to be a very useful tool in order to present the dispute between the state's sovereignty and the national sovereignty of a state. Presenting the advantages offered by the state sovereignty: states border integrity, based on the idea of historical possession, natural borders and their duration in time, Barkin highlights *the viability* of state institutions, based on its ability to exercise authority over the population. This control is best ensured by effective states (sovereign states) with *strong institutions* at the expense of new states which don't have the administrative experience or the social stability needed in this regard². Thus, from the perspective of the international system, international norms should favor the stability of sovereign states against secessionist tendencies generated by unpredictable acts intended to lead to the emergence of new states based on national sovereignty requirements.³

At the same time, given the absence of international authorities to ensure the proper observance of treaties and international agreements, states based on strong institutions are actors who have control of their territory and can thus provide greater *security* and *predictability* than states created on national principles. This derives from the fact that legal borders can be fixed objectively, while national identities, with an inherently subjective nature, cannot claim the same idea.

Barkin analyzes as well, the relevance and the role that a state plays in creating and maintaining international order, offering two different perspectives in this respect. From the realistic perspective, sovereignty is based less on principles and more on the ability of a political group to establish an internal control on its own territory, defending it against external attacks. As Robert Jervis stresses *international anarchy allows each state to be their own judge of the interests it has and the means he uses to achieve them*⁴. Thus, creating a system based on state sovereignty- is based on mutual recognition among the ruling governments of each state, on diplomatic procedures, treaties, international law and other institutions that contribute to the communication and interaction between states.

¹ Richard, A, Falk *The declining World order America's imperial geopolitics*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 28.

² Olivier Cortens, *Cours de droit public international*, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2010.

³ Samuel J. Barkin , Bruce Cronin, *The state and the nation: changing norm and the rule of sovereignty in international relations*; International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1995, pg. 107-130, Article stable at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706916> , Date of Acces: 20th of February 2015

⁴ Robert Art, Robert Jervis, *The meaning of Anarchy*, eds. *International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision making*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985, p. 3.

1.2. Changes of perspectives on sovereignty issues. State sovereignty versus national sovereignty

Liberalism is the main tool which offered a totally different vision of the same concept of the state. If the respect of the borders, of the state institutions and the ability to have authority over the population were the main issues of the realist theory, the liberalism highlights as the prime directive of state behavior: to meet the economic and social needs of *individuals*. Rather than technically conform to anarchy (as in neorealist vision), states must ultimately conform to the needs of *individuals*. They must be socially adaptive. This leads to a performing *laissez-faire* 'minimalist' role of the state⁵.

It is what is called the *national sovereignty*, claimed especially by the secessionist groups, but recognized as well at international level. Barkin examines four scenarios where the legitimacy of the state alternates within its borders legitimacy. After the *French Revolution*, France has followed the spread of the ideas promoted across Europe: nation, liberty and republicanism, which were considered as a threat to the principles that relied most European monarchs.

The period that followed *World War I* brought a partial failure of the idea of the nation. Thus, nationalism was seen as one of the main causes of the war, while the desire for self-determination was seen as a political objective. Moreover, the UN Charter prioritized institution maintaining territorial integrity at the expense of national groups' demands, which demonstrates the indubitable preference for statehood.

The end of the *Cold War* legitimized political and economic ideologies at the expense of the state: internal imperialism, fighting for the end of the domination by a majority ethnic group within the borders of the state. Countries like Belgium, Spain, Canada, begin to make concessions to ethnic minorities on their territory, which, assume a reconsideration of the idea of national state and has brought to the fore the idea of nation, state and national sovereignty nation.

Ideas related to the state and the one related to the nation are often contradictory and satisfying both types of criteria is difficult, even impossible⁶.

1.3. Ukraine as a sovereign state

In the case of Ukraine, which sovereignty is disputed in present, being confronted with secessionist claims sees its territorial integrity threatened. The basic law of Ukraine may be cited in this respect. Its Constitution stipulates that *Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state*⁷- article 1 of the Constitution. This article or the idea that it reveals is found in the basic law of the European countries and express their attachment for the traditional state sovereignty, being the paradigm characteristic for the period when they appeared as modern state. For Ukraine, this article (Art.1) highlights the respect that it brings to its borders, to the viability of state institutions and to its ability to exercise authority over the population.

The crisis started in Ukraine, by the suspension of the preparations for signing the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, announced by President Yanukovic (pro-Russia elected President) two days before the Summit in Vilnius, lead to a massive revolt of the civil society called *Euromaidan*. Ukrainian government said the decision had been taken for 'reasons of national security', as well as for the need to improve its declining trade with

⁵ John, M. Hobson, *The state and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, p. 27.

⁶ Samuel J. Barkin, Bruce Cronin, *The state and the nation: changing norm and the rule of sovereignty in international relations*; International Organization, Vol. 48., No. 1, 1995, pp. 107-130, Article stable at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706916>, Date of access: 20th of February 2015.

⁷ Ukraine Constitution

Russia and other CIS countries⁸. The existing difference between the will of government and the will of the Ukrainian people has led to a continuing crisis.

What is important to note is that the current conflict in Ukraine threatens its sovereignty by losing Crimea (March 2014), by changing the status of Lugansk and Donetsk (two separatist regions in Eastern Ukraine) and by modifying the Ukrainian Constitution itself (stipulated in the Minsk II Agreement).

The basic law and the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state is put in danger and we will try to find if the lack of sovereignty from one state may represent a risk of security at the international level or if a *spillover* effect is possible in the region.

In the Ukrainian case, we can apply the liberal theory and explain the secessionist claims of the self-proclaimed Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Using the national sovereignty perspective, they could have called on this theory in order to claim their secessionist rights (even if the International Law doesn't stipulate a right of secession based on ethnic grounds).

Started in 2013, after the refusal of the President Yanukovich to sign the AA, the Ukrainian population was outraged and this was the way that the *Euromaidan* revolution started. Ukraine's decision to adopt a pro-European course and prospects of extending the Euro-Atlantic security structures in the former Soviet space generated harsh reaction from Moscow, which led to the crisis that is currently facing Ukraine. On 18th of March, Vladimir Putin took the decision of Crimea annexation, province that belonged to Russia until 1954. The EU didn't recognize the annexation of Crimea and has adopted a prohibition on imports originating from Crimea and Sevastopol unless accompanied by a certificate of origin from the Ukrainian authorities⁹.

On 11th May, the pro-Russia rebels from the Donbas region (inhabited by mostly Russian ethnics), decided to hold a referendum to obtain Luhansk autonomy. The same day, on 11th May, it was held another referendum to obtain autonomy for the Donetsk region as well. The question stated on the ballot: "*Do you support the Act of State Self-rule of the Donetsk People's Republic / Luhansk People's Republic?*"¹⁰ The result was, unsurprising; in favor of the secession for the two regions and on the 12th of May they requested the union within the Moscow Russian Federation. Strongly disapproved by the international community, this didn't happen, but on 24th of May, the two self-proclaimed Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk asked to become part of the Novorossiya (Putin's project idea to go back to the Tsarist period, when these provinces weren't part of Ukraine)¹¹.

Ukraine didn't recognize the annexation of Crimea or validate the two referendums held in Donetsk and Luhansk¹². The international recognition of the two new Republics is lacking too, but, in practice Kyiv has given up some of its political jurisdiction over them. On 15th of November, President Poroshenko decided to cut off all banking services in the rebel-held territories of the Donbas region, both to legal entities and to the population. He

⁸ Wojciech Kononczuk, *Ukraine withdraws from signing the Association Agreement in Vilnius: The motives and implications*, OSW, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-11-27/ukraine-withdraws-signing-association-agreement-vilnius-motives-and>, Date of access: 2nd of March 2015

⁹ European Union Action Service, *EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis*, http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#5, Date of access: 20th of February 2015.

¹⁰ Unknown author, *Referendum results in Donetsk and Luhansk show landslide support for self-rule*, Russia Today, May. 2015, Article stable at: <http://rt.com/news/158276-referendum-results-east-ukraine/>, Date of Access: 23rd of February 2015.

¹¹ Adam Taylor, *Novorossiya, the latest historical concept to get worried about in Ukraine*, Article stable at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-to-get-worried-about-in-ukraine/>, Washington Post, Date of access: 24th of February 2015.

¹² Art. 72 of the Constitution of Ukraine establishes that a referendum applicable to the entire population of Ukrainian-All Ukrainian referendum may be called only by the Parliament (Rada) or by the President in office, or following a popular initiative of over 3 million citizens voting in at least two thirds of all the oblasts of Ukraine, registering at least 100,000 signatures for the referendum in each oblast.

ordered, as well, that state organizations and local administrations in the rebel-held area close and for the personnel to be evacuated, together with property and documentation they have, if this was possible¹³.

1.4. Regional Security Complex

Barry Buzan says that *security* is an essentially contested concept; it naturally generates both, questions and answers. In a first approach, security is provided when an entity is uncertain about its survival. In 1991, Stephen Walt study sets out the definition of security threats and of the control of the use of military force¹⁴. It examines the conditions that make the use of force likely, affecting individuals, states, corporations and specific policies that states adopt to prevent the war or to participate on it.

An important aspect of the definition of this term is the fact that the security or the lack of it is defined in relation to external and internal vulnerabilities that threaten or have the ability to destroy or significantly weaken the structure of the state and the regime in its territorial aspect, as well as in its institutional structure.

Extending the security at regional level, B. Buzan and O. Waevre define the regional security complex (RSC) as a set of elements whose security or insecurity or both are so interdependent that their security problems cannot be analyzed or resolved separately¹⁵. But, in order to analyze the security of a region, we have to focus on the insecurity 'sources that may threaten the international scene. In recent years, the number of sources of insecurity has been increased with new elements that have their origin in phenomena such as: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, technologies for their production, trafficking in radioactive materials, weapons, drugs, illegal immigration and effects arising from this politically and socially. The fragility of the security environment is determined as well by internal factors related to poor governance of the new entity arising, among which include:

- economic crises (underground economy);
- political instability;
- state institutions incapacity to ensure compliance with the law;
- increasing degree of corruption;
- violation of human rights;
- ethnic and confessional conflicts¹⁶.

Considering that *Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia* are part of a region, situated in the proximity of Russia, we will try to identify if the security region complex is valid for these countries, taking Ukraine as the first pillar in the *domino* effect.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are vulnerable states, divided by ethnic conflict, often supported by Russia. Even if there is no common strategy for the three countries in question, the similarities between them, represented especially by Russian ethnics over the territories of those states could present the risk of a new pattern creation.

The way that Russia acted in Ukraine, by annexing Crimea and by sustaining pro-rebel separatists may be followed by similar actions in Transnistria and Gagauzia in Moldova or in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

¹³Unknown author, *Ukraine to cut financial ties to rebel held in Donbass*, BNE Intellinews, Article stable at: <http://www.bne.eu/content/story/ukraine-cut-financial-ties-rebel-held-donbass>, Date of access: 24th of February 2015.

¹⁴ Stephen Walt, *The Renaissance of Security Studies*, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 211-239.

¹⁵ Barry, Buzan, *Peoples, states and fear*, Cartier, Chişinău, 2000, p. 212.

¹⁶ Alexandra, Sarcinschi, *Security and insecurity in the era of globalization*, National Defense University Carol I, Bucharest, 2011, p. 29.

Moldova's and Georgia's vulnerabilities are mainly caused by a lack of control over the country's entire territory, namely by the break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, or Transnistria and Gagauzia for Moldova¹⁷. Both of them are poor countries, facing many political, economic and security challenges, which may lead to crisis where Russia could become a significant player.

In all of these cases, the threats are internal rather than external, but they can be exploited by an international actor according to its interests.

Holsti's theory may apply here, as well, which takes into consideration the particularities of every single country. He argues that *the composition of state legitimacy and the characteristic of weak, strong, and failed states explain war today, or the conflicts in our cases. Many Third World countries and post-Communist states are confronted within a competition-often lethal-between the forces of "state-building" and the forces of fragmentation and autonomy.* Still, their own histories, identities, strategies for survival, and localized systems of rule-making remain the decisive acting conditions¹⁸.

Thus, establishing Ukraine as a precedent for Georgia and Moldova would be premature, thinking at the differences between them, but we can agree that the crisis in Ukraine may be a risk in destabilizing the security in the region, all depending on the balance of power established at the end of the Ukraine conflict (not reached yet).

1.5. The absence of sovereignty in some regions of Ukraine

As Brzezinski highlighted, Ukraine has always played a key role in the Russian strategic calculations¹⁹. Signing the AA and choosing a pro-European course was interpreted by Moscow as an attempt to limit its sphere of influence. The denial of Yanukovic (pro-Russia elected President) to sign the AA leads to a massive revolt of the civil society and to a series of conflicts, taking place not only in the center of Kiev (Euromaidan Square), but all over Ukraine, especially in its Eastern region. The pro-Russian rebels started attacking the governmental institutions, defended by the Ukrainian authorities, which led to an open and endless conflict, despite two ceasefire agreements (Minsk I, Minsk II).

By the public support of the European course for Ukraine and by the decisions taken by the pro-Russian authorities, Ukraine has become a major stake in the hegemonic confrontation between Russia and the West.

The relation between the West and Russia worsened after June 2014, when 298 passengers were killed when the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 exploded over strife-torn in eastern Ukraine on July 17, crashing in the Donbas region²⁰. Pro-Russia separatists were taking responsible for the plane crash in eastern Ukraine, being accused of blocking the investigation into the apparent shooting-down of a Malaysian passenger jet with 298 people on board²¹. This led to economic sanctions imposed by the West to Russia: at diplomatic level,

¹⁷ LAZAR, Maria-Sabina, *The Ukrainian crisis seen from a regional perspective: Isleted conflict or driving agent for regional security dynamics?*, Europolity, Vol. 8, Nr. 2, 2014, pg. 17-26

¹⁸ J.K., Holsti, *War, Peace, and the State of the State*, Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 16, No. 4, Les dangers de notre temps (Oct., 1995), pp. 319

¹⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea table de sah (The Grand Chessboard)*, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucuresti, 2010, p. 43.

²⁰ Robert Pary, *The danger of an MH 17*, Global Research, jan. 2015, Article stable at: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-danger-of-an-mh-17-cold-case/5426007>, Date of access: 20th of February 2015

²¹ Al Jazeera, *Ukraine says rebels blocking crash inquiry*, Article stable at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/07/ukraine-rebels-accused-blocking-jet-probe-201471981632462296.html>, jun. 2014, Date of access: 24th of February 2015.

economic sanctions (assets freezing), as well as measures targeting sectorial cooperation and exchange²².

But the conflict continued. On 7th of September, a ceasefire Agreement was signed in Minsk, which stated, as the name indicates: an immediate bilateral ceasefire, a temporary “self-rule” for parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which still remain part of Ukraine, OSCE monitoring of a 'buffer zone' on the Russia-Ukraine border, early elections and humanitarian aid being the most relevant decisions²³.

Unfortunately, these provisions have not been complied, as separatist fighting continued and the Agreement couldn't be implemented. This led to another Agreement, reached in Minsk, at the beginning of 2015. On 15 February 2015, another meeting took place in Minsk; *another Agreement* was reached, having almost the same conditions as the previous one (from September 2014). Concerning the two separatist regions, the new *Agreement stipulates* a political reform in Ukraine to ensure decentralization and a special status for its rebel provinces. It requires Ukraine to *change its legislation in order to provide permanent privileges to the Luhansk and Donetsk Regions, currently self-declared republics, by the end of 2015*²⁴ and a new Constitutional reform in Ukraine that could be read as a new framework for the Ukrainian sovereignty.

For the moment, this Agreement is not respected and doubts still remain concerning the future of the two separatist regions. What is certainly is that as long as the fighting continues, the status quo will be threatened and a significant change in the international balance of power may be possible after the conflict is close to an end.

2. Extreme cases of lack of sovereignty

Ukraine, within Crimea and the two regions Luhansk and Donetsk it's just one example where the lack of sovereignty may be applied. The *worst case scenario* of the lack of sovereignty exists and we will make a short brief on it. Statehood is the basic prerequisite for democracy all over the world. The main database for all the 193 states is: United Nations and the Fund for Peace. If we have a look at the Fund for Peace Index, which just changes its name from *Failed States Index* in *Fragile States Index*, we may notice that the countries ranked first in this Index are those which have problems exercising their sovereignty²⁵. States like Somalia, South Sudan, Iraq are countries where the government and its institutions didn't manage to control the facts happening within their borders: the case of Iraq where the institutions weakness allowed the development of the terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, ISIS or the case of Somalia which didn't manage to stop the piracy phenomenon from its maritime zone - 12 nautical miles. These are the extreme cases where the absence of sovereignty was one of the causal elements, strongly related with the internal conditions from each country.

As we already explained sovereignty supposes three elements: population, territory and capacity of exercising authority on the population-efficient institutions. As there cannot be any doubt concerning the population or the territory of a state, the last element is the one that fluctuate and that can explain the absence of sovereignty idea. The absence of sovereignty supposes the ineffectiveness of the institutions by which the authority expresses its control.

²² European Union Action Service, *EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis*, http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#5, Date of acces: 20th of February 2015

²³Unknown Author, BBC, *Ukraine ceasefire: The 12 points plan*, Article stable at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29162903>, Date of access, 24th of February 2015

²⁴ Russia Today, *Ukraine peace deal*, feb. 2015, Article stable at: <http://rt.com/news/231571-putin-minsk-ukraine-deal/>, Date of access: 6th of March 2015

²⁵ Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2014*, Article stable at: <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview>, Date of access: 9th March, 2015.

This can appear when the authority in place is contested and the population or part of it don't respect it, when the authority is lacking due to internal causes (war, crisis, power abdication in some cases, excessive corruption or any other fact that lead to an internal anarchy)²⁶. This could be a scenario that Russia plans for Ukraine: destabilizing it and transforming Ukraine into a weak state that only Russia can save.

But the main player, even if these circumstances remains the internal conditions, the democratic tradition of the state and the example is offered by the Kingdom of Belgium which didn't have government for a period of 541 days, starting from June 2010 until December 2011 without affecting significantly the population²⁷.

The external help may be an important element as well and a Ukraine crisis demonstrates it. By its engagement in negotiations with Russia, by its presence in Ukraine, the West looks committed in helping Ukraine to reach stability and peace on its territory.

Conclusions

Ukraine sovereignty may be threatened by the secessionist claims with which it has to deal from the Russian ethnics in Luhansk and Donetsk, Crimea seems to be a forgotten problem and the negotiations concerning how much Ukraine is disposed to give up are going on.

The internal situation from Ukraine played important role in the current crisis - Ukraine is a new state (from 1991) without institutional experience, having an economic deficit, a different ethnic composition. But the external conditions play a significant role as well: Russia neighborhood, Russian ethnics on its territory, UE border, all of this gave to Ukraine internal crisis an international scale. Even if the status-quo remains in place for Georgia and Moldova, their security strategies take in consideration the threats that they may be confronted, as well.

By consequence, the sovereignty, a theoretical concept may be used in explaining many practical aspects, even when it is not expressed directly as a cause of a crisis or of a conflict. Even if a direct attack to the sovereignty is less probable nowadays, Russia within its imperialist vision demonstrated the opposite and the lack of the exercise of sovereignty by itself demonstrates that it could become a state vulnerability. As we all know, vulnerability invites to aggression and, by consequence, the lack of sovereignty can be a risk for the international order or security.

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²⁶. Kraxberger M. Brennan, *Failed states: Temporary obstacles to democratic diffusion or fundamental holes in the world political map?*, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No 6 (2007), pp. 1055-1071.

²⁷ Le Figaro, *La Belgique, 18 mois de crise*, dec. 2011, Article stable at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/12/01/01003-20111201ARTFIG00822-la-belgique-18-mois-de-crise-politique.php> , date of access: 24th of February 2015

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THE CHART OF CONFLICTS IN THE 21st CENTURY – POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

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Abstract: Major transformations of the contemporary world and the new spheres of interests and influences have led to the creation of multiple areas and even regions of instability on a worldwide level, with important implications for achieving local, regional and even global security.

This Paper clarifies the terms and concepts which are the most representative for the crisis and conflict theory, in order to understand the specific terminology, examines the evolution of conflict in the modern world with its main causes: access to resources, mechanisms of distribution markets with the differences in ethnic, religious, cultural, political, ideological topic and promotes the negotiation theory as a non-military solution for solving the conflicts between the actors, in order to prevent the military intervention.

Keywords: crisis, conflict, negotiation, interaction, intervention, military means.

Introduction

The evolution in the international environment, marking the beginning of the XXIst century, risks and threats globalization, the proliferation of states and non-state actors and, increasing liberty of action, power diffusion (both horizontally and vertically), nonlinearity of the new conflicts emerging strategic competition, the emphasis regarding access to energy resources was dominated by conflict and instability. The dynamism and complexity of current security environment are strongly influenced by the phenomenon of globalization, by which a new world order and power relations are reconfigured.

The process of asserting and defining new centers of power is strongly influenced by the particular interests of each, for which, the conflict is a *sine qua non* condition for their development - the world's states, civil society, international, regional and global organizations, companies trans. Achieving these interests, goals set by each actor, is essential for maintaining the balance of power, and the international status. This is a battle, in which combative methods are used most complex and diversified¹.

Thus, relations between actors on the international stage are strongly influenced by the globalization of risks and threats, for which the transformations of the contemporary world and new spheres of interest and influence on the international scene led to the creation of zones or regions of instability throughout worldwide, with major implications in obtaining local security, regional and even global².

We intend in this study to achieve an indexation of the main conflicts that dominate the beginning of the XXIst century and an analysis of negotiation as the main non-military solution to resolve conflicts between actors on the international stage.

¹ „Aux sources de la guerre économique”, available on <http://www.franceculture.fr/oeuvre-aux-sources-de-la-guerre-economique-de-ali-laidi>, accessed in 27.04.2015.

² Barry BUZAN, „People states and fear. An agenda for security studies after Cold War”, Ed. Cartier, Chişinău, 2000, p. 8.

1. Conflict - boundaries and conceptual approaches

Before proceeding to the actual drawing of the map that highlights the main conflicts of the XXI century, we will define and make a brief review of the main concepts that we will use in this paper, namely crisis and conflict. These represent conflicts between the actors on the international stage. Crisis and conflict analysis are the starting point of our study.

The crisis is a manifestation of contradictions (economic, ideological, military) or critical time, for resolving a dispute³. Internationally, the crisis represents that confrontation that has a significant contribution in the balance of decision, it can be a mean of compelling the states in which they give up to legitimate interests in order obtain concessions, to avoid total war⁴.

Definitions of the crisis are elaborated by security specialists, but also can be found in official documents of security institutions. A comprehensive definition of crisis is given by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has the following vision "*crisis can be understood as an unpleasant situation manifested at national or international level, which is characterized by the existence of a threat to values, interests or the main goals of the parties involved*"⁵, while the US Defense Department defines the crisis as "*incident that threatens tension [nation], citizens, military or vital interests of a State which is growing rapidly and creates a state of diplomatic importance, military or economic or in which, military forces and the existing resources are needed to achieve national objectives. Those threats can target territories and resources and even a country, but also the strategic value, institutions, or critical infrastructure, with major or less serious consequences for the state security*"⁶.

Depending on the intensity of acting, crisis can be classified as it follows: crisis of high intensity and low average almost indefinitely. This classification can be found in the international geopolitical environment at any level.

It is more than obvious that crises can occur in any society, and given their complexity and dynamic, they must be handled with great care, in order to prevent it, limit the effects that may occur, or actually, the settlement of the entire crisis. In case this does not happen, the crisis can degenerate into conflict, such as violent or why not in a military aggression⁷.

The conflict will ever be, wherever there is an unsolved crisis. It was defined by Kate Malek as a "*unsolved crisis between several groups of the same countries and the object of contention independence, political power or economic power*".⁸ The origin of the word comes from the latin. *conflictus*, meaning "*shock, impact*" and according to Edward Azar represents "*tracks of the state own goals which are incompatible, with the ones of the others actors among there is an ineffective system of mediation and conciliation*"⁹.

³Florin MARCU, „The great dictionary of neologisms”, Ed. Saeculum, 2000, p. 48.

⁴Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, „Potential crises that may affect national security: to prevent, mitigate and resolve crises” Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University, 2011, p. 7.

⁵George C. MARSHALL European Center for Security Studies, "*Conflict Prevention and Management of Crisis and Conflict*", available at <http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-text/lang-en/page-coll-ep-1/xdocs/coll-ep-syllabus-04-01/module-10.htm>, accessed on March 24, 2015.

⁶US Department of Defense, JP 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 73, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed on March 20, 2015.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

⁸Kate MALEK „The Conflict Resolution information Source”, available on site <http://www.crinfo.org/coreknowledge/international-conflict>, accessed on March 24 2015.

⁹Edward AZAR "*The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*". Hampshire, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990.

The sociologist L. Coser identifies conflict with *"the struggle for the right of the state's own values and status, power and resources, in which the aim is to neutralize the rivals opponents"*¹⁰.

Here we should note the next thing, and namely that the conflict between states is not unusual, but natural, and the unavoidable condition of their development in the international system. The object of a conflict pretty often will be found at the interests' intersection of the state actors and represents a violent interaction solution of disputes between actors, with a major impact of any relational strategies.

Even if the conflict can be included in a much broader sphere of understanding, most of the time it will be identified with the *armed conflict*¹¹.

Conflicts can be sorted by the main actors which are involved, area of progress, scope, intensity and of course in terms of causes that trigger them, which determine the nature of international conflict, and anticipates its developments. Causes of conflict are diverse and can be classified¹² by the following major dimensions: geostrategic conflicts concerns – as territorial disputes (border disputes, and various attempts to secede, concrete case situation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine) and identity conflicts (ethnic, religious and ideological) subsumed to economic conflicts.

Geostrategic conflicts refer to territorial disputes (border disputes, the various attempts to secession specific case, the situation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine) and the struggle for access to natural resources. Acquiring a favorable position on spaces with a specific meaning, whether resources are important geo-strategic position gives the state (straits, channels) constitutes a valid enough reason for preserving conflict.

*The conflict between Israel and Palestine*¹³ began in mid-twentieth century and a conflict is full development between the State of Palestine and Israel¹⁴, which is based on a territorial dispute in the sense that, for the Israelis, the conflict is intended to provide a "safe house" on the Holy Land, while Palestine considers that Israel usurped the territory belonging to them by right, with the help of the West¹⁵.

Clashes on the Palestinian territories culminated in the summer of 2014 with the killing of a Palestinian and three Israelis teenagers, event which led to a military confrontation between Hamas and Israel army. So, in August 2014 Hamas broke the ceasefire agreement signed in 2012 and fired with about 3,000 rockets into Israel, which prompted Israel to launch air strikes on targets in Gaza suspected terrorist. The dispute was mediated by Egypt and was solved at the end of August with a ceasefire accord.

John Kerry, US Secretary tried to resume peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, with a view of solving the main dispute between the two states. However, peace talks were interrupted when the *Fatah faction*¹⁶ formed a government with its rival Hamas, which led to the resignation of Martin Indyk, US envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in June after failing to achieve peace.

¹⁰L. COSER, „*Functions of social conflict*” available at <http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/courses/COSERR1.HTML>, accessed in March 25, 2015.

¹¹ Marshall, *Ibidem*.

¹²Made by the author.

¹³ Council on Foreign relations *available on site* <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!?marker=22>, accessed on 20.03.2014.

¹⁴“*History of the Conflict*” available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/default.stm, accessed on 27.04.2015

¹⁵“*Israeli conflict. Where to start and when will it end?*”, *available on site* <http://www.externe/conflictul-israeliano-palestinian-de-unde-a-inceput-si-cand-se-va-sfarsi-192957.html>, accessed on 04.27.2015.

¹⁶ Fatah, organization of Palestinian refugees, created in 1958 - 1959, which triggered the early 60s guerrilla and sabotage actions against Israel. Member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

If the ceasefire agreement, fails, it is possible insurgency or a third *Palestinian intifada*¹⁷. Which does not suit US interests, which aims to protect the main ally in the region, namely Israel and achieving a lasting accord between it and the Palestinian territories.

Identity conflicts. Most conflicts refers to identity, whether their nature is weather *national* (ex. Modern states were created as a result of independent wars), *ethnic* (conflicts in North Africa, Kurdistan etc.), *ideological* (such as: Nazism, communism, etc.) or *religious* (Protestant vs catholic in Northern Ireland Islamic mosaics vs Israel-Palestine Islamic Christian vs Iraq-US Sunni vs Shia Iran-Iraq).

A conflict crosses different stages of evolution: it starts with the stage "0" represented by the cooperation (at this stage is important the achievement of the same objective France, Germany vs. USA), followed by the competition (achieve your goal by undermining other actors), then the possibility of diplomatic tensions (according to different perspectives on a dispute) completed with a crisis (the threatening of using force may appear) or an armed conflict.

Ethnic conflict is based not only on what someone *makes* but in what someone *represents* and is deep rooted in aversion or hatred felt by members of one ethnic group against another ethnic group. Ethnic groups share hereditary linked on language, culture, religion and a common identity. Places where they live, usually is an ancestral land and they are in majority which makes them consider themselves a nation and they do arrange to have their own state included in some internationally recognized territorial borders¹⁸.

The resulting situation is that an ethnic group controlling the State and another ethnic group representing minority is most often the subject of discrimination. In most cases the motherland, usually located in the vicinity, worried tries to get revenge.

The conflict between Turkey and the PKK. is an armed conflict between the Republic of Turkey and the Kurdish various insurgent groups, who requested separation from Turkey to create an independent Kurdistan, and the autonomy and the political and cultural rights for Kurds within Turkish Republic¹⁹.

PKK members refused to withdraw from Turkey to Iraq's Kurdish region, despite peace talks with the Turkish government. They stopped the fires in early March 2013 but they did not give up their goal of achieving an autonomous Kurdish state.

Situation was exacerbated by spillover of the civil conflict in Syria into Turkey, but also in other countries beyond its vicinity. Kurds from Syria - coordinated by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People protective Unit (YPG) -with close links with the PKK, took control of the Kurdish region of northern Syria. In September 2014, the area of Koban city, controlled by the Kurds in was besieged by ISIS, who managed to capture the city and to caused the death of 1,200 people. Meanwhile, migration has reached maximum in that period, given that more than 300,000 Syrian refugees have crossed the border.

ISIS advanced forward in the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, move that made that that armed fighters who protected the Kurdish region of Iraq to join to the Iraqi security forces and received financial aid and weapons from the US. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was able to mobilize massive Kurdish in the fight against ISIS group.

Creating an autonomous Kurdish state will lead to chaos, and can lead to an accelerated secessionist movements in different parts of the Middle East. Increased activity of

¹⁷ Intifada (Ven. Arab "uprising"), popular and nationalist movement of disobedience, which broke out (1987) in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. Also called "war of stones".

¹⁸ Lars-Erik CEDERMAN, "*Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*", Princeton, 1997.

¹⁹ David BYRNE, "*PKK 'would disarm for Kurdish rights in Turkey'*", available at. Bbc.co.uk, accessed at 27.04.2015.

the Kurdish separatist terrorist groups worries the US, which appointed PKK as a terrorist group²⁰.

Ethnic Conflict resolution is difficult, the reason is not quantifiable, and each part highlights the loss of the other parts. Specifically, an individual is willing to do anything, to lose anything if it means depriving the enemy of certain values. That's the reason why ethnic conflicts can't be solved.

Ethnic Conflicts often find expression in *religious conflicts*, given the fact that religion represents some values for the community and religious practices different from those of the majority are considered unworthy, are worthless or disregarded. Currently, violent religious conflicts are fought in the name of the great religions of the world²¹. A religious conflict is based on a group or a country belonging to different faiths.²²

*Religious violence in Irak*²³. Shiite and Sunni Muslims are divided. The two communities share only five fundamental beliefs - Confession (Allah is the only God, Muhammad is the Prophet while his), praying five times a day (2.5% of revenues bound for poor families), fasting in Ramadan last pilgrimage to Mecca.

However, there are fundamental differences in interpretation of the Quran, and the right of succession. Cleavage groups originated in disputes that took place immediately after the death of Prophet Mohammed on who should lead the Muslim community²⁴

In December 2013 the conflict erupted in Anbar province in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite groups. Following the attacks made by ISIL, the armed forces, they responded with an offensive to regain the controlled terrorist group areas.

As a result, in August 2014, President Barack Obama approved air strikes against ISIL forces located in northern Iraq. There were also sent humanitarian aid to refugees in the territories controlled by Yazid ISIL group. Originally the support was provided by 1,400 American soldiers, and guns sent to the Kurdish forces and there are training and plans for sending at least another 1,500. Fighting IS resulted with the direct killing of more than 12,000 Iraqis in 2014, and the migration of about 1.2 million. IS groups targeted ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq, killing at over five hundred Yazid.

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, widened divisions between religious groups, groups managing to empower over the others. Shiites account for over 60% of the population in Iraq managed to influence political decisions in the country.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was replaced on 11 August by Haider al-Abadi Chairperson, change that aimed at easing the conflict situation of religious minorities. If religious violence would continue, the situation in Iraq could degenerate into a civil war.

Thus, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was replaced on 11 August by the chairman, Haider al-Abadi. his change aimed easing the situation of religious minorities. Bombing attacks that have targeted Shiite neighborhoods, came in response to the situation by removing officials and arrests of hundreds of Sunni extremists. If religious violence continued, the situation in Iraq could degenerate into a civil war, which is not desired by the great powers. US wants the stabilization of Iraq and the destruction of the possibility of creating a haven for terrorist organizations.

²⁰*Ibidem*, Council on Foreign relations

²¹R. Scott APPLEBY, , "*Tire Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*", Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2000.

²², "*Support ongoing international conflict analysis and integrated management of the crisis*", Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, 2011 pg 45

²³ *Ibidem*, Council on Foreign relations

²⁴ , "*Sunni and Shiite slaughter in Iraq. Why?* "available on <http://semneletimpului.ro/international/asia/irak/macel-intre-siitii-si-sunitii-din-irak-de-ce.html> accessed at 4/27/2015.

The last but not the least form of manifestation through identity conflicts is represented by the *ideological conflicts*, which as the religious ones only amplifies the interstate conflicts rather than to underpin their outbreak.

Economic conflicts. Economical differences between the actors and the existence of the inequality between groups, can influence the character of a conflict. With globalization, the economic reasons are found in different percentages in all other types of conflict²⁵.

This is why conflict analysis requires a good knowledge of the economic, political and history, geography, geopolitics of the states being in a conflict.

We attached a map conflict for Africa, Europe and Asia, no matter the reasons which triggered them.



Figure 1. Map of conflicts worldwide (color intensity represents possibility at any time a conflict can be escalated into armed conflict)²⁶

These types of conflicts are not exclusive and most often affect each other. Thus, in 2014, under a joint document governing the operations of US forces it is defined the form that conflicts will take in the future *"As sometimes happened in the past, future conflicts will appear as hybrid combinations comprising diverse, dynamic and simultaneous, organizations, technologies and techniques that defies categorization."*²⁷

3. Negotiation - non-military solution for solving the conflicts between the actors

The divergent interests and the interests in conflicts can be identified in matter of intervention or nonintervention, separatism and anti-separatism, territorial or for sovereignty, ethnic problems, commercial dispute, etc, which can lead directly or indirectly to a military crisis. In normal conditions, every country or political groups will try using politics, economics and diplomatic methods to solve the conflicts of interest between them.

The management of crisis and preventing conflicts, but also keeping peace, has led to the awareness of human being of the necessity to create some international security institutions. This is the reason why after The World War Two, National Organization of

²⁵ Irina CUCU, *"Economic effects of conflict"*, Annual International Scientific Session of the Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies *"Policies and strategies in managing conflictuality"* 20 to 21 November 2008.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, Council on Foreign relations

²⁷ Department of Defense, *"Capstone Concept for Joint Operations"*, Versiunea 3, Washington DC, din 15.01.2009, p. 2.

United Countries, was founded, with a specific role in management of crisis and preventing conflicts, with clearly stipulated principles in The Charter of the United Nations.

The Charter is the document which considers that disputes and must be solved in a peacefully way *“parties of any dispute, which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security must solve it by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means”*²⁸.

The ways of peacefully solving can be classified in informal ways, rules of international law, unwritten but recognized and respected by actors on international scene and those are investigation, mediation, conciliation and good offices – conducted through negotiation and formal ways as arbitration, judicial route, and the use organizations and regional agreements - which analyze and decide whether the parties are under negotiation or not

Further, we will analyze the negotiation as non-military solution for preventing and solving international conflicts.

The negotiation is one of the most efficient and representative ways of solving conflicts between actors *„negotiation represents the process of approach a dispute or an international situation through peacefully ways , others than legal or arbitration having the purpose to promote a deal, adjustment or regulation of the situation between the interested parts”*²⁹.

The negotiation process wants to identify a solution of the problem, which means that solving the conflict, it is preferred before entering in a violent phase. This is based rationality, intelligence and imagination of the ones situated at negotiation table which use the logical and mathematical models in support the sociological, political and economic analysis.

The main elements³⁰ of the negotiation process are talks, in which:

- the offer is presented to the parts involved;
- are presented those elements which can't be negotiated, and for which the parts won't admit divergent positions;
- the parts involve some rewards or sanctions, to determine the obtaining of concessions from the other part;
- both parts are making concessions for closing the points of view.
- the concessions are accepted totally or partially when there exists the danger of stopping negotiations is imminent;
- finally, the parties should reach converging views, of the ideas already submitted.

Solving a dispute by negotiation, may result in the signing of an agreement. The agreement occurs when each party obtains more favorable terms than those in the absence or prior the agreement; there are also situations where the agreement appears only for obtaining effects, such as satisfaction of the international public opinion.

The result³¹ of negotiations can be evaluated according to:

1) Accord – intervenes in the moment when each part involved obtains advantageous conditions that the ones they had in the absence or before the agreement; there are situations when this appears for obtaining some secondary effects , as satisfaction of the international public opinion;

²⁸ The United Nations Charter, available at http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/legislatie/internationala/Carta_Organizatiei_Natiunilor_Unite_ONU_.pdf , accessed on March 24, 2015.

²⁹Arthur Samuell LALL ,”*Modern international negotiation principles and practice,*” New York Columbia University Press, 1966, p. 12.

³⁰Teodor FRUNZETI, ”Conflict and negotiation in international relations”, Course, Ed. Carol I National Defence University, 2011 P117.

³¹*Ibidem*, p.120.

2) Efficiency- appears depending on the complexity and dynamics of the situation and refers to the utility of the negotiation process and the flexibility of the parties to the agreements reported;

3) Equity - is a subjective concept, since any actor has its own way of seeing the conflict; this refers to the non-discriminatory character given to the parties in which they should benefit of certain standards from international law;

4) Stability - refers to sustainability of the signed agreements, that may exist as long as neither of the parts proceed to the non-compliance; this is a criterion derived from those already mentioned, and occurs when the parties deem fair and favorable and its implementation serve for their interest.

Conclusions

Conflicts are to be solved when a negotiation process explicitly or implicitly reach a mutually acceptable outcome for the both parties. Passable does not mean that both parties are happy, or that the result is correct - but that neither of them consider that it is worth changing the outcome. Perhaps both parties are satisfied that they have entered into a right arrangement, benefic agreement or that one party left without means of pressure (in extreme case, was totally destroyed) and has no prospect of improving the results through further negotiations.

Conflict resolution seeks to ensure that the actions taken, lead to a conflict resolution in a quite short time. Violence adversely affects conflict resolution. States may also have alternative factors and strategies that often work better than war in conflict resolution (putting them end in mutually beneficial terms).

Any other non-military means of conflict resolution, implicitly negotiation will work, but only for limited periods, their resolution is impossible. Conflicts come only in a latent state, the so-called *frozen conflict*.

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DEALING WITH ISLAMIC STATE: EXTERNAL ACTORS AND THEIR GOALS

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Abstract: *Following text is focused on current conflict between the international community and so called Islamic State, the one of the biggest threat of (not only) Middle-East region. The involvement of many internal and external actors makes conflict in Iraq and Syria very complicated. Their goals differ from each other and that is the main reason the Islamic State still exists in very good shape. The main aim of this text is to explain and to analyze motives and goals of all relevant actors and sides of mentioned conflict and describe the way they affect its dynamics. Due to that it is possible to increase the knowledge of readers in such a chaotic, unclear and often misinterpreted situation in the Middle-East.*

Keywords: *Islamic State, ISIL, Terrorism, External Actors, Syria, Iraq.*

Introduction

The Islamic state or IS only (also known as Da'esh, Islamic State in Iraq and Levant – ISIL or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – ISIS) is a new non-state or quasi-state actor of conflict at Syrian and Iraqi territory. Politicians, military experts and orientalists often publicly speak about possible solutions of conflict and about the elimination of IS, but they usually forget to mention the most important point resisting the total defeat of IS – motives and goals of many external actors. Those actors have direct influence on conflict dynamics and their interests in Syria and Iraq are usually in contradiction to each other. Due to lack of relevant and proved information from areas occupied by IS it is very difficult to examine internal behavior and function of this state-like formation. Field research is necessary but also very dangerous. Interviews and own knowledge of local reality creates the ground for other studies, but it is still not enough. The examination of the position and activities of external actors intervening into conflict with IS is much easier. So the explanation of their basic motives, goals and behavior in presented conflict is the main aim of following text. Its ambition is not to interpret all events and causalities influencing, but rather introduce problems and dilemma connected to elimination of IS threat.

1. Main actors and their goals on the background of conflict development

Since the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011 there has been a huge development and high dynamics of this conflict. At first it was mainly about political, economic and social demands by masses of unsatisfied Syrians on the wave of so called Arab spring. Riots during public demonstrations were violently suppressed by Syrian armed forces which caused the escalation of conflict to the level of civil war. Another important milestone was the spill-over of conflict into neighboring Iraq. Especially Iraqi Sunni minority at so called Sunni triangle was frustrated and unsatisfied with post-Saddam development in the long-term basis. The connection of Syrian and Iraqi Sunni radicals created the root of Islamic state and the rise of self-appointed spiritual leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi. From 2013 (when the ISIL started to operate under this name) or 2014 (the creation of Islamic State) the leading issue of this

conflict is the sectarian tension between radical Sunnis on the side of IS and Shia on the side of Assad regime in Syria and Iraqi government. The change of Syrian-Iraqi environment in 2013 and 2014 caused a huge shift in minds and goals of many participating external actors that needed to reevaluate their position towards this conflict. Therefore it is necessary to analyze motives, goals and activities of foreign powers in two historical parts – Syrian civil war (2011 – 2013) and the Islamic State era (2014 – present). For each described external party there are two paragraphs splitting their goals and activities according to era before and after the creation of Islamic State.

Before getting to external actors it is also necessary to mention main warring internal parties. Generally it is possible to label them as Syrian state forces or President Assad's forces on the one side and the rebels on the other. The problem with rebels is their massive fragmentation not only according to their political, religious and ethnical bases, but also according to their local tribe division. Any attempt to unite and consolidate some compact Syrian opposition has failed. Syrian National Council as an exile government doesn't represent almost anyone in Syria; Free Syrian Army controls only few parts on the north of the country and other Islamic radicals from al-Nusra group or Jaish al Islam are fighting local battles and take care about sporadic terrorist attacks against Assad's regime and against each other. Since 2014 we could have speak about IS being the only widely successful opposition group in Syria, although its unity is also highly speculative.

2. Iranian support of Syrian regime

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been one of the most important Syrian allies since 1980s. Closeness of Alawites minority ruling Syria with Iranian Shias makes very strong connection between Assad's regime and Iranian ruling clergy. Syria is for Iran also important due to access to Lebanese (and Palestinian) territory where Iranian proxy Hezbollah operates.¹ Syrian civil war complicates Iranian access to Hezbollah which has led to involvement of this radical Shia terrorist organization into Syrian conflict (see below). Iranian influence in whole Near-East region is based on the axis Tehran-Damascus-Bikaa and by elimination of one of these points – Damascus – could destroy Iranian position in this area. Not only religion dimension of Iranian activities is important, also political-power struggle between Iran and other regional power Turkey is present. Rivalry with Turkey is the never-ending story of Iranian foreign policy. Iran is so afraid of irredentism of its Azerbaijan minority supported by the "Turks" that weakening position of Ankara and Baku is considered in Tehran as a crucial goal for maintenance of the Iranian territorial integrity.² Turkey also aspires for the position of leading power in whole region and from Iranian point of view the gain of one means the loss of the other. Therefore from the beginning of Syrian civil war Iran has sided Assad's regime and put into conflict so much own resources.

After the creation of IS Iranian activities multiplied and spread from Syrian to Iraqi battleground. Iran supports militarily Syrian and Iraqi armies by supplying weapons, military equipment and also takes personally part in armed clashes. Iran has its own air campaign over Iraqi territory, Iranian military advisors and intelligence officers operate at and behind the

¹ For more please see KRAUS, Josef. 2010. Komparace strategie íránské podpory terorismu na příkladu Hamásu a Hizballáhu (The Comparison of Strategy of Iranian Terrorism Sponsorship: The Example of Hamas and Hezbollah), *Obrana a strategie*, roč. 10, č. 2, Available online: <http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/aktualni-cislo-2-2010/clanky/komparace-strategie-iranske-podpory-terorismu-na-prikladu-hamasu-a-hizballahu.html#.VMkppETvol I>.

² SOULEIMANOV, Emil; KRAUS, Josef a PIKAL, Kamil. The Rise of Nationalism among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step toward Iran's Disintegration? *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2013, Vol. 17, No. 1

frontline, especially those from Iranian Revolutionary Guards units called al-Quds.³ Why is Iran so active in fights against IS? Iranian government considers rising power of IS as a direct threat to Iran just right behind its borders. Primary goal of Iran is to destroy IS, to protect Shia ruled Iraqi government and to support Kurdish defenders against marauding Sunni radicals from IS. Of course the support of Syrian regime is still in the game. And there is also one small additional point of Iranian strategy in Iraq – getting closer with the United States. Islamic Republic is nowadays on the same side of a frontline with Americans and it does help with instant negotiations about Iranian nuclear program and sanctions withdrawal.⁴

3. USA and its interference

The world leading power United States from the beginning of intra-Syrian conflict carefully observe the situation and interfere in it. In first phase US were motivated predominantly by weakening their enemies - Russia and Iran - by toppling Bashar Assad from Syrian presidential post. Assad as a longtime ally of Moscow and Tehran and the enemy of Israel was automatically put on a list of US enemies. Washington declared its will to throw down Assad and support Syrian opposition. So the United States supported rebels by mainly non-lethal materials such as humanitarian aid, communication systems, ballistic protection, military equipment etc. This support was widely distributed via American crucial ally in the region – Turkey.⁵ Confusion, ignorance, chaos and especially lack of any constructive vision of solution of Syrian conflict are typical for American engagement in Syria. This was confirmed even by general David Petraeus, retired American military officer and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, during his speech at University of Defense in Czech Republic.⁶ Petraeus could identify what US government did not want in Syria – the continuation of Bashar Assad regime, the rise of Islamic extremism, the disintegration of the country or the split between Sunni and Alawite parts, the increasing influence of Iran in the region. But in his speech there was no point about what US in Syria want.

The creation of IS caused a big change in American attitude towards Syrian conflict. The conflict spill-over to Iraq led to American support of its Iraqi ally. The public outrage after the execution of American journalist James Foley and other western hostages by IS put a strong political pressure to US government. In September 2014 Obama proclaimed US “would degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.”⁷ So under the US guidance a coalition of western and also Arabic states such as Bahrain, Jordanian, Qatar, Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates willing to take part as running air-campaign was created. From more than sixty participating states in coalition the majority of them are involved by providing finances and humanitarian aid to IS opponents such as Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters. Iraqi army fully dependent on its American patron has also started to accepting support from neighboring Iran. USA has suddenly appeared on the same side as its long-term enemy.

³ For more information about Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and al-Quds units please see KRAUS, Josef. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Their Influence on the Iranian Government, Military and Economy. In: Proceedings International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment. Bukurešť, Rumunsko: "Carol I" National Defence University - Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2014, p. 171-175. ISSN 2285-8318.

⁴ Interviews with Iranian political experts at Al-Mustafa University, Qom, Iran, February 2015.

⁵ Interview with Ibrahim Fayad, Syrian specialist, Center for human rights and democracy, December 2013, Brno, Czech Republic.

⁶ Presentation and interview with David Petraeus, University of Defense, Brno, Czech Republic, September 2013.

⁷ HUDSON, David. 2014. *President Obama: “We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL”*, The White House Blog, Dostupné online: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/10/president-obama-we-will-degrade-and-ultimately-destroy-isil>

Nevertheless Barack Obama still refuses any military cooperation with Iran as well as Assad's regime and still insists on his overthrow.⁸ This can be explained by strong Turkish pressure put on United States so Ankara would still follow its goal by toppling Bashar Assad. For Americans the number one priority is to destroy IS by supporting allies on the ground and by using the air-campaign, but not by fully participation of US troops on the battlefield. Simultaneously they are willing to support their allies in region – Turkey and Iraq – and try to avoid the rise of Iranian power and Assad's survival.

4. Turkey and its schizophrenia

One of the most important external actors is the generally less accented Turkey. Turkey wants to be regional power and the axes between Damascus and Tehran and Syrian alliance with Russia created power barrier to Turkish expansion. The overthrow of Assad's regime and the installation of pro-Turkey one in Syria is the primary goal of Ankara policy towards its southern neighbor. Surprisingly the Syrian conflict has a resources dimension from Turkish point of view. Although Syria has no important oil and gas reserves its territory has potential to become important transit country for energy resources from Persian Gulf or Lebanon. Nowadays Turkey is crucial for European energy security due to transportation of resources from Caspian sea area and its influence could rise in case of building infrastructure from Syria via Turkey's territory to Europe.⁹ Turkey's effort to influence events in Syria and Iraq are maintained by skilled and with local reality familiar Turkish intelligence agencies. They also work as a proxy for NATO allied states, but under Ankara's command of course. That means Turkey is able to provide service for European states and United States in distributing material, aid and lethal and non-lethal military equipment to rebels. It is Ankara who finally decides about the distribution which gives to Turks such a big power in region. Except material and financial help Turkey provide also military training to chosen rebel groups.¹⁰

The rise of IS has made Turkey even valuable ally of the West in the Middle-East. Turkey is of course against IS and feels the threat of radical Islamists on its border very sensitively, because it is highly unstable, unpredictable and problematic actor. It is impossible for Ankara to reach any of above mentioned goals if Syria would be ruled by IS. On the other hand Turks cannot allow Assad to win and Iran to increase its power. Another part of Turkish dilemma is the Kurdish card. Kurds were dragged into conflict by attacks of radical marauders. They were active not only at Syrian territory, but also in Iraq itself where Kurds have to defend their autonomy. The siege of Kobani has become a symbol of Kurdish defense against IS and a proof of IS thirst for ethnical cleansing and bloodshed. At this example it is easy to demonstrate the Turkish dilemma considering Kurdish question. Ankara was under huge international pressure to allow Kurdish fighters to use Turkish territory for transporting themselves to battlefield around Kobani. Ankara was refusing this demand for a long time and even violently suppressed Kurdish protest against that refusal. But finally during October 2014 Turks allowed Kurds to pass Turkish territory to sieged Kobani which caused turn-around in Kurdis-IS clashes and Kurds finally pushed back attackers.¹¹ This Turkish attitude

⁸ The Daily Mail, 16. 11. 2014. *Obama rules out alliance with Syria's Assad against IS*, Available online: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2836487/Obama-rules-alliance-Syrias-Assad-against-IS.html>

⁹ For more information see SOULEIMANOV, Emil a Josef KRAUS. Turkey: An Important East-West Energy Hub. *Middle East Policy*, Washington, Middle East Policy Council, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 157-168.

¹⁰ NAVIS, Sean. 2015. *US And Turkey's Competing Interests In Syria: Fighting ISIS Or Fighting Assad?*, MintPress News, Available online: <http://www.mintpressnews.com/us-and-turkeys-competing-interests-in-syria-fighting-isis-or-fighting-assad/203130/>

¹¹ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 31. 10. 2014. *More than 20 vehicles enter the city of Kobani*, Available online: <http://syriaahr.com/en/2014/10/more-that-20-vehicles-enter-the-city-of-kobani/>

towards Kurds is based on own security issues with Kurdish minority. Turkey has had problems with Kurdish separatism for last couple decades. The potential support of Kurds by Turks could easily backfire on them in not distant future. Ankara's point of view is – today we give weapons to Kurds, tomorrow they would use it against us. Kurdish victory in Syria threatens by creating another Kurdish autonomy or even independent Kurdistan which is a nightmare for Turkey. Balancing of Kurdish question (stand western pressure and weakening Kurdish separatism), worsening position of Iran and getting control on Syrian territory are the main goals of Turkish policy toward neighboring conflict.

5. Russia and its diplomatic support

Russia as the opposite side of the Cold War perspective has different view on Syrian crisis than United States. First of all, Syria has been crucial Russian ally since 1980s. Such an ally that even allowed Russians to create and use its navy base in city of Tartus that provides access to Mediterranean. Due to relative isolation of Syria Russians has evolved strong political and economic influence on Damascus. The loss of Bashar Assad means the loss of access to whole Near-East region for Russians.¹² Therefore Moscow intensively blocks any international action against Syria at UN platform. Despite of Russian military presence in Tartus Russians don't interfere into Syrian conflict directly, but they intensively provide weapons to Syrian army. Richard Galpin estimates that the export to Syria is at the level of 10 % Russian whole arms export and reaches the amount of 1.5 billion dollars.¹³ There are also Russian military advisers for training Syrian army in using Russian arms.¹⁴

The threat of IS haven't change Russian position so much, but it has strengthen the concern for domestic security issues. Moscow is afraid of Chechen and Dagestani rebels taking part in conflict on IS side that could spill-over to North Caucasus and cause problem for security of Russian Federation. So Russians has started to accent the threat of foreign fighters within IS for global security and terrorism.¹⁵

6. Arabic states and ambivalence toward conflict

No less important actors are other Arabic states, especially those from the Persian Gulf. Primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar stood behind the origin of Syrian civil war by supporting of opposition and religious zealots. Both states directed by doctrine of *Wahhabism* – the radical kind of Sunni religion – are the most important donators of Sunni radicals worldwide. Mainly after the invasion to Iraq in 2003 the fear of so called Shia crescent has motivated majority of Persian Gulf Sunni ruled states to support anti-Shia militias in the Middle-East.¹⁶ According to Financial Times, Qatar and Saudi Arabia supported Syrian rebels financially by 3 billion dollars during first two years of conflict and Saudis even donated

¹² AL-MARHOUN, Abdul Jalil. 2014. The story of Syrian-Russian relations, Middle-East Monitor, Available online: <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/9631-the-story-of-syrian-russian-relations>

¹³ GALPIN, Richard. 2012. *Russian arms shipments bolster Syria's embattled Assad*, BBC.co.uk, Available online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16797818>.

¹⁴ BORGER, Julian. 2012. *Russian military presence in Syria poses challenge to US-led intervention*, The Guardian, Available online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/23/syria-crisis-russian-military-presence>.

¹⁵ SOULEIMANOV, Emil a OUELLETTE, Megan, The Participation of North Caucasian Jihadists in the Syrian Civil War and its Security Implications, *Meria Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 2014, Dostupné online: <http://www.rubincenter.org/2015/02/the-participation-of-north-caucasian-jihadists-in-the-syrian-civil-war-and-its-security-implications/>

¹⁶ For more information about Shia crescent see Middle East Quarterly. 2005. *King Abdullah II: „Iraq is the Battleground – the West against Iran*, Vol. XII, No. 2 Spring 2005, Available online: <http://www.meforum.org/688/king-abdullah-ii-iraq-is-the-battleground>

some arms.¹⁷ Saudi Arabia officially and unofficially supported many Syrian militias including the nucleus of future IS.

Nevertheless after the creation of IS it wasn't political sustainable to officially support Sunni radicals. IS by its extremism, bad behavior and massive aggressiveness are non-controllable actor that causes more problems even for Saudis. Especially after the invasion of Iraq by IS and threatening Saudi territory majority of Persian Gulf states joined the anti-IS coalition and participated even on the air-campaign. However some influent and rich families of Persian Gulf still unofficially send money to rebels and undermine the effort of IS opponents.¹⁸ Again the main motives for that are Sunni-Shia rivalry and the fear of the empowered Iran. Persian Gulf states still insist on overthrowing Bashar Assad and on any prevention against Shia crescent.

The role of smaller and less influent Arabic countries such as Jordan and Lebanon is little bit different. Those two countries have been aware of Syrian conflict since its beginning due to wave of Syrian refugee flow into these states. Some security concerns were put on the flow of foreign fighters and military equipment via Jordan and Lebanon to various fighting parties in Syria. The creation of IS, its invasion to Iraq and its threatening to other states changes the position of Jordanian Kingdom which has taken a part in anti-IS coalition. After the shoot down of Jordanian pilot and his shocking execution by IS by burning him alive the Jordanians has become one of the hardest opponents of IS calling for total elimination of this quasi-state.¹⁹

Another important Arabic and neighboring actor is the Lebanese Hezbollah – a non-state actor active within Damascus-Tehran axis. Shia Hezbollah's existence is based on connection to Iran via Syria. The loss of Bashar Assad means to this Lebanese organization high risk of interruption of connection to Tehran providing finances, aid and weapons. Due to that reason Hezbollah fighters has been taken part of the conflict unofficially since 2012 and declaratory since 2013. They control south-west parts Syrian territory, mainly in the region of al-Qusa'ir close to Lebanese borders.²⁰ Thanks to it Syrian armed forces don't have to keep an eye on this territory and can focus on frontline with Free Syrian Army and IS. The engagement of Shia Hezbollah into conflict emphasizes the sectarian dimension of conflict. On the other hand Hezbollah officially proclaims it fights against murderers and apostates, not Muslims. The general secretary Hassan Nasrallah mentioned in his speech the IS kill more Sunnis than Shias and it is the general threat for all peace-loving people around.²¹

7. The endangered Europe and omnipresent Israel

European powers, namely the Great Britain and France, were since the beginning of the Syrian conflict on the side of opposition. In contrast to US these two European countries officially accented non-lethal and financial aid, but in fact they provided arms to rebels. French president Francois Hollande in 2014 publicly admitted that France had directly

¹⁷ Financial Times. 3. 6. 2013. *Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms*, Available online: <http://goo.gl/89646D>

¹⁸ STEPHENS, Michael. 2014. *Islamic State: Where does jihadist group get its support?*, BBC.com, Dostupné online: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29004253>

¹⁹ Deutsche Welle, 7. 2. 2015. *Jordan: United in sorrow, united against IS*, Available online: <http://www.dw.de/jordan-united-in-sorrow-united-against-is/a-18242900>

²⁰ Al Arabiya, 17. 2. 2013. *Hezbollah fighters, Syrian rebels killed in border fighting*, Available online: <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/17/266843.html>

²¹ It is possible to see one of the most famous speech of Hassan Nasrallah about IS on YouTube, available online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZuNg3cm1PE>

supplied Syrian militias by weapons.²² The Great Britain officially only considered this option and advocated for lifting an arms embargo towards Syrian non-state actors.²³ But there was no doubt within security and expert community the Great Britain provided arms to Syrian opposition unofficially as well. Both states also called for toppling Bashar Assad and establishing new political regime²⁴ more opened for western investments.²⁵

Although Europe is not directly threaten by militant activities of IS, its creation meant the creation of other menace – European fighters within IS. Former French and British engagement on the side of Syrian rebels switched to passive defense against own citizens fighting for IS in Syria and Iraq. European state has to face the new security threat by Islamic fighters owning French, Belgian, German or British passports and citizenship. According to French Prime Minister Manuel Valls there are about 3 000 Europeans fighting for IS and until the end of 2015 their number could rise to 10 000.²⁶ The threat of repetition of so called Afghani scenario about radicalized, trained and skilled fighters returning home is highly probable in case of Europe. The fear of European states of the return of thousands of their own citizens with war experiences and religiously radicalized is the main factor determines European position towards current conflict in Syria and Iraq. European states draw-off their former support to rebels and focus more on own actions against Islamic radicalism in Europe itself. EU activity towards IS is primary about financial aid for its opponents. Another sum of money goes from Europe for solving humanitarian crisis in Lebanon and to other project dampening war effects in afflicted region.²⁷

Israel has interest in any security issue in Middle-East of course. So it is in Syrian civil war and conflict with IS. Israel doesn't interfere directly into conflict, because participation of Jewish army on intra-Islamic war would create completely different conflict dynamics and would threaten by joining all fighting forces against Israeli invader. On the other hand Israel monitors the situation highly attentively due to new opportunities the conflict brought alive. First of all there is a chance to get rid of Syrian hostile regime. Israel has many disputes with Bashar Assad, mainly about Golan Heights and the support of Hezbollah. But it is necessary to say Israel doesn't want Islamic radical state such as IS on its own borders neither. According to Ibrahim Fayad the situation of internal Syrian conflict when Muslims are fighting each other and Jewish are winning plays into Israeli hands. Israel has the interest of sustaining this conflict and obstructing any solution. According to Fayad Israel keeps this weak balance by using its own secret services and by influencing American policy towards this region.²⁸ According to Israeli ambassador to Czech Republic – Gary Koren - the crucial goal of Israel is to balance all sides of conflict so that they wouldn't be able to endanger Israel

²² MABUT, Pierre. 2014. France admits it directly supplied arms to Syrian “rebels”, WSWS.org, Available online: <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/08/27/frsy-a27.html>

²³ The Guardian. 28. 4. 2013. *UK forces EU to lift embargo on Syria rebel arms*, Available online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/28/uk-forced-eu-embargo-syria-rebel-arms>

²⁴ France was also the first country which publicly blame Asad for using chemical weapons against his enemies and called for using of force to punish him. SEDHAIN, Pramod Raj. *Syrian Conflict: The Key International Interests*, Available online: http://www.academia.edu/4355411/Syrian_Conflict_The_Key_International_Interests

²⁵ IRISH, John. 2012. *France eyes Middle East influence, image with Syria gamble*, Reuters.com, Available online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/us-syria-crisis-france-idUSBRE8AE0K620121119>

²⁶ PORTER, Tom. 9. 3. 2015. *Isis: '10,000 Europeans could be fighting for Islamic State by 2016' warns French PM*, International Business Times, Available online: <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-10000-europeans-could-be-fighting-islamic-state-by-2016-warns-french-pm-1491082>

²⁷ TheTrumpet.com, 9. 2. 2015. *EU Steps Up Aid in Fight Against the Islamic State*, Available online: <https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/12415.19.0.0/eu-steps-up-aid-in-fight-against-the-islamic-state>

²⁸ Interview with Ibrahim Fayad, ref. 5.

(whether by IS strengthening or by Hezbollah strengthening) and he admitted the current situation is from purely pragmatically point of view very favorable for Israel.²⁹

Conclusion

The Syrian civil war and the conflict with so called Islamic State are currently one of the biggest issues of global security, although it is limited to not so large territory. The main problem hindering any solution of the bloodshed is the intensive internationalization of conflict and the fact all the main regional and supraregional actors are involved with different expectations, goals and motives. Big number of external actors and fragmented opposition towards Bashar Assad in Syria so as weakness of Syrian and Iraqi state cause the escalation of the conflict and limited perspective to its solution. The world leading power United States is lost and still doesn't know what kind of position should stand towards Syria – whether to support Bashar Assad in his fight against IS as a less evil - or if carry on own ground military action, or if thenceforward trust and rely on Turkish ally. Similar dilemma is being solved by European countries with special focus on European fighters in service of IS that would bring their religiously radical views and military skills back to Europe one day. Russia on the other hand makes so much effort to back its ally Syria at the international political level and to prevent Caucasus radicals spread the violence back to Chechnya and Dagestan. Position of Turkey and Iran are motivated by mutual regional rivalry, power balancing of Kurdish fighters and fear from the growth of radical Sunni Islam. Motives and goals of neighboring and regional Arabic states are typical by their schizophrenia between the elimination of inscrutable and dangerous Islamic State on the one side and the rise of so called Shia crescent in region on the other.

In such an environment the existence and survival of Islamic State is no surprise, however it would be possible to eliminate it fast and efficiently if there would be general will and agreement on it by the whole international community without any particular national interests of involved actors. Unfortunately in current spread of power and interests between so many actors the pacification of conflict at Syrian and Iraqi territory is nothing we can expect in not distant future.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

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***Abstract:** The crises gripping the European Union's eastern and southern neighbourhoods are calling into question, yet again, the relevance of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It is an all-too-familiar truism that the European states have to shoulder a larger share of the defence burden and that they have to reduce their dependence on the United States of America. The liberal international order gravely under threat coupled with the US rebalance to Asia mean that Europe has to assume an enhanced role in the efforts of assuring its own security and the security of its immediate spheres of interest. Problematic at its début and atrophied by constant political blockages, the NATO - CSDP relationship needs an overhaul, which may open the way for a reinvigoration of the transatlantic security architecture. This paper sets out to indicate a possible scenario regarding the trajectory of the security order in Europe, more specifically it posits that Europe's inability to devise a common strategic posture will persist, making the operational autonomy of the CSDP quite improbable.*

***Keywords:** Berlin Plus, CSDP, EU, inter-institutional cooperation, NATO, security*

Introduction

The unprecedented security threats in the European Union's eastern and southern neighbourhoods raise the question of whether the Common Security and Defence Policy can offer a proper response under such dire circumstances. Obviously, neither CSDP nor NATO alone are expected to address the menace facing Europe, but the EU's contribution to the continent's security has been and remains manifestly unsatisfactory. Civilian missions are undoubtedly important, but a preference for such missions may indicate the Europeans' option regarding the form the CSDP should take - a structure with a prevalent civilian focus, that will barely make an impact when it comes to genuine security threats. After briefly presenting the emergence of the European Union's defence policy, the ensuing NATO-EU cooperation and the EU and NATO's rapid reaction forces, the paper focuses on the future of European security, especially on the future of the United States' role as the continent's security guarantor.

1. The NATO - EU relationship and European security

An analysis of European security properly debuts with an investigation of the EU-NATO inter-institutional cooperation and America's stance on the emergence of a European security pillar outside of NATO. For the United States, the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) had been a welcome addition that would have led to an increase in interoperability within the Alliance. The creation of a European defence policy had marked, nonetheless, a significant change that was received with pragmatism by the US. NATO represented not only the guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, but also of American hegemony and an autonomous European defence pillar was perceived as nothing short of a defiance.

1.1. NATO Primacy and CSDP Autonomy

NATO has been the main transatlantic institutional forum that played a role in security and defence policy. The EU and the Western European Union (WEU) - its military arm created in 1948 - hardly had any impact in this policy field.¹ The Maastricht Treaty mentions that „the Union requests the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”² Moreover, „WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union *and* as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”³ The Treaty of Amsterdam mentions that the WEU is „providing the Union with access to an operational capability”⁴ (for the Petersberg tasks), while the EU „will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”⁵ After the Amsterdam Treaty, the Western European Union has continued to function as the connection component between the EU and NATO. It must be said that the NATO-WEU interaction has been superior to the WEU-EU one, due to America's intention of keeping the WEU as the guarantee of the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity.

After the Kosovo campaign, the United States expressed its reluctance to intervene in another future crisis on the European continent, making it clear that the EU had to set up a mechanism that would enable it to deploy if and when Europe's security is threatened. In this regard, the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)⁶, a „deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defence of the Alliance territory”⁷, meaning the so-called „non-article 5 operations”. The CJTF concept was designed to offerseparable, but not separate capabilities, that can be used by NATO and, in certain situations, by the WEU.

The compromise reached in 1994 has been completed at the 1996 ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council⁸, through the Berlin Agreement, that has given the Western European Union access to NATO assets and capabilities. The WEU could thus conduct operations without the participation of the United States, yet using its capabilities. The Berlin Agreement and the CJTF concept can be placed in connection to the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity - the American version of the European defence pillar within NATO. An older NATO concept, which can also be found in the Alliance's 1991 strategic concept, the ESDI basically signifies a transfer of responsibility to the European NATO members.

¹Caja SCHLEICH, “NATO and EU in conflict regulation: interlocking institutions and division of labour”, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2014, p. 187.

²***, Treaty on European Union, Article J.4 (2), p. 59, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1992:191:FULL&from=EN>, accessed at 24 March 2015.

³³***, *Ibid.*, Declaration on Western European Union, p.105.

⁴***, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Article J.7 (2), p. 12, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>, accessed at 24 March 2015.

⁵***, *Ibid.*, Art. J.7 (3), p. 12.

⁶***, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm>, accessed at 24 March 2015.

⁷***, The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-eng/16cjtf.pdf>, accessed at 24 March 2015.

⁸***, Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June 1996, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>, accessed at 24 March 2015.

The CJTF concept has apparently represented a convenient compromise as regards the French and British controversies over the primacy of the WEU or of NATO. The logics of the process nonetheless revealed the intention of preserving the EU's dependence on NATO/American capabilities. The ambiguities related to the legitimacy the WEU can claim, the role played by the EU in European security and the „division of labour” among the three organizations has led to somewhat of a blockage, partially solved by the Saint-Malo reunion.

The debate regarding the extent of the EU's autonomy vis-à-vis NATO in regard to security and defence has resurfaced due to the 1998 Franco-British summit held in Saint-Malo. The summit's declaration spoke of the EU's „capacity for autonomous action”, using its own structures, „without unnecessary duplication”, „where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”⁹ The support to „Europeanize” the Saint-Malo declaration has been garnered in the difficult context provided by the war in Kosovo. The Saint-Malo agreement has been formalized at the 1999 European Council in Cologne, a moment that marks the début of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), included in the second pillar of the European Union - the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For the first time, the EU agenda includes concepts such as „conflict prevention” or „crisis management”, related to the Petersberg tasks, the Western European Union being thus incorporated in the EU.

The Franco-British agreement was quite remarkable as it appeared to reconcile the Gaullist pride with the Atlanticist stance on European security. Nonetheless, the progression towards an autonomous European defence was to be supported by the Clinton administration on its own terms. American primacy within the transatlantic relationship was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who warned the EU against the „three Ds”: decoupling, duplication, discrimination.¹⁰ Aside from the imposition of a certain conditionality, the inter-institutional relation was also having a problem regarding hierarchy, related to the so-called „right of first refusal” that NATO reserved for itself regarding future operations. The problem appeared in the context of the Berlin Plus set of agreements between NATO and the EU, that have been concluded in Copenhagen, on 16 December 2002 and have become operational on 17 March 2003. It must be said that the Berlin Plus agreements remain the only form of institutionalization of the cooperation between the two organizations. According to the Berlin Plus arrangements, the European Union receives access to NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led missions, when the Alliance as a whole decides not to get involved.¹¹

The agreements have been created for those situations when the EU takes over a NATO operation or when it launches a mission previously refused by NATO. CSDP has only twice conducted operations within the Berlin plus framework - operation CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia between 31 March and 15 December 2003 and operation EUFOR ALTHEA, launched on 2 December 2004 and which replaced NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fact that EUFOR ALTHEA remains the sole ongoing mission that uses NATO assets and capabilities can be explained by the virtual blockage of the CSDP-NATO collaboration, beginning with May 2004, when Cyprus has become an EU member country. Actually, Cyprus and Turkey „are using the division of Cyprus, whose northern part Turkey invaded forty years ago, as a bargaining chip in NATO

⁹ “British-French Summit, St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998” in Maartje RUTTEN (coord.), “From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents”, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 47, May 2001, p. 8, available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf>, accessed at 25 March 2015.

¹⁰ Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future”, *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998 in Maartje RUTTEN, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

¹¹ ***, Berlin Plus Agreements, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, Press release, 22 August 2003, available at http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm, accessed at 28 March 2015.

and the EU.”¹² The ensuing institutional paralysis has meant that the agenda of the periodical meetings between NATO's North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee can include nothing more than the EUFOR ALTHEA operation. „In other words, issues other than Berlin plus, such as terrorism, Afghanistan or Kosovo cannot be discussed in NATO-EU platforms; thereby rendering the progress of the so-called strategic cooperation ineffectual.”¹³

Turkey objects to the inclusion of Cyprus in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), thus blocking the participation of Cyprus in CSDP missions conducted under Berlin Plus. Because of Turkey's steadfast opposition, the Berlin Plus agreements had been negotiated over a period of two years and could be concluded only when Cyprus and Malta were excluded from the deal. Turkey invoked the fact that it could not approve the dissemination of NATO classified information to the European Union (a fundamental provision of the Berlin Plus agreements) because the information would also be made available to non-PfP members, meaning at that time Cyprus and Malta.¹⁴ The situation has persisted until March 2003, when an agreement on the exchange of classified information has been reached by NATO, the Council of the EU, the High Representative for the CFSP and the European Commission. In its turn, Cyprus refuses to approve the implementation of a document that would allow Turkey to associate itself to the European Defence Agency (EDA). Turkey's frustration stems from what has been long perceived as the breaking of a promise made at the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, where it has received rights and privileges similar to those it had as a full member of the Western Armament Group, EDA's predecessor.¹⁵ Because of the slow pace of its accession talks with the EU, „Turkey will most likely remain skeptical of any autonomous CSDP initiatives and continue preferring a central role for NATO.”¹⁶

1.2. EU and NATO's rapid reaction forces

At the 1999 Helsinki European Council¹⁷, the EU governments have adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal (2003) that included the creation and operationalization of the EU Rapid Reaction Force. By 1 January 2003, the EU member states pledged to „be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks [...] including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons) [...] Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days [...] They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year”¹⁸, while 180,000 troops were necessary for rotation purposes.

At the 2002 Prague North Atlantic Summit, NATO members have decided to create the NATO Response Force (NRF), consisting of „a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to

¹²Judy DEMPSEY, “Time to End the EU-NATO Standoff”, Carnegie Europe, 8 December 2014, available at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=57423>, accessed at 28 March 2015.

¹³ Sinem Akgül ACIKMESE, Dimitrios TRIANTAPHYLLOU, “The NATO-EU-Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2012, p. 564.

¹⁴ Antonio MISSIROLI, “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2002, p. 15.

¹⁵ Simon DUKE, “The Future of EU-NATO Relations: a Case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?”, *European Integration*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2008, p. 38.

¹⁶Oya DURSUN-ÖZKANCA, “Turkey-NATO relations at a crossroads ahead of NATO's New Strategic Concept”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 15 October 2010, available at <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-nato-relations-at-a-crossroads-ahead-of-nato8217s-new-strategic-concept-2010-10-14>, accessed at 26 March 2015.

¹⁷ ***, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, accessed at 24 March 2015.

¹⁸***, Helsinki, Headline Goal, available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf>, accessed at 25 March 2015.

move quickly to wherever needed”¹⁹ When reaching full operational capability, the NRF was supposed to comprise 21,000 troops, that would be drawn from the pool of rapid reaction forces of the member states, the greater part being European. The initial proposal was modified, so that the NRF currently comprises three reaction forces, that rotate every six months and only the forces in stand-by can be deployed. In other words, the NRF actually needs a total of 63.000 troops²⁰, meaning almost the same number of troops committed by the member states through the Helsinki Headline Goal. At the time, it has seemed that troops from the common pool could have been used both within the NATO Response Force and the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

It was obvious though that the European states would not be benefiting from two sets of forces for the cost of one. So the European Union decided to proceed in a manner similar to NATO's, going from massive peacekeeping forces to lighter, much more flexible units. At the Franco-British Summit held in Le Toquet, in February 2003, the two member states brought forth a proposal addressing the European Union's need to have nine easily deployable battlegroups of 1,500 troops each. In February 2004, Germany declared its support for the Franco-British plan and at the November 2004 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, the European Union Battlegroups were officially launched. Each battlegroup would comprise 1,500 troops and, as of 2007, the European Union has two battlegroups on stand-by, for a six-month period, that rotate according to a schedule. „Inspired by the successful Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU's BGs have been touted as a robust and mobile force to address low-level conflict, particularly in Africa.”²¹ Moreover, there is a significant mention that „they were conceived for failed or failing states. In terms of geography, only Africa was mentioned.”²²

Nonetheless, the EU Battlegroups have never been deployed, although there have been situations where their deployment was not only possible, but also direly needed. EUFOR Libya, the military mission approved by the EU Council in 2011, could have used the battlegroups, were it for a (highly improbable) request made by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. „Germany [...] indicated it could participate. With an EU Battle Group on standby, the Germans could have moved fairly quickly.”²³ The reluctance to use the Battlegroups has also been quite clear in the case of the crises unfolding in Mali and the Central African Republic, where „the Europeans collectively preferred to sit on their hands and wait for others [...] to do the heavy lifting before making a late and limited "supporting" contribution.”²⁴ Regarding the Central African Republic, France has deployed troops there in December 2013 and on 10 February 2014, the EU Council has adopted EUFOR RCA, a military mission comprising 750 troops, assigned to protect the airport and two districts of the capital Bangui. „No less than six force generation conferences were

¹⁹ ***, Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, Press Release (2002)127, 21 November 2002, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, accessed at 25 March 2015.

²⁰ Sven BISCOP, Jo COELMONT, *Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a Distinctive Power*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, p. 106.

²¹ Wade JACOBY, Christopher JONES, “The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic: What National Defense Reforms Tell Us about European Rapid Reaction Capabilities”, *European Security*, Vol. 17, Nos. 2-3, 2008, p. 316.

²² Martin REICHARD, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2006, p.75.

²³ Richard GOWAN, “The EU and Libya: Missing in action in Misrata”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 31 May 2011, disponibil la http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_and_libya_missing_in_action_in_misrata, accesat la 27 martie 2015.

²⁴ Richard GOWAN, Nick WITNEY, “Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR Policy Brief, December 2014, p. 2, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/WHY_EUROPE_MUST_STOP_OUTSOURCING_ITS_SECURITY.pdf, accessed at 27 March 2015.

needed to acquire the planned strength, the mission was deployed with a delay of six months and the second largest troop contributor, after France, was a third country - Georgia.”²⁵

One reason given for the reluctance to use the EU Battlegroups has even been „the lack of a genuine necessity for these units”.²⁶ There has been a preference for some tactically more suitable alternatives, whereas the EUBG have been used as a catalyst for the EU capability development process, rather than as a crisis management instrument. Acknowledging the fact that most EU members are lacking readily deployable, agile forces, the battlegroup concept was meant to catalyse a reform of the defence sector in states with little battlefield experience. Needless to say that the big players in European defence do not need battlegroups to deploy their troops abroad, while the others know that the battlegroup is too lax of a framework to generate a genuine transformation of national capabilities. The Battlegroups' weakness is thus their own flexibility, as member states can easily freeride in order to avoid making new commitments.²⁷

At the time, the two rapid reaction forces have certainly created high expectations, even related to a cooperation between them, though „the EU and NATO's more or less simultaneous decisions to establish rapid reaction forces [...] is one striking example of the development of parallel practices.”²⁸ The NATO Response Force has been declared fully operational in November 2006 and the EU Battlegroups, in January 2007. The NRF's initial purpose proved to be too ambitious and in November 2007, NATO ministers issued a declaration withdrawing its full operational capability.²⁹ As regards the EUBG, there have been doubts regarding their strategic viability and their cooperation with non-European military partners in the field.³⁰

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, NATO has taken a series of measures meant to reinforce its eastern flank, most notably the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan at the September 2014 Wales Summit. The plan is meant to boost the Alliance's ability to react to crises in its eastern periphery in a firm and swift manner, including the type of „hybrid warfare” practiced by Russia in eastern Ukraine. Duly following the trend of increasing reaction times, NATO'S Response Force will be consolidated by incorporating the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). According to plans, the VJTF will include a land component of 5,000 troops, with air, maritime and special operations components that can be deployed within days. Though intended to acquire full operational capability status by the beginning of 2017, the VJTF is meant to replace NATO's Immediate Response Force, which basically leaves the number of quickly deployable forces unchanged, meaning 13,000. „What is new is the Alliance's open articulation of its rapid reaction force as an instrument of collective defence and missions linked to NATO's Article 5, as in an attack on one is an attack on all. For more than a decade it was more or less explicitly understood that the core

²⁵Thierry TARDY, “EUFOR RCA: tough start, smooth end”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Alert 17, 13 March 2015, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_17_EUFOR_RCA.pdf, p. 1, accessed at 27 March 2015.

²⁶Wade JACOBY, Christopher JONES, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

²⁷Wade JACOBY, Christopher JONES, *Ibid.*

²⁸ Nina GRÆGER, Kristin M. HAUGEVIK, “The EU's Performance with and within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices”, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 2011, p. 747.

²⁹The withdrawal of the NRF's full operational capability status has been related to NATO Allies withdrawing their pledges in order to contribute to other ongoing operations at the time, most notably ISAF in Afghanistan. That was the context that prompted the proposal to maintain a 'permanent nucleus' of the NRF – the Immediate Response Force (IRF) – comprising 13,000 troops.

³⁰ Richard GOWAN, “The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?”, pp. 13-19 in Sven BISCOP (ed.), “E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union”, Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Papers, No. 7, 2005, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/8982/1/ep7.pdf>, accessed at 27 March 2015.

purpose of NATO's response forces [...] was to serve as a vehicle of transformation gradually modernising the allies' military units."³¹

2. Future perspectives for European security

The current strategic environment is remarkably different from the one at the time of the European Council of December 2013, where the latest decisions regarding European defence have been taken. Postrevolutionary transitions in the Middle East seem to exceed even the worst expectations - Libya is a failing state, the threat of radical Islam ceaselessly expands across the region, while the vacuum left in Iraq and Syria allowed for something like ISIS to flourish. Perhaps in a more worrying manner, Russia's behavior seems to set to question the basic assumptions that underpin the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Russian revisionism is reminiscent of great-power politics, even bringing to the fore the possibility of a continental war. Although the Europeans are facing their most serious threats since the end of the Cold War, the state of the EU's defence posture does not give much hope for optimism. John McCain's outburst at the Munich Security Conference is a case in point. Branding the German chancellor's opposition to providing lethal military support to Ukraine as „foolishness”³², McCain's criticism goes to the heart of the debate on Europe's (insufficient) contribution to its own security.

This debate gained new momentum at the peak of the global economic and financial crisis, when America has announced its shift towards Asia-Pacific, where it has to contend with its most important competitor for decades to come. When compared to the long-term relevance of the impending Sino-U.S. strategic rivalry, the European continent's crises seem worthy of less attention, which was initially reflected in the downsizing of America's troops in Europe. The move did not necessarily increase Europe's awareness of the need to boost its own defence capabilities. On the contrary, in the context of a Eurozone still dominated by austerity policies, the downward trend in Europeans' defence spending persists, while NATO's 2 percent spending goal has little likelihood of being respected.

Needless to say, the Ukraine crisis has brought about a renewed focus on Europe. The measures taken thus far have been intended to reassure those Eastern allies most concerned with Russia's aggressive policy. Such measures include the adoption of the NATO Readiness Action Plan that will ensure a swift and firm response to security challenges, the creation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force that can be rapidly deployed „to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's territory”³³, an expanded maritime presence in the Black and Baltic Sea areas and large-scale ground forces exercises in Poland and the Baltic states. With the help of a reinvigorated American commitment, NATO has strengthened its eastern flank defences, delineating the geographical limits of its security guarantees. Rightly so, „while Ukraine is neither a member of NATO nor a U.S. ally, the United States (along with Russia and Great Britain) committed to provide security assurances to Ukraine in exchange for Kyiv giving up its inherited nuclear weapons in the 1994 Budapest

³¹ Jens, RINGSMOSE, “NATO's Response Force reloaded: How much support, to counter which threats?”, Friends of Europe, 3 February 2015, available at <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/security-europe/natos-response-force-reloaded-much-support-counter-threats/>, accessed at 21 March 2015.

³² Michael R. GORDON, Alison SMALE, Steven ERLANGER, “Western Nations Split on Arming Kiev Forces”, *The New York Times*, 7 February 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/world/europe/divisions-on-display-over-western-response-to-ukraine-at-security-conference.html?_r=0, accessed at 28 March 2015.

³³ ***, Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (2014) 120, 5 September 2014, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, accessed at 28 March 2015.

memorandum.”³⁴ In other words, „the strategic difference between NATO allies [...] on the one hand, and nonmember Ukraine, on the other, is the U.S. nuclear umbrella. As the Europeans will be unable to match or replace this ultimate security guarantee with their own nuclear arms (French and British nukes aren't overly relevant in this equation), *Europe will remain dependent on the U.S. deterrence capability for a long time to come.*”³⁵

Nevertheless, America's extension of a nuclear guarantee to its NATO allies or the Washington Treaty's Article 5 clause cannot and should not account for an over-reliance on US security services. When the idea of a European army has recently resurfaced, being invoked by the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, the ensuing debate not only pointed to the lack of interoperability of 28 different military forces, but also to a reluctance on the part of some members (i.e. Great Britain) to adhere to such an endeavour, for the recurrent fear of duplicating structures and decoupling Europe from America. In contrast, Germany has responded positively to this vague proposal, which does not make the issue of an independent EU army more than it is - an exercise of imagination - especially since the EU will probably not even be making any significant steps towards achieving operational autonomy. Moreover, there are high chances that in the case of a serious crisis, the current *modus operandi* will persist - the intervention of a state or a coalition of willing states, clearly not under the aegis of the EU, while the actual deployment of a battlegroup will remain a matter of national political will.

Conclusion

The crises at Europe's borders lend a sense of urgency to the creation of a unitary European framework for military cooperation. More robust European capabilities will not only allow the EU to tackle problems from its strategic surroundings, but it will also strengthen the transatlantic alliance. As it has been presented, the Europeans need to acknowledge that they have to take more control of their own security. Those EU members, such as Great Britain, that still seek to impede the development of the CSDP by invoking the duplication of NATO structures or the decoupling from America may want to more accurately identify what America is actually encouraging and that is European strategic autonomy. The ability to project significant force in response to crises, outside the framework of NATO is thus a necessity of current times, but also the original objective of the CSDP and the EU leaders need not forget their initial commitment to develop a common European defence.

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³⁴Jeffrey MANKOFF, Andrew KUCHINS, “Russia, Ukraine, and U.S. Policy Options: A Briefing Memo”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 29 January 2015, p. 4, available at http://csis.org/files/publication/150129_Mankoff_RussiaUkraineUSOptions_Web.pdf, accessed at 28 March 2015.

³⁵Jan TECHAU, “The Illusion of an Independent EU Army”, Carnegie Europe, 10 March 2015, available at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=59296>, accessed at 28 March 2015.

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DECONSTRUCTING THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AFTER 2005

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Abstract: *This paper examines the dynamics of the construction of the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom after 2005. It will make an analysis of what was learned in the time between the two events and will try to identify what is still to be improved in enhancing the internal security of Western Europe. The point of departure is that the link between a condition and threat framing should not to be taken for granted, and that threat construction is subjective and varies among actors. This assertion will be demonstrated through our analysis. This will be done from a neo-realist perspective in order to attain a better image of the conditional relation between these factors. The analysis should allow us to make the appropriate correlations between conditions and threat constructions are intricate, and that the explanation of a securitization lies in the interaction of certain social and cognitive processes.*

Keywords: *United Kingdom, terrorism, threat, Iraq, Afghanistan, reform, security*

Introduction

The 21st century brought us a great deal of changes in the way international conflicts are happening. While during the Cold War, we could talk about a mirrored correlation between the human material, financial and informational resources available to be used in finding a legal solution to a critical situation generated by conflicting or irreconcilable interests.

Even though the literature flourishes in research on technical means and on covert operations, we need to have a more profound approach to find actual research on intelligence research and analysis. In this paper, we will show how the terrorist threat influenced the last ten years of writing Britain’s security policies and its role in the world.

We start this analysis from the premise that intelligence policies and intelligence analysis must not be seen as fortune telling but as a scientific method that allows professionals to devise *probabilities* and to make available *possible solutions* for the political leaders, its purpose being to reduce uncertainty to an absolute minimum, necessary in attaining the proper decision.

We will try to identify the several degrees of responsibility in the British intelligence and national-security systems. Due to spatial limitations, we will only try to answer to two fundamental questions: *Which are the elements that lead to a global approach to terrorism?* And *How are evolving the antiterrorist policies evolving to face the new challenges?* To answer these questions we will examine the major pieces of legislation in Britain and how are they perceived in the society. We will also try to shed some light on how intelligence work is perceived in Britain - having as key points the London Bombings of 2005, the chain letters attack of January-February 2007, the bombing of the Glasgow Airport and the beheading of a British soldier in 2013.

In other words, we start the deconstruction from a recent problem – management of the threat of the Islamic State, to the profound analysis of the way in which the terrorist threat is dealt by the British national-security apparatus. In this sense, we will take a leap from contemporaneity into the not so distant past, in order to observe the terrorist activity in 20th century Britain, and the security paradigms generated by it. These were transformed into genuine security policies implemented at one time or another. Therefore, the second element of this paper is made of the way Britain responded to the terrorist threat and how was this made a national strategy. Finally, we will take the above results and will put them into the global paradigm of the responses to terrorism. This has to be done as Britain is an active member of the international community and to a set of alliances that are as well influenced by the Britain’s policies in the field.

1. History of the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom

British intelligence has the reputation of being some of the most experienced throughout the world. Despite their long history and of the expertise gained in the fight against the Irish Liberation Army, the global wave of fundamentalist terrorism created a context never seen before. According to the Security Service (MI5) the United Kingdom is a major target for international terrorist organizations, a large number of their operatives or associates being known to operate within its territory. Organizations such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State have explicitly threaten the UK and the other members of the coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹

We deem relevant to mention some of the major fundamentalist - terrorist attacks in the UK in the past ten years. The emergence of groups affiliated to Al Qaeda in the Pakistan’s Federal Tribal Administrated Areas has led to the widening and increasing of the threats from Islamic terrorism against the western world. We can undoubtedly say that the *Arab Spring* was a catalyst for increasing the number of the fundamentalist groups, some of which manifesting an active interest in attacking the UK and their interests.²

| o. | Date | Incident | Type | Author |
|----|------------|--|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| | 07.07.2005 | Bombing of the London transport system | Suicide Attack | Al Qaeda |
| | 01-02.2005 | Chain letter bombings | Letter bombings | Domestic |
| | 30.07.2007 | Glasgow Airport Bombing | Suicide Attack | Islamic extremism |
| | 30.06.2008 | Failed bombing in Exter | Suicide attack | Domestic Islamic extremism |
| | 22.05.2013 | Beheading of a British soldier in London | Religious motivated crime | Islamic extremism |

Table 1. Major terrorist incidents since 2005

¹The Security Service, “International Terrorism,” accessed 4 May 2015, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terrorism.html>.

² *Ibidem*.

Al Qaeda is known to be active for approximately the last twenty years, reaching its apex in 2001 with the attacks on the United States. Ten years later, despite being decapitated, the organization evolved into a completely different direction from the centralized structure of the 1990s. After the *extreme prejudice* solution against Osama bin Laden, the organization became more decentralized as a series of regional leaders emerged.³ One of the major effects of the decentralization of Al Qaeda's former *monopoly* was the emergence of several regional organizations, comparable in size and power with the aforementioned.

The Islamic State had emerged at the same period as Al-Qaeda and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, however, the opportunity for their growth rose only with the 2003 invasion of Iraq when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi proclaims himself the leader of the insurgency against the coalition. Although he is eliminated in 2006, the group continues the fight under Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, unleashing new campaigns in the Middle East and in the Western Europe.⁴

2. British answer to the terrorist threat

The antiterrorist effort is essentially linked to the prevention of the perpetration of the terrorist threat, or the diminishing of the effects of the terrorist threat. Each terrorist threat or act can be considered an effect of the state's security apparatus. Terrorism makes governments to rethink their policies designed to protect their own citizens. We can see after the last wave of attacks against North America and Western Europe a set of countermeasures designed to enhance, among others, the cooperation between intelligence agencies, but without showing much concern for the possible breaches of *habeas corpus*.⁵ This has led to a heightened attention from citizens and political action groups.

Successive governments, security forces as well as the Muslim communities in Britain took part in numerous initiatives designed to the support of the monitoring of the incidents related to the Muslim community. Furthermore, the government ran several actions within the community together with its leaders.⁶ UK Home Office developed a consultation process with the Muslim community with the purpose of enhancing cohesion and tackling extremism.

Starting with 2005, the UK manifested a strong and constant interest in the adaptation of the security and intelligence agencies, this tendency *surviving* cabinet shuffles. The quality of most of the legislative changes can be long debated, especially the failure to establish a structure similar to the US Homeland Security. This objective was only partially fulfilled by the establishment of several departments within the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice – structures similar to those in other EU member states. Labour governments of 2005-2008 had to tackle severe threats such as the improvised explosive devices at the Glasgow International Airport.⁷

³ Mohammad-Mahmoud OULD MOHAMEDOU, "The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda Lessons in Post-September 11 Transnational Terrorism," *Geneva Papers* (2011) p. 8.

⁴ Patrick COCKBURN, "The Rise of Islamic State Review: the story of ISIS," *Guardian*, 9 February 2015, accessed 4 May 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/09/rise-of-islamic-state-patrick-cockburn-review-isis-new-sunni-revolution>.

⁵ Chiara GIORGETTI, "Balancing Security and Human Rights : Post 9/11 Reactions in the United States and Europe," in *Europe Confronts Terrorism*, ed. Karin Von HIPPEL (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 244-62

⁶ "FOIA Centre News: Home Office Funds Muslim Council of Britain." *FOIA Centre Homepage: 'freedom of Information' and 'open-access' Laws*. FOIA Centre. 06 Apr. 2015. <http://www.foiacentre.com/news-MCB-060510.html>.

⁷ BBC News, "Blazing Car Crashes Into Airport," *BBC News*, 30 June 2007, accessed 6 April 2015, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6257194.stm>.

The British Government is considering the implementation of some of the experiences of their European allies, such as France, where magistrates have special powers in investigating terrorism. A new set of legislation is still under debate in the Parliament – reflecting a better knowledge of the terrorist threat due to better research on the subject in the past years. For example, the treatment given to financial statements in the 2000 Bill was amended to include charities and guilds, compelling them to publish all potential suspect transactions. Among other measures, we have to mention the effort to create a unique DNA database – modeled on the US one; and a series of legal mechanisms designed to control the persons suspected of traveling abroad with terrorist purposes. For this reason, the legislation was modified to include *terrorism from racial or ethnic grounds*.

During its short term, Gordon Brown managed to accomplish very little the antiterrorist policies, this being mostly due to the need to continue the implementation of the policies enacted by the former cabinet. Even so, we can identify a bi-partisan tendency in the implementation of the policies, in a way similar to that in the United States. Among the most important legislative measures, we identify the tendency to allow detention without pressing charges before a courtroom – a measure desired by the former administration but which didn't pass parliamentary approval, or other judicial surveillance measures.

Even though the administrative model remained unchanged, keeping three types of contingency (natural disasters, man-made catastrophes and terrorism), we see an ever-increasing cooperation between the different agencies and departments. These are the preconditions of the functioning of the departmental structures involved in the functioning of the three pillars of the anti-terrorist strategy. The first being the Action Plan for countering violent extremism: winning hearts and minds – it depends upon the cooperation between the interior and foreign ministries, local government and a multitude of other authorities part of the Committee for Integration and Cohesion.⁸

As for the anti-terrorist reaction system, the *declaration* underlines three important elements that need to be better analysed by the academia but also by the general public. First, we have to take into account whether the use of evidence gathered without a warrant should be admissible in the courtroom. Secondly, we have to consider the complex investigations related to international terrorism and whether the government has legitimate reasons to extend the maximum detention without pressing charges to 28 days.⁹

The 2010 elections led to a cabinet shuffle and a new paradigm brought by the David Cameron administration. He proved to be the supporter of more strict security policies, managing to pass legislation that allows the police to investigate suspects without pressing charges, compelling convicted terrorists to notify the police on changes in their residency status, the extension of the extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes committed against the British interests abroad,¹⁰ or the reauthorization of freezing the propriety of terrorism suspects.¹¹

⁸ Declaration on security" of Gordon Brown to the Parliament of July 25, 2007, and the letter by Ruth Kelly, Member of Parliament and Secretary of State for communities and Local Government, the Chairman of the Joint Committee of human rights of the House of Lords and Commons, June 27, 2007, 19 report of the Joint Committee of human rights of the Chamber of the Lords and Commons, session 2006-2007 Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 Days, Intercept and Post charge Questioning HL 157 and 394 HC, Ev. 67-8 7, The Stationery Office, London, 7th 30, 2007.

⁹ Home Office, consultation document on detention without a charge, July 2007.

¹⁰ UK Counterterrorism Act 2008.

¹¹ Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010

An expected evolution in the fight against terrorism should have come with the Counter-terrorism and Security Bill of 2015, despite the cabinet being unable to pass bold measures regarding cyber crime and domestic extremism. Its critics argued that restrictive measures such as seizing passports – a right previously held by the Home Secretary himself; or the long term storage of Internet traffic data, were catalogued as a dangerous threat to personal freedom. Furthermore, the act gives extensive rights for the limitation of the movements of foreigners within the UK.

Despite evident progress and of the new means introduced to the security services, David Cameron pledged the commitment during the General Election of 2015 that in the first year of his second term - if he is to be re-elected – to give a new legal framework for the GCHQ – the British agency responsible in monitoring communications, as well as for the other agencies responsible in monitoring suspects of terrorism.¹²

3. The intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and Britain's global role

Shortly after the attacks on New York and Washington the first fear of UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair was that the Bush administration will use these events to launch an attack against Iraq without proving an actual connection between the two. To avoid this, Blair should have imposed his vision over that of George Bush. An appropriate answer to the attacks of September 11 must have been directed against Al Qaeda and had to be sanctioned and supported by organizations such as the United Nations or NATO. The next step was to give an ultimatum to the Taliban regime in Kabul to cease sheltering and supporting Al Qaeda operatives: either they turn down Bin Laden, its accomplices and close the training camps and allow international inspectors or they will be military coerced to do so. For this reason, Blair and its advisors considered essential that the relationship with the neighbouring Pakistan and Iran to be bettered to a level where they support the British effort. Another point on the agenda was the revitalization of the Middle East Peace Process, making a priority in order to attain the support of the Arab world in the fight against terrorism.

At the same time with the preparation of the invasion, Blair had to handle the internal security of the UK. While before 9/11 the administration was mainly concerned of IRA's activity, now they also needed to consider threats like Al Qaeda and its accomplices.¹³ – the first immediate actions to ensure a security framework for the British had created a conflict between the labour government and liberal-democrats.

The intervention in Afghanistan marked the start of the critics against the Blair cabinet from the opposition and from the government itself. His top priority was that the military intervention to be fast and with a minimum loss of lives and with a continued support of the international community. Furthermore, with the downfall of the Taliban regime, the UK and the US started to have diverging opinions on the search for Bin Laden whether they should keep

¹²Patrick WINTOUR, "David Cameron to Reveal New Laws to Fight Terrorism in the Uk," *Guardian*, 13 November 2014, accessed 5 Mai 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/13/david-cameron-counter-terrorism-strategy-australia-speech>.

¹³ Dacă în 2000 exista deja Terrorism Act, în 2001 a fost dat Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, care nu a primit acordul în Camera Lorzilor, urmat în 2005 de Prevention of Terrorism Act și Terrorism Bill care îmbunătățeau simțitor capacitatea de acțiune a forțelor de ordine împotriva acțiunilor teroriste Counterterrorism and Security Bill care îmbunătățește legislația în domeniul extremismului domestic și al securității cibernetice, precum și măsurile legislative ce urmează să fie promovate ca efect al promisiunilor din campania pentru alegerile generale din mai 2015 ce promit să afecteze agenții precum GCHQ sau Security Service (MI5).

searching for Bin Laden and annihilate Al Qaeda or the coalition forces to provide troops to occupy and rebuild Afghanistan. The chosen solution was to build - with massive British support – the International Security Assistance Force under NATO command. While Afghanistan became *history* for the American administration right after the fall of the Taliban regime, it was not the same case for the British. At 7 January 2002, Tony Blair makes a visit to Baghram where he meets Hamid Karzai – provisional leader of Afghanistan – proclaiming the full British support in the reconstruction of the country.¹⁴ This direct promise can be interpreted as a reward for the cooperation manifested by the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in October 2001, when he agreed to join the effort against Al Qaeda.

Regarding Iraq, the things are far more controversial. Though unofficially it was credited that Afghanistan represented only the tip of the iceberg, Britain was yet to figure US's standpoint only after the State of the Union address of 30 January 2002. When Bush indicated North Korea, Iran and Iraq as the new axis of evil it became clear that somehow the UK must either find a way to withdraw from such a dangerous adventure or find a bulletproof justification for their next stop in Iraq, even though in 1998 the UK took part together with the United States in Operation Desert Storm to *contain Saddam and change the regime*¹⁵, that approach wasn't directly preparing an invasion to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.

The decision to join the US in an intervention against Iraq is one of the most important ones taken by the Blair administration. At the beginning of 2002 he considered that the most important threat is that of WMD proliferation by terrorists. The possibility that WMD's to fall in the hands of terrorists lead to the necessity of disarming Iraq. This was supported by numerous breaches of UNSC resolutions, all these suggesting the possibility that other rogues states could manifest a similar behaviour and remain unpunished.

For Blair, the attitude towards the Iraqi threat was the ultimate test between establishing a new world order and world chaos. The elimination of these threats could have been done according to Blair only by standing by the US. This approach and his friendship with George Bush led to some intense debates.¹⁶ However this was not only from a personal point of view, several British prime ministers were real players in Washington – Churchill, MacMillan, Thatcher – this was a role desired by Blair for Britain. He said “I'm the only western leader that will be listened in the US on these matters. Of course a price must be paid [...] My goal is to make the Americans to support a viable strategy for Iraq, that will consider a military intervention only in the right circumstances. This strategy must be widened to include other issues such as the peace process in the Middle East, Africa and the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”¹⁷

Conclusions

Making a deep analysis of the entire national security legal framework in the United Kingdom would have been a far too great effort that would have remained unsubstantial in such

¹⁴ Alastair CAMPBELL, *The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries* (New York: Knopf, 2007), p. 600.

¹⁵ Terminologia în engleză este ”containment plus regime change” – această nouă strategie a fost introdusă de Madeleine Albright la începutul lui decembrie 1998, într-un efort de a-l forța pe Saddam să fie de acord cu cerințele ONU;

¹⁶ “Blair, Bush's puppy” is one of the best known;

¹⁷ Anthony SELDON, *Blair Unbound* (London: Simon & Schuster UK, 2009), p.87.

a limited space. Far from promoting an isolationist policy, the United Kingdom needs to *gather its forces* to face the *unknown* of the new international system.

In the United Kingdom as in most European countries, the debate over security policies focused mainly on the legality and extensivity of the means used by the governmental agencies. These problems must be tackled in an integrated manner, having in mind the development of new instruments to tackle the new threats.

The failed bombings of 2007 have demonstrated that initial evaluations of the phenomenon were well founded and tackled. The security structures and their strategies are by all means dynamic, trying at the same time to correct structural failures – including coordination issues – as well as the effort to elaborate new legislation where there is little or no regulation.

Experts warn of the risk that some measures taken hot end up being revoked by international justice. The clearest precedent over-regulation is on the US Patriot Act, passed after the 11 September 2001 and included measures such wiretaps without a warrant. We cannot deny the existence of the extremist groups, and individuals prepared to commit terrorist attacks in Europe; however, governments resorted to different approaches in tackling the issue. The extreme violence backed by religious or xenophobic views has reached the front lines of the news and the made the top-priority list of the security agencies since the second half of the 2000s in countries like the UK, Spain, France, Denmark or Germany.

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DERADICALIZATION: DIFFERENT APPROACHES

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***Abstract:** Counterterrorism experts consider that in order to prevent radicalization of vulnerable individuals through virtual space there is a need to go beyond security and intelligence measures and adopt proactive measures. Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian governments have established prison-based individual rehabilitation programs that usually promote a non violent interpretation of Islam while Europeans officials have taken a very different approach based on cooperation with Muslim representatives.*

This article shows that radicalization programs can not simply be translated from one state to another even within the same region and that they have to take into account the specificity of every nation.

***Keywords:** deradicalization, intelligence, terrorism, strategies, national security*

1. Deradicalization – a realistic objective... or not

Terrorism continues to pose a significant threat to civilians, spreading around the globe with a destructive interpretation of Islam. In order to mitigate these risks, every state has developed different strategies to counter the radicalization of the Muslim population. But, culture matters. Therefore, for a full understanding of the reasons why an individual is determined to leave extremist groups one should study, first of all, the regional context.¹

Terrorists' deradicalization is a much-discussed process which requires participation of the state and local authorities as they cannot dismiss as negligible the increased number of attacks in different countries, especially from Middle East, and the potential risk surrounding far-right groups, narco-terrorists, and al-Qaeda affiliated groups.

This article examines the basis of deradicalization approaches, pointing out the way in which cultural, social, economic, and religious patterns are influencing the scope and extent of the programs developed by each state. To understand the basis of this approach we must make the difference between deradicalization programs (which aim to reform terrorists) and counter-radicalization efforts (which can prevent the radicalization of vulnerable persons). Deradicalization can therefore be considered an important tool in each country's counter-terrorism, and counter-radicalization approaches. Transformation towards non-violent is seen as a complex process which has the goal to remove tens of thousands of militants from the ranks of al-Qaeda or other group' supporters.²

Taking into account that is very difficult to change an ideology that is rooted in a major religion, as Islam is, many experts believe that the real scope of such programs must be disengagement which doesn't entail a change in beliefs, but only some behavior modifications (e.g. removing individuals from a terrorist group and thus refraining them from further violent actions).

The most important instrument to assess effectiveness of a deradicalization program is represented by recidivism rate. Even if we can notice some achievements as far as the recidivism rates are concerned, there are still a lot of questions if deradicalization schemes

¹ Angel RABASA, Stacies I. PETTYJOHN, Jeremy J. GHEZ, and Christopher BOUCEK, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremist*, 2010, p. 192.

² Marisa L.PORGES, Jessica STERN, "Getting Deradicalization Right", *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2010.

really work. Every program developed by government officials has seen several failures. In Saudi Arabia, members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula returned to militancy and in Indonesia from hundreds of militants detained since October 2002 Bali bombing, only 20 can be considered “reformed”. In that case, critics said the government should have hired people with “*knowledge and charm*” who are respected by the suspected terrorists and could help them give up radical views³. Another example is the deradicalization of Armed Islamic Group’s militants from Algeria, a process which failed to succeed.⁴

So, taking into consideration these situations, one can consider that by developing weak deradicalization programs governments have an excuse to avoid dealing with the real causes behind the militancy.

Another worry is the region where the deradicalization programs are developed, the cultural, social, and religious context being very important for the operation’s success. According to Philip Mudd, ex-CIA officer on South Asia and terrorism, “*deradicalization doesn’t take place in a vacuum. One of the reasons for the disappointment of the ongoing US-led detainee deradicalization program in Afghanistan is that, when released, its subjects return directly to villages in areas where support for the Taliban insurgents is strong*”⁵

Peter Neumann, member of the International Center for the Study of Radicalization at King’s College London, considers that deradicalization can only work “*when an insurgency or an extremist movement was losing*”. A good example is Saudi Arabia, which is now almost entirely free of extremist violence. On the opposite side is Pakistan, where due to the ongoing civil war, there have been additional complications.

In 1974, Robert Martinson, assistant professor at the City College of New York, had reviewed 231 offender rehabilitation programs and concluded that “*with few and isolated exceptions, these efforts had no appreciated effect on recidivism in regard to ordinary crime*”⁶.

Even if we speak about “*individual deradicalization*” or “*collective deradicalization*” we cannot ignore the power of ideological indoctrination and the limits of these efforts. The principles of terrorist ideology are regarded as religious obligations, being therefore very hard to build barriers to recidivism⁷. The best practices cannot be identified. Instead, every country develops different tools that fit best on its cultural patterns, political obstacles or social and economic problems.

1.1 Middle East Approaches

Middle Eastern countries have developed prison-based individual or collective rehabilitation programs, very different in approach, motivation and result, despite the fact that all have the same final objectives: return to non-violence.

One of the first regime to look at deradicalization was the Egyptian Mubarak Government who tried to exploit the divisions between hardliners and relative moderated in the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya Group (IG)⁸. The objective of these efforts has been the “*collective deradicalization*” which aims to moderate entire militant organizations. By 2007, the deradicalization process had been consolidated, with more than 15,000 IG militants being

³ Christanto DISCKY, *Deradicalization program a failure: Researchers*, accessed on June 26, 2010, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/06/26/deradicalization-program-a-failure-researcher.html

⁴ OMAR Ashour, *Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures*, November 2008, p. 3.

⁵ Jason BURKE, *Fighting Terrorism: Do radicalization camps really work?*, June 2013, accessed on June 9, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-deradicalization-camps-work>

⁶ Jessica STERN, *Deradicalization on Disengagement of Terrorists Is It Possible?*, 2010, p.9

⁷ Kate BARRELLE, *Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, 2010, p. 1.

⁸ The OG was a former ally of al-Qaeda that cooperated in the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 for signing the peace treaty with Israel.

removed from the salafi-jihadi camp. Jihad's deradicalization process, however, has been only partially successful in the country.

Saudi Arabia led the way in this field with a relative successful program that has experienced a low recidivism rate. Christopher Boucek, member of Carnegie Endowment, analyses three key components of the Saudi strategy: prevention (hundreds of programs were developed "*to educate the population about radical extremism with significant impact on Saudi public perceptions about terrorism*"), rehabilitation (members of the Ministry of Interior's Advisory Committee frequently meet with detainees "*to change misinterpretation of Islam*", in many cases encouraging family's participation in the rehabilitation process), and aftercare programs (Saudi Officials are making efforts for "*continuing the rehabilitation after the release of the detainees from state custody*" through educational training, continued religious and psychological counseling as well as through extensive social network support)⁹.

Another example is Yemen, which launched its dialogue program after arresting a large number of Yemeni suspects of terrorist activities, following the 9/11 attacks. But, according to RAND experts Angel Rabasa, Stacies I. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, Yemen's rehabilitation program was unsuccessful mainly due to the Government's inability to assure a postrelease care.¹⁰

In contrast to Egypt, which focused on collective deradicalization, Yemen and Saudi Arabia used individual programs to promote a religious dialogue with the detainees.

1.2. South East Asian Approaches

In this region, programs aimed to rehabilitate terrorist from Jemaah Islamiah network, a secretive group established in 1993 by two Indonesian clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The deradicalization efforts took place in the context of the JI fragmentation and can be observed two big models, which have influenced the entire region's strategies:

- One model represented by Singaporean and Malaysian programs-well resourced, structured and focused;
- Indonesian model – run by a few police officers without the support of other government agencies, and funded by private donors.

Singapore is probably the best example of what a comprehensive program means. Here, the rehabilitation process begins in prison and continues long after the release of detainees. In this case, we don't speak only about a psychological rehabilitation, but also about a religious and a social one. Last, but not least, authorities put a focus on communities' involvement and family support. Unlike others states, especially from Europe, programs developed in these countries have a strong theological dialogue component aimed at informing extremists about the correct interpretation of Islam.

1.3. European Approaches

Over the last few years, European authorities have introduced a wide array of radicalization initiatives seeking to prevent young Muslims from radicalizing and, in some limited cases, to deradicalize committed militants or persuade them to disengage. Different approaches were adopted due to their differences as far as religions, cultures and societies are concerned. Unlike Middle Eastern countries where programs have an important theological component, Europeans cannot promote an interpretation of Islam or is very difficult for them to do that despite the fact that some countries maintain a close relation with churches. So, they

⁹ Christopher BOUCEK, *Saudi Arabia's soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare*, September 22, 2008, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/09/22/saudi-arabia-s-soft-counterterrorism-strategy-prevention-rehabilitation-and-aftercare/ex3>

¹⁰ Angel RABASA, Stacies I. PETTYJOHN, Jeremy J.GHEZ, Christopher BOUCEK, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremist*, 2010, p. 52.

have chosen an indirect path, supporting Muslim nongovernmental organizations with sufficient credibility within the Muslim community.

Since 2005, the activity in this field has been guided by the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment, which contains standards and measures that aim to prevent terrorist radicalization.¹¹ But, despite this fact, there is not a broad political consensus on how to tackle extremism and the tools need to confront this issue. As of today only the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway have issued a comprehensive national counter-radicalization strategy, even if virtually all Western European countries have adopted at least some counter-radicalization initiatives, often only at the local level.

There are significant variations between European programs in terms of goals, structures, budget, and philosophy, as none of them can be separated from the political, cultural, and legal context in which they were conceived. Nevertheless, there are some experiences and lessons learnt that are common to all states.

Instead of addressing the ideological dimension of extremism, radicalization is seen as a broader social problem related to the high unemployment rates, criminality, urban fragmentation, and other social illness.

Of all European countries, *the UK* has faced the most significant threat from domestic terrorism. Lorenzo Vidino and James Bradon in *Counter Radicalization in Europe* explain that this fact is based upon a combination of factors: a large influx of Islamists from the Arab world and South Asia, a highly tolerant policy of *multiculturalism state*, and a large and young Pakistani-origin population.

The prevent level of the British CONTEST strategy¹² has three main objectives: the ideological challenge (*challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote*), supporting vulnerable people (organizations commissioned to provide support to such kind of individuals *must be credible and able to reach and talk to people at risk*), and working with key sectors (a wide range of sectors are helping *to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism*).¹³

The British Government realized that it could not directly tackle extremism and this argument lies beneath the cooperation of British authorities with important Muslim bodies, such as Muslim Council of Britain, Progressive British Muslims, British Muslim Forum, Sufi Muslim Council or Quilliam Foundation.¹⁴ It also developed different projects aimed at helping young vulnerable Muslims to integrate into society and to have access to labor market and education. An example is *M-Power*, a local initiative developed in Northwest London for the young Somalis, which involves organizations of debates about radicalization, terrorism, democracy, and foreign affairs. Another example is *Radical Middle Way*, a British government-sponsored project that brings traditional Muslim scholars to speak to young British Muslims and denounce terrorism from a theological perspective. Other local project included *trust-building measures* between police and local Muslim institutions and a range of police-led initiative targeting schools, which aim at increasing awareness of the risk of extremism among children. An example to that end is *Operation Nicole*, implemented in dozens of cities

¹¹ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/radialisation/index_en.htm

¹² The counter-terrorism strategy has four elements: Prevent (preventing terrorists), Pursue (pursuing terrorists and their sponsors), Protect (protecting the British population), and Prepare (preparing for the consequences of a terrorist attack)

¹³ HM Government, *Contest: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, July 2011, p.8, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/100000/strategy-contest.pdf

¹⁴ According to RAND experts, Quilliam Foundation is one of the most active and certainly the most visible British Muslim group involved in counter radicalization. Its work consists in media activities –it disseminates articles in mainstream British media, training – of local government personnel and police, work in academic institution, community events –session with local imams, politicians, teachers, police officials, public debates with Islamists.

and aimed at bringing together local police officers and members of the Muslim community who spend a weekend getting to know each other in informal settings, sharing meals and playing football. The initiative has yielded good results, even transcending its radicalization prevention aim.¹⁵

On the other hand, Germany has also reached out to Muslim organizations and communities developing a couple of initiatives (*The Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point - Clearingstelle Präventionskooperation and Nationwide Phone Hotlines-HATIF* and BAMF's *Counseling Center Radicalization – Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung*¹⁶). The difference is that Germany does not have a national-wide strategy but federal programs implemented by each of the sixteen federal states, which are different as far as the scope, objective, and timing of initiatives are concerned, such as whether domestic intelligence services – as opposed to migration and refugees offices – should be in charge of phone help line and awareness programs or whether programs to exit extremist circles constitute a viable option. Thus, Berlin's intelligence service uses theological arguments to counter extremist interpretation of Qur'an while other states don't engage in any theological debates. In Brandenburg, since 2010 the intelligence service has begun convening regional security dialogues to educate the public on Islamist radicalization and extremism.

Federal and state governments are collaborating as part of a working group led by German Interior Ministry on prevention of Islam extremism and terrorism. Representing state and federal security services at the more tactical level, the Joint Counterterrorism Center (*Gemeinsames Terror-Abwehr Zentrum, GTAZ*) added a new working group dealing exclusively with deradicalization in December 2009 (*AG Deradikalisierung*), specifically tasked with amassing federal and state counter-radicalization initiatives, sharing experiences and best practices, and developing new policies.¹⁷

It should be noted that there are important variations between the targeted interventions implemented throughout Europe one of them concerning the role of law enforcement agencies. In the UK, Channel, the country's targeted intervention scheme, is largely police-led. In Netherlands and in Denmark, on the other hand, where several cities conduct targeted interventions, law enforcement agencies are only marginally involved in the process while in Amsterdam and Copenhagen, for example, the entity making the assessment and planning the intervention is a unit within the city administration.

Conclusions

Counter-radicalization programs have attracted strong criticism from various quarters being considered ineffective and a waste of money. Some worry they infringe on civil liberties by criminalizing thoughts, while others argue they stigmatize the Muslims, therefore potentially resulting in the opposite of what they are intended to achieve. Despite all the difficulties and controversies that such programs face, most counter-terrorism practitioners believe that at least some forms of counter-radicalization are important components of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.

This article started from the following premise: deradicalization programs are shaped by cultural, economic, political, social, and legal patterns of each country/. Although all

¹⁵ In 2008, for example, leaders of a Somali mosque in Bristol reported to a local police the presence among their congregation of a radical convert only days after participating in one of Operation Nicole's events, admitting they had not done so earlier because they distrusted the police. The man was later convicted of planning to blow up a local shopping center.

¹⁶ <http://www.bamf.de/DE/DasBAMF/Beratung/beratung-node.html>

¹⁷ Der Spiegel, *Abwehr im Innern*, November 30, 2009, accessed at <http://www.spiegel.de/Spiegel/print/d-67963946.html>

efforts have the same long-term objective – returning individuals from radicals to normal – the tools used are different from state to state. It is useful not only to identify the best instruments for a successful program, but also to understand the basic behavioral issues that determine an individual to adhere to a terrorist network. Also, in order to develop efficient strategies that can be implemented, we must take into account the regional context, which until now has been adequately understood.

It is useful to study both theoretical aspects of radicalization, deradicalization processes, and to understand the reasons behind terrorist activities, which will influence the final objective of operations. The best plans depend on the level of understanding of local cultural patterns.

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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Abstract: *During crises, it is essential that information is transmitted fast, completely, clearly and directly to the receiver. The role of public relations is to transmit certain messages, to form the public opinion and to condition the expected behaviour reactions.*

On the other hand, related to the relationship with the public the attitude of the masses towards certain social events will be studied, and to feed-back, valuable information will be collected for the elaboration or correction of suitable crisis management strategies. For a complete evaluation of the security image, the subjective perception of an individual, a group, an organization or a nation on risks and security threats or their absence is of the utmost importance.

To support this point of view we will analyze the recorded answers of some of the questions from the risk perception questionnaire we have applied during doctoral research.

Keywords: *crisis situations, the image of security, public relations, communication with the public, crisis coverage.*

Introduction

We find the notion of „*crisis*” in Ancient Greek meaning *to separate* or *to decide*. The evolution of the contemporary concept resides in the decisional essence, for we cannot speak about crisis without a previous analysis of the phenomenon, understanding particularities and the need to take a decision¹. The actors involved must decide either for the preservation of the system and the mending of the tear, or for the transformation imposed by the moment of crisis, for a return to balance and normality. Albert Einstein’s quote, one of the most important scientists, is well-known: „*The crisis is the greatest blessing that can happen to people and countries, because the crisis brings progress*”.

Although it may be about military-political risks such as armed conflict, terrorist attacks, civil and interstate wars, economic risks such as poverty and financial criminality, environmental risks such as droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, anthropic risks (generated by man’s activity and the human mind products), such as technological and transportation accidents – phenomena which lead to the destabilization of coherent systems, cause an imbalance, disorder, chaos which is evident through its destructive force and the necessity to find new ways of solving and recovery – the result of combining unfavorable circumstances in a place and in a period of time is called a *crisis situation*.

Lately, mankind has been increasingly concerned to find the right solutions to solve several unexpected and unpleasant situations, called crisis situations. Glossaries and dictionaries of modern concepts define crisis as a difficult situation which is hard to anticipate, an acute lack of something, a painful period of transition, a sudden and drastic change. According to B. Buzan² (2002), the crisis does not take place outside of a reference system or an entity which deals with the crisis and must solve it with the existing mechanisms

¹ Jean-Louis Dufour. *International Crisis*, Bucharest, Ed. Corint, 2002, pp. 13-16.

² Barry Buzan. *People, States and Fear*, Chisinau, Ed. Cartier, 2014.

through special institutions. The crisis represents a condition of state or individual insecurity. Actors may be special individuals, groups, organizations, communities, states.

1. Conceptual image of objective reality of security

In a contemporary sense, security is tied not only to the states preoccupation to defend their territory and citizens, to national security strategies and individual or collective defence policies. The analysis of security indicators such as the state of the natural environment, the political expression, democracy, sufficient dwellings, the population's health, access to education, non-discrimination, religious freedom, economic prosperity and stability highlights *the objective state of security /insecurity* of any state. In order to make a complete picture of its security, it is crucial to know the subjective perception of individuals, groups, organizations on the risks and threats to security or on their absence. The conceptual idea of the subjective perception is translated into a language code and transmitted through public discourse to the population.

Objective factors of security must be distinguished from the image created in the conceptual dimension. *The conceptual reality of security* built through language with the help of concepts, theories, ideologies, political projects, provides a new and relevant dimension of the state of security/insecurity. The social impact of the security perception is created by the media communication of security evaluations. Public relations have a wide range of applicability. Professor J. A. R. Pimlott³ defines public relations as “*one of the methods through which the society adapts to changes and solves conflicts between attitudes, ideas, institutions, opposing people*”. Another researcher, E.L. Bernays⁴ supports the view that “*public relations represent an essential instrument of adjustment, interpretation and integration between individuals, groups and society*”. Communication with public is no less important during crisis management, in the post – crisis stage or while implementing preventive security actions.

The evolution of the public relation concept conditioned the active involvement of the public in counteracting threats to security specific for 21st century, peace and international security keeping and it made the bond between public institutions and masses more relevant in crisis management. On the one hand, public relations *produce messages* (communications, discourses, files, invitations, reports), on the other hand they are tasked in the *management* process to coordinate and conduct the process of communication program release (concept, plan, research, evaluation). Public relations target the masses attitude research, then it identifies action programs and communications of those programs. Last but not least important, communication with the public has and influence on the same public at opinion level. Thus, four roles of public relations emerge⁵: *research, action, communication and evaluation*. Or, these roles are compatible with crisis management stages.

1.1. Types of Public Relations

In the process of solving non-military crisis, public relations play a major role and are involved in the targeted context: *economic, political, legal, moral-ideological, informative-educational*. In the decision-taking stage, specific methods of relating can be applied as follows: *reduction of erroneous perception, decision flexibility, negotiation options, preventive strategies*. In order to reduce the erroneous perception, preventive measures will be

³ In *Public relations and american democracy*. Kennikat Press, 1972.

⁴ Heath, Robert Laurence. *Encyclopedia of public relations*. 2004, pp. 161-164.

⁵ J. Marston, apud F. P. Seitel. *The practice of public relations*. New York, MacMillan Publishing Comp., 192, p.8.

applied as well as immediate reactions to problems found⁶, such as: *common security approach, preventive diplomacy, rapid alterations, agreement reaching, decision-making efficiency, pro-active attitude, suitable infrastructure*. These measures will be applied through methods adapted to security needs: developing strategic security culture at European and national level, mutual exchange of information, evaluating the interest of the involved parties, producing solutions in the long and short run, cooperating within relevant international organizations ONU, OSCE, NATO, UE, making, consolidating and keeping peace.

During crises it is essential that information is transmitted fast, completely, clearly and directly to the receiver. It is important to make a distinction between *government and non-government* public relation structures as well as outlining the type of public relations⁷:

- 1) *communication between authorities,*
- 2) *mass media communication and*
- 3) *official institution communication with the public.*

Communication between authorities (1) in critical situations will be assured in conformity with certain rigours and protocol and is based on clear principles:

- Necessary information must be transmitted immediately in all relevant directions, without preliminary request but on compulsory registration of informed receivers automatically.
- Available communication procedures must be well-developed, institutionalised, independent from personal contacts.
- Exchange of urgent information should not be limited in time and should be made as a priority, irrespective of the date or the time.
- In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is recommended that the communication medium chosen between institutions should be mainly in writing; also related to phone calls, a complete copy of audio-video recordings or of written messages must be kept to be later checked, messages must be processed to point out the evidence, and, as far as external communication is concerned, special attention must be given the language used to communicate.
- The communication system must be systematically tested and kept in perfect working conditions, and the personnel must be trained in order to communicate efficiently.

In emergency situations, maximum collaboration between authorities and mass media is impetuously necessary. Orders and protection instructions are transmitted by the authorities towards the population through the radio, the television and press agencies. The message transmitted by and towards the mass media must be well-balanced, dosed and graded, in order not to stir panic and to get an appropriate reaction from people. The communication released should contain information about the situation, the dangers and their consequences, should explain the actions taken and planned by the authorities and send clear instructions towards the population affected, as well as contact data of the authorities /people in charge. This kind of communication aims at reducing rumours and making actions more efficient. In case a major disaster strikes, foreign journalists may be present in the area, for whom the information must be available at least in English and in other languages of international circulation.

The most difficult part, but also the most direct, of public relations in emergency situations is *talking directly to the public*. This can happen in different shapes and ways— orally, by audio records, visually or written, structured or free. It is crucial that the message is transmitted, supported and argued upon at the core with references to the ideas promoted, to

⁶ I. C. Diaconescu, L. Trifiniuc, V. Bogdan. *Relațiile publice și crizele politico-militare*. București, Ed. Militară, 2010, pp. 144-146.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 152.

people's essential values, interests and priorities. Besides mass-media communications, special warning technology will be used to warn the population. Zones of potential industrial or natural risks must have systems of external warning, and for remote area warning transmitter must be specially equipped with sirens and loudspeakers.

Direct communication with the population could be done during *disaster prevention training* which occurs within projects supported by NGOs and from international funds. Regrettably, at state level not enough programs are carried out for adult population. Only in a small part it is done within kindergarten and schools through thematic meetings with legal representatives, fire-fighters, paramedics, rescuers. In order to carry out preventive education, *information boards* containing reaction instructions to follow during natural disasters or in any other emergency situations are welcomed within community centres, town halls, schools, hospitals, culture houses, social assistance centres and any other public institutions. At the block entrance within cities or in any other visible public spaces in villages, posters with useful information can be displayed or flyers can be distributed by mail on different occasions containing messages such "How to react in situations....", with clear instructions to follow during earthquake, fire, flood or in common transport situations. Agents trained for emergency situations will be designated to directly keep in touch with the population, on site, to offer helpful information.

1.2. Media efficiency

In order to clarify questions coming from the population, it is advisable that local and central authorities, specialized bodies interact with the public through *thematic shows* on TV or on the radio, through special rubrics in the written press or by direct meeting people.

Using *the internet* for anticipated preparations in relation to early warning of the population is still poorly used, with a significant share in urban areas, particularly municipalities. *Landline phones and particularly mobile ones* are a very rapid way to transmit vital messages (spoken and written) to large masses of population, but for now it is used sequentially, for advertising, and by traders only and there aren't any efficient programs created for crisis communications. Agents trained for emergency situations will be designated to directly keep in touch with the population, on site, to offer helpful information.

Choosing the efficient ways of communication will guarantee the success of rapid passing the information and the correct perceiving of transmitted messages. Communication channels can be characterized along certain lines depending on a wide range of criteria: *time, cost, accuracy, place, detail, relation, inscriptions, etc.*

In short, communication in crisis situations can be achieved through:

- informing the community affected by the crisis, the country's population, the international medium;
- applying crisis plan provisions in order to timely respond to the media's and the government agencies' questions;
- the official discourses of community leaders;
- deliberately creating press events by spokespeople and central and local authorities;
- commenting on the public opinion's reactions, both internally and externally;
- paying attention to mass-media comments on the event produced;
- holding debates within the administrative/ crisis management team related to finding the best solutions;
- holding debates (or negotiations) between specialists and organizations in order to solve the crisis situation or conflict.

The level of speech acts will vary inversely proportional to the level of involvement of the receiver. After clarifying the purpose and the objectives of communication, the emitter must permanently control the communication process. From this point of view, in situation

crisis and in conflict we plead for communication strategies which state that the control can be oriented by the emitter. There two strategies in this respect:

- *for information purposes*: the emitter wants the receiver to find out, to understand;
- *for conviction purposes*: the emitter wants the receiver to act strategically, conform with the situation.

As far as the first strategy is concerned, it is not necessary to involve the receiver in the communication process, except for short questions or clarifications. The second strategy is applied as a peaceful solution to the crisis or conflict and implies the direct involving of the receiver. In this case we must take into consideration that the two sides can very well be part of opposing parties. The need for involvement stems from necessity of knowing their opinions, expectations or from the need to convince them to do something, to act.

2. The relationship between public opinion and the psychosocial representation of security

The coverage of crisis in mass media is of the utmost importance for shaping the public opinion. The media greatly condition the individual perception of reality, stimulating public interest for certain things, people, events and overshadowing other important facts obscured by media. By participating in discussions with others, each individual has the tendency to generalize things he knows less, trying to fit them into generally accepted symbols and meanings. This psychosocial mechanism contributes to changing representations, then to changing of involved people behaviour. Media sources clearly influence the forming of opinions, attitudes and human behaviour⁸.

Public opinion is a sum of knowledge, convictions, active experience manifested at relatively high intensity by the group's members or by a community towards a subject/domain of vital importance. As stated by William R. Alger, "*public opinion is a second conscience*". Stirring a favourable public opinion is a prerogative of the decision-making factor during crisis management, within the stage of the result evaluation management or during the period of stability and prevention preparations. It must be specified there is no such thing as public, opinion generally speaking, but just a reference to a certain object. The more restricted and general the subject is, the greater the possibility of reaching an agreement and the lower the activism of the public opinion.

The instruments for investigating public opinion consist in Questionnaires or Polls (face to face interview, telephone survey, nominal letter with one or more questions, and so on). The data thus collected from population can give the picture of social representations about security in certain segments of interest and public.

Further, we will refer to the doctoral research study; in this study we have referred to the psychosocial dimension of security described in the first part of the research. We can not refer to security as to an abstract notion, as we can not quantify the statehood of nations or the power exerted by a particular state. But we can measure the psychosocial representation of security in society and in every individual by measuring the level of life satisfaction and the perception of potential threats as being present or not. Moreover, we can represent human security through the objective factors of hazards absence or the high degree of control over the threats, but also through the subjective factors resulting from the way of keeping and preserving the spiritual and material values of the individual and the community to which he belongs. The perception of economic, social and environmental threats and vulnerabilities, the level of life satisfaction, individual and collective interests and attitudes are indicators of security at individual and national level.

⁸ S. Spataru. *The formation of social representations*. Communication Conference, ANI, Bucharest, 2014.

Analysis of psychosocial representation indicators of risk will be made as referred to the concept introduced by the scientist Serge Moscovici who founded the theory of social representations in the book "*La psychanalyse, son image et son public*"⁹ (1961). This concept about duality of formation of social representations, from figurative and imaginary perspective and reported to the group has been widely discussed in the literature. Furthermore, any causal relationship between individual and environment is related to the concepts of good and bad, generally accepted in the community where he lives. Finding of his own standard of living as "good enough", even if subject faces a lot of particular problems and security concerns, he will report the standard of living to others around him. However, M.L. Rouquette's scheme explains the transformation of social representations in relation with two factors we will study also: the impact on the group and the personal involvement of the individual.

The communication relations of those who control conceptual representation and revealing of symbolic meanings to consumers of this information actually emphasize the social representations and form the public opinion¹⁰. The public opinion, referring to a subject or other, is determined by the way some ideologies are handled in the social environment of reference. Forms (or ways) of public communication can be reduced to three key issues: *information* – dissemination which serve a public interest, but has a low degree of materiality; *propagation* – a form of public dissemination of ideas that suggest a concrete and structured vision on a subject; *propaganda* – the most rigid form of spreading of ideas to the public where alternative ideologies are not accepted.

Beyond ideology suggestion mechanisms, we know that public opinion is formed and explicitly expressed when there is a clear concern for the subject matter. From the results extracted by submitted questionnaire, we can highlight the interest of the population for several aspects of its existence, which shows great concern for the quality of life, in general, and the palette of increased interest in specific areas indicates targets of fear and insecurity. Exact these issues will lead to a vehement public opinion for or against.

2.1. Partial results of the risk perception questionnaire¹¹

This study contains topics that reveal two aspects of the formation and transformation of social representations with respect to security: the areas of interest referred by the interviewed subjects show involvement in community issues to which they belong, and the questions about the actual problems - social impact of perceived risk. Overall, we can conclude public opinion with regard to security issues. Based on these ideas, we are presenting here the psychosocial image of security expressed in public opinion towards safety as indicated by the results of risk perception questionnaire applied on 130 subjects in Romania.

Using a synthesis of the information for identifying the subjects and overlapping these data we can draw a common portrait of the survey participants; this image will help us understand some attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of the assumed character to risk perception. Thus, we are presenting an individual with medium life experience, in his 40s, probable a man or woman, who has or has not dependent children, more likely living in urban environment, in a block of flats, a graduate or postgraduate who works under an employment contract / authorized in an intellectual professional field. That is the collective character to which we will study for the analysis of risk perception.

⁹ Moscovici Serge, *La psychanalyse, son image et son public*, Paris, PUF, v. 2, 1961, pp. 328-330.

¹⁰ M. Curelaru. Social representations. Ed. 2nd. Iași. Ed. Polirom. 2006.

¹¹ S. Spataru. Report no. 1 "Psychosocial Risk perception and representation of security / insecurity" part of doctoral research topic "Modeling individual and group behavior in crisis by means of effective communication", Ch. 2.

The major emphasis is placed on social area - education, school (2/3 of respondents are very interested), followed by the family problems and society, health, culture and science insurance (more than half) - this indicates the dominant area for psychosocial representation of security (*fig_1*). Of great interest to the public are environmental issues - climate change, natural disasters, and last decade's ecosystem imbalance - domains that reveal the serious threats to planetary security and brings growing concern for the Romanian. Living style in other states and military situation in the world rise the public interest, indicating restlessness regarding the national security concerning aspects in foreign policy and military security. Equally important are news related to economics and energy, reflecting concern for national economic security.

An average level of interest is conferred to crime and terrorism, as much as internal policy of the state - indicators of citizen physical insecurity and distrust in the political and legislative effectiveness of the state. Almost a lack of interest is observed for the collective character questioned related to tabloid news, technological / transport accidents, as well as religion or sports.




Figure no. 1. Level of interest in certain areas of life

A specific feature is sorting the priorities on probable impact on private life and occurrence of an imminent favourable or unfavourable event. Expression of opinion not necessarily indicates personal preferences, but rather reflects generally recognized rules or problems in society. In the chart in Figure_1, it can be seen the personal importance upon certain areas of life, on which overlaps the psychosocial representation of security. The most important aspect of life for the large majority is the family - without any negative assessment. Of major importance are the work, as well as knowledge, love, friends, leisure. These themes are found in areas of interest and in discussions held in the family, at work, in society. Personal interests are directly proportional to the degree of involvement in community affairs. The pattern of collective personality of the respondent - intellectual, lives in the city, family man, active in the work field - should be considered. It is possible that in a more differentiated range of respondents to barely find these values equally.

A major importance in crisis effective solving is confidence of people in the official institutions (*fig_2*). Survey results show, however, a low level of trust in various state and

non-state organizations, local or international. The highest degree of confidence (over half of respondents) is shown by our compatriots of the organization with the greatest military power in the world today - NATO. National Army is highly appreciated as well, which proves the confidence of citizens in defence structures and completes the picture of positive representation on military security. A vote rather poor, and moderate rather than firm, is accorded to European Union and to Church, and more than a third believe in the Police and NGOs.

By far, the greatest mistrust is paid to political parties, as well as to Government and Parliament. The general public does not believe in unions or the media.




Figure no. 2. Confidence in national and international organizations

In crisis management the relationship between local authorities and people is vital, as well as the positive feedback from citizens. Collaborative behaviour of citizens with local authorities (City Hall) is, in part, conditioned by the trust or distrust in central state structures (Government, President, Parliament) and to internal security structures (Military, Police, and Justice). The lack of confidence denotes a form of ineffective public communication and a weak capacity of the official structures to control and influence the masses in critical situations. On the other hand, negative public opinion on control bodies could cause mass revolt behaviours or social commotions.

Media, intermediate factor in forming public opinion, does not have authority among intellectuals. This fact highlights certain difficulties in transmitting the ideology of the official state structures or the important public persons to the people. One of the main reasons may be the concern of the population for strictly personal problems despite other kinds of problems discussed in the media. Another reason may be the lack of trust in local and central authorities, accompanied by the political conditioning of media. This ideological division, i.e. the preferential narrow representation of real political structures by certain media sources, leads to the division of population and to the fading of ideological factors influencing large groups of the population. Another cause could be the increasing share of Internet information to the detriment of the media.

Romanian intellectual declares that is quite contented with his way of life or even very satisfied (*fig._3*), the quality of his life being assessed in terms generally optimistic (3/4 subjects). The positive image of life accepted by most people in the social consciousness,

filled with the active interest manifested for several areas of social, leads to the psychosocial representation of a generally good security.




Figure no. 3. Life contentment

In further description regarding near future (*fig._4*) we can observe a realistic optimism: only a third part is declared trustful in *the quality of life improvement*, and half of them think it will *be the same*. Particularly, the hope for better are paid in domains as *health and family*, as well as *personal economic situation*. In terms of *personal security on street, climate in our living zone, and Romanian international relationships* the situation will remain the same in people’s view. For these domains there are no evident threats observed, nor improvement solutions. In the prognosis for *economic stability in Romania, government of our country and European political-military security* people’s opinion is less optimistic.




Figure no. 4. The trust in future.

We should mention that this questionnaire was done in the summer of 2014. Due to this fact we must admit that now the answers might not be the same and the general picture of psychosocial representation might be slightly different.

Conclusions:

The idealistic reality of security is expressed through public opinion and represents an important factor in crisis management. After studying the population interest for particular domains of life we may conclude the relevant public opinion, evinced through a critical attitude towards social aspects of life like education, health, well-being, social assurances, as well as environment. The level of personal involvement in community life is firstly related to family and love, then to other important social aspects as work and knowledge, friends and free time.

In emergencies situations, in order to have an efficiently interaction with the population, it is important for the authorities to have a general picture of people’s authentic values, these being decisive factors in crisis situations

At communication level with the public – to inform and convince – there are at least two deficient aspects: the authority’s communication with the media and official institutions’ communication with the public. The first aspect, regarding the complete and accurate information passing by the media, is connected with the preferential and inaccurate information representation which is the main reason of public distrust in the media. The second one, related with the population mistrust in official institutions of state, is the evidence of uncertainty, vulnerability and the lack of individual control of citizens upon actual situation, especially in political context.

The vast palette of population interests ought to be correlated with the critical appreciation upon existing issues and with the high educational factor of the studied subjects. The public opinion, in the research moment, was the mirror of population uncertainty concerning economic stability and the government of our country, as well as the political-military uncertainty in Europe, particularly in the geopolitical zone nearby our country’s borders.

On the other hand, the general optimistic attitude of Romanian population towards future is an important psychical resource, which pays its contribution at overcoming the daily stress and successfully dealing with personal or community issues.

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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE BALKAN STATES: SHARED UNDERSTANDING AND RELEVANT PECULIARITIES

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Abstract: *Humanitarian intervention, which is argued to originate in the XIX-th century, is today one of the most controversial topics in the field of international relations and its incorporation in the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine as a result of the intense international discord triggered by 1999 Operation Allied Force turned this new concept into a subject of dispute among both scholars and politicians. Firstly, this paper advances a comprehensive definition of humanitarian intervention and briefly explains how it was considered to be linked with the history of the Balkans. Secondly, the dissensions at international level prompted by Operation Allied Force and the positions on this issue adopted by the governments of the Balkan states are highlighted and explained. Thirdly, the relation between Operation Allied Force and the emergence of the R2P doctrine is explored, this doctrine being shortly described with a special focus on its humanitarian intervention component. Finally, the positions on R2P doctrine upheld by the Balkan states during the 2009 UN General Assembly meeting are examined, a special attention being given to the reservations expressed by Turkey and Serbia. This paper concludes that in the Balkans the R2P doctrine will continue to be subjected to intense scrutiny which will benefit its development and could enlarge the number of states supporting it.*

Keywords: *humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, Operation Allied Force, Balkan states, Serbia, Turkey, Ottoman Empire*

1. Humanitarian intervention: past and present

For more than 20 years now, humanitarian intervention established itself as a landmark topic in the field of international relations. Its pre-eminence, gained immediately after the end of the Cold War, was challenged by the terrorist threat that became an overwhelming concern as a result of the attacks from 11 September 2001¹, but it was largely reestablished in the context of the Arab Spring that led to NATO's operations in Libya from 2011 and prompted repeated calls for a military solution to the appalling human rights violations taking place in Syria².

Taking into account various definitions of humanitarian intervention, one could maintain that, traditionally, humanitarian intervention is conceived as the protection of fundamental human rights, especially the right to life, by means of military force undertaken by one or more states or by a non-state actor against the government of a state which violates these rights with respect to its own population³.

¹ See for example Thomas G. Weiss, *The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era* și S. Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, Thomas G. Wiess, *The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?*

² One example is Thomas G. Weiss, *R2P alive and Well after Libya*

³ See for example the following definitions of humanitarian intervention: Adam Roberts: “military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants “ (Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian War: military intervention and human rights*, p.

In the last decade, some international relations scholars and historians argued that humanitarian interventions had been carried out long before the collapse of the Soviet Union and even well ahead of the mid-nineteenth century when *humanitarian* terminology acquired the present day meaning and the concept of human rights began to emerge⁴. Thus, Oded Löwenheim (Löwenheim 2003) maintains that the first large-scale military action that could be retrospectively termed as a humanitarian intervention was probably the one conducted in 1816 by Great Britain against the city of Algiers in order to put an end to white slavery, while Tonny Brems Knudsen (Knudsen 2009) holds the view that another military intervention in the Ottoman Empire, namely the intervention in Greece (1827-1830), could be said to have been the first humanitarian intervention ever.

Almost 200 years later, the former territory of the Ottoman Empire became anew linked with the issue of humanitarian intervention, given that on 17 August 1992 the UN Security Council authorized for the first time in resolution 770, concerning Bosnia & Herzegovina, the use of force “to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and also as a result of 1999 Operation Allied Force led by NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the stated purpose by Javier Solana, its Secretary General at that time, of stopping “the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo”⁵.

Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are all situated in the Balkans so that it could be rightly said that this region played an important part in the development of this controversial topic. For this reason, the present paper examines the attitude adopted by the Balkan states with respect to Operation Allied Force and to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P) by which the replacement of the humanitarian intervention concept has been subsequently sought.

2. Operation Allied Force and the emergence of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine

2.1. Balkan states reactions to Operation Allied Force

NATO's military actions directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started on 24 March 1999 and triggered conflicting international reactions that exposed the disagreement among relevant international actors on the issue of humanitarian intervention. Strongly supported, among others, by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union, it was harshly criticised by the Russian Federation and China. Bill Clinton, the then president of the United States, stated that “our mission is clear: (...) to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, to seriously

429); Fernando R. Teson: “proportionate international use or threat of military force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of the double effect “ (Fernando R. Teson, *The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 94); Allen Buchanan; “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory forced is applied“ (Allen Buchanan, *Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 130); Jennifer Welsh: “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering” (Jennifer M Welsh, *Introduction*, p. 3)

⁴ See, for example, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 45-46, J.L Holzgrefe, *The humanitarian intervention debate*, p. 45-47, D.J.B Trim and Brendan Simms, *Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 3-10, Garry Bass, *Freedom's Battle: Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* and Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914*

⁵ Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, following the Commencement of Air Operations (24 March 1999) available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-041e-htm>

damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo”⁶. The British prime minister at the time of NATO operation, Tony Blair, maintained that “we are taking this action for one very simple reason: to damage Serb forces sufficiently to prevent Milosevic from continuing to perpetrate his vile oppression against the Kosovo Albanian people”⁷ and the European Council expressed the view that “it cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses”⁸. At their turn, the then Russian president, Boris Yeltsin declared that “a dangerous precedent has been created regarding the policy of diktat and force, and the whole of the international rule of law has been threatened”⁹ and the permanent representative of China to the United Nations, Qin Huasun, pointed out that “this act amounts to a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the accepted norms of international law”¹⁰. As for the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations in that period, Vladislav Jovanović, he stated that “My country has been a victim of the brutal unlawful aggression of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” which tramped “upon each and every principle of international relations, defying the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations and its resolutions”¹¹.

Moving from international to regional level, it is to be analysed if there was a similar disunity among the Balkan states, a relative ambiguous concept¹² that, for the purpose of this article, designates Turkey, Greece, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania¹³. Considering first the position of Turkey, one could observe that the Turkish government, as well as the overwhelming majority of the Turkish citizens, supported Operation Allied Force, this position being partly motivated by the obligations reasulting from NATO membership and the strong religious and family ties between the Turks and the Kosovar Albanians¹⁴.

The Greek officials, unlike the vast majority of Greek citizens, stood for NATO’s actions but were not disposed to take part in Operation Allied Force, being among the first NATO members to call for a cessation of airstrikes. According to a poll presented on 17 April 1999, 96% of the Greek citizens opposed NATO’s operations, an attitude that could be explained as deriving from the religious affinity with the Serbs that was strongly highlighted by the Greek Ortodox Church during the conflict. The pro Serbian feelings of ordinary Greeks

⁶ William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (24 March 1999) available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57305>

⁷ Blair’s statement: The fight for peace, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/30364.stm

⁸ Presidency Conclusions – Berlin European Council, 24-25 March 1999 available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html

⁹ Boris Yeltsin cited by Sergey Lavrov, Record of the 3988th meeting of the UN Security Council, 24 March 1999, UN document S/PV.3988, p. 3

¹⁰ Record of the 3988th meeting of the UN Security Council, 24 March 1999, UN document S/PV.3988, p. 12.

¹¹ Record of the 3989th meeting of the UN Security Council, 26 March 1999, UN document S/PV.3989, p. 11.

¹² About the ambiguity of this concept and, more generally of the term Balkans, see Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999*.

¹³ Robert D. Kaplan in his work *Balkan Ghosts: a Journey through History* includes in the category of Balkan states Hngaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and the European part of Turkey and George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Kleomenis Koutsoukis și Andrew G. Kourvetaris, editors of the volume *The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction*, consider that the Balkan states are Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey and the states that have been part of Yugoslavia. Arguments against including Romania in the category of Balkan states have been advanced, for example, by Nicolae Iorga in his article *Is Roumania a Balkan State?*

¹⁴ Karen Donfried (coord.) *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress - Kosovo: International Reactions to NATO Air Strikes*, 21 Aprilie 1999, p. 6, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473513>

determined large demonstrations against NATO and the United States to take place in some major towns¹⁵.

The Albanian government together with the Albanian citizens were strong supporters of NATO's intervention given that Operation Allied Force was undertaken on behalf of the ethnic Kosovar Albanians. Albania made available to NATO its airspace, military facilities and harbours, a position that was intended to consolidate its participation in the Partnership for Peace programme and was in line with its NATO membership aspirations¹⁶.

The authorities of Bosnia & Herzegovina welcomed NATO's intervention despite the fact that Živko Radiši, the then chairman of the Presidency, condemned it. The political leadership of Republika Srpska also sharply criticised the airstrikes, while the leaders of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina openly supported them. These divisions manifested equally at the level of ordinary citizens, the Bosniaks and Croats being favorable to the intervention, while the Serbs rejected it and organized in Republika Srpska violent protests against NATO¹⁷.

The government of Macedonia which was involved in the Partnership for Peace since 1995, supported NATO's intervention in order to accelerate the process of becoming NATO member. Nevertheless, many Macedonian citizens did not share this opinion and staged violent protests against NATO's actions, by which they expressed their cultural affinities with the Serbs and the fears of separatists claims on the part of ethnic Albanians from their country¹⁸.

Both the Croatian authorities and the Croatian citizens pleaded for Operation Allied Force, an attitude justified largely by the desire to consolidate the ties with NATO and by the rivalry with Serbia grounded in the war from the beginning of the 90's that led to the collapse of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia¹⁹.

Slovenia, which joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1995, strongly backed Operation Allied Force having the full support of the Slovenian citizens and hoping to accelerate the process of becoming NATO member²⁰.

Bulgaria, in its quest for NATO membership, supported Operation Allied Force and provided access to NATO airplanes to the country airspace but rejected a direct participation in the hostilities. However, the official position was criticised by the Bulgarian citizens who felt close to the Serbs on religious grounds, and who manifested in Sofia against NATO²¹.

As for Romania, which failed to acquire NATO membership and was struggling to increase its chances of joining the Alliance, its government backed Operation Allied Force and provided NATO with the country airspace. The official position was contested by many Romanians due to historical ties with Serbia and because of fear that it was going to encourage the secessionist demands on the part of ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania²².

It follows that, despite the controversy at international level, the governments of all Balkan states supported Operation Allied Force even if, in the case of Greece, Bosnia &

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 4. An explanation of the official position of Turkey and Greece on Operation Allied Force and of the popular reactions to it is provided by Georgios Kostakos in his study *The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, Turkey*

¹⁶ Karen Donfried (coord.), *op.cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 10-11. See also Cvete Koneska, *Macedonian discourse on NATO*, p. 6.

¹⁹ Karen Donfried (coord.), *op.cit.*, p. 9-10. See also Branko Caratan, *The Security in South East Europe after the Big Change: Consequences of the Kosovo War and Croatian Elections*, p. 24 and Gorjko Marinovik, *Croatia and NATO Air-Strikes in FR Yugoslavia*, 29 March 1999 available at <http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199903/90329-005-trae-zag.htm>

²⁰ Karen Donfried (coord.) *op.cit.*, p. 12.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²² *Ibidem*, pp. 11-12.

Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania, this position ran counter to the opinion of significant parts of their population.

2.2. The reconceptualization of humanitarian intervention in the wake of Operation Allied Force

The irreconcilable divisions among international actors generated by Operation Allied Force confronted the international community with what Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General, termed in September 1999 the dilemma of humanitarian intervention: “on one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a United Nations mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences”²³.

Responding to his call for a solution to this dilemma, the Canadian government established in September 2000 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that, a year later, released its report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*²⁴. From the very beginning, ICISS mentioned that “this report is about the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention”: the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state”²⁵. The consideration of this controversial right led ICISS to advance a new concept, namely responsibility to protect (R2P), which integrated the old term humanitarian intervention and went beyond it, given that it “sandwiched”²⁶ it between prevention and post-conflict rebuilding, the other two components of the R2P doctrine. Using the ICISS terminology, the R2P consists of three dimensions, namely the *responsibility to prevent* – dealing with the prevention by the international community of man-made catastrophes -, the *responsibility to react* – concerned with the use military force as a last resort in case of large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing -, and the *responsibility to rebuild* which refers to the prevention after a military intervention of situations that could create again the conditions that had prompted the intervention. As James Pattison highlighted, “humanitarian intervention (...) is part of the responsibility to protect”²⁷ so that it could not be rightly maintained that humanitarian intervention ceased to exist with the formulation of the R2P doctrine.

Until the 2005 World Summit, the newly R2P doctrine became subject of numerous criticism advanced by academics as well as by political leaders²⁸ but even in this unfavorable context it was part of the *2005 World Summit Outcome Document*²⁹ at the price of its content being altered from its original version³⁰. The changes suffered by the ICISS version of the R2P doctrine affected the humanitarian intervention constituent but did not eliminate it³¹. Ban Ki-moon, who in 2007 succeeded Kofi Annan as UN Secretary General, assumed the difficult task of assisting the UN General Assembly in the consideration and development of the R2P

²³ Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report To General Assembly, 20 September 1999, Press Release SG/SM/7136; GA/9596 available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html

²⁴ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*

²⁵ *Ibidem*, Foreward.

²⁶ Thomas G. Weiss, *Whither R2P?*, p. 7 in *The Responsibility to Protect: challenges & opportunities in light of the Libyan intervention*, November 2011 available at <http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P.pdf>

²⁷ James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?*, p. 250.

²⁸ See Neil S. MacFarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, Thomass G. Weiss, *op.cit*

²⁹ *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN document A/60/1, paras. 138-140.

³⁰ For the differences between the two versions of the R2P doctrine see Alex. J. Bellamy, *Whiter the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit* and Carsten Stahn, *Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?*

³¹ See *2005 World Summit Outcome*, para. 139.

doctrine. Consequently, since 2009, he presents each year a report on R2P to the UN General Assembly³² which subjects it afterwards to in-depth analysis by the member states³³.

3. The Balkan states on R2P doctrine: support and reservations

During the 2009 UN General Assembly debate on R2P doctrine, ambassador Anders Lidén took the floor in the name of European Union – which at that time included also Romania and Bulgaria - and of Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Montenegro expressing the total support for this doctrine and showing a lack of concern for its potential misuse³⁴. Among the Balkan states, only Turkey and Serbia³⁵ did not share this uncritical reading of the R2P doctrine, their representatives pointing out the risks that could be associated especially with its humanitarian intervention component.

Thus, Fazlı Çorman, Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, declared that “we should also be able to further identify and clarify the elements of the concept in order to avoid misperceptions” responsible for the fact that “many States perceive that they are faced with a new concept of neocolonialism”³⁶. As for Serbia, Boris Holovka, Counselor with the Permanent Mission of Serbia to the UN, made clear that “We must remain aware of the ease with which noble goals and lofty ideas can be utilized for particular purposes and of how paths paved with good intentions can sometimes lead to unjustifiable actions”³⁷. These reservations did not undermine a strong commitment to the R2P doctrine that both states asserted with clarity at the mentioned meeting of the UN General Assembly.

With respect to the reasons underpinning their cautious positions, Holovka argued that Serbia was very concerned with the tendency to establish connections between Operation Allied Force and the R2P doctrine manifested by some international public figures such as Martti Ahtisaari, while Çorman indicated that Turkey was sensitive to the fact that “this concept has been misused on various occasions in the past”³⁸. In this context it is reasonable to suppose that one historical episode that Çorman had in view was the military intervention in Greece carried out by major European powers in the first half of the XIX-th century.

³² Ban Ki-moon, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 12 January 2009, UN document A/63/677, Ban Ki-moon, *Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect*, 14 July 2010, UN document A/64/864 ; Ban Ki-moon, *The Role of Regional and Sub-regional arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 28 June 2011, UN document A/65/877, Ban Ki-moon, *Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response*, 25 July 2012, UN document A/66/874; Ban Ki-moon, *Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention*, 9 July 2013, UN document A/67/929; Ban Ki-moon, *Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect*, 11 July 2014, UN document A/68/947

³³ UN General Assembly 96th - 101th plenary meetings, 21 – 28 July 2009, UN documents A/63/PV.96, A/63/PV.97, A/63/PV.98, A/63/PV.99, A/63/PV.100, A/63/PV.101; UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue On Early Warning, Assessment and The Responsibility To Protect, 9 August 2010, available at www.globalr2p.org; UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on *The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, 12 July 2011, available at www.globalr2p.org; UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on *Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Action*, 5 September 2012, available at www.globalr2p.org; UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the *Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention*, 11 September 2013, available at www.globalr2p.org; UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the *Responsibility to Protect: Fulfilling our collective responsibility: International assistance and the responsibility to protect*, 8 September 2014 available at www.globalr2p.org

³⁴ See 97th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 23 July 2009, UN document A/63/PV.97, pp. 3-5.

³⁵ In 2006 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased to exist so that Serbia and Montenegro become independent states

³⁶ See 99th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 24 July 2009 UN document A/63/PV.99, p. 21.

³⁷ See 101th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 28 July 2009, UN document A/63/PV.101, p. 13.

³⁸ See 99th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 24 July 2009 UN document A/63/PV.99, p. 21.

Conclusions

Humanitarian intervention in the framework of the responsibility to protect doctrine represents for the Balkan states an element of common ground but at the same time it allows for different views, mostly of historical nature, that need to be explained. Turkey shared the view of all Balkan states on Operation Allied Force and thus was totally opposed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but when it came about the assessment of the R2P doctrine, its position was different from the one adopted by other Balkan states, this time being close to the one advanced by Serbia. The reservations expressed in 2009 by Turkey and Serbia prove that the issue of the responsibility to protect will continue to be a subject of careful and critical examination in the Balkan region, and this aspect has the potential to bring more clarity on this topic and thus to consolidate the doctrine's endorsement at international level.

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GEOPOLITICS OF BORDERS IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA AREA AFTER THE COLD WAR

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Abstract: *The border issue is placed within the geopolitical paradigm of the Wider Black Sea Region, being a concept which defines one of the most important institutions of international public law. Border issue is extremely complex, topical, and of main concern for all member states in the Wider Black Sea Area, its establishment and enforcement throughout history being the subject of many disputes and territorial conflicts. This paper aims to analyze the geopolitical developments of borders in the Wider Black Sea Area in the post-Cold War era from the following perspectives: the eastward movement of NATO and EU; redefining the borders of former communist states; and redrawing of the main geopolitical axes. The border concept is also analyzed in all its perspectives: ideological, political, economic, social and religious, and is applied in case studies to all Wider Black Sea Region states. In the current security context the state and non-state actors in the Black Sea region need to redefine their security policies and to adjust them depending on the likely and ongoing actions of the Russian Federation, in order to preserve the balance of power in the Wider Black Sea Region, and to maintain the borders stated by the United Nations after the implosion of the former Soviet Union.*

Keywords: *actors, geopolitical axis, Wider Black Sea Area, regionalization, geopolitical borders*

Introduction

The analysis of borders geopolitics of the Wider Black Sea Area in the post-Cold War Era is performed through the following perspectives:

- The movement of the North Atlantic block border towards East, by including Romania and Bulgaria as member states, determined NATO to reach the vicinity of the western Black Sea;
- Redefining the borders of the former communist states under the Soviet geopolitical sphere of influence, after the implosion of the former Soviet Union, leads to borders relocation to their traditional positions, which is a difficult process evolving over time;
- With redefinition of boundaries in the post-Cold War, the main geopolitical axes were redrawn.

The border issue is placed within the geopolitical paradigm of the Wider Black Sea Region, being a concept which defines one of the most important institutions of the international public law. Border issue is extremely complex, topical, and of main concern for all member states in the Wider Black Sea Area. The establishment and enforcement of the border issue throughout history constitute the subject of many disputes and territorial conflicts.

The geographic limits of the extended Pontic area are the boundaries of Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Greece, Turkey, Russia and the republics in South Caucasus. The Wider Black Sea Area incorporates the Caspian Sea and Transcaucasia, including the territories of the former Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In these regions there are recorded complex geopolitical developments focused on conflict outbreaks related to national

rebirth and reconstruction of local nations, or ethnic and territorial disputes following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. All these problems perpetuate until today, but passed in the background in the context of the 2014 and 2015 events happening in Ukraine. With multiple motivations, conflicts circumscribed to this area are characterized by extremely high potential for contaminating neighboring regions.

1. Conceptual delimitations

The Wider Black Sea Area has been marked by many armed conflicts for the conquest of key points and territories. Borders are basic elements in the Pontic peoples' mentality and sub consciousness which are said to have blocked peace and established true artificial barriers between peoples. This is confirmed by post-Cold War geopolitical developments of countries in the Wider Black Sea Area still struggling for nation's relocation within traditional boundaries. Most conflicts that have occurred throughout history in the Wider Black Sea Area were held to conquer territories and consequently to exploit assets in soils, sub soils, and sea and air spaces. The current armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, which began in 2014 and is still perpetuated with no predictable concrete solutions, is a good example in this respect.

The Wider Black Sea Area represented in nations' history a true border line between cultures, civilizations, and religions. The Pontic area was, next to Central and Eastern Europe, the "Iron Curtain in Europe", drawn after the Warsaw Pact, as a real ideological and political border of the Cold War era. Through the political and legal importance and distinct significance in the context of international law institutions, the border confers content to the fundamental principles of borders inviolability and territorial integrity, the principle of good neighborliness and cross-border cooperation. These principles, in close interdependence with other principles of international law, generate an effervescent movement of doctrinal ideas and practical approaches, organically linked to the states sovereignty and existence. All these approaches related to geopolitical borders are disrespected and flagrantly violated by the Russian Federation through illegal annexation of the Crimea peninsula in 2014, the disguised support with arms and military equipment of the pro-Russians separatists in Donbass and Lugansk regions of eastern Ukraine, interposition of its own army corps in Transnistria in order to maintain peace between the belligerents. These so-called regional frozen conflicts were created and maintained by the central government in Moscow, which aims at maintaining the control of the close proximity area, the geopolitical space of strategic importance serving the Kremlin's strategic interests.

Professor Gr. Geamănu defined the border as the legal limit in which a state exercises its full sovereignty and the nation - its right to self-determination¹. It is these principles of regard for state sovereignty and independence, the right to self-determination of peoples in Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova, that are flagrantly violated by the Russian Federation through its foreign policy of territorial influence. From this point of view, the concept of border signifies the territorial and legal limit established by treaties with neighboring states within which each state exercises its absolute and exclusive sovereignty. Geopolitical developments in the Wider Black Sea in the post Cold War era highlight the border's changing role and its transformation from barrier for peoples political ideology to the venue of geopolitical and economic, national and cultural realities, crossing the rigid conceptions of sovereignty, providing states the perspective of the European integration by correcting, mitigating or even eliminating the border effect.

¹ <http://www.academia.edu/4718786/Drept-International-Public>, accessed at 03.03.2015

2. Borders geopolitics in the Wider Black Sea Area

In the contemporary international environment, the behavior of the conventional actors - the states, and of the non-state actors, is characterized by diversity and complexity in methods of approach, attitude and intensity manifested in international relations. Zbigniew Brzezinski calls as active geostrategic players, those states which have the capacity and national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders and which have the predisposition to be geopolitically unstable. The title of geopolitical pivots is given to the states whose importance derives not from strength or motivation, but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable situation for the behavior of geostrategic players.²

2.1. The Wider Black Sea Area state profiles

2.1.1. State profile: Romania

Romania is in the stage where it is building its security on architecture of interdependence, cooperation and good neighborliness, effective participation and expanded partnerships. No country in the world and therefore in the Wider Black Sea Area cannot be alone and isolated. As a result, borders do not separate and oppose states, but they identify and unite people. This generates a new concept in international relations, in national and collective defense, but also in security building. Therefore, we become witnesses to unprecedented developments of society in general, and especially of the global hierarchy, in which power centers are developing a fierce competition for a more prominent place on the stage of international relations.

With the redefinition of boundaries after the Cold War and the implosion of the former Soviet Union, the major geopolitical axes have undergone major changes. The Black Sea area is both an opportunity and a source of risk, being at the crossroads of two strategic axes: the Black Sea – Mediterranean Sea axis, NATO's south-eastern flank – an area of strategic significance to the North-Atlantic Alliance, mainly affected by border risks; and the axis Black Sea – Caucasus – Caspian Sea, a transit space for Central Asian energetic resources, affected by certain forms of sub regional instability reverberating from Central Asia.

The evolution of the geopolitical environment is in continuous dynamic, also due to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union, which implies reconsidering the relations with the countries of the Wider Black Sea Area. The Romanian State has the obligation to harmonize national legislation concerning the conclusion of bilateral agreements. Thus, Romania will aim to promote good neighborly relations, cooperation in the multilateral framework, enhancing dialogue and strengthening relationships to achieve the objectives of stability, active participation in the programs launched by the European Union through the Common Security and Defense Policy, European Neighborhood Policy, and Black Sea Synergy.

Therefore, Romania acts and will act as an important player in stabilizing regional security environment, through its role in NATO and EU membership, organizations which have extended their boundaries in the vicinity of the Wider Black Sea Region. Romania is considered as a catalyst for boosting cooperation policies and interstate relations to ensure a climate of stability in the Black Sea area, promoting positive effects of multinational cooperation in Southeast Europe to the Black Sea and the Caucasus.

The Wider Black Sea Region is the new frontier of democratic transformations in Europe, given that we are witnessing in countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, at an effort for profound transformation. In Romania's view on the long term

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, Publishing House Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 2000, p.53.

security strategy in the Black Sea, our country reiterates in international politics its commitment to be a vector of stability, democracy and promoting Euro-Atlantic values in the region. It is in Romania's interest not to remain the border of the West, but it is aiming to become a springboard for extending the benefits of the West beyond our border.³

2.1.2. State profile: Bulgaria

Bulgaria is a country of "shared identity" between East and West. Post-communist transformation process is marked by the effects of opposing influences from East and West. Russia's attempts to isolate the country from the 1990 NATO enlargement were active and unscrupulous. To link the future of Western institutions and its national destiny, Bulgaria needs to significantly improve not only the domestic reform process, but also the regional environment in which it is located.

Bulgaria has built its entire security strategy in accordance with NATO and EU standards. It also assumes that the Bulgarian state has no territorial disputes with any other country; this principle is used as a basis to settle old regional tensions and avoid the outbreak of new ones. The Bulgarian State currently has legal borders, i.e. borders recognized by the United Nations and neighboring countries. However, it recalled the problem of delimiting the territorial sea with Romania for which for no viable solution has been found at the moment.

Another important objective for Bulgaria security is the maintenance of its national identity by promoting specific history and spiritual values. Bulgaria is considered "Country of Bulgarians" both inside and outside the official boundaries of the country. Like Romania, Bulgaria and proposed medium- and long-term full integration into NATO and the EU. This integration is seen by the Bulgarian state as a factor of stability and prosperity in the Wider Black Sea. Currently, Bulgaria is considered a hub of trade and energy in both the EU and NATO and a barrier to cross-border threats emanating from the Wider Black Sea Area.

2.1.3. State profile: Russian Federation

In the last two decades the Russian Federation has faced a crisis caused by loss of the superpower status. The space used for centuries by the Tsarist Empire and for three quarters of century by the Russians dominated Soviet Union would be filled with a dozen countries, most - except Russia - hardly prepared for genuine independence and of various sizes from the relatively large size of Ukraine, to that of Armenia. Their viability seemed uncertain, while Moscow's desire to constantly come to terms with the new reality was unpredictable.⁴ Although Russia's signature in the Black Sea decreased, the same cannot be said about its claims⁵, which in recent years have become increasingly visible.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union the world map and consequently the Black Sea map has undergone significant changes. Thus there were created new states with borders recognized by the United Nations. In the Wider Black Sea Region the number of independent states that emerged after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union has doubled. In this area, the effects of Machiavellian cutouts made by Stalin in 1936 were felt in the most painful way with the disappearance of the USSR in 1991. Transcaucasia is the most eloquent case of imposed borders that emerged after secessionist movements backed by the collapse of authoritarian Soviet empire.

With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union four geopolitical entities appeared in the Wider Black Sea Region: Abkhazia, South Ossetia,

³ Gheorghe Vlasceanu, *Active geo-strategic players, geopolitical pivots and the changing balance of power in Eurasia*, Romanian Magazine of Political Geography, no. 1, may 2010, pp. 116-125.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, pp. 104.

⁵ Eugene B. Rumer, Jeffrey Simon, *Contribution to an Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Area* (in Romanian), National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 26.

Transnistria and Nagorno - Karabakh. Following armed conflicts with mother state governments, the breakaway regions were able to maintain control over their territories, making enclave states. All these secessionist regions are not recognized as sovereign states by the international community and the UN. To a large extent, these enclaves remained politically, militarily and economically dependent on the Russian Federation.

The existence of secessionist entities weakens states whose borders from which they were drawn, leading to regional instability, including the emergence of large masses of refugees, terrorism and organized crime, and also corruption. These enclaves are areas that encourage trafficking in weapons, alcohol and tobacco smuggling and trade in counterfeit goods. Stimulation of all these types of activities brings lots of black money, which does not encourage direct or indirect beneficiaries to regulate the situation in any way, quite the contrary.

With the simultaneous pursuit of the US military and political influence in the Wider Black Sea Area through NATO presence, by concluding bilateral defense and supporting pro Western elites who opposed the Russian-speaking governments, the Russian Federation felt surrounded. The intensity of Russia's fear of encirclement was clearly visible during the crisis in Georgia in August 2008, where Moscow was in a genuine security dilemma⁶, and continued in 2014 and 2015 in the Ukraine crisis, by illegal annexation of Crimea peninsula, and by disguised support of pro-Russians fighting insurgents in Donbass and Lugansk areas of eastern Ukraine.

Russian Federation grants a leading position on the national security agenda to the Wider Black Sea Region. The main concern in the region is the Ukrainian conflict, and the smoldering conflict in Transnistria, where there is illegally parked a Russian Federation army corps, and not least, the conflict in Chechnya which threatens to expand into Dagestan and Georgia, with serious internal and external consequences for Russia and the surrounding region. The series of terrorist attacks in Moscow, Beslan, Nalchik involving Chechens and members of Caucasus ethnic groups, shows that the Kremlin failed to control the smoldering conflict for decades. Furthermore, this threatens the contamination of the entire Caucasus region.

To slow down the process of Westernization of the former Soviet republics, Russia adopted as a defensive strategy the orchestration of a series of conflicts between ethnic groups strategically placed by Stalin's policy of ethnic relocation. Thusly conflicts have erupted in the Ponto-Caspian Basin, which are still "frozen" today. On the other hand, Russia tried to maintain its influence on newly independent states by the creation of the Community of Independent States, a Russian Federation controlled space.

At the beginning of 2014 in Ukraine there was a clear aggression from the Russian Federation, a hybrid operation conducted in all environments: land, air, information, media and psychological. These events led to the occupation of the Crimea peninsula by armed forces with no state insignia.

The annexation of Crimea has sparked much controversy and is considered by the European Union, OSCE, NATO and the UN as an illegal annexation, which began as a result of Russian intervention in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine's administrative divisions. Once the unrecognized local authorities declared their independence from Ukraine, they organized a referendum under Russian military occupation, referendum that is not recognized and considered illegal by the Kiev government and the international community. Finally, joining the newly conquered territory to the Russian Federation was only a formality, formalized by President Vladimir Putin on March 18, 2014.

⁶ The security dilemma describes a situation in which a state's efforts to enhance its security pose a threat to other countries. These latter countries take measures to protect themselves which, in turn, threaten the initial state. Therefore, the initial efforts to enhance security finally determine the security reduction.

Through Russia's pronounced involvement in the Republic of Moldova domestic affairs, Moscow keeps Chisinau under continuous pressure by supplying arms to rebels in the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria. The same scenario applies to Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Also Russian Federation is actively involved in the Armenian-azeri issue of Nagorno Karabakh.

The fact that many of these separatist movements are manipulated and even entirely created by Russia's occult interests does not fundamentally change the situation. Once local elites build a power system, endowed with sovereignty symbols and a minimum national consciousness, it is very hard to turn around. This system is one of client type and organically bound to Russian Federation as tutelary power. Kremlin maintains these buffer zones specifically designed to remove the North Atlantic Alliance from the close vicinity. Thus the Russian Federation applies the old Roman principle "divide et impera" to the entire area of interest.

Within the Russian Federation there are internal borders between regions with Russian origin minority populations. The number of Muslims is continuously growing, and the southern and eastern borders of Russia are expected to be more vulnerable due to alarming decline of Russian-speaking population. The ratio between the territory size and the demographic decline exposed Russia to risks of all kinds considering there are overcrowded hostile spaces and in its immediate vicinity. Russia is currently paying for its policy of "divide et impera" which led to a large ethnic heterogeneity even within its own territory.

2.1.4. State profile: Turkey

Turkey is the main winner after the implosion of the USSR, but, paradoxically it is also Russia's main ally on opposition to the processes of opening the Black Sea to the Euro-Atlantic community. As a NATO member, Turkey aims to become the leader of Muslim populations in an area stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Not incidentally the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization was founded at the initiative of Turkey. In addition to controlling the straits, it also holds the control of the routes to Iraq, and in the prospect of oil exploitation in the Caspian Sea, Turkey is an optimal way for the construction of oil pipelines as well as for ensuring oil exploitation control, which is essential in the view of transnational companies.

Turkey has a special status in the Black Sea geopolitical architecture. New conditions of the Cold War, the NATO membership, the special relationship with the US, gave the country an opportunity for regional leadership in the Black Sea. Despite the historical and strategic divergences, Turkey has boosted its economic relations with Russia. Turkey continues to play a very active role in the economy of the regional balance of power, constituting itself as an important power center, which supports the resolution of conflicts through cooperation in a regional framework. Thus, an important aspect is the increasing role of "omnipresence" in its region. Turkey has several territorial disputes with most neighboring states. The Turks have always been a nation of conquerors and considered the boundaries as arbitrary drawn lines encompassing different ethnic populations.

Turkey understood that in order to strengthen the status of a regional center of power in the Wider Black Sea Area, it requires rethinking foreign policy in relations with the states of Transcaucasia. On this line fall the diplomatic efforts made in relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia has waived the recognition of the Turkish genocide of the Armenian population as a condition for the resumption of diplomatic ties, but this drew the reaction of Azerbaijan, who interpreted the opening of the Turkish - Armenia border without the resolution of the Nagorno - Karabakh conflict as an attack to its national interests⁷.

⁷ Ancuț, Isabela; Dănilă, Mihai, *Geopolitical and Geostrategical Evolutions in the Wider Black Sea Area* (in Romanian), "Infosfera", vol I, no. 4, 2009, p. 35.

A particular problem concerns Turkey's eastern border. Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Parti Karkerani Kurdistan*) – the PKK, is a Kurdish separatist organization fighting for territorial independence of the Kurds in Turkey, in order to create of an independent Kurdistan. Turkey, together with the United States and many European countries consider the PKK a terrorist group and refuses any negotiations to resolve the Kurdish issue. Kurdistan means "Land of the Kurds" and is the name of a geographical and cultural region in the Middle East, inhabited mainly by Kurds.

Kurdistan includes large parts of eastern Turkey (Turkish Kurdistan), northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), northwestern Iran (Iranian Kurdistan) and smaller parts of Azerbaijan (Kurdistan Uyezd), northern Syria and Armenia, near the border with Turkey. The region is bounded approximately by Zagros Mountains and the eastern peaks of the Taurus Mountains. In political terms, Iraqi Kurdistan is the only Kurdish region that has gained international recognition as the official independent federal entity. Kurds in Iran are also an officially recognized minority, although on the Iranian territory there is no Kurdish autonomous entity.

The relationship with the Russian Federation from its position of regional power center, offered Turkey the context for developing the concept of Eurasian state, a link between East and West. Ankara's foreign policy has followed that by its bridging role in the European energy security area, to secure an advantageous position in the run-up to EU accession talks, conditioning its participation to an energy project that transits its territory – through which Turkey was still getting access to energy stocks - for speeding up the accession negotiations. Turkey sought to protect its own foreign policy interests, even if this has aroused at a time concern about a possible reorientation to the East, contradictory situation, if we consider NATO membership and the nature of the special relationship consolidated through the Strategic Partnership US - Turkey.

Better relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey do not imply that the two regional centers of power gave up the highlights in their foreign affairs agendas, nor led to the complete disappearance of sensitive issues that generate regional instability. Thus, there is disagreement between Ankara and Moscow on the open conflict in Ukraine, the wars in Chechnya, the Muslims rights in the Russian Federation and Kremlin attitude in the Kurdish issue. Today, Turkey encourages most new member of the CIS, in order to strengthen their independence. In a wider perspective, Turkey gives economic support and military assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia. The problem of returning to the old frontiers in Azerbaijan is particularly important with major implications for regional security. Nagorno-Karabakh is the disputed region of Armenia and Azerbaijan and is an enclave in the Azerbaijan territory.

The frequency of small conflicts became worrying lately and clearly shows the attitude of the two countries towards a military conflict in the detriment of diplomatic settlement. The main sponsor of the Azerbaijani state is Turkey, these two countries having Muslim majority populations. The Turkish Republic has greatly improved its relations with the Russian Federation, a state that supports Armenia having majority Orthodox population. This approach can be extremely beneficial to the stability of the Caucasus. The Montreux Convention of 1936, the adoption of which Romania played an active role, stipulated the remilitarization of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, restored Turkish political and military suzerainty over them, recognized the right of passage of merchant vessels of all states, Turkey being able to restrict this right only in case of war, when it is belligerent. The importance of the Montreux Convention influences the current geopolitics in the Wider Black Sea Area through the particularly beneficial implications on the economies of states concerned in shipping through the Turkish Straits.

2.1.5. State profile: Ukraine

Ukraine is the second largest state in Europe and a major beneficiary of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Through its surface, equivalent to that of Germany and Britain combined, and its 52 million inhabitants, Ukraine falls among the leading countries of the continent. The considerable interface and length of coastline on the Black Sea have become to Ukraine realities related to the recent history of this state, which has an important geopolitical pivot status, arousing the interest of major Western powers, through the possibility of influencing the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Black Sea area but also in relation to Russia. Following the Russian aggression, Ukraine lost through non-combat Crimea and Sevastopol land. In eastern Ukraine there are armed conflict started in 2014 and currently taking place, between Kiev government forces and pro-Russians separatists in Donbass and Lugansk regions.

In his famous work "The Grand Chessboard"⁸, the American geostrategic Zbigniew Brzezinski, referring to independent Ukraine's role of geopolitical pivot, said that "Russia without Ukraine ceases to be a Eurasian empire", resumed to the status of an Asian empire liable to be drawn into the conflicts that will weaken it, with Central Asian states supported by southern states, Islamic as well. It is possible that China would oppose any rebuilding of the Russian domination over Central Asia, given its increasing interest for the newly independent states thereof. According to the same author, a Ukraine returned to Mother Russia, would bring about 52 million Orthodox Christians, natural and food reserves, Crimea, Sevastopol and an important Black Sea coastline, and would create in the Polish area, a direct border between the European Union and the Russian Federation. These predictions of the great geostrategic Zbigniew Brzezinski were partially true given the events begun in 2013 in Kiev, Euromaidan, continued in 2014 and 2015 by the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation, and the disguised Kremlin leadership of guerrilla in eastern Ukraine, in Donbass and Lugansk regions, a conflict that left more than five thousand dead and tens of thousands wounded since inception.

Geopolitically, Ukraine consists of 3 distinct regions, namely: Western Ukraine, the central core, and Eastern Ukraine. Crimea which was annexed by Russia illegally, constituted the fourth largest administrative division of Ukraine.

Western Ukraine is composed of historical Polish provinces (Volani, Galitia) and Romanian (Northern Bucovina, Transcarpathian Maramures, Herta, Southern Bessarabia), some of them being former regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, given by Stalin to the Soviet Republic after the Second World War, as part of his policy of "divide et impera". The moral illegitimacy of the incorporation of these territories, which cannot be removed by any treaty, remains as such in the collective mind and is the source of exacerbated Ukrainian nationalism in this geopolitical region.

Exacerbated nationalism explains the pro-Western and anti-Russian orientation of Ukrainians in this region, and the population mix and the former Austro-Hungarian domination explain the significant weight of the Catholic religion. The common denominator, besides the political element, is ideological - the aversion of the inhabitants of other than Russian ethnicity towards the Russians. Western integration is seen as a final solution detachment from the sphere of influence of the masters of the east.

The central part, from Chernigov Odessa, including Kiev, is culturally akin to the west, and is the nationalist core with the main Orthodox religion. From a historical perspective, Kiev for Russia is the equivalent of Kosovo to Serbia, and it is the starting point, the cradle of Russian civilization. Therefore, as a psychological defense mechanism, Kievan

⁸ Brzezinski, Z., *The Grand Chessboard*, Publishing House Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 2000, p.59.

Ukrainians are also extremely nationalist with strong anti-Russian and pro-Western orientation.

Ukraine east of Dnepr, the most developed part in terms of economy and infrastructure, connected to gas, transport and electricity networks in Russia, is Russian-speaking, Orthodox, geopolitically related to Moscow and ethnically dominated by Russian-born population. The energy dependence of Ukraine to the Russian Federation is not just about oil and gas, but also nuclear fuel required to operate nuclear power plants mainly in the region; an eloquent case is the plant in Zaporizhyya, the largest of its kind in Europe. Also in this region there is the Donbas province, with the most important railway infrastructure, large reserves of coal and mining secular tradition in Donetsk basin.

The Crimean Peninsula, Russia annexed in 2014, represents the geostrategic control point of the northern Black Sea region. The Sevastopol land, through its major geostrategic port allows anchorage of military vessels and oil tankers, becoming vital for the Black Sea military Russian Fleet. Sevastopol is the capital of this new territory of the Russian Federation and a very hot topic between Kiev and Moscow. Ukraine is a state border (in Old Eastern Slavonic "kraina" means the territory of the border⁹) between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. Huntington said in its thesis "Clash of Civilizations" that Ukraine is torn between Russophile East and nationalist West, the extreme Ukrainian nationalism complicating ethnic relations in all provinces of the country and increasing centrifugal tendencies.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine in Donbass area, and the annexation of Crimea peninsula are hot topics on the agenda of global and regional security, which are heavily debated and concern the Euro-Atlantic security-oriented organizations. Following the ceasefire agreement in Minsk in February 2015 between Kiev authorities and pro-Russian separatists controlling eastern Ukraine, Russia retraces Ukrainian internal borders, threatening and negotiating from a position of strength. The agreement signed in the capital of Belarus was mediated by EU countries and represents a ceasefire truce between two warring camps. This agreement is very important for maintaining the status quo starting from February 2015 and is ensuring only partially and temporally the stability in the Wider Black Sea Region. The Russian Federation is the main winner in this situation orchestrated by the Kremlin itself.

Theoretically, following the Minsk agreement, Ukraine borders do not change, but there is practically plotted an officially unrecognized frontier within the Ukrainian state, between secessionist regions Donetsk and Lugansk and the rest of Ukraine. The newly created border in eastern Ukraine will be monitored by OSCE troops, organization in which Russian Federation has veto right. By this move Russia puts in chess the EU states that have mediated the conflict, thus creating a new buffer zone between the Euro-Atlantic region and close proximity¹⁰.

2.1.6. State profile: Georgia and Republic of Moldova

Georgia and Moldova are the members of the Wider Black Sea Area who resemble in some geopolitical respects. The dimensions of the two countries are relatively small, with populations of 4-5 million inhabitants. Current borders of the two countries are internationally recognized by all neighbors, but also by the United Nations. A common element of the two states' population geography is the massive presence of ethnic minorities - Armenians, Azeris, Ossetians, Abkhazians and Adjars in Georgia and Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians in Moldova. Some common elements include the adherence to Orthodox Christianity of the population majorities.

⁹ Room A., *Placenames of the World*, MacFarland and Co., Inc., London, 1997.

¹⁰ <http://fumn.eu/cum-s-a-definit-practic-o-noua-granita-pe-harta-europei-catalin-radu-tanase-si-dan-dungaciuanalizeaza-acordul-de-la-minsk-video/>

State organization of Georgia and Moldova is semi-federal type. Georgia inherited from the Soviet period three autonomous regions: Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia. Moldova recognized political territorial autonomy of Gagauz Yeri and Transnistria. Both countries are in a process of masked federalization. A common element in the geopolitics of the two countries is hidden autonomies, such as regions Kvemo Kartli, with a majority Azerbaijani population, but also Djavaheti with predominantly Armenian population in Georgia, and Taraclia in Moldova.

The geo-historical past of the two countries is also comparable because they were vassals of the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires. An important common element is the Soviet past and the presence of the two countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, regional body created on the ruins of the former USSR. Both countries have complex relationships with the Russian Federation. Both Georgia and Moldova fail to control approximately 1/8 of their national territory. Other common geopolitical elements are the active territorial conflicts - active conflicts are the Transnistrian in Moldova and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian in Georgia; the passive conflicts are the Djavaheti problem in Georgia and the region of Gagauz autonomy of Moldova, possible conflicts are represented by the Kvemo Kartli problem of Azerbaijanis, and the Bulgarians in southern Bessarabia.

Although the conflict in Transnistria is often treated separately, it is but a segment of a much larger territorial conflict, namely, a chain of conflicts stretching from Galicia to the mouths of the Danube and involving besides Moldova and Russia, countries like Romania and Ukraine. With complex geo-historical origin and high explosive potential, the conflict axis Bucovina - Bessarabia - Transnistria was overshadowed by events in Crimea - 2014, eastern Ukraine - 2015 and the Caucasus (Georgia - 2008) in recent years. The issue was never addressed as a whole, but only on parts - the conflict in eastern Moldova, called the Transnistrian conflict, the conflict in southern Moldova, called Gagauz, the Moldovan-Ukrainian border issue, and Romanian-Ukrainian border - Bâstroe channel. Thus is stated the appearance of a conflict axis with three segments, involving three countries: Romania, Ukraine, Moldova in relatively uneven measure. All these conflicts have different historical roots, but the same protagonists. Bucovina border segment implies the predominant participation of Romania and Ukraine. The Bessarabian segment brings together Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine and includes the Gagauz and Bulgarians problem in southern Bessarabia, and the Moldovan-Ukrainian border issue. In the Transnistrian segment there are listed as state actors Ukraine and Moldova.

It is wrong to attribute this axis the sole dimension of a regional conflict and limit ourselves to the only three actors directly involved. At least four other states may be regarded as engaged in open or latent conflicts from the axis of conflict: Russia, USA, Turkey and Bulgaria. In conclusion, following the implosion of the Soviet Union, with the redefinition of the geopolitical borders of the States belonging to the Wider Black Sea Region, there have also changed the major regional and international geopolitical axes.

Conclusions

The Wider Black Sea Region is constituted as a genuine strategic corridor ensuring energy security - a vital issue for population welfare, social growth and the proper functioning of the EU Member societies. The extremely complex social geography of the Wider Black Sea Region has generated and continuously generates a unique and turbulent political climate for regional countries. Turntable not only between Europe and Asia or between Christianity and Islam, but also between the European integration and Eurasian disintegration space, the Wider Black Sea Region has experienced a real geopolitical revolution after the implosion of the Soviet Union.

The disappearance of the Soviet geopolitical dictatorship and the re-affirmation of Russian expansionist interests in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the proliferation of littoral states, reactivation of the Turkish factor, and the geo-economical dis-enclavisation of immense Black Sea heartland, are some of the results of recent reconfigurations of political and geographical borders occurred in the Wider Black Sea Region. The geographical location of the Black Sea region along the north-south geopolitical fissure, and the neighborhood with two leading players of the international political scene - the Russian Federation and the European Union, but also with the Caspian region housing large reserves of hydrocarbons, all these have contributed to its geopolitical value.

However, being surrounded by a chain of inter-ethnic conflicts and often associated with phenomena such as cross-border crime or political instability, having a poor economic situation, the Wider Black Sea Area is a real powder keg. Reality proves that we will not find another area of the world where such a small territory would present so many open territorial conflicts. We recall not only the publicized conflicts in Crimea, eastern Ukraine - Donbass and Lugansk, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkish Kurdistan, but also many latent conflicts, almost anonymous to the wide public. These latent conflicts include the problem of Bessarabian Bulgarians, the Turkish-Armenian dispute, the Gagauz issue or the relations between Ukraine and the two Romanian countries Moldova and Romania.

Thus, the relocation of territorial boundaries of the states emerged after the fall of the Iron Curtain lead to the idea of building up in the period following the Cold War of a new distinct geopolitical region – the Wider Black Sea Region, on the stage of international relations. Following the implosion of the Soviet Union, with the redefinition of the geopolitical borders of the states belonging to the Wider Black Sea Region, there have also changed the major regional and international geopolitical axes.

The Black Sea space is geopolitically positioned at the crossroads of three strategic axes: the Black Sea – Mediterranean Sea axis - the south-eastern flank that NATO's, an area of strategic importance for NATO, mainly affected by cross-border risks; the Black Sea - Caucasus – Caspian Sea axis – a transit area influenced by certain types of sub regional instability reverberating from Central Asia; and the axis Russian Federation - Armenia - Iran, a significant axis from economical, military, and strategic perspective. Transforming the Cold War relations between states belonging to the Wider Black Sea Region by redefining internal and external borders, the geographic presence of NATO and EU at the Black Sea by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the development through the European Security and Defense Policy of the program for Black Sea Synergy, the regional strategic interests expressed by NATO and the US, convert the Wider Black Sea Region from Europe periphery and ideological border - also called the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, to a geostrategic area in the middle of transatlantic geopolitical actions of post Cold War period.

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REGIONALIZATION AND THE LOCAL EFFECTS OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract: *The collapse of the Soviet Union has proven to be the main driver of transforming of the Black Sea Region into a very complex and volatile area. The attempt of the new independent countries in the region, which formerly were soviet republics, to join euro-atlantic community determined a new dynamic of regional politics. This dynamic is marked by a series of conflicts whose purpose is to maintain the former Soviet republics in the Russian sphere of influence. In addition, the newly created Ukrainian crisis has cast an entirely unforeseen cloud over the whole euro-atlantic politics and intensified the long-standing debate about the Europe's security. In such circumstances the main objective of this paper is to assess the strategic situation in the Black Sea Region, explore its impact on European security and identify the special consequences for European maritime security.*

Keywords: *regionalism, Black Sea region, maritime security*

Introduction

After the Cold War Black Sea area has become one of the most dynamic regions of the post-Soviet era. Therefore, from the perspective of European and Euro-Atlantic security, the evolving strategic Black Sea presents important implications. But what has changed in the equation of security in the Black Sea and what are the main political-diplomatic and military issues of this region?

Undoubtedly, any strategic review of the Black Sea region must start with these questions, in fact, the very purpose of this article is to analyze the manner in which the Black Sea has acquired a new significance both, inside and outside as well, and how the security dynamics of the region influences the European maritime security.

1. From rivalry to cooperation and back to rivalry

The end of the Cold War has marked the end of the period in which the Black Sea was on the spot of the ideological and military disputes between US and USSR, and their global power blocs. The end of the Cold War has marked the end of the period in which the Black Sea was on the spot of the ideological and military disputes between US and USSR, and their global power blocs. More than a quarter century ago, the Black Sea Region was an area dominated by the Warsaw Pact signatory states (Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria). Among them we could find only a NATO member country (Turkey), and this is why from this perspective there were authors considering the Black Sea Region as the „microcosm” of the Cold War. But the collapse of the Soviet Union was undoubtedly of paramount importance when marking the region's new geopolitical landscape - an event that rivals in importance with the end of the Cold War¹.

¹ Although the phenomenon is directly linked, for historical, political and conceptual reasons, it is very important to make a clear distinction between these two major events (the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR). For

For obvious reasons several centuries, from the fall of Constantinople in 1453, until the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was signed, in 1774, the Black Sea was dubbed "Ottoman Lake". With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca practically starts the domination of Russia².

So, from a historical perspective, the Black Sea was the "maritime component" of the long confrontation between the Ottoman and Russian, a "competition" that stretched from Eastern Europe to the Caspian Sea. From a military perspective, the Black Sea provided a convenient platform which could lead Russia's enemies offensive from the South toward what appeared to be its most vulnerable points. On the other hand, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia aimed at increasing power to become a force in the Mediterranean and from there to all the seas and oceans. But, to make this possible, the Russians had first to impose their self as a force in the Black Sea.

In the 90^s, the Black Sea significance for Europe is found primarily in its positioning as the shortest route of access to the rich resources of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. The collapse of the Soviet Union led therefore cease its maritime dominance in the Black Sea after two centuries. No longer subject to Moscow, the newly independent states of the region, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia have become autonomous elements of an open and multipolar regional system evolved behind a renewed balance of power. After a secular domination, hegemony of the former Soviet Union seemed ended and therefore, the region was expected to develop a new balance of power.

This particular change in regional relations seemed that resulted in a change to a fundamental point: the end of a regional hegemonic system whose center was Moscow, a system which throughout its existence closed its doors to outside world.

In a period of about two decades of strategic transformation the Black Sea region has completely changed both its geopolitical status and role. The countries mentioned above, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, with the 6 countries resulted from the dismantling of the USSR - Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, all Black Sea countries - began to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation ties in various fields - political, economic and military. On the other hand, the enlarged strategic picture of the Black Sea region began to be altered by a number of frozen conflicts which began to dominate the former Soviet space.

The Black Sea regional dynamics caused by the Cold War, which seemed to have changed the bipolar rivalry with bi- and multi-lateral cooperation tenders was seriously complicated by the war in Georgia in 2008, and then more seriously in 2014 by the Ukrainian crisis. Chauvinist policy of Moscow, recently launched against US and EU is probably the most blatantly anti-Western rhetoric in Russia policy. At the same time the West seems to be absorbed similarly, in a more and more anti-Russian propaganda.

Both sides seem to be confined to an area of mutual accusations of imperialism greedy as an unfortunate replica of a "cold war" era, which places the Black Sea region back in the old ideological and military rivalries. In addition, irresponsible dramatization of the conflict in the media, and the lack of strong reactions from international organizations further aggravated tensions rising between the West and Russia.

similar reasons see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Western efforts to Shape Post-Soviet Behaviour: Contemporary Developments in Historical Perspective*, in: Karen Dawisha (ed.), *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 13-14

² Russia is becoming a power of the Black Sea, in the true sense, only in 1783, when Crimean Khanate, a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire since 1478, was attached. The annexation has followed the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty, 1774, based on which the defeated Ottoman Empire was obliged to grant independence Crimean Khanate. This treaty is key in the Russia and Turkey rivalry to dominate in the Black Sea, and at that time held the first advantage. See, Norman E. Saul, *Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807*, Chicago: University of Journalism, 1970, p 3-22. Moscow has received an enormous advantage with more than a century before, when Bohdan Khmelnytsky Cossack leader voluntarily surrendered Ukraine to Russian based on treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654.

2. The Ukraine independence

After nearly 300 years of union, the separation of Ukraine from Russia in December 1991, was a decisive event in the new geostrategic situation in the Black Sea region. This is due to the large area of territory and wealth of Ukraine and its strategic positioning in Eastern Europe (featuring 2782 km of coastline along the northern shores of the Black Sea)³.

The special location of Ukraine, between Europe and Russia, has awarded to Ukraine an enormous significance in terms of strategic importance, becoming a pivotal element in European security.

On the other hand, the loss of strategic depth by loss of Ukraine, led to a feeling of uncertainty for Russia vis-à-vis the West, from where it was invaded twice in less than a century. Deprived of human and material resources offered by Ukraine, Russia suffered severe losses among many vital elements - strategic depth, military and civilian ports, military bases etc. - which could be translated into national power, to no longer mention the psychological impact had on separation. Crimea has been the greatest loss in terms of Russia's position as a dominant power in the Black Sea. Crimea was the loss of one of the two key points for control of the region, the second being the Turkish straits. Russia has invested heavily in Crimea to make it a fief of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Traditionally, the harbor of Sevastopol, was the symbol of Russian influence in the Crimea.

Many years after independence Crimea remained as a source element of conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Although Moscow has accepted formally that the island belongs to Ukraine, nationalist Russian Communists and pro-Russian Crimean residents argued vehemently in favor of its annexation back to Russia. The conflict found an apparent resolution by signing a bilateral agreement, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership signed on 31 May 1997 that Russia approved and recognized the territorial limits of Ukraine. Finally, the Russian Parliament ratified the treaty in 1999.

Ukraine's independence also determined to the division of the Black Sea fleet, which was particularly strong in the past. Therefore, while Ukraine started to increase its role as a regional power of the Black Sea, Russia's position had decreased. Negotiations on fleet division lasted between 1992 and 1997. Russia's insistence to continue using Sevastopol (one of the best natural harbors in the world), as the center of its Black Sea Fleet, was the main reason for bottlenecks negotiations. Final agreements on the sharing of the fleet, together with payments or payment arrangements have been finalized on 28 May 1997 driving the signing of the bilateral treaty on 31 May⁴. These agreements, which allowed Russian Federation to use Sevastopol as its main military base at the Black Sea for the next 20 years, were finally approved, on March 24, 1999, by the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament), despite strong opposition to the nationalists. Interestingly, the Russian-Ukrainian treaty signing coincided with Operation Allied Force, under NATO against Yugoslavia to resolve the conflict in Kosovo⁵.

Despite the resistance of the radical Ukrainian opposition on April 27, 2010 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Kharkov agreement signed by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and Russian, Dmitry Medvedev, which extend the stationing of the

³ The World Factbook 1993, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc. for the Central Intelligence Agency, 1993, p. 352.

⁴ See, „Fleet Accord Paves Way to Russia-Ukraine Treaty“, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDSP), XLIX:22, July 2, 1997, pp. 1-5.

⁵ Alexander Tkachenko, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, told the press that the ratification of the treaty was made with highly complex international conditions generated by NATO actions. Also, linking the recent proposal to parliament to revoke the current status of Ukraine's non-nuclear country, points out that "in the current international situation", Ukraine needs to develop a complex and powerful defense. See "Ukraine: Ukraine Ratifies Agreements on Black Sea Fleet Basic" Itar-Tass World Service, 24/03/1999, in: Reuters, March 24, 99.

Russian Black Sea Fleet to in 2042. Similarly, the State Duma of the Russian Federation also ratified the document. The consequences of this decision, together with other decisions which were taken by the Kiev in his dealings with Russia, proved to be lengthy, and at least for part of Ukrainian society, have seriously undermined the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

3. Russia's concerns

Russia's concerns with the emerging Black Sea maritime environment arises from strategic considerations that go beyond the region. The decrease of Russia's military power in the area, the increased NATO's visibility the Black Sea, complementary with the relative increase of Turkey's naval power, are intended to strengthen Moscow's fears of losing the ability to control the Black Sea region. If we put these aspects in conjunction with the existing influences over Mediterranean we finally can understand the increased Russia's fears to be transformed from a great power in a simple coastal state⁶.

Turkey launched successively a number of initiatives to encourage and develop trust between the Black Sea countries Navies. Thus, in 1998, discussions took place between military representatives of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia and Ukraine, for measures to develop the exchange of military information and joint exercises. In 2001 Black Sea Naval Force (BLEACKSEAFOR) was created, and in 2004 the BLACKSEA HARMONY Operation started, both at the initiative of Turkey. All of these initiatives followed after Turkey suggested in early 1999 setting up a fleet of the six Black Sea states to achieve operational cooperation⁷.

Black Sea offers one of the cheapest shipping oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Europe. Oil pipeline network built in the Soviet era ends at Novorossiysk, the northeastern part of the Black Sea. Relying only on this option would only perpetuate traditional Russian monopoly on oil shipping routes, political influence and control that would arise from it. This lead to national concerns in the three states which, backed by the US, are engaged in finding alternative routes. For understandable reasons, Russia is afraid of losing their most powerful asset in the region, which is hampered by the construction of new pipelines that does not use its territory.

4. The impact of local conflicts on the Black Sea regional stability

The proliferation of local conflicts in the Black Sea region, especially ethnic separatist conflicts is the main cause of perpetuating uncertainty and instability. Statistics show that in the Black Sea extended region occurred most armed conflicts that were based on ethnic separatist causes (especially within CSI). Examples here are those of Moldova, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In addition, tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and the Crimea status could not be kept under control and burst into the bloodiest conflict in the former Soviet Union space⁸.

⁶Nikolai A. Kovalsky, *The Mediterranean Process: Towards a Closer Cooperation*, in: Nikolai A. Kovalsky (ed.), *Russia: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Region*, Moscow: Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1996, pp. 52-54.

⁷ Ukraine: *Ukraine Ponders Turkey's Proposal for Joint Naval Force on Black Sea*, BBC Monitoring, Former Soviet Union - Political 20/01/1999, Source: Itar-Tass, Moscow, 20 Jan 99, in: Reuters, 20 Jan 99.

⁸ Most separatist conflicts in the former Soviet Union have launched very soon after independence, or by exception, Nogorno-Karabakh in 1988. In Moldova, ethnic Russians fought for so-called Transnistria State in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhaz fought for independence from Tbilisi. In Azerbaijan, Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh fought for independence from Baku, managing to occupy nearly one fifth of Azerbaijani territory with the support Armeniei.

Although, none of the Black Sea region separatist conflicts has been solved so far, the use of weapons has been discontinued. However, it is well known how fragile is the ceasefire agreement signed in Minsk in March this year, and therefore the atmosphere of uncertainty and instability remains above. Internal conflicts in the Wider Black Sea represent a significant source of regional instability because of the negative effects they have on economic growth and national development, as well as the possibility of intervention by foreign powers in support of different parts. However, the cost of economic, political and social armed conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan stressed the difficulties of transition.

5. The dynamic of the Black Sea security processes and their impact on the European security

The Black Sea region is located on the periphery of Europe. That is why it can be considered that changes in this area seem to bind conceptual center and security policy issues in Europe. Although in this statement there is a considerable dose of truth, the link and inter-state relationship would have ceased if it jeopardized the security of Europe. To support this idea, we can give more examples of inter-relationships. First and perhaps most important, is that in 1991, the region, as a whole, has returned to Europe. In anticipation of integration into European structures the Black Sea countries were satisfied (some of them still thank) the partnership, if integration is still a topic that can be discussed. Most of the Black Sea countries and their people want very much to be part of Europe. Second, all countries in the region were included in the matrix structures of European security, NATO, OSCE and CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe). For this reason, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, for example, are equally involved in the control of the security of Europe as Western countries. Moreover, Georgia and Azerbaijan can possibly hope to persuade NATO to assume a security role in the South Caucasus.

Going forward, Russia is still the greatest power in the Black Sea, and is coming from history as a core element of European security. His behavior in the peripheral regions of its territory can be a test of its long-term intentions as a former imperial power. Unfortunately, Ukrainian crisis has introduced a new negative calculation element in European's security by creating an outbreak of open conflict between Europe and Russia. The consequence of this aspect is that solving this crisis in conjunction with future amelioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine will be crucial for the future security of Europe

Therefore, changes and political problems in the Black Sea region after the 90's analyzed in this paper, directly and indirectly affect European peace and stability in various ways, from which the Ukrainian crisis is distinguished by far. If the Black Sea region would become a prosperous democratic area on the edge of Europe inhabited by over 330 million people, the benefits of the political, economic and cultural would be immeasurable. At the same time, there is unfortunately a negative variation of the situation, one in which Europe could suffer from the effects of instability in the region, poverty, dictatorship and war, especially among the great powers of the region.

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SOUTH CAUCASUS, A STRATEGIC CONCERN FOR THE GREAT POWERS

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Abstract: *The current situation in the South Caucasus has largely been determined by its unique geostrategic position. From this perspective, this paper aims to analyze the complex relations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with external players and in the context, the territorial disputes evaluation of “frozen conflicts”. This paper assumes that the current strategic concerns and the increased importance of the South Caucasus are on the one hand directly linked to the interests of neighboring states and, on the other hand, with the influence of the West in the area, due to its strategic, geopolitical and economic advantages that region holds. The evaluation of relations between the South Caucasus states and various external actors take into account the current geopolitical and security environment, while emphasizing the collision of interests between them. This paper seeks to provide a viable solution capable to transform the intense geopolitical competition in the area, which creates a rift between states, into opportunities.*

Keywords: *South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, frozen conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, strategic importance.*

The region is located on the periphery of Russia, Iran and Turkey, at the crossroads of the Middle East and Eurasia, between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. From this perspective, the strategic geographical location has a configuration which prevented the formation of sustainable state entities, for centuries the region being a center of great powers interest.

From the historical perspective, the region was in time one of the most disputed regions, a battle ground for various empires, the Persian, Ottoman and Russian who have left their mark, resulting a political, military, religious and cultural rivalries arena.

The current strategic concerns and the growing importance of the South Caucasus are directly related with the interests of regional powers and influence and interest of the Western in the area, due to strategic advantages, geopolitical and economic region holds.

Each of the three South Caucasus countries has a distinct and different relationship with external actors. Armenia, geopolitical vulnerability depends on Russia, Azerbaijan rich in natural resources is pragmatic and Georgia eager to reunite the country is ready to risk.

1. Armenia and Azerbaijan Conflict

1.1. Armenia

Armenia's foreign policy has a dual character, on the one hand the development of Russian military alliance and the Eurasian Economic Union integration¹ (EEU) and on the

¹ Eurasian Economic Commission, Armenia is now in the Eurasian Economic Union, <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/02-01-2015-1.aspx>;

other hand maintaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations and continuing the bilateral dialogue with other countries².

The interest in developing relations between Russia and Armenia exists on both sides. While Russia is an important factor for economic development and for maintenance of Armenia's security, Yerevan is Moscow's main ally in the area. The Armenia's interest to strengthen the economy and energy security, namely integration in EEU, concur with Moscow's desire to prevent from signing an agreement with the European Union a simultaneously Armenia's sercing for closer ties with the West.

Due to regional tensions and uncertain security situation, the Armenian authorities are continuously concerned because of the increasing Armenia's defense capability. At military level, Armenia is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), whose founding member is, which guarantees military security in the event of any external aggression. Moreover, Russia contributes to increasing Armenia's operational capacity with Russian military base in Gyumri, for which has been signed an agreement to expand military presence until 2044. This base is part of the missile defense system of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) next to Erebuni air base, part of the same Russian military base 102³. Although Russia claims that the presence of 102 base in the region does not infringe any international treaty and does not change the balance of forces in the region, Moscow tries to maintain its political and military control in the Southern Caucasus, on border with Turkey and Iran, CIS and CSTO intergovernmental military alliance non member countries.

In terms of energy, Armenia is dependent on importing natural gas from the ArmRosGazprom Company where Gazprom holds 79% and Armenian Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 21%. Armenia's gas export is offered at a preferential price, the lowest in the CIS alliance. Almost 40% of Armenia's electricity needs is provided by the Metsamor⁴ nuclear plant, whose control is held by Russia. Located in an area of high seismic risk, Russia has recently approved Armenia, a loan of \$ 270 million⁵ to delay the plant closure by another 10 years, until 2026.

Armenia's situation regarding its neighbors is influenced by the absence of diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which determines Yerevan to maintain interest in cooperation with Russia, Iran and Georgia.

Although Armenia has little interest in developing political and military relations with NATO regarding Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), it continues to support the alliance actions in Afghanistan and Kosovo⁶.

A major threat is the regional isolation - the construction of the largest transport and energy projects Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and railway Baku-Tbilisi-Kars⁷. The Armenia's main threat to security continues to be the situation of Nagorno-Karabakh maintaining latent conflict⁸.

² Colonel Artak Tonoyan, The Future of the Armenia – NATO Relationship, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA590245.

³ GlobalSecurity.org, 102nd Military Base, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/102-military-base.htm;

⁴ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Overview, www.nti.org/country-profiles/armenia;

⁵ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Armenia, Russia Approves Nuclear Energy Loan To Armenia, <http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/26764371.html>.

⁶ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Erik Davtyan, Armenia and NATO Reaffirm Their Cooperation, [www.jamestown.org/programs/edm - 2015 Archives for EDM/February 4, 2015 Volume 12 Issue 22/ Armenia and NATO Reaffirm Their Cooperation](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm-2015-Archives-for-EDM/February-4,-2015-Volume-12-Issue-22/Armenia-and-NATO-Reaffirm-Their-Cooperation).

⁷ Rovshan Ibrahimov, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars: Geopolitical Effect on the South Caucasian Region, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2763/baku-tbilisi-kars-geopolitical-effect-on-the-south-caucasian-region.html>.

⁸ Grisha Aghajanyan, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh. Conflict: Key issue to Armenia's National Security: (Russia's influence and involvement), <http://thearmenianpost.com/azerbaijan-and-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-key-issue-to-armenias-national-security-russias-influence-and-involvement/>.

1.2. Azerbaijan

In foreign policy, the Azeri attitude has a multi-vector character exploiting energy aspect which is a major advantage in managing potential rivalries with regional powers and the West, a strategy that helps to maintain independence and security in the region. Both Russia and West efforts to change Azerbaijan authorities perspectives have not succeed in arousing the interest of Baku to join any military alliances, either NATO or CSTO, Azerbaijan follows its strategic course to keep a balanced between the two entities⁹.

Azerbaijan's economic growth is a guarantee of a constructive relation with its neighbor Russia with whom the Azerbaijani government was able to negotiate with pragmatism. Russia is the main partner in military-technical cooperation and helps to increase the capacity of Azeri defense. Azerbaijani government has increased annual military spending by nearly 30%. While Washington maintains its embargo transactions on military equipment toward parties involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the government in Baku expects more support from Moscow who is contributing to the development of military Armenian's capabilities, contrary to Azerbaijani's objectives. The decision to extend the lease agreement with Russian Gabala's radar station, failed in 2012 mainly as a result of Azerbaijani financial claims for hire station, amount that was increased from \$ 7 million to \$ 300 million¹⁰. Although Azerbaijan has understood the missile system importance for Russia's security, located near the border with Iran¹¹, officials in Baku showed their tendency of remaining outside Moscow's control area. However, this situation will not strain the bilateral cooperation as long as exists their mutual interest in maintaining a relationship that aims weapons purchases, oil and gas pipelines and settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh file.

Azerbaijan will continue to use its energy advantages to protect its sovereignty. Although as stated the President of the Azeri state oil company, SOCAR, overall export capacity up to 2025 was estimated to be 40-50 billion cubic meters per year¹², Azerbaijan is not able to fully meet the Europe's natural gas needs. The European annual demand for gas supply may reach to 80 billion cubic meters by 2020 and exceed 140 billion m³ by 2030.

Azerbaijan, the only state with significant oil resources in the South Caucasus is an important actor in the region. Natural gas extracted from Shah Deniz II field are crossing the Azeri state, Georgia and Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, project that intended to be a key element for the Southern Corridor, which connects the Caspian Sea, Turkey and the EU.

Azerbaijan is one of three states, along with Iran and Turkmenistan, which has not solved the problem of the Caspian Sea status regarding the administrative control over the oil fields. Southern Corridor idea is not simply to import natural gas from Azerbaijan, but also from Iran and Turkmenistan. Although the Azeri state can become an important intersection, all Iranian gas fields are in the south, near Syria and Turkey, and the transport to the north is not profitable, tense situations and penalties make foreign investment in the area, impossible

⁹ Rainer Freitag-Wirringhaus, Prospects for Armenia and Azerbaijan between Eurasia and the Middle East, kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/.../chapter3.pdf - Prospects for Armenia and Azerbaijan between Eurasia and the Middle East.

¹⁰ Joshua Kucera, What Will Gabala Closure Mean For Russia-Azerbaijan Ties, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66307>.

¹¹ Russian Press Review, Russia terminated the operation of the missile early warning radar station in Azerbaijan, <http://tass.ru/en/russianpress/686830>.

¹² Aynur Jafarova, Azerbaijan's gas export potential to increase by 2023: SOCAR, http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/61879.html.

for the moment. Moreover, Turkmenistan is focused mainly towards east, particularly China¹³.

The US role is crucial in transforming Azerbaijan into a Caspian Sea transit gas country and could influence on the one hand Iraq to sell gas to Europe which will contribute to economic reconstruction and post-conflict infrastructure of Baghdad and on the other hand might reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

Strategic Partnership with Turkey, a NATO member, and military cooperation with Israel shows an informal regional alliance that could ensure Azerbaijani's security.

A threat in terms of the security situation in Azerbaijan is the separatist phenomenon and radical Islamic manifestations. Presidential Administration is ambivalent about Shiite political activism, manifested both through a policy of conciliation and by measures of repression, because of the fear that this religious minority could challenge the current policies of the government. At the same time, to strengthen the control over the civil society were tolerated public events of social conservatives, followers of Salafist ideology, loyal to the Azerbaijani leader. The main concern of the Baku's authorities is the restoration of administrative control in the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

1.3. Nagorno-Karabakh

In 1923 the Soviet authorities decided to establish Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan SSR, an Armenian enclave with Christian population in the middle of a Muslim country, which aroused popular discontent and created an ethnic conflict. In 1988, Armenians organized demonstrations annexation to RSS Armenia who voted, a year later, the annexation of the region. Following, Azerbaijan SSR decided to abolish the Karabakh Autonomous Region and take control of the area, which led to a military conflict after which Armenians won. Bishkek Armistice in 1994, under the supervision of Russian Federation, although officially ended the fighting, did not produce a clear solution¹⁴.

Nagorno-Karabakh Republic gained its independence but is not recognized by Russia, Armenia or any UN member state, only republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia supports it.

Existing dispute concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is the main factor of instability between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Repeated cease-fire violations along the contact line between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops deployed near the breakaway region continue to strain the situation in the area and violent outbursts are causing casualties on both sides. Diplomatic attempts to solve the conflict, the Minsk Group, formed due to OSCE decision to engage in conflict resolution and facilitation of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained without significant results. Chaired by France, United States and Russia, the latter assumes unilateral the role of conflict mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh, bypassing the official Minsk Process without admitting the involvement of peacekeeping troops under OSCE mandate.

Through the intensification of refractory attitude regarding the peace process and the ongoing official support of Armenia while also arming Azerbaijani, Russia supports the continuing hostilities from behind.

Armenia who has chosen a pro Russian approach by acceding to Eurasian Economic Union¹⁵ (UEE) made a compromise in terms of establishing its borders. Because the Treaty of Accession of Armenia to UEE requires a clear specification regarding the internationally

¹³ Jan Sir and Slavomir Horak, China as an Emerging Superpower in Central Asia: The View from Ashkhabad, kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../06_cesca20080575-88.pdf - China as an Emerging Superpower in Central Asia: The View from Ashkhabad.

¹⁴ Carol Migdalovitz, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, <http://fas.org/man/crs/92-109.htm>.

¹⁵ Stratfor, The Tumultuous Birth of the Eurasian Economic Union, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tumultuous-birth-eurasian-economic-union>.

recognized borders, Armenia has chosen not to establish checkpoints with the breakaway region, the region integration being made "de facto" not "de jure".

A total enclave dependence on Armenia which is in the best position to create opportunities for the region development, the almost total dependence of Armenia on Russia, upward trend in terms of Azerbaijan's defense spending and possible amplification of radical Islamism, cause the current vulnerability level to a possible security challenges in the South Caucasus.

2. Georgia in the middle of two major challenges

The priorities in relations with the European Union, promoting a pro-active policy in order to attract European investors and Euro-Atlantic integration efforts lead to Russia's attempts to continue the expansionist actions to maintain its influence in the area.

Regional stability, inviolability of borders and cooperation with like-minded democracies are few foreign policy principles that guide the Georgian state. Euro-Atlantic integration, US strategic partnership, deepening relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey and improving the relationship with Russia without compromising its independence and integrity, are some foreign policy priorities, objectives assumed by the current government¹⁶.

Although the Tbilisi government tried to give more pragmatism to Russian-Georgian relations, now they are obstruct even more because, recently, Russia signed treaties of alliance with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This action taken by Moscow also states the incompatibility between its own foreign policy priorities and that the Georgian government promoted. Moreover, the Georgian government said that there can be no diplomatic relations between Georgia and states that recognize the independence of the two separatist regions.

Strengthening the partnership with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, establishing administrative border between them and Georgian export restrictions to the Russian market are political issues promoted by Russia which is using any pressure tool to achieve its goals.

At the NATO Summit in September 2014, the Allies gave Georgia the "Substantial Package of Measures"¹⁷ which, although is a step preceding the integration, it was below Georgian's authorities expectations concerning Euro-Atlantic integration. Due to Georgia's territorial problems and in actual conditions of Ukraine crisis, there is a lack of cohesion between NATO member states regarding Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration. If, for the international community, providing the "Substantial Package of Measures" was a convenient option to control the balance NATO-Russia, for Georgia, this approach could discourage a potential Russian aggressive action owing to increased NATO military presence on Georgian territory.

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, diversifying energy sources and finding a convenient way to transport that can provide optimal conditions for European consumers, it is a requirement. The main stream that feeds Europe and currently transiting a conflict area, make Europe look for other solutions to ensure energy security. Trans-Anatolia (TANAP) will transport gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe via Turkey. Due to the Azerbaijan opposition to carry Turkmen gas, Azerbaijani gas will be transported through Georgia. In this context, as transit state, Georgia plays an important role in Europe's energy security.

The ability to perform, in a timely manner, the necessary reforms required during its Euro-Atlantic road and counteracting of any counter-measures of Russia, might be Georgia's way to achieving the security. The main threat remains the conflict between Georgia and the

¹⁶ Davit Zalkaliani, Georgian Foreign Policy in a New Era, www.chathamhouse.org/.../20140318GeorgianForeignPolicyZalkaliani.pdf.

¹⁷ NATO, NATO's relations with Georgia, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm#.

two breakaway regions which, due to the influence that Moscow designs, can transform Georgia border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in external border of Russia.

2.1. Abkhazia

Ethnic tensions have escalated in the late 80s, beginning with the start of disintegration of the USSR. While Georgians were making steps towards their independence, the Abkhazians opposed that idea, fearing that this situation will eliminate the autonomy offered by Stalin in 1931, and wanted to maintain the Soviet Union and change the republic status. Violence broke out in 1989 and Abkhazia proclaimed in 1991, its independence. A bloody conflict followed won by Abkhazia which committed an ethnic cleansing and expelled a million Georgian ethnic¹⁸.

Abkhazia is recognized only by four UN member states, due to the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008, Russia recognizes its independence, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. The independence is supported by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria.

The Sukhumi authorities took a step toward annexation of the breakaway region by signing with Russia the "Treaty of Alliance and Strategic Partnership"¹⁹ signed in 24.11.2014, in Sochi. This integration agreement provides for the implementation of a coordinated foreign policy, the formation of a common social, economic and security and taking the control, by the signatory forces, of the border surveillance over port and airport points.

Treaty will contribute to the total subordination of Abkhazia at all levels, economic, financial, social, military and Abkhazian identity loss. This framework represents an early stage of the de facto annexation process of the breakaway region to Russia.

2.2. South Ossetia

In September 1990, politicians have asked the Ossetia autonomous republic status of the region, inside USSR, like Georgia. The refusal of Tbilisi authorities led, in 1991, to a war between both sides, until 1992, when Russian peacekeeping troops intervened and remained in the area. In 2008, following the escalation of tensions and attacks from Ossetians separatists, Georgian troops launched a military offensive on South Ossetia. In response, the Russian army invaded Georgia under the pretext of protecting ethnic Ossetians. Under international pressure, the conflict ended after five days but represented a failure both in humanitarian terms, due to ethnic violence that led to the deaths of hundreds of people and displaced nearly 200,000 people, and diplomatic one²⁰.

Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia is recognized only by some members of the UN, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. However, although with the issues regarding international recognition, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria also support the independence of Ossetians.

Unlike other states with uncertain status, South Ossetia choose for joining Russia, preferred embodiment of the vast majority of the region inhabitants. At the present, the republic survives thanks to 3,500 Russian soldiers stationed in the region, which ensures besides independence, the subsistence.

The signing "Border Treaty", on 18.02.2015, between Moscow and Tskhinvali implicitly lead to the transformation of Georgia's border with South Ossetia in Russian

¹⁸ Wikipedia, Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhazia.

¹⁹ EU statement on the signing of a "Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership" between the Russian Federation and Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia, <http://www.osce.org/pc/131471?download=true>;

²⁰ Amnesty International, Civilians in the line of fire. The Georgia-Russia Conflict, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/.../52000/eur040062008en.pdf> - Civilians in the line of fire. The Georgia-Russia Conflict

external border. Moreover, on 18.03.2015 Vladimir Putin and his South Ossetia counterpart Leonid Tbilov, signed the "Treaty of Alliance and integration of Russia and South Ossetia". This partnership signed for a period of 25 years with possibility of extension up to 35 years, could have a military, political and economic regional implication, similar to Crimea²¹.

Under the treaty, the foreign policy of the two states will be a coordinated one, regional security will be ensured by Russia that will build a joint defense system, with the purpose to encompass South Ossetians military units in the Russian Armed Forces. Also, the procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship will be simplified and common border crossing will be unrestricted.

Kremlin's leader decided, in the near future, to allocate large sums to implement the treaty, in particular to social and economic projects.

The so-called "Treaty of alliance and integration of Russia and South Ossetia"²² is not recognized by NATO or Georgia which will try to intervene around the international community, calling for a firm position regarding the attitude of the Russian Federation.

Following the signing of the treaty, "de jure" annexation of the region, respectively EEU integration is not possible due to non-recognition of independence by its members.

Conclusion

Security concerns of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are directly linked to neighboring countries: Russia, Iran and Turkey. It is important to note that relations between these states are characterized by conflict of interests and security perceptions.

South Caucasus was, for Russia, primary strategic concern. In order to restore the regional hegemony in the so-called "near abroad", Russia is using as a management tool for its own interests, so-called frozen conflicts. On the one hand, Russia, the successor to the USSR in the international arena, is the strongest player in the South Caucasus while the West is seeking to minimize its political and economic influence in the region.

Turkey, an important strategic partner for the United States and EU and a major player in terms of access to energy resources, adopted a foreign policy different from Western interests and Transcaucasian region objectives. Ankara closed its borders with Armenia and promoted a pro-Azerbaijani attitude regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to limit the influence of the Russian Federation and Iran, Turkey has developed cooperation with Baku and Tbilisi through oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and railway Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. Turkey is considered by Azerbaijan, an ally against, on the one hand Iran's influence in the South Caucasus and on the other hand, the Armenian-Russian relation. Turkey and Azerbaijan are supported by Kazakhstan to express their disagreement on Armenia.

Iran considers Armenia, the link that will strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, being involved in infrastructure and energy projects. Armenia, which accepted Russia's pressures and joined the Eurasian Economic Union, developed cooperation with Iran in order to counterbalance Turkey's cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan and Iran have a strained relationship because of the disagreements on establishing the Caspian Sea maritime borders, of Azeri ethnic support in the territory of Iran and pro-Armenian position of Iran in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

While Armenia is the closest political ally of Russia in the region, Azerbaijan uses energy resources to maintain favorable foreign policy, Georgia is oriented towards West,

²¹Maia Otarashvili, Russia's Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia, <http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/02/russias-quiet-annexation-south-ossetia>

²²United States Mission to the OSCE, Condemnation of the so-called „Treaty of Alliance and Integration” between Russia and the South Ossetian Region of Georgia, <http://www.osce.org/pc/147771?download=true>

Russia uses frozen conflicts to negotiate its own interest and West sees the region only from the “energy hub ” perspective, the South Caucasus interest creates a rift between states.

The evaluation of relations between the South Caucasus states and various external actors take into consideration the current geopolitical environment and security, while emphasizing the collision of interests between them. In this context, analyzing the complex relations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with external players aims to provide a clear vision of the current territorial disputes and challenges, a result of manifested interests, can lead to viable solution capable of converting geopolitical competition in the area, into opportunities.

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SIGNIFICANT RECENT NAVAL EVOLUTIONS AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE PERSIAN GULF

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Abstract: *A very intense strategic competition is taking place place, along several years, in the Persian Gulf, directly connected to the regional balance of power. This intense competition is a major part of the broader evolutions in the Persian Gulf, one of the most important areas of the Greater Middle East. At least four important actors of the international arena are seriously involved in naval operations of all sorts in the Gulf, and these operations are deeply influencing the regional balance of power. These actors are: the Shiite Iran, the Sunni Arab states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United States and Israel. Some other Western powers (including the UK and France) are also present in the Persian Gulf, together with Pakistani naval vessels. Naval evolutions in this region of the World Ocean are indicating how really important sea power is on the international arena.*

Keywords: *naval power, (regional) balance of power, Persian Gulf, Iran, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, U.S., Israel.*

This paper is *not* aiming at offering the audience and the readers a set of *general* facts about geo-strategically significant evolutions in the Persian Gulf area. It is aiming a completely different goal: *that of presenting a limited, but solid image of the most recent naval evolutions in the Persian Gulf, based on extensively using open sources. Naval evolutions is a concept which means, in the context of this text, geo-strategically important interactions (mainly competition, confrontation or cooperation), at sea, by means of using naval assets, in order to significantly influence the strategic landscape.*

In order to better understand the complex and quickly evolving evolutions in the Persian Gulf, we used a number of works in different fields, all of them connected, in a way or another, to the study of international relations: political geography¹, geopolitics² and geo-strategy³, military power⁴, naval power⁵, history of combat vessels and trade ships⁶, and also world conflicts (with their sources and history)⁷.

¹ Georges DUBY, *Grand atlas historique: L'histoire du monde en 473 cartes*, Larousse, Paris, 1995.

² Aymeric CHAUPRADE, Francois THUAL, *Dicționar de geopolitică: state, concepte, autori*, Ed. Corint, București, 2003.

³ Gérard CHALIAND, Jean-Pierre RAGEAU, *Strategic Atlas: A comparative geopolitics of the world powers* (second edition, revised and updated), Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1985, and Robert D. KAPLAN, *Răzbușnarea geografiei: Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*, Ed. Litera, București, 2014.

⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, Oxford University Press, October 2004 and IISS, *The Military Balance 2014* and IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*.

⁵ E. B. POTTER, *Sea Power: A naval history*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis (Maryland), 1981, and Geoffrey TILL (editor), *Seapower at the millennium*, Sutton Publishing, UK, 2001.

⁶ Christopher CHANT, *The history of the world's warships*, Island Books / Regency House Publishing Ltd, U.K., 2001.

⁷ Patrick BROGAN, *World Conflicts: why and where they are happening*, Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, London, 1989.

Several actors of the international arena, including extra-regional powers, have a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf and in “the Strait of Hormuz, which is the Gulf’s only exit [to the Indian Ocean] and is bounded by Iran and Oman, is the route for 30 percent of world oil supplies carried by tanker ships”⁸.

1. Iran in the Gulf

One of the most active players in the region is Iran, a country aiming at least regional hegemony. Some of the pieces of news in various open sources speaking about recent Iranian naval plans and actions are relevant for both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. For example, in mid-March 2015, media in Tehran reported starting of mass production of an Iranian “anti-ship cruise missile dubbed ‘Ghadir’”, a weapon which “can be carried on helicopters and warships”. Open sources indicate that “the defense ministry has reportedly delivered large quantities of the missile to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps navy during the production line inauguration ceremony”⁹.

And, in early November 2014, Iranian media quoted by open sources in Azerbaijan said “the Iranian Navy’s 32nd flotilla of warships was dispatched to the Gulf of Aden to protect the country’s commercial ships and oil tanks against pirates, the Islamic Republic’s Fars news agency reported Nov. 5”. The same open source indicated that “the flotilla including [a] destroyer and [a] helicopter-carrier warship left Bandar Abbas port... on Nov. 4”, and also reported that “the ships would later proceed via the Strait of Hormuz, Jask port in the Oman Sea and finally to the Gulf of Aden”¹⁰.

In late February 2015, Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari made some official statements indicating a quick pace of evolution of both Iranian naval ambitions and naval capabilities, significant both in the Persian Gulf region and in the Indian Ocean or in the Caspian Sea. Sayyari said “Iran is one of the top 10 countries in making destroyers”, emphasizing that “formerly we were unable even to repair destroyer parts, but now we make submarines, warships and destroyers”. He also said: “Once we would only voyage within the 300,000-square-kilometer span of the Persian Gulf, but now we surf an area of 2.2 million square kilometers, one and a half times the area of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. The piece of news we are quoting from also reports that “Iranian warships currently travel to the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean”¹¹, which clearly indicates the very *existence of plans aimed at transforming Iranian Navy into an increasingly global presence.*

One of the ‘strategic tools’ massively used by Iran in order to promote its strategic interests at sea is the large-scale military exercise. At the end of 2014, the Iranian armed forces staged such military exercises “near the strategic Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf”. The commander of the Iranian Navy said that “various warships, destroyers,

⁸ Adam SCRECK, “Royal Navy to establish base in Bahrain as UK fights Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, works on nuclear deal with Iran”, *The Times of Israel*, December 6, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofisrael.com/britain-to-boost-military-presence-in-persian-gulf/>

⁹ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran starts mass production of anti-ship cruise missile”, on the *Trend* webpage, March 14, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2374031.html>

¹⁰ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran dispatches Navy’s 32nd flotilla to Gulf of Aden”, on the *Trend* webpage, November 5, 2014, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/society/2329997.html>

¹¹ For all text fragments quoted along this paragraph, see Khalid KHAZIMOV, “Iran among top 10 of destroyer manufacturers”, on the *Trend* webpage, February 21, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2366827.html>

submarines, missiles, aircraft and helicopters would be used in the drill in a bid to improve the naval forces' power"¹².

Also in late December 2014, the Iranian Press TV reported that a "six-day, wide-scale military drill that will span an area of 2.2 million square kilometers" was to take place "in the air, on land and sea", and also that "under-surface vessels" were "tested"¹³.

In late February 2015, Iranian armed forces staged new massive military exercises in the Persian Gulf. According to Israeli open sources, these exercises began with 'maritime mine operations by speedboats' and 'the firing of coast-to-sea missiles'¹⁴.

Last summer, one serious incident took place in the Persian Gulf (in August 2014). "A U.S. Coast Guard vessel had a tense encounter with an Iranian fishing boat in the Persian Gulf on Tuesday and fired a warning shot, the Pentagon said", an Israeli newspaper reported on August 27, 2014. When the U.S. cutter *Monomoy* sent a small, inflatable boat "to approach the Iranian dhow and when it got close, the Americans spotted two 50-caliber machine guns, with one of the guns aimed at them, US military officers said". The event, U.S. official sources say, is a tiny part of a by far larger picture, and the same open source says: "American naval ships and Iranian vessels over the past decade have had occasional tense confrontations in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf"¹⁵.

2. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states

The Arab Sunni states in the Persian Gulf area are currently attempting (by separately using national resources or by using, together, the GCC framework) to balance (and to deter, if possible) the Iranian bid for regional hegemony. One of the most ambitious policies aimed at quickly developing naval forces in the Persian Gulf Area is that of Saudi Arabia. Early in January 2015, a very reliable open source reported that "a little noticed December contract award for the missile launchers used as part of the U.S. Navy's Aegis Combat System gives hints to the direction of a potential \$20 billion U.S. naval arms sale to Saudi Arabia". The same source also reports that "included in the initial \$235 million" contract was "an unspecified number of MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems", and that "for almost seven years Saudi Arabia has been in negotiations with the U.S. to upgrade the Royal Saudi Navy's Eastern Fleet, composed of aging American-built ships". The source we are quoting here from also says "this massive purchase could include destroyers, patrol craft, helicopters, ground vehicles... and substantial upgrades to port infrastructure", and that "recent estimates values the overall program at around \$20 billion". *USNI News* also reports that "ship types the U.S. could sell to the Saudis include an anti-air warfare capable version of the Freedom or

¹² For the fragments quoted along this paragraph see Times of Israel staff and AP, "Iranian military begins massive drill in Persian Gulf: Ground forces, navy and air force to participate in week-long exercise near Strait of Hormuz", in *The Times of Israel*, December 25, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-military-begins-massive-drill-in-...>

¹³ "Iran seeks to show off military prowess with massive six-day drill", *Jerusalem Post*, December 25, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-seeks-to-show-off-military-prowess-with-massive-six-day-drill-385696>

¹⁴ "Iran tests naval missiles as part of fresh war games in Persian Gulf", *Jerusalem Post*, February 25, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-tests-naval-missiles-as-part-of-fresh-war-games-in-Persian-Gulf-392139>

¹⁵ AFP, "US ship fires warning shot at Iranian boat in Persian Gulf. Coast Guard spokesman says 'one of the machine guns was manned and trained' on American vessel", in *The Times of Israel*, August 27, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-ship-fires-warning-shot-at-iranian-boat-in-persian-gulf/>

Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship or a ballistic missile defense capable Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer”¹⁶.

In late August 2014, French media and other open sources reported that “Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, could sign a letter of intent (LOI) with the French Government for 6 FREMMs during his visit in Paris in early September. French Navys FREMM multi-mission frigates are designed and built by DCNS. Five hulls have already been launched, with three Frigates delivered to the French Navy and one to the Royal Moroccan Navy”. The same open sources said “there were also unconfirmed rumors earlier this year about negotiations between Germany and Saudi Arabia for the delivery of a large number of patrol boats as well as submarines”¹⁷.

In late February 2015, open sources offered some significant – and more detailed – information about *Saudi plans to sharply and quickly enhance the combat capabilities of their naval forces (most probably, part of a larger effort aimed at deterring and balancing Iran)*: “A second letter of request (LoR) from the Saudi government detailing requirements for the Eastern Fleet replacement program was delivered to the US Navy in February”, and that “the move” represents “a project that could be worth as much as US \$16 billion”. The open source we are quoting here from also reports that “four 3,500-ton ‘frigate-like warships’ capable of anti-air warfare, armed with an eight-to-16-cell vertical launch system (VLS)... fitted with an ‘Aegis or like’”, and also “six 2,500-ton warships with combat systems compatible with the frigates, able to operate... helos”, plus “20 to 24 fast patrol vessels about 40 to 45 meters long”, plus “10 ‘maritime helicopters’”, plus “three maritime patrol aircraft for coastal surveillance” and “30 to 50 UAVs, some for maritime use, some to be shore-based” are to be bought by the Saudis¹⁸.

Later on, in mid-March 2015, the presence of the commander of the Saudi Navy in Ferrol, Spain, might indicate the possibility of other future contracts with the shipbuilder *Navantia*, which has extensive experience in designing and building combat ships of different sorts: frigates, surveillance and patrol ships, ships fit for forces projection, support and auxiliary ships, plus submarines (the “S-80” class)¹⁹. Open sources say that “Admiral Abdullah Sultan Alsultan, Commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces has paid an official visit to different units and facilities of the Spanish Navy and Navantia in Ferrol”²⁰.

Not only Saudi Arabia, but also other regional actors in the Persian Gulf are quickly developing their naval forces, in a deliberate attempt aimed at deterring and balancing Iran. The UAE, for example, have bought or built several modern warships along the past few years. In early January 2013, “the UAE Navy’s first Abu Dhabi class anti-submarine corvette and its first Falaj-2 class patrol vessel have been formally delivered by the Italian shipbuilders

¹⁶ Sam LaGRONE, “Missile Launcher Contract Gives Hints to Saudi Arabia’s Naval Expansion”, *USNI News*, January 9, 2015, at the Internet address <http://news.usni.org/2015/01/09/missile-launcher-contract-gives-hints-saudi-arabias-naval-e...>

¹⁷ “Royal Saudi Navy would be interested to procure 6 FREMM Frigates from France”, on the *Navy Recognition* webpage, August 26, 2014, text available at the Internet address <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year-2014-news/august-2014-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1966-royal-saudi-navy-w...>

¹⁸ Christopher P. CAVAS, “Saudi Eastern Fleet Request Advances”, on *DefenseNews* webpage, February 28, 2015, at <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/02/28/saudi-eastern-fleet-navy-lcs-frigate-lockheed-aegis-let>.

¹⁹ See “Naval Construction – Products”, in “Activity Lines”, on the official webpage of *Navantia*, at the Internet address http://www.navantia.es/interior.php?id_sec=3&id_pag=97

²⁰ “Saudi Naval Forces Commander Visits Spanish Navy and Navantia”, on the *NavalToday.com* webpage, March 13, 2015, at the Internet address <http://navaltoday.com/2015/03/13/saudi-naval-forces-commander-visits-spanish-navy-and-navantia/>

Fincantieri at their yard in Muggiano”²¹, open sources report. A few months later, in December 2013, “Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB) has confirmed a Dh870 million deal to build two combat ships for the UAE armed forces”, and local open sources report “the shipbuilder said the vessels would be ‘equipped with multi-tasking equipment and advanced communication devices’”²². And in late February 2015, open sources reported “Abu Dhabi Ship Building Company will deliver three Baynunah warships to the United Arab Emirates Navy by 2016”, and that the “UAE, one of the countries taking part in air strikes against Islamic State targets”, recently “unveiled new defense contracts worth 9.48 billion dirhams (\$2.58 billion)”²³.

The Arab Sunni states in the Gulf are also using naval exercises. In early March 2015, for example, an important international naval exercise took place in the Persian Gulf. Open sources report that “Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152), working with and headquarters staff from across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), recently conducted a dedicated, coordinated maritime security operation in the Persian Gulf”. The same open source says “The Saudi-led CTF-152, based in Bahrain, used naval and air assets from the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Saudi Arabia to conduct joint operations in support of Combined Maritime Forces’ (CMF) mission of deterring criminal and terrorist activity in the Gulf and maintaining regional maritime security”²⁴.

3. Pakistan in the Gulf

Pakistan, a Sunni non-Gulf country (but a state which has to rely on oil and natural gas imported mainly from the Gulf) is also present, by naval means, in the Persian Gulf.

In early February 2015, a Pakistani frigate, *PNS Tariq*, sailed to the Persian Gulf, docking at Kuwaiti shores on a visit described as “mutual” and aimed at “strengthening bilateral ties”. The Kuwaiti open source we are quoting here from underlines that “Pakistan is committed to aiding the spread of peace and stability in the region, maintaining free trade routes and assisting the international community in its fight against terrorism”²⁵. *The episode is important for better understanding the complexity of efforts done by Sunni states to contain the Shiite Iran, but also for better understanding how important the problem of maintaining free trade routes is for all the states on the shores of both the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.*

Two months earlier, in December 2014, another Pakistani frigate sailed to the Persian Gulf region, docking at the Sultan Qaboos Port, in Oman. The commanding officer of *PNS Aslan*, declared that “we underwent a series of bilateral exercises with the Royal Navy of Oman in conducting anti-piracy operations and other aspects”, and local media said “the exercises covered the regions of the Sea of Oman, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean”. The basic fact that official statements presented the relationship between Pakistan and the

²¹ David BLACK, “UAE Navy warships are ready to set sail”, *The National*, January 11, 2013, at the Internet address <http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/shipping/uae-navy-warships-are-ready-to-set-sail>

²² The National staff, “Abu Dhabi Ship Building lands Dh870m order”, *The National*, December 11, 2013, at the Internet address <http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/abu-dhabi-ship-building-lands-dh870m-order>

²³ Reuters, “UAE Navy Getting Three New Warships”, *The Maritime Executive*, February 23, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/uae-navy-getting-three-new-warships>

²⁴ “CTF-152 Engages in Maritime Security Op in Persian Gulf”, on *NavalToday.com* webpage, March 9, 2015, at the Internet address <http://navaltoday.com/2015/03/09/ctf-152-engages-in-maritime-security-op-in-persian-gulf/>

²⁵ “Pakistani Navy frigate in Kuwait to boost bilateral ties”, *Kuwait News Agency (KUNA)*, February 1, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2422322&language=en>

Sultanate of Oman as being based on “respect, loyalty and trust”²⁶ may also indicate, we think, that Sunni states in and outside the Persian Gulf are interested in maintaining free oceanic trade routes, but also in developing a strategic cooperation aimed at deterring and containing the Shiite Iran.

4. The U.S. in the Gulf

In several occasions along the past few years, major Western powers boosted their naval presence in the Persian Gulf area, in order to balance increasing Iranian ambitions in the region. The most prominent Western power continuously present, with massive naval means, in the Gulf is the U.S.

In late December 2006, for example, *New York Time* announced that “The United States and Britain will begin moving additional warships and strike aircraft into the Persian Gulf region in a display of military resolve toward Iran that will come as the United Nations continues to debate possible sanctions against the country”. The open source we are quoting here from reported the U.S. military commanders had already requested “a second aircraft carrier and its supporting ships to be stationed within quick sailing distance of Iran by early next year”²⁷.

Deterring increasing Iranian regional hegemonic ambitions and general aggressiveness led major Western powers to significantly increase once more their naval presence in the Gulf, in 2012. On that occasion, *New York Times* reported, “the United States has quietly moved significant military reinforcements into the Persian Gulf to deter the Iranian military from any possible attempt to shut the Strait of Hormuz and to increase the number of fighter jets capable of striking deep into Iran if the standoff over its nuclear program escalates”, and the same reliable open source also said that “the deployments are part of a long-planned effort to bolster the American military presence in the gulf region”²⁸.

We have to take into account that concomitantly with these U.S. strategic moves aimed at balancing and deterring Iran, Tehran was significantly increasing its naval and anti-ship capabilities. At the end of July 2012, Washington Post reported that “Iran is rapidly gaining new capabilities to strike at U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf, amassing an arsenal of sophisticated anti-ship missiles while expanding its fleet of fast-attack boats and submarines, U.S. and Middle Eastern analysts say”, and that “the new systems, many of them developed with foreign assistance, are giving Iran’s commanders new confidence that they could quickly damage or destroy U.S. ships if hostilities erupt”. The open source we are quoting here from also reported that “although U.S. Navy officials are convinced that they would prevail in a fight, Iran’s advances have fueled concerns about U.S. vulnerabilities during the opening hours of a conflict in the gulf”, that “increasingly accurate short-range missiles – combined with Iran’s use of ‘swarm’ tactics involving hundreds of heavily armed patrol boats – could strain the defensive capabilities of even the most modern U.S. ships, current and former military analysts say”, and that “in recent weeks, as nuclear talks with world powers have faltered and tensions have risen, Iran has repeated threats to shut down shipping in the oil-rich

²⁶ For all the fragments quoted here see Tariq al HAREMI, “Pakistan Navy strengthens its relations with Oman”, *Times of Oman*, December 21, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofoman.com/News/44616/Article-Pakistan-Navy-strengthens-its-relations-with-Oman>

²⁷ Thom SHANKER, “U.S. and Britain to Add Ships to Persian Gulf in Signal to Iran”, *New York Times*, December 21, 2006, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/world/middleeast/21navy.html?n=Top%2FNews%2FWorld%2FCountrie...>

²⁸ Thom SHANKER, Eric SCHMITT and David E. SANGER, “U.S. Adds Forces in Persian Gulf, a Signal to Iran”, *New York Times*, July 3, 2012, at the Internet address <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/world/middleeast/us-adds-forces-in-...>

gulf region. Its leaders also have warned of massive retaliation for any attacks on its nuclear facilities, which the United States believes are civilian covers for an Iranian drive to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability”²⁹.

In some other recent (or even very recent) occasions, the U.S. had several major combat ships in the Gulf, operating at the same time (and sometimes closely coordinated, in order to accomplish, with combined resources, the same major political-military goal). For example, in early July 2014, USNI News reports, “in a rare concurrence of events, a carrier strike group and all three ships of a Navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are in the Persian Gulf, for a total of nine U.S. Navy ships in region, defense officials told”. The carrier was USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), “accompanied by one cruiser and five destroyers – guided missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG-58) and the guided-missile destroyers USS Truxtun (DDG-103), USS Roosevelt (DDG-80), USS O’Kane (DDG-77) and USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)”, and the open source we are quoting here from also reports that “though not all of the ships are part of the presence mission that is focused in Iraq, all of the ships can respond to military threats if required”, a “navy official said”³⁰. One month later, eight U.S. combat ships and some 100 combat planes were deployed in the Persian Gulf region, launching strikes against the Islamic state forces: “The U.S. has assembled a massive force of eight ships and more than 100 aircraft in the Persian Gulf for the air campaign against ISIS in Iraq”, and open sources indicate that many (or even most) of the airstrikes involved jets coming “from the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush”, and that a second carrier was ready to be deployed to the same geo-strategically sensitive region³¹.

According to open sources, the *U.S. have at this very moment (Mid-March 2015) at least one carrier in the Persian Gulf.* The ship we are speaking about is CVN 70, the *USS Carl Vinson*. In September 2014, the ship was in Western Pacific. On October 16-17, 2014 she was in North Arabian Sea; she relieved the *George H.W. Bush* Carrier Strike Group on October 18, 2014, when she arrived in the Persian Gulf. In November-December 2014 she was in several occasions near Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, and in late January and early February 2015 she arrived at Khalifa Bin Salman Port, Kingdom of Bahrain. In late February 2015, the carrier was at Mina Zayed Port, in the UAE, and from late February to March 10, 2015, the ship patrolled in the Persian Gulf³².

NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence), an interesting “digital library of world naval operational news”³³ strongly underlines the fact that the U.S. Navy was involved, in 2014, in “the first operational deployment of a laser weapon at sea on the USS Ponce in the Persian Gulf”. The source we are quoting here says that this episode is one of the “ten most significant naval news stories / trends / themes”³⁴ in 2014.

We are speaking here about the fact that, *in December 2014, the U.S. Navy officially announced a combat laser is already fully operational*, as a potent defensive system on one of

²⁹ Joby WARRICK, “Iran bolsters retaliation capability in Gulf, experts say”, *Washington Post*, July 26, 2012, at the Internet address <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-bolsters-retaliation-capability-in-gulf-experts>

³⁰ Sam LaGRONE, “USS Bataan Enters Persian Gulf, Nine U.S. Ships Now in Region”, *USNI News*, July 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://news.usni.org/2014/07/08/uss-bataan-enters-persian-gulf-nine-u-s-ships-now-region>

³¹ Jeff SCHOGOL, *Military Times*, Massive U.S. force in Persian Gulf moving on ISIS, *USA Today*, August 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/08/iraq-air-campaign-ships-aircraft/13792573/>

³² For the locations of CVN 70 see “Aircraft Carrier Locations – CVN-70 Carl Vinson”, at the Internet address <http://www.gonavy.jp/CVLocation.html>, accessed on March 14, 2015 (text last updated on March 11, 2015)

³³ “What is NOSI?”, in “About / FAQ”, on the *NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence)* webpage, at the Internet address <http://nosi.org/faq/>

³⁴ “2014: World Naval Operational News Highlights”, in “Naval Year In Review”, on the *NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence)* webpage, at the Internet address <http://nosi.org/review/>

the ships deployed to the Persian Gulf. On December 11, 2014, *Fox News* reported “the Navy’s 30-kilowatt solid-state laser aboard the *USS Ponce* is now being fired in operational scenarios by sailors in the Persian Gulf, marking the first-ever deployment of a sea-based directed energy weapon”, and that “the Navy’s Laser Weapon System, or LaWS, uses heat energy from lasers to disable or destroy targets fast, slow, stationary and moving targets. The system has successfully incinerated drones and other targets in tests shots”, and that “the scalable weapon is designed to destroy threats for about 59-cents per shot, an amount that is lower than the hundreds of thousands or millions needed to fire an interceptor missile...”³⁵.

Some other open sources (their reliability could not be verified in this very case) also indicate that not only US Navy combat ships are operating in the Gulf, but also intelligence ships possibly operated by the USAF. More precisely, “the U.S. Air Force quietly keeps a small, inconspicuous spy ship in the Persian Gulf, presumably in order to keep an eye on Iran’s missile launches”. The open sources we are quoting here from say that “USNS *Invincible* – a 224-foot vessel displacing a mere 2,800 tons – belongs to Military Sealift Command”, and that “*Invincible* is just a hull... It’s what’s inside and atop the hull that really matters. A sophisticated, dual X- and S-band radar called Gray Star that belongs to the Air Force”. Same open sources say “Military Sealift Command refers to the vessel as a ‘missile range instrumentation ship’ whose job it is to ‘monitor missile launches and collect data’³⁶. *If this piece of news is accurate, it speaks about monitoring Iranian ballistic activities and detecting any hostile ballistic missile launch able to harm US forces and interests in the Persian Gulf.*

5. Other Western powers

But the U.S. is not at all the only Western power with significant interests and a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf. In early December 2014, the *United Kingdom* officially announced a significant increase of its naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Open sources reported that “Britain’s top diplomat said... his country has signed a deal with Bahrain that will bolster the United Kingdom’s military presence in the island nation and give it a more permanent naval base in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region”. The open source we are quoting from also reports that “the agreement marks a strategic shift for Britain, which formally withdrew from its major Gulf military bases in 1971. It comes as the UK, the United States and their allies seek to push back Islamic State group militants that have taken over large parts of Iran and Syria and as world powers work to forge a lasting nuclear deal with Iran, which sits just across the Gulf from Bahrain”, that “the agreement calls for improved onshore facilities at Bahrain’s Mina Salman port that will give the Royal Navy a base to plan, store equipment and house military personnel”, and that “four British minesweepers are already based in Bahrain, and other British ships rely on facilities in the kingdom”³⁷.

In mid-February 2015, *France* also sent an aircraft carrier accompanied by several support ships to the Persian Gulf, to fight against the Islamic State. Open sources report that “after patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the northern Indian Ocean, the French Navy’s Task Force 473 sailed through the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday, February 15”, that “the Task Group, built around the *Charles de Gaulle* aircraft carrier, is now sailing in the Persian Gulf.

³⁵ Kris OSBORN, “Navy declares laser weapons ready to protect ships in Persian Gulf”, *Fox News*, December 11, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/12/11/navy-declares-laser-weapons-ready-to-protect-ships-in-...>

³⁶ David AXE, “The U.S. Air Force Has a Spy Ship –Yes, Ship – in the Persian Gulf”, on *War is Boring* webpage, at the Internet address <https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-air-force-has-a-spy-ship-yes-ship-in-the-persian-gulf-6ebb07...>

³⁷ Adam SCHRECK, *op. cit.*

Here, the Group is expected to join the Task Force 50 and operate alongside the US Navy's Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group"³⁸. In March 2015, open sources report that French combat planes are using, in some occasions, the decks of U.S. carriers deployed in the Persian Gulf³⁹.

6. Israel in the Gulf

One of the important actors of the international arena more and more present in the Gulf, in order to protect its vital geostrategic interests is Israel. The Israeli decision-makers are aiming to deter Iran, a country which publicly threatened, in several occasions, the very existence of the Israeli state. In order to deter Iran, a country which is regarded as being more and more dangerous because of the magnitude and pace of its nuclear program, the Israelis have already deployed – are stating, with a lot of details, many reliable open sources – at least some of their submarines in the Gulf.

In early September 2014, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) blog reported that "Israel's powerful INS Tanin (Crocodile) submarine is on its way from Germany to the port of Haifa". The same source quoted Israel's Navy Commander Vice Admiral Ram Rothberg, who said the new submarine will allow Israeli naval forces to "reach farther and deeper, for longer periods of time, and exert firepower which we haven't seen until today"⁴⁰. And we know with all necessary details that *at least some of the German-build Israeli submarines have nuclear capabilities*. In 2012, *Spiegel Online* made public an extensive piece of investigative journalism stating that "the [Israeli] submarines contain... nuclear warheads, small enough to be mounted on a cruise missile". The German open source we are quoting from also reports that, most probably, the strategic weapons the Israeli submarines are carrying are seriously upgraded "cruise missiles... which are supposed to have a range of around 1,500 kilometers and which could reach Iran with a warhead weighing up to 200 kilograms"⁴¹. And at the end of May, 2010, *Haaretz* published a media report quoting an article in *Sunday Times* and saying that "Israel is to deploy three submarines equipped with nuclear cruise missiles in the Persian Gulf", and that these mighty naval ships "will gather intelligence, act as deterrent and potentially land Mossad agents". The media report is clearly stating that deploying so potent submarines in the Persian Gulf is a direct result of the fact that Israel "fears that ballistic missiles developed by Iran... could be used to hit strategic sites within Israel"⁴².

Conclusions

All the quite many recent elements listed and analyzed with some details along the previous pages, put together, are shaping the broad and quickly evolving picture of an intense geo-strategic competition, in the Persian Gulf, of several types of actors of the international arena (several traditional world powers, a large regional power not placed in the Gulf, plus

³⁸ "French Navy's Vessels Enter Persian Gulf", on *NavalToday.com* webpage, February 20, 2015, at the Internet address <http://navaltoday.com/2015/02/20/french-navys-vessels-enter-persian-gulf/>

³⁹David CENCIOTTI, "French Rafale omnirole fighter jet operates from U.S. aircraft carrier in the Arabian Gulf", on the *Aviationist* webpage, at the Internet address <http://theaviationist.com/2015/03/06/french-rafale-carl-vinson-gulf/>

⁴⁰ "Powerful Submarine Joins Israel's Navy", on the *Israel Defense Forces* blog, September 8, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/09/08/powerful-submarine-joins-israels-navy/>, accessed on March 12, 2015

⁴¹ "Operation Samson: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany", *Spiegel Online*, June 4, 2012, at the Internet address <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-built-submarines-a-836784.html>,

⁴² *Haaretz* Service, "Report: Israel to deploy nuclear-armed submarines off Iran coast", *Haaretz*, May 30, 2010, at the Internet address <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/report-israel-to-deploy-nuclear-armed-submarines-off-iran-coast-1.293005>, accessed on March 10, 2015

several regional powers, both large and medium-sized ones – including at least one of them which is seriously aiming at regional hegemony in very large region of the Greater Middle East). For *all* these powers constantly operating larger or smaller segments of their Navies in the Persian Gulf, the geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of this region of the World Ocean is really a major one. And we can legitimately predict that the geo-strategic significance of the area, together with the intensity of the strategic competition there, are going to grow even more along the next years, in a very clear and direct correlation with extremely significant strategic evolutions in the Indian Ocean.

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RECENT NAVAL EVOLUTIONS AND REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

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Abstract: *The Indian Ocean is a large and important part of the World Ocean. Its geo-strategic significance grows larger, and several important actors of the international arena are seriously involved in naval operations of different sorts in the region. India and China are almost openly competing for regional hegemony, Pakistan (supported by Beijing) tries to balance the Indian power, Iran is quickly developing its naval forces, and the U.S. is trying to maintain, with severely limited resources, regional geo-strategic predictability and stability. Other evolutions in Australia and the Gulf of Aden make the geo-strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean even more complex. The study explores the correlation of naval evolutions and regional balance of power, extensively using open sources.*

Keywords: *naval power, (regional) balance of power, Indian Ocean, India, China, Pakistan, Iran, U.S., Australia, Gulf of Aden.*

This paper is *not* aiming at offering the audience and / or the readers a set of *general* facts about geo-strategically significant evolutions in the Indian Ocean. *It is aiming a completely different goal: that of presenting a limited, but solid image of the most recent naval evolutions (procurement dynamics, military exercises, political and media debates concerning the use of the ocean and of naval forces) in the geo-strategically very significant Indian Ocean, based on extensively using reliable open sources of several types (media news, but also academic or quasi-academic reports).*

In order to better understand the *complex and quickly evolving evolutions* in the Indian Ocean, we extensively used a number of major works in different fields, all of them connected, in a way or another, to the study of international relations: political geography¹, geopolitics² and geo-strategy³, military power⁴, naval power⁵ and history of combat and trade ships⁶, and also world conflicts (with their sources and history)⁷.

¹ Georges DUBY, *Grand atlas historique: L'histoire du monde en 473 cartes*, Larousse, Paris, 1995.

² Aymeric CHAUPRADE, Francois THUAL, *Dicționar de geopolitică: state, concepte, autori*, Ed. Corint, București, 2003.

³ Gérard CHALIAND, Jean-Pierre RAGEAU, *Strategic Atlas: A comparative geopolitics of the world powers* (second edition, revised and updated), Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1985, and Robert D. KAPLAN, *Răzbușnarea geografiei: Ce ne spune harta despre conflictele viitoare și lupta împotriva destinului*, Ed. Litera, București, 2014.

⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, Oxford University Press, October 2004 and IISS, *The Military Balance 2014*.

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⁷ Patrick BROGAN, *World Conflicts: why and where they are happening*, Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, London, 1989.

1. India

India is the largest (geographically and above all demographically) actor of the international arena on the shores of the Indian Ocean. Its national interests in the area are connected with both balancing both China and Pakistan, and maintaining freedom and security of vital sea routes.

In mid-February 2015, an important member of the Indian government, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, said “that the Indian Navy must remain a ‘superior force’ in the Indian Ocean region”. Indian open sources reported that the senior official “assured that the government would extend full support for making it a truly bluewater navy”. The text we are quoting here from also lists some military exercises at sea, including “a variety of weapons firing, MiG 29K and Sea Harrier operations from two aircraft carriers – the other being INS Viraat – integration of the P8I aircraft with fleet, and operations by the navy's Marine Commandos” and “a successful and impressive vertical launch of the Brahmos, the supersonic long range anti-ship cruise missile, from the recently commissioned stealth destroyer INS Kolkata, a milestone in itself”⁸.

In early March 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi “gifted an aircraft and unveiled a radar system in Seychelles, at the start of a tour of island nations aimed at reasserting India's presence in the Indian Ocean, where China has been increasingly active in recent years”, open sources reported. The same sources strongly underlined that Modi's diplomatic “trip is part of a bigger effort by the regional power to build a maritime presence across an extended neighbourhood including South-east Asia, which India is actively engaging”. The open sources also indicate “the radar station inaugurated by Modi is the first of eight that will make up the Coastal Surveillance Radar System to be managed by Seychelles, but will also give India greater access to information on movements in vast tracts of the Indian Ocean”. Open sources also indicate that “apart from the Seychelles, Modi is also visiting Mauritius and Sri Lanka, to build maritime and security ties with these island nations where China has been making inroads through building of infrastructure such as ports”, and are quoting a senior Indian official, Anil Wadhwa, secretary (East) in the external affairs ministry, who declares that the Indian “government has moved with a great sense of priority and speed to transform India's Look East Policy into an Act East Policy... The idea is to evolve a security architecture first of all in the region”⁹, and *such a policy strongly indicates, in our opinion, a clear attempt to deter and contain China's more and more ambitious moves in the Indian Ocean region*. The former Indian foreign secretary Lalit Mansingh openly says that there are two reasons for increased attention paid by India to the Indian Ocean: “The seas are more important for India now that the economy is growing at 7 to 8 per cent [per year]. Secondly, there is a challenge from China, which has become more strident. China is flexing its muscles in disputes with the Asean countries and making its presence felt in the Indian Ocean,”¹⁰.

For some contemporary Indian authors in the area of strategic studies and defense policies, quickly developing India's naval power is a must. Recently, such an author clearly stated: “Even as the Chinese military keeps Indian ground forces busy in peacetime by staging Himalayan border incursions and other flare-ups, the oil and liquefied gas flowing from the

⁸ PTI, “Navy should remain a 'superior force' in Indian Ocean: Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar”, *The Economic Times*, February 14, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=21680>

⁹ Nirmala GANAPATHY (The Straits Time), “Modi gifts plane, unveils radar system in Seychelles”, on the *Asia News Network* webpage, March 12, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.asianewsnet.net/-Modi-gifts-plane-unveils-radar-system-in-Seychell-72734.html>

¹⁰ Nirmala GANAPATHY, *op. cit.*

Gulf and Africa to China pass through the Indian Ocean unmolested and unimpeded. Over 80% of China's oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait chokepoint. Boosting SLOC interdiction capability would allow the Indian Navy to dominate key maritime routes and help improve the Chinese military's behaviour along the Himalayas"¹¹. *Such statements strongly indicate that developing its naval capabilities, India is aiming at making China less aggressive in continental disputes (and, possibly, less active in operating an enhanced strategic partnership with Pakistan, which pushes India to make major defense efforts on two different axes / directions).*

One of the tools / methods used by India in order to test and boost naval capabilities is that of naval exercises. In the early stages of March 2015, India stages a massive naval exercise. According to Indian open sources, TROPEX 2015, the annual Theatre Level Readiness and Operational Exercise, "saw the participation of two aircraft carriers and integration of various new platforms including Mig 29K, P8-I Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft". The nuclear submarine Chakra, indigenous stealth destroyer INS Kolkata and anti-submarine warfare frigate INS Kamorta also participated besides 50 ships, submarines and more than 70 aircraft from all the three Commands as also assets of IAF and Indian Coast Guard", the open sources report. The massive naval exercise was aimed at experimenting "the future road map of operations for the Navy", including "refining existing concepts of operations catering for the improved maritime capabilities with new acquisitions and infrastructure"¹².

2. China

Even if China is not geographically placed on the shores of the Indian Ocean, its interests in the area are both important and obvious. Its strategic competition with India, together with the basic fact that the routes connecting China and Europe, or China and the oil sources in the Persian Gulf are crossing the Indian Ocean are important elements explaining why China is increasingly present in all regions of the Indian Ocean. Speaking about Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, we have to take into account that "during a press conference on January 29 [2015], a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND), announced that China will step up its deployment of a range of warships in the Indian Ocean. IHS Jane's reports that Senior Colonel Yang Yujun, after being asked a question on PLAN submarine movements in the Indian Ocean, tried to downplay Chinese naval activities in the region, characterizing them as 'normal' and emphasizing that 'there is no need to read too much into them'. The same open source reports that "the presence of Chinese submarine forces in the ocean has the other great regional power, India, worried. Indian military officers have stated that the deployment of nuclear subs would cross a redline and trigger a naval arms race"¹³.

In early February 2015, "Defense News ran a very interesting piece attacking the often repeated assertion that China will soon be adding one additional fleet to the three existing ones (the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets) it currently operates. This new fleet will

¹¹ Brahma CHELLANEY, "India needs to build sufficient naval prowess in Indian Ocean", at the Internet address <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-needs-to-build-sufficient-naval-prowess-in-indian-ocean/article1-1325317.aspx>

¹² PTI, "Navy chief RK Dhowan presides over debrief of annual TROPEX", *The Economic Times*, March 11, 2015, at <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrfr.php?newsid=21766> or <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/navy-chief-rk-dhowan-presides-over-debr>

¹³ Franz-Stefan GADY, "China's Navy to Send More Ships to the Indian Ocean: Recent reports of PLAN naval movements have many analysts worried", in *The Diplomat*, January 31, 2015, at the Internet address <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-navy-to-send-more-ships-to-the-indian-ocean/>

allegedly be headquartered in Sanya on Hainan Island and project Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean. One expert noted in 2014¹⁴.

Quite clearly, “India’s more long-term concern is related” *mainly* “to Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean. Since December 2008, China has regularly rotated naval task forces in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly for anti-piracy missions” Open sources indicate that India is worried, having Chinese “future submarine operations in mind”. And such fears “have been partially confirmed by Lt. General Michael Flynn, the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, who declared in February 2014 that China had “recently deployed for the first time a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the Indian Ocean”, open sources also indicate¹⁵.

3. Pakistan

It is important to remember, we think, that Pakistan has a major and obvious strategic vulnerability: most of the vital trade routes it has to operate (for example in order to import oil) are crossing the Indian Ocean, not far away from the shores of India. If an open conflict with the clearly more powerful India starts, “it would involve limited action on the ground and full-scale fighting at sea and in the air”, and open sources strongly underline that “India has the upper hand in both, particularly at sea where it would have the ability to blockade Pakistani ports. Pakistan imports 83% of its gasoline consumption, and without sizable reserves the economy would feel the effects of war very quickly”¹⁶. We estimate that the very perspective of a potential massive Indian sea blockade is clearly shaping at least some of the strategic plans of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean region.

In September 2014, *Pakistani Taliban attacked the Navy yard in Karachi*. *NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence)*, which is a really interesting “digital library of world naval operational news”¹⁷ underlines the fact that non-state actors have been involved in this major episode in the Indian Ocean, in 2014. The open source we are quoting here from is clearly stating that this episode is to be regarded as being one of the “ten most significant naval news stories / trends / themes”¹⁸ in 2014.

Dealing with the same episode, *BBC* reports that “Pakistan navy fought a long gun battle with militants who had attacked its Karachi dockyard”, that “the gun battle is said to have lasted about six hours” and that “A low-ranking navy personnel member and two militants were killed, while six soldiers and an officer were wounded”. The same open source reports that “four militants had been captured alive”, and that “Taliban militants have said they had inside help. Pakistani officials have also said that some navy personnel appeared to have collaborated with the attackers”. *BBC* commentators say: “If true, this latest incident is a stark reminder of lingering concerns about the ability of jihadi militants to penetrate deep inside Pakistan’s security installations. Of particular concern is a wave of radicalisation in the

¹⁴ Franz-Stefan GADY, “China’s Ghost Fleet in the Indian Ocean: Are the stories surrounding China’s Indian Ocean fleet just wishful thinking?”, in *The Diplomat*, February 07, 2015, at the Internet address <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/chinas-ghost-fleet-in-the-indian-ocean/>

¹⁵ For the fragments quoted here see Iskander REHMAN, “The Indian Navy Has a Big Problem: The Subsurface Dilemma”, in *The National Interest*, November 4, 2014, at the Internet address <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-indian-navy-has-big-problem-the-subsurface-dilemma-11598>,

¹⁶ Kyle MIZOKAMI, “If India and Pakistan Went to War: 5 Weapons Pakistan Should Fear”, *The National Interest*, August 16, 2014, at the Internet address <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-india-pakistan-went-war-5-weapons-pakistan-should-fear-11089>, accessed on March 14, 2015

¹⁷ “What is NOSI?”, in “About / FAQ”, on the *NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence)* webpage, at the Internet address <http://nosi.org/faq/>

¹⁸ “2014: World Naval Operational News Highlights”, in “Naval Year In Review”, on the *NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence)* webpage, at the Internet address <http://nosi.org/review/>

lower ranks of the Pakistan Navy, where anti-Americanism... is said to have grown in recent years”¹⁹.

A few days after the attack, a major Indian newspaper reported – directly quoting a statement of an al-Qaeda spokesperson – that the Karachi attackers “were former Pakistan Navy officers-turned-jihadists who were attempting to hijack a missile frigate to stage an attack on a United States aircraft carrier”²⁰.

Pakistan also uses naval exercises to increase and test its naval capabilities. In late September 2014, the Pakistani Navy staged “fire power exercises”; during these open sea activities, a “Torpedo [type] missile was fired from Augusta 90 B class submarine while [an] anti ship guided missile was fired from navy aircraft”²¹. In almost any *rational* scenario we can imagine, only two naval forces can be the target of Pakistani missiles: those of India, the most important *strategic* rival of Pakistan along the past few decades, and those of the Shiite Iran (*if Pakistan is to cooperate with other Sunni states against the more and more obvious hegemonic ambitions of the Shiite Iran*).

4. Iran

Iran is a country with increasing ambitions and capabilities both in the Persian Gulf and in various regions of the Indian Ocean. In late November 2014, the commanding officer of the Iranian Navy declared that “currently 32 Iranian naval groups are present in the international water”, and that “Iran’s naval forces have escorted over 2,000 trade ships in the past few years,” also adding “that the country’s naval forces also repulsed over 150 pirate attacks, Iran’s Mehr News Agency reported”. The most senior Iranian naval commander also said “we have also assisted 22 countries through international waters”²². This piece of news clearly indicates that some of the Iranian Navy’s missions on open seas are aimed at getting triple results: boosting national influence in some regions of the World Ocean, protecting national sea trade, and consolidating the regime’s prestige and legitimacy on the international arena.

In February 2015, Iran send a small task force (called flotilla in some official text, because of obvious propagandistic reasons) in the Indian Ocean, in order to show the rest of the world that Tehran is “active and powerful” in this region of the World Ocean, Western open sources report, quoting Iranian media. “The Iranian Navy’s 33rd flotilla, comprised of martyr vice-admiral Naqdi destroyer and Bandar Abbas logistic warship, embarked on the voyage after berthing in early February at Sri Lanka’s port of Colombo, where the ships were ‘welcomed’ by ‘Sri Lankan navy commanders’ Iran’s state-run Fars News Agency reported”, and “Fars quoted Col. Ebrahim Rouhani, Iran’s military attache in Sri Lanka, as saying the ‘Indian Ocean is a stage for the big powers to display the power of their fleets, and the presence of this flotilla shows that we are active and powerful on this stage too’”. Iranian sources quoted by Washington Times also report “other Iranian officials said the flotilla had engaged in a two-week and roughly 3,000-mile journey from Iranian waters to Sri Lanka. The

¹⁹ „Pakistan navy repels militant attack at Karachi dockyard”, *BBC*, September 9, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29122325>

²⁰ Praveen SWAMI, „First claim by al-Qaeda subcontinent wing: Pakistan Navy men ours”, *The Indian Express*, September 12, 2014, at the Internet address <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-others/first-claim-by-al-qaeda-subcontinent-wing-pakistan-navy-men-ours/>

²¹ “Pakistan Navy successfully tested torpedo and anti-ship guided missiles”, *The News Tribune*, September 27, 2014, at <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/09/27/pakistan-navy-successfully-tested-torpedo-and-anti-ship-guided-missiles/>

²² Milad FASHTAMI, “Iran naval forces escort over 2,000 trade ships” , on the *Trend* webpage, November 29, 2014, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/business/2338526.html>

point of the mission centers on ‘cadet training’, according to Fars, which said the flotilla is now headed towards Indonesia”²³.

We feel the need to underline that some of the pieces of news in various open sources speaking about Iranian naval plans and actions are relevant for both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. For example, in mid-March 2015, state operated media in Tehran reported starting of mass production of an Iranian “anti-ship cruise missile dubbed ‘Ghadir’”. The open sources we are quoting here report that “Iran’s defense minister, Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan said that the missile can be carried on helicopters and warships”. Non-Iranian open sources indicate that “the defense ministry has reportedly delivered large quantities of the missile to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) navy during the production line inauguration ceremony”²⁴. And, in early November 2014, Iranian media quoted by open sources in Azerbaijan said “the Iranian Navy’s 32nd flotilla of warships was dispatched to the Gulf of Aden to protect the country’s commercial ships and oil tanks against pirates, the Islamic Republic’s Fars news agency reported Nov. 5”. The same open source indicated that “the flotilla including the Jamaran destroyer and Bushehr helicopter-carrier warship left Bandar Abbas port, in Southern Hormozgan province on Nov. 4”, and also reported that “as part of the fleet’s mission, the ships would later proceed via the Strait of Hormuz, Jask port in the Oman Sea and finally to the Gulf of Aden”²⁵ (this piece of news is speaking about a patrolling mission starting in the Persian Gulf and aimed at reaching the Gulf of Aden, in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean).

And in early February 2015, Iran’s Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, “referring to the Iranian Navy as a strategic force, said presence in international waters is important for the country. ‘Iran aims at having a constant presence in open seas’, he underlined”. Sayyari also “added as it was instructed by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, one of the major goals of the Iranian Navy is to expand its defense lines in international waters”. According to a piece of news published by the Islamic Republic’s official IRNA news agency, Sayyari has also declared that “powerful navies of other countries present in the North Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have accepted Iran as a powerful navy in the region”, and also that “presence of Iran’s Navy in the Gulf of Oman and North Indian Ocean is to prevent hegemonic powers from dominating other nations’ resources by controlling their waterways”²⁶. In late February 2015, Iranian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari made some official statements indicating a quick pace of evolution of both Iranian naval ambitions and naval capabilities, significant both in the Persian Gulf region and in the Indian Ocean or in the Caspian Sea. Sayyari said “Iran is one of the top 10 countries in making destroyers”, emphasizing that “formerly we were unable even to repair destroyer parts, but now we make submarines, warships and destroyers”. He also described, in very clear terms, the quick enlargement of the geo-strategic space the Iranian Navy tries to control (or, if possible, to completely dominate): “Once we would only voyage within the 300,000-square-kilometer span of the Persian Gulf, but now we surf an area of 2.2 million square kilometers, one and a half times the area of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. The piece of news we are quoting from also reports that “Iranian warships

²³ Guy TAYLOR, “Iran flexes muscle in Indian Ocean, sends flotilla of warships across equator”, *The Washington Times*, February 19, 2015, at the Internet address <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/19/iran-sends-flotilla-warships-across-equator/>

²⁴ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran starts mass production of anti-ship cruise missile”, on the *Trend* webpage, March 14, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2374031.html>

²⁵ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran dispatches Navy’s 32nd flotilla to Gulf of Aden”, on the *Trend* webpage (*Trend News* is a news agency in Azerbaijan), November 5, 2014, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/society/2329997.html>

²⁶ “Iran Navy in North Indian Ocean vies with powerful counterparts”, on the *Trend* webpage, February 2, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2359773.html>

currently travel to the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean”²⁷, which clearly indicates the very existence of plans aimed at transforming Iranian Navy into an increasingly global (or at least trans-regional) presence.

Iran also uses naval exercises (including some in the Indian Ocean) in order to boost and test its naval capabilities. In early December 2014, the commanding officer of the Iranian Navy officially announced large scale naval exercises “to be held [in] late December. According to Iranian sources, the exercise was called ‘Veleyat 93’ and took place “in the 10 degree geographical latitude in the northern part of the Indian Ocean”. According to Iranian sources, the exercise proves Iranian Navy is “present in high seas to defend interests of our country”, and several types of naval missiles were tested²⁸.

One of the most important recent pieces of news dealing with the way in which balance of power is shaped – and evolves – in the Indian Ocean is connected to the Iranian decision to help the Houthis in Yemen develop several seaports. Quite clearly, the very fact that Yemen is now a country dominated by allies of Iran (with strong religious, ideological and strategic ties with Tehran) means that the general “balance of power in the region is changed in Iran’s favor”, as one senior IRGC declared a few months ago. But the regional influence of Iran in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean is, probably, to grow even more, as long as “Iran will help Yemeni government backed by Shiite Houthi rebels-Ansarullah for developing strategic Red Sea port of Hodeidah”, which “is the second largest port in the country after Aden, a southern city on the Gulf of Aden”. The Iranians will also “send experts to look into constructing power stations in the port cities of Hodeida, Aden and Mukha, carrying out maintenance work on the current generating plant in Marib, and expanding the Hodeida port, [a] Houthi official said”²⁹.

In more general terms, it is very clear that *Iran has special interests in the Western part of the Indian Ocean*, near the Eastern shores of Africa. According to an analysis published by *Stratfor* in October 2012, *Iran is clearly interested in gaining a growing influence not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean.* The text we are quoting from is stating that “Iran’s focus on expansion in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea serves several purposes. First, it establishes an Iranian presence along a key transportation route where Iran can protect its vessels from Somali pirates. Second, it is a military tactic, giving the Iranian navy influence outside the Persian Gulf - something Tehran believes is necessary for its success as a regional power”. The same open source is estimating that as long as “Iran attempts to move its navy toward a blue-water capability, the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea will be where developments occur first”. The *Stratfor* analysis is also stating that Iranian naval expansion (or increased activities and actions) in the Indian Ocean are to be regarded as a tool which “supports Iran’s goals in eastern Africa. Iran’s navy is not advanced enough to challenge other navies in the region, but the maritime presence in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea allows the Iranians to provide cover for their weapons smuggling routes to the north”³⁰. The same open source is estimating that “Iran’s navy cannot project enough power to control key shipping lanes” in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean, “but Tehran has emphasized its presence around Bab el Mandeb as a possible means of

²⁷ For all text fragments quoted along this paragraph, see Khalid KHAZIMOV, “Iran among top 10 of destroyer manufacturers”, on the *Trend* webpage, February 21, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2366827.html>

²⁸ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran sends warning to foreigners ahead of holding naval drill”, on the *Trend* webpage, December 6, 2014, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2341108.html>

²⁹ Umid NIAYESH, “Iran helps Shiite-backed Yemeni government to develop strategic port”, on the *Trend* webpage, March 14, 2015, at the Internet address <http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2374091.html>

³⁰ For all the fragments quoted along this paragraph, see „Eastern Africa: A Battleground for Israel and Iran”, *Stratfor*, October 29, 2012, at the Internet address <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/eastern-africa-battleground-israel-and-iran>

disrupting global trade in the event of an attack on Iran and a key point for negotiations in the future, much like the Strait of Hormuz”.³¹

A proof of the increased Iranian attention paid to the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean is the fact that at the end of 2014, the Iranian armed forces staged really massive military exercises “near the strategic Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf”. Iranian officials said that “various warships, destroyers, submarines, missiles, aircraft and helicopters would be used in the drill in a bid to improve the naval forces’ power”, and that “the first part of the drill was set to include exercises by ground units in southeast Iran”³². An Israeli open source, quoting Iranian official reports, said that the total area covered by these massive military exercises was large: “527,000 square kilometers in the northern part of the Indian Ocean, Sea of Oman and the eastern part of the passage, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes”, and we also mention here that a week before this large military event, “Iran said... new weapons would be test fired”³³.

5. Western powers: U.S and Australia

The U.S. usually deploys large squadrons to the Indian Ocean (and / or the Persian Gulf). But the U.S. is not the only actor belonging – if we take into account both major political values and major strategic interests – to the Western world which is significantly present in the Indian Ocean. Australia is one of the most important regional partners the U.S. can rely in the Indian Ocean.

In late August 2014, the largest combat ship ever built for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) started its final sea trials. We are speaking about HMAS Canberra, a 30,600 ton Land Helicopter Dock (LHD) built in Spain. It is, according to an official RAN statement, “one of the most capable and sophisticated air–land–sea amphibious deployment systems in the world”. According to open sources, “with a length of 230 m (754 ft) and 32 m (104 ft) abeam, Canberra... can cruise at 15 knots (17 mph) and does over 20 knots (23 mph) at flank speed. Cruising range is 9,000 nautical miles (16,600 km)”. We also know that “Canberra has an onboard hospital, a galley capable of preparing 5,000 meals a day, four main decks for heavy vehicles, accommodations for the crew and troops, helicopter hangar and light vehicles, and the helicopter flight deck. The latter boasts a ski jump that will allow Canberra to launch Harriers or F-35B Lightning IIs, though she isn't designed to handle fixed-wing aircraft as part of her regular complement. Below, the hull opens to receive four specially built landing craft”³⁴. *Quite clearly, this ship is to significantly boost Australia’s general naval capabilities, both in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean.*

A few months earlier, in late April 2014, an Australian combat ship, HMAS Darwin, “patrolling the coast of Africa”, has “seized more than one tonne of heroin on a sailing boat” on the high seas “east of Kenya”. The same source says “this area of operation [of the Australian Navy ships] encompasses an area of more than 2 million square miles, including

³¹ *Ibidem.*

³² For the fragments quoted along this paragraph see Times of Israel staff and AP, “Iranian military begins massive drill in Persian Gulf: Ground forces, navy and air force to participate in week-long exercise near Strait of Hormuz”, in *The Times of Israel*, December 25, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-military-begins-massive-drill-in-persian-gulf/>

³³ Times of Israel staff and AP, “Iranian military begins massive drill in Persian Gulf: Ground forces, navy and air force to participate in week-long exercise near Strait of Hormuz”, in *The Times of Israel*, December 25, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-military-begins-massive-drill-in-persian-gulf/>

³⁴ David SZONDY, “Largest ship ever built for the Royal Australian Navy begins final sea trials”, on the *Gizmag* webpage, August 22, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.gizmag.com/nuship-canberra-trials/33433/>

the Indian Ocean”³⁵, and *this piece of news is important because it makes us better understand how important is the Australian Navy in shaping the strategically significant balance of power in the Indian Ocean.*

We also mention here that the naval (and air) presence of major Western powers (mainly the U.S. and U.K) in the Indian Ocean is seriously boosted by the existence of a major base, that at Diego Garcia. Open sources say “the Naval Support Facility (NSF) Diego Garcia is a US Navy installation located in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)” and that “NSF Diego Garcia provides logistic, service and installation support for the US and Allied forces forward deployed in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf regions. Diego Garcia is home to 16 separate commands. The base accommodates 360 military personnel, 1,800 base operation services contractor (BOSC) staff, 300 mariners (MSC), 220 civilians and 80 overseas government employees”. The same open sources say “NSF Diego Garcia provides services for the vessels of the US Navy, British, MSC and Allied forces transiting through Diego Garcia. The major tenant commands based at Diego Garcia are Military Sealift Command Office, Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two, Afloat Prepositioning Ships Squadron Four, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Detachment, Mission Support Facility, FISC Yokosuka and 36 MXG Pacific Air Force. The base provides support for the US Navy and allied vessels assigned to these commands”³⁶.

Conclusions

All the elements listed and analyzed above, put together, are shaping the broad and quickly evolving picture of an intense geo-strategic competition, in the Indian Ocean, of several types of actors of the international arena (traditional world powers, emerging global powers and some regional powers – including at least one which is seriously aiming at regional hegemony in a large region of the Middle East). For *all* the powers operating larger or smaller parts of their Navies in the Indian Ocean, the geo-strategic significance of this region of the World Ocean is really a major one, and we can legitimately predict it is going to grow even larger along the next years.

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³⁵ “Australian Navy seizes \$290 million of heroin from boat off Kenyan coast”, on the *ABC News Australia* webpage, April 25, 2014, at the Internet address <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-25/australian-navy-seize-290-million-of-heroin-from-boat-off-kenya/5412108>

³⁶ “Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia”, on the *naval-technology.com* webpage, at the Internet address <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/diego-garcia/>

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COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CHINESE PROJECT OF THE SILK ROAD AND TRACECA - THE E.U. PROJECT OF THE SILK ROAD

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Abstract: *Rebirth of the « Silk Road » is a project which, apparently, has the support of the major political actors of the international scene. It seems to exist a certain unity regarding the development of this concept. A deeper analysis shows that under the mask of using the same name, different realities and even contradictory realities are hidden. For Russia, « Silk Road » represents the Trans-Siberian. For Europe is a modality of projecting its influence into Central Asia. Finally, for China, «Silk Road» although it is presented as a bridge to Europe, in reality, it is a power platform into Eurasia.*

Keywords: *Silk Road, China, Africa, Traceca, Russia*

Motto:

Same bed, different dreams – Chinese proverb

Introduction

«The Silk Road» is a concept of Chinese politics which applies to multiple fields: culturally, admittedly more as a basis for developing economical collaboration, politically, for facilitating economical collaboration, energetically and regarding infrastructure. Practically, it comes to express any tie between China and the distant exterior.

From China's point of view, the American encircling is avoided via an alternative route, which results in diversifying the possibilities of getting through to Europe and Africa. It is a multidimensional strategy which intensifies the economical advantages using political ones. The strategy is applied in the infrastructure, communications and energetical fields. Each stage of the project is profitable on its own, but all of them lead to synergy. The infrastructure union, doubled by the lack of customs rates may generate a commercial union between the European Union and the Co-operation Organization of Shanghai, in future.

1. The main routes of the Silk Road

From the point of view of the infrastructure, “China's New Silk Road is based on three main corridors across the Eurasian Continent, called the Eurasian Land Bridge, which serves as the main arteries from which offshoot rails, highways, and pipelines will be built”.¹

The first branch of the route is actually the Transsiberian, from Vladivostock to Moscow, where it is connected to Western Europe to Rotterdam – 13.000 km. In January 2005, China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus and Germany have inaugurated this route. The time necessary for the transport of goods is 15 days, compared to 40 days for the sea route, and the route is shortened with more than 10.000 km.

¹ Dr. Christina Lin, *China's New Silk Road to the Mediterranean: The Eurasian Land Bridge and Return of Admiral Zheng He*, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, Issue No. 165, October 2011, p. 2.

The second branch of the route is from the Chinese port Lianyungang, through Central Asia and getting to Western Europe again, ending in Rotterdam – 10.900 km. On this route the involvement of the European Union appears too, through Traceca.

The third branch goes from the South of China, Shenzen and arrives in Rotterdam again- 15.000km. Also, the third branch arrives in Africa. Probably the main interest regarding this branch is the link with Africa and not with Europe. In Turkey, this branch reunites with the Traceca Route.



Image no. 1 The third branch of the Silk Road

It is noticed that on China’s territory there is a reduced diversification of routes of the Silk Road, from Lanzhou to Alanshankou, there is only one main branch, and the rest of the deviations have the role of transporting goods from the area of East China, the one which is more heavily industrialized.



Image no.2 Eurasian land bridges
Source China Daily – July, 2nd 2009.

The distinct role played by the Dutch port of Rotterdam is observed, point terminus of three routes of the Silk Road, and not only, because here the sea routes converge as well. It is expected that Rotterdam and Holland, through extension, to become increasingly important to China. Practically, the North, Center and South of China are linked to Western Europe, the second route being used as a link to Africa.

A question mark raises referring to the fact that two of the routes are under direct control by Russia. Probably this dependence is caused not by political preference, but by the existence of an appropriate infrastructure and the easiness of relating to a reduced number of partners.

It is the European Union's intention, through Traceca, to reduce this dependence. It can also be considered that through its' actions, China has determined the European Union to diversify transport routes, to reduce dependence on Russia. Estimations cannot be made whether this was the result of a strategy or a fortuitous benefit.

2. The Traceca Program – Comparison to the Chinese Silk Road project

Apparently, the European Union, through the Traceca program, is involved in the infrastructure field, partially covering sections of the Silk Road. Although it is not publicized intensely, it has an immense potential of developing Europe's ties to Asia and Central Asia, especially. From the administrative-technical point of view, Traceca is part of the TACIS financial program, European Commission Program for CIS. Traceca was created in Brussels on the 3rd of May 1993.

The Objectives of Traceca are as follows:

1. *Creation of the necessary conditions to develop the Traceca corridor as an alternative to the Northern Transsiberian Route.*

The Northern Transsiberian Route is actually the first branch of the Silk Road as it is conceived by China. This objective indirectly declares that Traceca is a competitor of the Chinese version of the Silk Road. If we may say so, we have a Silk Road versus another Silk Road.

2. *Unification of the Traceca corridor with the European Transport Network (TEN)*

This objective indirectly affirms that there is a will to economically integrate these regions#

3. *Support for the political and economical independence of the CSI (Community of Independent States) and of the party-states to the «Basic Multilateral Agreement Regarding International Transport Aiming to Develop the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor»*

The third objective is actually a summary of the second objective. An integration of transport networks will allow countries on the Traceca route more possibilities. More options mean more independence. This objective is clearly directed against Russia, which is interested in maintaining the status-quo, meaning the infrastructure dependence of the Central Asian countries.

“All the transportation and other logistical infrastructure of Central Asia was directed toward European Russia as part of the Soviet legacy. With respect to oil and gas infrastructure, pipelines crucially ran to Russia. Likewise, communications, railroads, river, and air transport were linked with Russia and nowhere else.”²

From the analysis of the objectives it is evident that objective 3 is the most important, the other two rather being means to accomplishing objective 3. The countries of Central Asia have a favorable position with respect to this route, to avoid being controlled by a single power and to promote a balance of the main international actors interests. Europe is an

² Edward C. Chow, Leigh E. Hendrix, *Central Asia's Pipelines: Field of Dreams and Reality*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #23, September 2010, p. 31.

attractive model to the Central Asian countries, ensuring a balance of the Chinese and Russian interests in the area. This way a whole infrastructure is created which redirects Central Asia from Moscow towards the European Union.

Regarding a way of integrating Traceca in the larger context of the Silk Road, a possible interpretation is that Traceca is actually one branch of the Silk Road, and that through its' involvement, the European Union shows that not just China has an interest in the realization of this project.

Another possible interpretation is that Traceca is a part of the response strategy of the EU to China's policy of projecting itself as a world power through economical means, "projecting China's power and cultural superiority to a system of tributary states".³ Consequently, Masako Ikegami presents the following scenario:

- Investment in infrastructure to extract natural resources
- Military intervention to defend these investments.
- Installation of puppet-governments.

If, indeed the three points are part of a strategy or not, is impossible to tell. What can certainly be said is that by logical and natural order, the accomplishment of objective 1 will naturally determine actions to accomplish the next objectives. So, no matter if a plan is being followed or it is just natural political evolution, the result will be similar.




Image no.3 Official Traceca map
[Map of Eurasia]

3. The Chinese Concept of the Silk Road

From a historical point of view, "The Silk Road" has consisted of a series of non connected routes, linked only by the fact that they originated in China and were transporting similar goods, mainly silk. If, in the past, at least, there was a silk road, nowadays it cannot be said that we are faced with a reality, but rather a concept used by China to smooth its' global ascent. The past is evoked to psychologically facilitate the acceptance of China as a great

³ Dr. Christina Lin, *op. cit.*, October 2011, p. 2.

power. What is being done now is presented as a repetition of a past economical phenomenon. “The Silk Road” exists because it previously existed. Through this logical gimmick the new “Silk Road” is justified and legitimised, without presenting arguments which belong to the present day.

China presents a certain history of the “Silk Road”, which is incorporated in its’ strategy of gaining a great power status, or even to achieving world domination. So it is not the past that determines the future, but it can be rather said that envisioning the future modifies or illuminates the past. Practically, the past doesn’t matter anymore, being modeled to correspond to temporary intention. China intends to point towards Africa; the story of Chinese admiral Zheng He who visited Africa as a peace and free trade ambassador, unlike European colonial powers, comes to mind. An international development policy is justified on the grounds of a past that can be modified or presented in the desired fashion.

The new Chinese president, Xi Jin Ping, describes the logical basis of strategy accurately enough:

”We should clearly present our policies to the outside world, *tell China's story in an acceptable way*, speak out so that we are heard, interpret the Chinese dream from the perspective of the cooperation of all people in all countries for a better life and regional prosperity and let the sense of common destiny take root with our neighbors. ” (Xi Jin Ping, China Daily, 26.10.2013, speech held in a „Conference regarding diplomacy work”)

The key words of the speech are „tell China’s story in an acceptable way”. „The Silk Road” represents the acceptable way through which China presents its’ global supremacy ambitions. The story is told to create a common destiny. „The Silk Road” is the common thread which offers meaning to states which would otherwise have enough diverging points. What is lost from analysis is the fact that this common destiny is actually a Chinese dream. To paraphrase a Chinese proverb, „Same bed, different dreams”, could also mean „Same dream, different beds”.

„The Silk Road” is more a metaphor to express the development and openness of China towards the exterior. Those unaccustomed to the subtleties of Chinese thinking have fallen into the trap of considering „The Silk Road” as something tangible and real. It is here that the mistake made by other powers which initiate their own silk roads resides. These concrete „roads” are incorporated by the Chinese concept which doesn’t need something real, but may use any opportunity. To the level of imagery, when „The Silk Road” is mentioned, China is mentioned automatically. „The Silk Road” may take numerous concrete forms, without identifying with any of them. That’s why whoever is fighting against it, or any association to it is like a fight with the shadow – an impossibility. The concept exists only to a logical and imagistic level. „The Silk Road” is a codeword for China’s effort to world domination. „All roads lead to Rome” may be paraphrased as „All silk roads lead to China”. China launches an open challenge towards world domination and nobody realises the implications. Or if they realise them, they may be too difficult to explain or be understood by the audience. „The Silk Road” is in reality China’s way towards global supremacy, but for obvious reasons it wasn’t possible to name it that way.

Conclusions

What China calls „Silk Road”, largely has nothing to do with the ancient silk road, especially regarding the Russian routes. China considers the Silk Road more as a bridge which links two continents, isolated and hermetical towards the external environment, while the European Union sees the road more as a means to promote its’ own values. This term indicates the fact that one of China’s main targets is Europe, and it uses Central Asia or Russia just as means of transit, without a special interest, except a certain stability and

security. The difference is clear between the Chinese pragmatism which leads to commercial and political interest, and the European vision based rather on cultural attractiveness.

The bridge concept involves the leap over a moving, unsafe, dangerous space. Without getting into detail, China's attitude towards Central Asia is one of distrust or fear. At the same time, China probably intends to make Central Asia at least as dependent as towards Russia, both from an economical and political perspective. That is why a developed democracy at China's border would be a dangerous precedent through the attractive model to the Chinese population. This is why there cannot be a Chinese interest in growing the European Union influence in the area, China indirectly going into conflict to objective 3 of Traceca – *Support for the political and economical independence of the CSI (Community of Independent States) and of the party-states to the "Basic Multilateral Agreement Regarding International Transport Aiming to Develop the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor"*.

We notice the utilisation of the same names, but these hide rather than clarify. The two Silk Roads, Chinese and European, are if not contradicting, at least competing. Of course the hypothesis of China's concentration on the Russian route, to leave a breach for the European Union to act can be emitted. Practically, a branch of the Silk Road is built for China by the European Union. This type of strategy is not unknown to the Chinese way of thinking, extremely complicated and hidden. This way, resources and energy are economised and a beautifying mask is placed over the Russian partners. The routes supported by China go through Russian territory, The fact that the European Union builds another branch of the route may not be charged to China. As a result, although apparently against, China will benefit from this branch of the Silk Road freely. The European Union fell into this trap through negligence or forced by circumstances.

An interesting direction of research is the comparison between the former energetical project, Nabuco and Traceca, both with very close linked routes. Traceca as well as Nabuco express a larger policy of the EU, indicating the European Union's attention to form a controlled corridor, both commercially and energetically. This corridor allows for the diversification of the energetical and infrastructure resources of the European Union.

Passing to another level of interpretation, it is possible that one of the main objectives of the Chinese Silk Road, although not very present in the media, is linking China to Africa's natural resources. In a typical Sun Zi manner, a direction is indicated, only to concentrate on another. In fact, reality shows that the bulk of the Chinese investments in infrastructure are on the third route, which is also directed to Africa.

Which is Romania's stance in this extremely fluid reality, where the interests of the main Powers converge or oppose? Our country's answer must be as fluid as the reality which surrounds us and we must not go into confrontations that aren't ours. Otherwise, one can observe that this answer is adopted in reality. Romania is for the Silk Road, but avoids specifying which of the projects it stands for. Any concrete answer would risk antagonising at least one of the parties.

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RECENT IMPORTANT GEOSTRATEGIC EVOLUTIONS IN YEMEN

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Abstract: *The Democratic Republic of Yemen is occupying an important position in the extreme South of the Arabian Peninsula, controlling through proximity the access to (and the exit from) the Persian Gulf, the access of a large share of the world market to oil resources in the Gulf area and the entrance to the Red Sea which is connected with the Mediterranean Sea by the Suez Canal, another significant strategic point. Yemen's geographical position has important and obvious geo-strategic advantages. The current paper is briefly exploring the status of Yemen as a geopolitical pivot in the regional power balance, and also the serious implications for Yemen, its neighbors and allies of the internal crisis with Houthi rebels having taken over large parts of the country in the recent years. Another aim of this analysis is to present the way in which other actors of the international arena are reacting as a consequence of the situation in Yemen. The paper based entirely on open sources and on works important for Political Science and Strategic Studies.*

Keywords: *Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Arabian Peninsula, Regional power balance*

Introduction

From a geostrategic point of view, Yemen is located *in the extreme South of the Arabian Peninsula*. Also the Gulf of Aden, situated between Somalia and Yemen, is an important segment of the vital routes for the global maritime trade. These aspects made that the territory of Yemen to be extremely disputed in the Gulf area, triggering the interest of various international actors during the history. In 1958, after the British “abandoned their military base at Suez, they moved the headquarters of Middle East Command to Aden [...] and it soon had a garrison of 15,000 troops.”¹ In the cold War era, Yemen, whose actual territory was split in North Yemen and South Yemen, was a war theater between the West and the communist block. Much closer to our days, Yemen, located between Saudi Arabia and Iran, controlling a almost 2,000 kilometers of the costal region around the Gulf of Aden, a trade route for the oil extracted in the Persian Gulf, has gain a new geo-strategic importance: for the Iranian government, a chance to avoid the complete isolation from the strategic encirclement drawn in the latest years, by the U.S. massive military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The problem of intensely rival – and often conflicting – religious factions has roots in the old history. The area of today's Yemen had accepted the tenets of Islam in 629 during the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed and Yemeni tribesmen played an active role in the establishment of the Islamic faith throughout the Near East and North Africa. In 642 A.D., when the Prophet died, the Muslim community split over the issue of choosing his successor

¹De Noel BREHONY, *Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2011. p.5

when some of them believed that the rightful successor is the Prophet's son-in-law, 'Ali. Later the Shia developed a different religious doctrine. The Sunni following the sunna or "the beaten path." The cleavage Sunni-Shia persists in the Islamic world and within Yemen today, generating a lot of very intense conflicts of all sorts.

But the Shia Muslim world eventually became divided within itself and one of these sects, the Hashemites, established themselves as the rulers of Yemen, creating a dynasty that was to last, with some interruptions, for over 1,000 years beginning in the year 893 A.D. when a violent intertribal conflict started in Saadah. Realizing the need to find a solution, the leaders of the warring factions appeal to Imam and eventually agreed to obey whatever the Imam would prescribe. The Imam grandson, Al Hadi Yahya Bin Al Husayn established initially only governorship over Saadah, but his descendents would eventually become the sole rulers of North Yemen until the establishment of the republic in 1962.

Another important moment in Yemen history was the Cold War. The South Yemen, Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen had for a long period a communist regime while the North Yemen was a pro-Western regime. We don't totally agree with Ginny Hill that "the roots of Yemen's current civil conflict, in which the government is trying to put down a localized but potent rebellion, lie in the Cold War regional politics of the 1960s"², but it is one of the causes.

On 20th May 1990 the unification of Yemen took place and Ali Abdullah Saleh became the president of the new state, the Republic of Yemen.

I've presented this brief history for a better understanding of the very deep roots of the current situation. The religious cleavage, the differences between the north capitalist Yemen and south socialist one split up the population. If we add the alliances in the Cold War era and the regional interests of other actor of the international arena (including the great powers), the inequality of the resources within the territory, the discovery of oil in Hadramawt province in 1993, we can sum up four important causes of the civil war that began in 1994. We may resume within the causes *a tradition of conflicts*³ *both between the local and central power and between tribes whom made the country a fertile ground for foreign powers to pursue their interests.*

Yemen was united from a political and administrative point of view for the first time in centuries. The unification was supposed to take place during the next 30 months. But the old problems didn't disappear, some of them were the economic marginalization of the south and the violence against the Yemeni Socialist Party. In 1994, the government of Prime Minister Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas became ineffective due to political infighting. In 1994, the accord signed in Amman, Jordan between northern and southern leaders failed to stop the civil war. From a military point of view, both the northern and southern armies "failed to integrate square off on old border."⁴

In June 2004, in Northern Yemen started the Houthi insurgency, when Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a dissident cleric of the Zaidi Shia sect, started an uprising against the central Yemeni government. The Yemeni government said at the time that "Mr. al-Houthi's rebels want to overthrow it and impose Shia religious law. The rebels say they are defending their community against discrimination and what they call aggressive acts by the government."⁵ Another interest of the central government was to create or boost a strong

²Ginny HILL, *Cold War roots of Yemen conflict*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8261867.stm

³Florin DIACONU, "Evolutions in Yemen and Some Central Elements of the Iranian Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy – 2009-2010" in *Impactul Evoluției Relațiilor Internaționale Asupra Mediului de Securitate*, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2010, p.532

⁴*Yemen profile*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951>

⁵*Deadly blast strikes Yemen mosque*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address

public mood, both at regional and international level, against the Houthi rebels, using the perspective of Iranian involvement in the conflict.

The conflict escalated in November 2009 when northern rebels clashed with Saudi security forces along the common border. The Saudis launched an anti-Houthi offensive with the result that the rebels accused that the attacks from the Yemeni government were also supported by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government denied the fact. More than that, on December 2009, when US provided firepower and intelligence to the government of Yemen to strike at suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda within its borders, Houthi leaders claimed that United States involved themselves in the war.

The Arab spring was another moment that drew the country into instability, when thousands of Yemenites took to the streets in Sanaa, asking Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. President Saleh's Sanhani clan and the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) was divided by the slaughter of protesters in Sanaa and was formed the centrist Justice and Development bloc. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) supported by the West, tried to negotiate a solution, proposed amnesty for the president and his close circle and a phased transitional process but Saleh didn't accept it.

On January 20, 2015, Houthi power grab in Sanaa escalated when the rebels attacked the president's residence and swept into the presidential palace. As a direct result of this move President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his prime minister resigned, creating this way a dangerous political vacuum.⁶ We are witnessing, at the moment I'm writing this paper, one of the greatest crisis in Yemen since president Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned three years ago.

“The civil war in Saada province in Yemen has long since become a proxy war of the two regional powers Iran and Saudi Arabia developed. The rivals accusing each other before upgrading the Yemeni parties to the conflict and to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Riad accused Tehran of building a second Hezbollah in Yemen and of promoting terrorism. Iran warns Saudi Arabia to stop interfering in the Civil War.”⁷ We will analyze the strategic interests in Yemen of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in the next two chapters.

1. Saudi Arabia

On January 23, 2015 king Abdullah bin Abdulaziz died. Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, the new King of Saudi Arabia, faced a growing impasse on how to administer the expanding crisis taking place at its South border with its neighbor at a time when it is facing increasingly menacing crises on most of its borders. Its natural boundaries along the Red Sea in the West and along the Persian Gulf in the East provide the country little security from Iran and its neighbor in East, Bahrain. Also, there are more security challenges at the border with Iraq, in North, with ISIL.

The coup in Yemen at the beginning of January 2015 has made the risks far greater, by raising the danger posed by Iran as Yemen is vital for the security interests of Saudi Arabia. Iranian influence in Yemen may turn into a catastrophe. Regarding the timing, the Saudis have been already worried by the American nuclear negotiations with Iran, weakening the international sanctions regime that has been imposed for thirty-five years. From a religious perspective, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have significant Shia populations and consider Iran as an existential threat. Between jihadists in Iraq and Yemen, “Saudi Arabia's has every reason to stay alert. ISIS, the well-armed and well-funded jihadist army that has seized control of

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7379929.stm

⁶*Yemen crisis: President resigns as rebels tighten hold*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30936940>

⁷*Stellvertreterkrieg im Jemen*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-01/jemen-krieg-iran>

most of western Iraq, is now effectively at the kingdom's doorstep. Nearly half the 900km (560 mile) Saudi-Iraq border is with Iraq's Anbar province where The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), now rebranded as simply The Islamic State, is largely able to move its fighters around at will. Saudi Arabia may not yet be directly in its sights but officials fear this is only a matter of time.”⁸ While the very future of Yemen is in question, for Saudi Arabia, the events at the south of their border are a matter of serious national security. Saudi Arabia cannot afford instability giving AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) free movement northwards and Iran a solid foothold on the peninsula.

According to *Business Insider*, “the fall of Yemen's government raises the stakes for the Saudis in the event of a US-Iranian accommodation. It could deepen the Kingdom's current independent streak, convincing them to further flood the global oil market to undercut the Iranian economy, or to accelerate its possible nuclear cooperation with Pakistan”.⁹

2. Iran

Over the last years, Iran actively supported the Shiite rebels in Yemen. Iran has “serious reasons to actively support, more or less openly, different militant and radical groups (mainly those based on, or mobilizing a lot, Shiite communities) in the entire Greater (Extended) Middle East. First of all, such actions can help political, military and religious leaders in Tehran to avoid, with minimal costs, complete strategic encirclement. [...] Maximal potential results targeted by Iran are obviously both more interesting, academically speaking, and more frightening for regional stability and for the strategic interests of the Western World [...] a Saudi Arabia more and more squeezed, like a lemon, by Shiites acting both from North and from South (from Yemen) or a Gulf of Aden completely fallen in the hands of radical Muslims (controlled from Tehran) on the shores of both Africa (Somalia) and Arabian Peninsula (Yemen).”¹⁰

Recent developments indicate a situation which grows more and more dangerous, as on March 2, 2015 a delegation of Yemeni ministers was sent to Tehran by the new administration in Sanaa for extensive talks, while Iran greeted them with open arms as their new ally on Saudi Arabia's southern border.

On March 1, 2015, were announced 14 direct flights a week of Yemenia Airways and Iran's Mahan Air between Teheran and Sanaa. This is one of the first signs of Yemen's new orientation and of the Iran's dominance. The U.K., USA, France, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States evacuated their diplomatic staff from Yemen and urged any remaining nationals to leave immediately. The ambassadors of Iran, Russia and China remained.

According to Telegraph, a hardline Iranian MP was widely quoted in Arabic media as having boasted that Iran now controlled four Arab capitals - Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad and Sanaa. “The victory of the revolution in Yemen has once again woken up the reactionary Arabs and the enemies of the resistance in the region,” said an editorial in Kayhan newspaper, seen as the mouth-piece of the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “The recent developments in Yemen are surely not favorable for or to the liking of the Americans and the region's monarchs who follow them.”¹¹

⁸Frank GARDNER, *Saudi Arabia: Sandwiched by jihadists in Iraq and Yemen*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28133086>

⁹Armin ROSEN, *The fall of Yemen's government is a huge problem for Saudi Arabia*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fall-of-yemens-government-is-a-huge-problem-for-saudi-arabia-2015-2#ixzz3TtvOmOxD>

¹⁰Florin DIACONU, *Evolutions in Yemen and Some Central Elements of the Iranian Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy – 2009-2010* in *Impactul Evoluției Relațiilor Internaționale Asupra Mediului de Securitate*, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, 2010, p.535

¹¹*Iran builds ties with new Yemen regime*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address

3. Other interests in the area

The instability and lack of a valid government system in Yemen laid ground for al-Qaeda quite many years ago. A very interesting author states that "in late 1989, Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih was preparing for unification. Over the past several months, while Osama bin Laden and Tariq al-Fadhli had been plotting their new jihad, Salih had been laying the groundwork for expansion. Quietly shuttling between his capital, Sanaa, and the whitewashed port city of Aden in South Yemen, Salih pitched the idea to Ali Salim al-Bid, his Socialist counterpart. It wasn't a difficult case to make. The Cold War was ending, and both North and South Yemen were in trouble."¹²

The fact that on January 2, 1993 the Pentagon had announced that it would no longer use Yemen as a support base citing security concerns was read by Bin Laden's as a success, in his version, "*he did nothing in Saudi Arabia and the Americans stayed. But when he hit them in Yemen, they ran.*"¹³

In 2007, Nayif al-Qahtani, a young Saudi member of al-Qaeda came with the idea of starting a magazine to help recruitment in Yemen. In January 2009 Nasir al-Wihayshi and Shihri, the former Guantánamo Bay detainee, announced a merger between the Yemeni and Saudi branches of al-Qaeda, under the name al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP. Later that year, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton designated al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula a terrorist organization. On January 14, 2010 Yemen's government declared war on the al-Qaeda movement. Since then numerous battles and attacks destabilized even more the country.

This year in January, according to Yemeni officials quoted by *CNN*, ISIS is active and recruiting in Yemen. According to Reuters, a group of Islamist fighters in Yemen renounced their loyalty to al-Qaeda's leader and pledged allegiance to the head of the Islamic State, according to a Twitter message retrieved by U.S.-based monitoring group site on February 11, 2015.¹⁴

Another major international actor deeply interested in Yemen along the latest years is China. In 2009, according to *PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries*, China and Yemen signed 3 cooperation agreements in value of 105 million Yuan (15.4 million U.S. dollars). "Under the agreements, China will allocate 50 million Yuan to promote economic and technical cooperation between the two sides. Beijing will also give Sanaa as much funds in support of the country's development projects. China will provide a relief assistance of five million Yuan through the agreements to the displaced people who fled the fighting between government troops and Houthi rebels in the southern province of Saada, the report said."¹⁵ The money are a clear sign of involvement in the conflict in Yemen and interests in a long term relationship.

In 2014 China offered an \$8 million grant to Yemen's defense ministry, a \$16.4 million general purpose grant, and a \$30 million long-term interest-free loan.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11445757/Iran-builds-ties-with-new-Yemen-regime.html>

¹² Gregory D. JOHNSEN, *The Last Refuge*, London, W.W.Norten & Company, Ebook, Chapter 2.

¹³ *Ibidem*

¹⁴ *Al Qaeda supporters in Yemen pledge allegiance to Islamic State: group*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaeda-supporters-yemen-pledge-allegiance-islamic-state-070123718.html>

¹⁵ *PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address

http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/116479/ichaptersection_singledocument/55422549-7e42-47a0-8e51-fd998154c7dd/en/02.pdf

China's interests in Yemen are related to the geostrategic position of the country. In the latest year, China invested much more in Africa and Yemen might be part of its larger ambitions to project power in the Horn of Africa.

According to Chris Zambelis, Senior Analyst specializing in Middle East affairs with Helios Global, Inc., a risk management group based in the Washington, D.C., area, “Yemen occupies a vital strategic position because of its location on the southwestern side of the Arabian Peninsula and across the shore from the Horn of Africa, adjacent to the Red Sea chokepoint known as the Bab al-Mandab and busy shipping lanes connecting the Suez Canal in the north stretching to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. As it has demonstrated by its presence in the Panama Canal Zone and the Egyptian Suez Canal, China places a premium on establishing footholds in or near strategic communication and commercial chokepoints across the globe. Yemen's position adjacent to the Bab al-Mandab fits this larger pattern of Chinese strategic thinking.”¹⁶

Although a general line of evolution can be drawn from these latest events, we have to take into account another aspect: the situation of the country's economy. Being the poorest country in the Arab world, over 54% of the population living in abject poverty, the situation has worsened in recent months. The oil and natural gas exports, although insignificant on a global level, generate 63% of the government's revenues. Yemen's budget deficit in 2014 was \$3.15 billion, alarmingly close to its shrinking foreign reserves which totaled only \$4.8 billion in October 2014. But even with the earnings from natural gas exports, the International Monetary Fund estimates that Yemen needs an oil export price of approximately \$215 per barrel to balance its budget.¹⁷

After the recent events foreign companies are leaving Yemen or already left form January as in the case of Houston-based Occidental Petroleum Corp. , which has been operating in Yemen for nearly thirty years, in part due to the instability in the country and the fact that the Houthis gained control of Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait that is connecting the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea offering a route for oil tankers heading to the Suez Canal.

Leaving an empty space in industry, and a great need for support in the country, the situation was evaluated quickly by the Houthi militants that are controlling Yemen's capital who understood the importance of the territory and started to seek new contracts and allies. According to two senior Houthi officials, the new administration has sent delegations to Russia to look for investment in energy projects, to Iran in search of fuel supplies and another delegation is planning to visit China.

5. Recent developments

At the end of March 2015, the situation in Yemen became so dangerous from the Saudi point of view, that they started (together with other regional and extra-regional allies) the *Operation Decisive Storm*. According to *Reuters*, on March 25, 2015, “Houthi militia forces and allied army units seized Aden airport and a nearby air base on Wednesday [March 25], tightening their grip on the outskirts of the southern Yemeni city after President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled his residence for a safer location.”¹⁸ With the Iranian regime supporting both “Shiite and Sunni terrorist groups (according to U.S. State and Treasury

¹⁶Chris ZAMBELIS, *Burgeoning China-Yemen Ties Showcase Beijing's Middle East Strategy*, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2899.html>

¹⁷*Yemen Report*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed at March 11, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ym>

¹⁸Sami ABOUDI, *Allies of Yemen Houthis seize Aden airport, close in on president*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0ML0YC20150325>

departments, key al-Qaeda financiers and planners reside and work from Iran)¹⁹, the instability in the region has increased a lot. What was a silent war until now, it came out into the open when “Saudi Arabia declared it sent 100 warplanes to strike targets inside Yemen, and now has 150,000 troops standing by at the border.” But according to the same source Saudi Arabia is “backed by nine other nations”, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait.

According to *Time*, on March 25, 2015, Saudi and Egyptian warships will be deployed on March 27 to the Bab al-Mandab strait, off Yemen to secure the strategic sea passage, Egyptian military officials said, aiming at paving the way for possible ground operations.²⁰

On March 26, according to *USA Today*, “the United States, which considered Hadi’s Sunni regime a critical ally in its fight against terrorism, is not participating in the airstrikes. But the Pentagon said it is assisting in communication, logistics and planning support.”²¹ We also underline that this war might be fought with U.S. weapons, according to a report published in January by the Congressional Research Service. The report is clearly stating that between October 2010 and October 2014, Washington and Riyadh reached more than \$90 billion in weapons deals.²² We also know that, when the most recent Houthi attacks started, “the ensuing chaos forced 100 U.S. advisers off the air base from which they operated the drones that searched for al-Qaeda targets” and they “are likely to return in some form behind elements of the 150,000 Saudi troops on the Yemen border awaiting orders from King Salman, photographed in his war room surrounded by generals in chocolate chip desert fatigues”. The same source says: “The uniforms, patterned after American combat fatigues, say a lot: First, about where the U.S. is in this fight. ‘We are establishing a Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support,’ the White House said in a statement. The other use of uniforms? Making clear, for a change, who’s actually fighting.”²³ But beside this no supplementary aid is known to be provided by the United States, probably due to the negotiations that started last year to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.

The military operations launched by the Saudis and some of their allies against the Houthis are, so far, quite successful. According to open sources “by sunrise, several senior Houthi leaders were already targeted and eliminated as the Royal Saudi Air Force took complete control of the Yemeni airspace”²⁴ and the military actions will go on “as long as needed to protect the Yemeni government”.²⁵

Meanwhile Russia and Iran have a different position: “Speaking to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Russia’s Vladimir Putin called for an ‘immediate cessation of military activities’ in Yemen and increased efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, the Kremlin

¹⁹Faisal J. ABBAS, *Why 'Operation: Decisive Storm' Was Needed in Yemen*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address http://www.huffingtonpost.com/faisal-abbas/why-operation-decisive-st_b_6952894.html

²⁰*'Decisive Storm' targets Houthi camps in Sanaa*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/03/27/-Decisive-Storm-targets-Houthi-camps-in-Sanaa-.html>

²¹Jim MICHAELS, *Yemen fighting grows into regional conflict*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/26/tikrity-shiite-iran-saudi-arabia-yemen/70505808/>

²²Dan LAMOTHE, *How U.S. weapons will play a huge role in Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/03/26/how-u-s-weapons-will-play-a-large-role-in-saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen/>

²³Karl VICK, *Why the U.S. Is Fighting Beside Iran in Iraq and Against It in Yemen*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://time.com/3759875/iran-fighting-yemen-iraq-us/>

²⁴Faisal J. ABBAS, *Why 'Operation: Decisive Storm' Was Needed in Yemen*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address http://www.huffingtonpost.com/faisal-abbas/why-operation-decisive-st_b_6952894.html

²⁵Edward YERANIAN, *Egyptian, Saudi Vessels Approach Yemen Coast*, accessed at March 27, 2015 at the Internet address <http://www.voanews.com/content/saudi-led-airstrikes-continue-for-second-day-in-yemen/2696496.html>

said in a statement on Thursday.”²⁶ Speaking about Russia’s interests in the region, we are also relying on open sources reporting that “an escalating conflict in Yemen could bode badly for global oil supplies, as oil prices spiked more than four percent on Thursday.”²⁷ The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying, said on March 26, that “the Chinese side has noticed that (Saudi Arabia has launched airstrikes against Yemen) and is deeply worried about the situation in Yemen that is getting worse,” hoping that the situation will be resolved “through political dialogues”.²⁸

Conclusions

Extracting and exporting a lot of oil, with a GDP and a budget based on oil price, and strongly worried by more than 40% drop in oil prices over the past year, Russia might evaluate the situation in Yemen as being an interesting window of opportunity: Any conflict near the vital maritime trade routes the oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf operate might be exactly what Moscow needs to solve – at least partially – its increasingly difficult financial problems. If our evaluation is accurate, Moscow might be really interested in maintaining an open conflict in the area.

From an economic point of view, we may read the recent events in the light of competition over the European oil-markets. This would benefit not only the Russia’s struggling economy but also the U.S. energy sector. Although the U.S. and European consumers might be affected in a negative way by the rising costs on short term. Another indicator of the geopolitical uncertainty and accordingly the economic uncertainty is the Gold’s rise.

Being a geopolitical pivot in the region, due to its geographic position and due to the elements described in the paper, the future evolutions in Yemen are very important not only at regional, but also at global level of the international relations. And we think that it’s very improbable that the intervention in Yemen will stop until the situation isn’t at least partially solved, but much depends upon the intervention [officially recognized or not] of the other great extra-regional powers in the conflict.

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DIASPORA AND MODERN SECURITY

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Abstract: *The new power relationships of the 21st century are marked by major changes on a regional level, the globalisation process which had the effect of including increased by the number of emigrants and immigrants, thus leading to the occurrence of societal changes.*

In the context of globalisation, it becomes more likely that those communities of people with a common origin will turn into minorities in the countries they have settled in, minorities which may become true diasporas which tend to become a visible actor within the regional and global security environment.

The newly created diasporas will, undoubtedly, bring about major changes on the people involved, influencing both the societies these people wish to fit in and the societies they come from.

Given that countries are seen more and more as instruments in the citizen's service and the individual rights of each person are mirrored in the emergence of the citizen's sovereignty, the protection of these rights represents the essence of modern security.

Keywords: *minorities, diaspora, multiculturalism, modern security, globalisation.*

Introduction

The beginning of the 21st century was and still is characterised by an acceleration of the globalisation and regional integration processes, concomitantly with the persistence and escalation of certain ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts, ending up in state fragmentation.

There is a more and more stringent need to restructure the architectures and policies of security as current threats to security acquire new valences and forms of manifestation which are no longer as stable and predictable as in the times of the Cold War.

At present, we notice a strengthening of the anarchic and destabilising tendencies in some regions, a new dynamics of the international relations, in parallel with the multiplication of forms and increase of the importance of the intervention of some non-state actors in the evolution of these relations.

In Europe, the security environment has been strongly influenced by some country border changes, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall (which led to the peaceful reunification of Germany in 1990), the division of Czechoslovakia in 1992 in two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (according to the two nations which formed the former republic established in 1918), the dissolution of USSR in 1991 (each of the 15 component republics splitting along ethnic criteria and, subsequently, proclaiming their independence), and afterwards the division of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a conglomeration of six regional republics and two autonomous provinces which chose to separate along ethnic principles.

Due to these processes, in Europe new actors appeared, as well as countries in search of their identity, or ethnic groups in search of their own country or of their country of origin new, different and more demanding security principles. Thus, the political orientation of some countries was changed, countries which opted for the market economy, spheres of influences

were reconfigured, new vulnerabilities and new conflicts emerged, either active or frozen, bringing along new risks and threats for the European nations and peoples.

In the central and south-eastern part of Europe, the security environment has experienced over the most extensive changes from the last fifty years, its development being closely related to the evolutions from the transatlantic region, as well as from Asia.

At the same time with the reconfiguration of the new power relationships of the 21st century which are marked by major changes on a regional level, the concept of security has been more and more influenced by society changes, the concept of state security becoming obsolete and being replaced by the concept of security of the nation - people living in that state.

Given that in an Europe made up of 28 states there are 80 nations, which does not imply the creation of 80 mono-ethnic and mono-religious states, the transformations suffered by the security environment must be considered and analysed in the context of globalisation and multiculturalism, security having to take into account the security of each individual both in the state they live in, as well as in the state of origin.

In the context of globalisation, security can no longer be seen as merely the security of a certain territory and of the population within it, but must ensure areal, regional and global security, the countries being bound to accept the values of the multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic society, in opposition with the assertions of the nationalists who claim that democracy can only work in a culturally homogenous space.

1. Diaspora – conceptual clarifications and delineations

In the Explanatory Dictionary, diaspora is defined as¹ “*an ethnic group outside the borders of its country of origin*”. The word “diaspora” comes from the Greek “*dia speiro*” which means “*I scatter*”, and the concept had long been used for referring to the Greeks of the Hellenic world and to all the Jewish communities scattered after the destruction of the Jerusalem at the beginning of the 6th century BC and exiled by Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon.

The term appeared rather late in the social-political sciences, around the '50s - '60s, defining the members of an ethnic or religious group which come from the same place, but are scattered in different regions. Scientists began to use it with reference to the African diaspora, and then extended its meaning in the next years.

As we have said, the concept of diaspora was not used in the social sciences until the end of the 1960s, and its plural form came to be used even later. Without denying its Greek origins, the word “diaspora” makes reference first and foremost to the Jewish experience, especially to their expulsion (the Babylonian exile), as well as to the destruction of the Jerusalem and of the Temple. The term captured in it the scattering of the Jewish people and the loss of its existential territory. In spite of these, ever since ancient times, the concept was also used to denote the Greek colonisation of the borders of the Black and Mediterranean Seas in Crimea, Turkey, up to Gibraltar Straits, between the 7th and 4th century BC.

Both of these experiences represented stereotypes of the diaspora in the Western opinion, although we must take into consideration the other Oriental nations whose history and evolution was more or less marked by powerful migratory waves, ever since medieval times and continuing up to modern times. For instance, the long history of China was marked by the scattering of its people, most of the times seen as a positive or, at least, neutral aspect, or the case of India which, through people migration, extended its influence especially in the region of the Indian Ocean.

¹ DEX '98, Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic 1998, page 300.

On a global scale, from the 19th century on, the growth of the populations of unqualified workers migrating in other regions of the world to find work in the agricultural or industrial field, calls for our special attention and must be taken into account when defining the concept of diaspora.

The variety of causes and forms of expression led to the formulation of various typologies of the diaspora. According to some authors, causes formation the diasporas may be consequences of the imperial and colonial policies, of the development of trade and migratory phenomenon, of globalisation in general.

Other typologies of the diaspora include classifications in terms of the consequences of the historical, political factors, various manifestations of the traditional or historical diaspora (Jewish, Greek or Phoenician).

Most of the researchers accept that the diasporas were generated by the massive movements of people at the middle of the 19th century, however, the diasporas became visible and recognised barely in the 20th century.

The basic characteristic of the diaspora is the dispersion of its members from a common origin and history, but leaving a collective identity. Analysing the recently created diasporas, their relationship with some newly created national states is more and more emphasised, this origin leading to the definition of the so-called national-ethnic diasporas which distinguishes them from the transnational diasporas which appeared and evolved in the context of globalisation.

The word “trans-nationalism” was used for the first time in Romania by Randolph Silliman Bourne² in 1916 referring to that attitude of the migrants to preserve cultural connections with their countries of origin, thus infirming the previous hypotheses according to which the new migrants should be completely assimilated by their new country of residence.

Thus, the beginning of 1990 marks the moment when the concept of trans-nationalism becomes a popular concept under the name of diaspora, the researchers accepting the definition of the “bipolar” model which emphasises the way in which the migrants build transnational and social spaces which exceed borders and geographical, cultural and political delineations.

2. The international migration and the appearance of the diaspora

The contemporary concept of diaspora implies an understanding of the interchangeability relations between the host nation and those people who enter its vital space, both in terms of societal changes and in terms of personal changes.

Although the diaspora appears as a consequence of the migrations, not all the migrations led to the appearance of diasporas. Changes, political crises do not necessarily lead to the creation of diasporas; apart from changing their territory, the newcomers must meet some other essential requirements as well:

- the number of persons the same ethnic origin;
- the distribution of this population within a certain territory;
- developing a feeling of belonging to the mother country at the same time with reinforcing the connections with the host country.

The diaspora space is inhabited not only by the migrants and their descendents, but by the natives as well. In other words, the concept of diaspora space (unlike the concept of diaspora) includes a wider range of genealogies.

The hope in a new country, defined and delineated in a certain territory, is not always stable or consonant with the interests of the entire diaspora. A diaspora, irrespective of its

² Randolph Bourne *Transnational America*, available <http://www.aramsaroyan.com/html/monologues/Transnational%20America.pdf>, accessed March 15, 2015.

character, must not be regarded as a discrete entity, but rather as being formed by a series of contradictory convergences of the peoples, ideas and cultures which are manifested within the group of citizens which constituted the same ethnic group.

The population exchanges between the territory they settle in and the country of origin may also generate different attachments to the idea of nation, either through the feeling of attachment to the mother country, or by attempting to identify with the population of the host country, in a new configuration marked by nostalgias doubled by the unpredictable.

The newcomers see the territory they want to fit in as a challenge, trying most of the times to turn the new existential space into a new homeland. The analysis of these aspects leads to the appearance of some specificities of the transnational communities which transcend the diaspora because such communities cannot be derived exclusively from the co-ethnic and cultural identification forms which are the constituents of the diaspora, but rather actual ways of identification which involve social class, cultural level and even professional interest.

All these groups come to share the same goals and common values which are, however, taken into consideration when defining the diaspora.

While more and more dislocated people may be referred to as the diaspora (such as exiles, refugees, people at work, asylum applicants, etc.), the term migrant / migrants is also widely used for delineating diaspora communities.

Thus, the diaspora usually refers to different types and groups of migrants who left their country, but continue to share the same religious, ethnic, national and cultural identity of their home country.

The middle of the 80s and the 90s marked the extension of the diaspora worldwide and included a significant number of people in different parts of the globe, the central element being the preservation of the diaspora identity. Consequently, asylum applicants, refugees, exiles, forced migrants, immigrants, expatriates, people in search of an employment and ethnic communities of various types came to be described as one only diaspora.

Under these circumstances, the challenge is to take into account, when defining the diaspora, the political and historical complexities of the various types of diaspora, recognising at the same time that the idea of home country and the way in which it is seen by the social categories and communities which make up the diaspora represent important characteristics for delineating the concept.

3. Redefining security in the global society

Until the end of the Cold War, the concept of security concerned mainly the “political-military” matter, and the environmental, economic, social and “domestic” problems of the countries only came to the fore when the concept of security had a direct impact on the military or diplomatic aspect.

Barry Buzan, in his work *People, States, and Fear* of 1983 marks the beginnings of this rethinking of the concept of security, appreciating that security must be reduced to the “study of threats, use and control of the military forces”, the classical definition.

A rethinking of the concept of security it comes with the fall of the Soviet Union its security had been totally compromised not by the lack of military capacity – enormous at that time – but by the social and economic problems³ it was facing.

Thus, in the edition of 1991 the same work, he redefines the concept of “threat” and makes a connection between “threats” and “vulnerabilities”⁴.

³ Dan DUNGACIU - Learning aid - security organisations, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Bucharest, 2007, page 11.

Starting from these, redefining the object of security would be the main topic of the debates on security henceforward, which Barry Buzan names the “societal security”. This is an extremely important element in the current security equation, security practically referring to ensuring the security of the identity of the individuals as members of a social group. Societal security refers to identity, to the self-perception of the community and individuals who identify themselves as members of the community.

We may say so that the modern security refers to providing the security of the entire international system, the security of states and, implicitly, the security of the individuals of those states.

Ensuring the security of human societies means ensuring the security of individuals, both militarily and politically, as well as, probably even more important, ensuring the economic, societal and environmental security.

If *military security* refers to the offensive and defensive capabilities of the states, it is determined most of the times by the *political security* which concerns the organisational stability of the states, governing systems and ideologies which grants them legitimacy.

Economic security concerns the access to resources, markets and capital required for maintaining acceptable levels of welfare and state power. *Societal security* concerns the sustainability, in the context of acceptable development conditions, of the traditional language, culture and religion patterns, as well as of customs and national identity. *Environmental security* concerns the maintenance of the local and global biosphere as essential support which all the other human activities depend upon⁵.

These branches of security are deeply interconnected, being impossible to analyse them separately, ensuring modern security meaning ensuring the security of all of these branches.

The 90s mark the beginning of the analysis of security by including in its study some issues which had been overlooked so far: poverty, migration, human trafficking, environmental risks, economic or political threats, which are the components of modern security.

The new transformations of the security environment in the context of globalisation and multiculturalism, require modern security must be reported as the security of each individual in the state he lives and evolves in, as well as the security of the individuals and of the state they come from.

4. Modern security, EU security, international migration and the diasporas

The new modern security concepts comprise both securing the EU member states on the long run against potential future threats and defending the security of the states neighbouring the EU, states which are, most of the times, the states of origin of the newly created diasporas.

The instability within these states generates implicit risks for the European security, this is why the openness manifested by EU in all of its actions, the accessibility and transparency of its policies must ensure a security climate inside and outside the Union.

The security environment is continually changing in the neighbourhood of the European Union as well as within it due to the existence of some lengthy disputes being determined most often preserve the identity of the minority in a territory of the majority.

⁴ Dan DUNGACIU, “*Security, International Relations and Security Studies*”, in Journal of Political Science and International Relations, available <http://revista.ispri.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/5-15-Dan-Dungaciu.pdf>, accessed March 15, 2015.

⁵ Dan DUNGACIU - Learning aid - security organisations, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Bucharest, 2007, page 12.

The main instrument for promoting stability in the close vicinity of the EU is represented by the development of its neighbourhood policies, position which provides actual benefits and preferential relations with the neighbouring states.

At the same time with adopting the first European security strategy⁶, there was the need to establish a *European strategic concept* starting from the premise that “*The Union is a global actor*” and, consequently, “*it should be ready to undertake responsibilities in the area of global security*”, to that end the strategy defining the characteristics of the present security environment, the threats and challenges the security of the European space and citizens is faced with.

Precisely, the main threats identified by the Strategy are:

- *terrorism* - Europe is the target of such a threat;
- *the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* - the most serious potential risk incurred by the European security;
- *regional conflicts* – which affect regional security, first of all of the immediate vicinity – Middle East, North of Africa, Caucasus, Transnistria, but of far regions as well;
- *state instability* - poor government, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, lack of responsibility and civil conflicts erode state authority from the inside and lead to collapse;
- *organised crime* - Europe is one of the main targets of organised crime as an internal threat, but it has an external dimension as well - cross-border drug, human, weapons, trafficking, money laundering and illegal migration⁷.

As we can see, all these threats are closely linked to the migratory phenomenon, contributing to its growth, and sometimes becoming causes for the appearance of diasporas.

The migratory phenomenon also poses a threat to the security of states, the security of the states of origin, as well as the security of the states the migrants settle in.

Thus, *the terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state instability, organised crime*⁸ are often causes and determining factors of the international migration, being responsible, to a great extent, for the appearance of diasporas and will remain some of the greatest threats to the values and interests of the EU states.

Also that Western Europe witnesses an increase in economic crimes, money laundering, illegal weapons and radioactive wastes trafficking, corruption, immigration-related crimes (human trafficking, illegal entry, visa and passport fraud, illegal use of the labour force from poor countries - the immigrants’), as well crimes related to prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, threats which appear more and more prominent in the immigrants’ communities or diasporas, affecting, however, some of the social classes of the native population as well.

International organised crime has gained momentum over the last decade, partly due to internal reasons (special human, material and financial capital, improvement of its organisation and mode of action), but also due to the burst of globalisation and in consonance with international migration.

Concerning organised crime, the partnerships entered with some neighbouring countries and key-partners, as well as the UN partnerships, must be further deepened to approach the movement of people and to develop police and judicial cooperation.

⁶ Solana Strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, adopted by the European Council in December 2003, Source: Council of the European Union, Brussels, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, December 12, 2003, accessed March 15, 2015.

⁷ *Ibidem* page 32, accessed March 15, 2015.

⁸ *Ibidem* page 3-5, accessed March 15, 2015.

The current geopolitical developments reveal the need to consolidate the capacity of the UE partners from Southern Asia, Africa and the southern vicinity, the Union being bound to support the multilateral efforts of the UN especially.

Another pillar of the EU security is represented by *cybernetic security*, modern economies being totally dependent on the internet infrastructure, the attacks against private and government IT systems of the EU member states granting to it the dimension of a possible economic, political and military weapon.

Cybernetic security is tightly linked to the phenomenon of international migration, networks of illegal human trafficking, organised crime, involved in illegal migration, using the cybernetic space for perpetrating crimes and coordinating its activities through the virtual space which is more difficult to control.

In terms of *cybernetic security*, the problem of energy dependence has grown lately due to the EU - Russia crisis. The European decreasing production, as well as the reduction of its own resources makes the Union more and more dependent on external sources of energy, thus the required petrol and gas has to be imported. These may be supplied by a limited number of countries from the neighbouring areas, some of them being faced with threats to their internal stability, and being transit countries for international migration or countries of origin for the people who choose to settle in the European Union.

The answer of EU can only be marked by the adoption of an energy policy which manages to combine internal and external dimensions, based on a greater interconnection and granting a particular attention to ensuring the stability of these countries. Through arrangements with Central Asia, Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, which include reference countries for international migration on the European continent, the EU policy must contribute to the fulfilment of these goals.

Climate changes directly affect international migration, as they represent a new component in terms of security as of 2008, when climate changes were considered a factor capable of multiplying the threats to the security of states and individuals. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflicts, especially in cases of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, medical, political and security-related consequences, including an increased migration.

The climate changes will exacerbate the existing causes of instability and may lead to conflicts for commercial roads, maritime areas and inaccessible resources. Adjustment is vital. The integration of adjustment to climate changes within the cooperation for development will lead to ensuring the capability of vulnerable states to face the new pressures brought about by climate changes. Some case studies regarding the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia revealed that there are risks to development and security. We summarise the results of these studies hereinafter. In the future, studies should be carried out concerning regions such as the Afghanistan and its surroundings; Southern and Eastern Asia; the Arctic region; the Pacific area; the Caribbean; and Latin America.⁹

It is vital that EU promotes a security strategy based on a policy of partnership between the member states which must achieve the efficient management of migration, as a consolidation of its efforts to build a sustainable economic development and social progress, respecting the values of an open society and paying attention to the policies for the integration

⁹ The implications of the climate changes on security are described in the report submitted by the Political and Security Committee of the EU to the European Parliament in December 2008 - *Climate changes and the security: Recommendations of the High Representative, based on the report of the High Representative and of the Commission on climate changes and international security*, document no. 16994/1/08 from 12.12.2008, available http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede310308climatechange_/SEDE310308climatechange_ro.pdf, accessed March 21, 2015.

of the immigrants, as well as to the policies supporting the states the immigrants have come from.

Securing the European space of the member states does not only mean securing the EU borders, but the European citizen, on the one hand, and all the citizens inhabiting this space, on the other hand.

At the same time, it is necessary to adopt some bipolar European policies, one for the integration and observance of the identity rights of all the European citizens, and one for the stabilisation of the conflict areas, supporting the development of countries in the surrounding areas which aim at a neighbouring policy in the interest of each party.

These policies must lead to ensuring the security of the member states there where populations and ethnic groups manifest their existence and establish communities which have already created real diasporas.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the 21st century globalisation has contributed the appearance a diasporas and the number of people with dual citizenship has been growing exponentially.

In this context, many countries set up organisations, institutions, procedures and instruments for helping and valorising the experience of their own citizens who live abroad, apart from attracting in the country of origin the financial earnings of the migrants, as well as support projects, such as the establishment of associations in the host countries.

The countries of origin have quickly realised the advantages they may obtain through the social transfers made by the persons who return to their mother country: transfers of technology, information, knowledge, including through the transmission of democratic values.

The increase in the number of people who live in the diaspora gave rise to concerns in their countries of origin regarding their potential loyalization for attracting them to support national interests. Additionally, host countries have launched policies for supporting the diasporas and the organisations thereof citizens abroad.

In spite of these, we must take into consideration the fact that in some cases, the diasporas come from countries known for an extremist-terrorist potential, countries whose citizens have a limited right of movement, which renders cooperation impossible.

Also, one must not overlook xenophobia, the way in which migrants are accepted or not in the host countries, aspects which may turn into crises.

Furthermore, the diaspora has brought along the problems of the migrants who permanently have the tendency to identify themselves with the countries where they lived, worked and raised their children, the creation of the new homeland requiring the co-habitation with different persons and groups, with different identities and the combination thereof granting to migrants the feeling that they belong to both countries, both the country of origin and the host country.

We appreciate that all the aspects listed above must be taken into consideration when approaching the new security strategies on a national, regional, local and global level, the problem of diasporas being more and more prominent and, therefore, requiring the proper attention.

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SECURITY OF ROMANIANS FROM DIASPORA AND ABROAD - REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract: *The minorities represent a source of ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity, an element of surplus value, contributing in unique ways to the richness of representations, the multilingualism and tolerance of a society.*

In Europe, over the last twenty years, many steps have been taken for consolidating the rights of the national minorities and for strengthening protection and monitoring mechanisms and instruments.

At the same time, we notice the emphasis of some national, at times nationalist, consolidation processes, which favours a certain type of “protectionism”. The final target of such manifestations is often represented by the minority communities and the Romanians all over the world have to deal with various challenges in relation to the majorities of the host-countries. .

At present, the Romanian State must rethink its relationship with the Romanians abroad, being necessary to strengthen communication and partnerships both with the Romanian communities from the Romanian historical space and with the Romanian emigrants, the aim being to safeguard their security.

Keywords: *ethnic communities, diaspora, minorities, Romanians all over the world, security.*

Introduction

The issue of the protection of minorities is connected to the issue of respecting the fundamental human rights and liberties, being dealt with in various treaties, declarations, resolutions of the intergovernmental bodies (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe).

The minorities represent that identity part different from the identity of the majority which stands out through their own traditions, customs and manifestations¹. The minorities have rights and obligations, just like the majorities, they may use their language, they have the right to study in their mother tongue, they have the right to religious service. In Europe, over the last twenty years, many steps have been taken for consolidating the rights of the national minorities and for strengthening protection and monitoring mechanisms and instruments. At the same time, we notice the emphasis of some national, at times nationalist, consolidation processes which, through political-legislative mechanisms, favour a certain type of “protectionism”. The final target of these types of manifestations is often represented by the minority communities and the Romanians all over the world have to deal with various challenges in relation to the majorities of the host-countries.

¹ Values consecrated and recognised by documents such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, available on: http://www.irdo.ro/file.php?fisiere_id=73&inline=, respectively, the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages, available on: https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Brochure/Brochure_ro.pdf, accessed March 22, 2015.

For the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the European Union, the issue of national minorities represents a highly important benchmark. The European Union sets much value on the observance of the minorities' rights, a precondition for the accession to the European Union, according to the criteria established in Copenhagen². The political modernity of a state, social equity, equal opportunities or tolerance may be quantified accurately enough by evaluating the "national minorities" indicator. The observance of the national minorities' rights and the implementation or adoption of certain international recommendations in this respect represents an example of good practice.

Our paper is not an exhaustive approach of the issue of Romanian minorities and communities all over the world; it is limited exclusively to the European space and to the problems subsequent to the accession and European integration of all the countries in the region, in an attempt to create that historical European space and unified Europe with equal rights for all of its citizens, the desideratum of creating the European citizenship.

1. The international legal framework regarding the minorities' rights

The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in the Conference of San Francisco in 1945, proclaims the goal of this organisation, namely the promotion and encouragement to respect the fundamental human rights and liberties within the society, irrespective of sex, language or religion, but does not make any reference to the issue of minorities.

In spite of this, there are several documents adopted by UN concerning the protection of human rights and the protection of the national minorities' rights, in particular, all being founded on the principle of non-discrimination: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960); The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); The International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (1966); The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992)³.

The adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992) represented the crowning of all the efforts of the UN to approach the problem of minorities⁴. Among the rights stipulated in this document, we find: the minorities' right to enjoy their own culture; to profess and practice their own religion; to use their own language; the right to effectively participate in cultural, social, religious, economic and public life; the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national level; the right to establish and maintain their own associations; the right to assemble.

The Council of Europe played an important part regarding national minorities by adopting treaties which recognise and ensure the protection of the minorities' rights. The European Convention of Human Rights or the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)⁵ is roughly similar to the International Covenant on Civil

² In June 1993, in the European Council from Copenhagen.

³ On the 28th of March 1947, the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was created within the Committee for Human Rights. Document available on <http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml>, accessed March 22, 2015.

⁴ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a preamble of 30 articles circumscribed to two categories of rights, without expressly referring to the minorities' rights. The two categories are: civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights.

⁵ Adopted in Rome in 1950 and ratified by Romania in 1994, *European Convention of Human Rights and Liberties*. The text of the Convention and of the protocols available on: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ROM.pdf, accessed March 22, 2015.

and Political rights (UN, 1966), indirectly protecting the persons belonging to national minorities. At the basis of this document lies the same principle of non-discrimination (chap. II, art. 81) and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (chap. III).

The Convention does not contain any express disposition concerning the situation of the national minorities' rights on the territory of the European states; however, it does make reference to the rights granted to each individual. These rights are relevant when it comes to the situation of the national minorities as well, the most important ones being the following: the right to non-discrimination (art. 14), the right to an interpreter in judicial proceedings (art. 5 and 2, art. 6 and 1, art. 6 and 3 lit. a and e), freedom of association (art. 11), the right to education (art. 2 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention) and electoral rights (art. 3 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention).

Recommendation no. 1201 (1993) of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – meant to become a Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights – reiterates in the first article some elements for defining national minorities: they live on the territory of a state and are its citizens; they maintain long-term, enduring and permanent connections with that state; they manifest distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; they are representative enough, even if they are less numerous than the rest of the population of a state or of a region of that state; they are motivated by preserving that which constituted their common identity, including their culture, customs, religion or language⁶.

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Language⁷ of 1992 represents a fundamental moment in dealing with the issue of minorities. Through the decision to promote languages and not linguistic minorities, it avoids the issue of granting autonomy, laying stress on the cultural dimension of linguistic diversity. The authors of the Charter avoided recognising a collective right of the minorities, taking into account only personal rights and relying on the linguistic difference in areas such as: education, justice, administration, mass-media, culture, economic and social life.

The Framework-Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)⁸, adopted in Strasbourg on the 1st of February 1995, came into force on the 8th of February 1998. The Convention represents, in fact, a series of general principles concerning the rights of the persons belonging to national minorities, including: non-discrimination, promoting equality, promoting the conditions required for preserving and developing culture, religion and traditions, freedom of association, expression, thought, freedom of conscience and of religion, use of the mother tongue in the public and private space, in speaking and in writing, as well as in relation with the authorities, education in the language of the minority, freedom to create educational establishments, involvement in the economic, cultural, social and public life, forbidding forced assimilation.

In the matter of minorities' rights, OSCE (CSCE) played an important part through the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting adopted on the 29th of June 1990⁹. The signatory states undertake to protect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Moreover, to fulfil a supervisory role, the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities was created in 1992, charged with identifying and solving ethnic tensions which might endanger peace, stability or friendship among the participating countries.

⁶ Document available on: <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta93/EREC1201.htm>, accessed March 22, 2015.

⁷ Document available on: <http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/>, accessed March 22, 2015.

⁸ The ratification law was published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 82 of 4 May 1995. The text of the Convention and of the explanatory report is available on: <http://www.edrc.ro/docs/docs/legis/ro008.pdf>, or http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/legislatie/internationala/Conventia_Cadru_pentru_Protectia_Minoritatilor_Nationale.pdf, accessed March 22, 2015.

⁹ Document available on: <http://www.osce.org/ro/hcnm/32189?download=true>, accessed March 22, 2015.

The European Union did not deal expressly with the problem of minorities' rights. The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, introduces the principle of non-discrimination in community law. Based on article 13, a series of directives was subsequently adopted, directly aimed at the protection of the persons belonging to national minorities. Among these norms, the most important are: Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment between persons, irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

Apart from the general principles of the common international law, the current international treaties assign to the states of citizenship the obligation to make sure that all the persons who are in their jurisdictions benefit from the fundamental human rights, including minority rights, and grant to the international community the role to supervise the obligations of the states of citizenship. Most of the supervision procedures are conventional, based on a treaty and on a supervisory committee or commission.

The monitoring mechanism of CCMN, created in 1998, combines the evaluations of experts from the Consultative Committee of Independent Experts with the political contribution of the Committee of Ministers¹⁰, the results being reflected in the Opinions of the Consultative Committee and Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers. The Charter of languages offers guarantees, such as a permanent monitoring system through the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In its turn, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (APCE) has a specialised committee, the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States, which elaborates periodical reports on the fulfilment of the commitments by states in the pre-accession phase.

2. The observance of the minorities' rights in the European space

If in the 18th - 19th centuries, nationalism could be seen as a factor of progress which favoured economic development and made possible the unification of territories and peoples which were separated and antagonised, the evolution of the society and of the national feelings had subsequently led to tensions and even wars.

The nationalism of the 19th century brought about national unification which was achieved in various manners, thus creating tensions (in France or in the United States the unification was founded on the values proclaimed by its citizens, while in Germany it was based on ethnic belonging, culture and language).

The so-called fight between the inclusive nationalism and the ethnic nationalism lasted for a century and broke the continent, the ethnic nationalism coming to the fore after World War I, but leading to the problem of nationalities in Europe.

Each ethnic group was granted its own state and new nations were created on the territory of the former empires, turning into an even bigger problem, that of the minorities.

Establishment of the European Union and the extension thereof, could not create, so far at least, that long-promised multicultural space, the observance of the minorities' rights and the promotion of ethnic and cultural diversity being still far from what it should be, in terms of the people's expectations.

Moreover, the economic crisis after 2007 – 2008 only managed to accentuate nationalism, as well as racism, xenophobia and protectionism.

¹⁰ Document available on: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/Table_en.asp, accessed March 21, 2015.

Although the minorities' rights have been consecrated in article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union ¹¹ which stipulates that “*The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities*” and that “*These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail*”, no common denominator has been found so far in this respect by the European states.

In spite of these, the internal policies of the Member States require certain changes for aligning themselves to the European desiderata, for being able to create that vital space of security “*Europe for citizens*” which means to promote European citizenship.

In conclusion, we can say that although the situation of minorities is intensely debated all over the European continent, the steps taken towards the observance of their rights are small and, most of the times, marked by the interests of the main Member States.

In terms of the European construction, the observance of these rights and the promotion of multiculturalism should not be neglected as they are an intrinsic condition of the development and existence of EU.

3. The problem of the diaspora and of the Romanians all over the world

The Romanian communities all over the world united in different stages and historical, political or economic contexts. However, all these communities are characterised by the belonging to the Romanian cultural identity.

The issue of the Romanians from the diaspora (or of the Romanians from all over the world)¹² – as they are called in Law 299/2007 amended by law 176/2013) is structured along 3 somewhat distinct pillars:

- historical communities (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, Kazakhstan);
- distant communities (USA, Canada, Asia Pacific and Latin America);
- newly-established communities (Western Europe and Central Europe).

If before 1989, in the context of the Cold War, the Romanian diaspora was trying to socially and multiculturally assert itself, but it was denied by the former regime, for a long period of time after 1990 the social image endured, the Romanian immigrants being perceived as lacking patriotism and civic spirit, who preferred to think only of themselves, without trying to build a democracy in a society fighting to free itself from the nightmare of communism.

The Romanian communities all over the world are faced with different problems and need solutions according to the specificity of each community. The existing challenges to the assertion of the Romanian identity may be managed, most of the times, by means of a good cooperation with the host state.

As respects the situation of the newly-created and distant communities of Romanians, generally, they do not have political or legislative problems with a negative impact on the entire community.

These communities have been created recently and were based on certain needs (mainly economic, like the case of Spain and Italy) and opportunities / possibilities (freedom of movement within EU, the possibility to relocate the individual and the workplace, the

¹¹ Document available on: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:020:ro:PDF>, accessed March 21, 2015.

¹² The title “Romanians from all over the world” was and still is contested by some of the Romanian ethnic communities (see <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/protest-al-aromanilor-la-parlament--urmare-a-adoptarii-unui-proiect-privind-romanii-de-pretutindeni-301358>, 22.03.2015), accessed March 21, 2015.

possibility to study in the West, the case of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, the Northern states). The Western communities experienced a first wave of settlement / relocation before 1989, generated by economic, social and especially political-ideological motivations (political emigration, exile, especially in France, Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, Portugal or Spain).

Successive waves of economic migration ensued, thus, in certain states and regions of Europe there are economic poles supported by the activity of Romanian workers and contractors. The high concentration of manpower and the permanent presence of the Romanians proliferate the community within the public space and the local and central mass media frequently deals with topics concerning the Romanians or Romania (Italy, Spain, Great Britain). The contact with the Romanians was quickly achieved by the majorities of the host - states, unlike the historical communities where adjustment and co-habitation occurred gradually.

Considering the above, Eurostat statistics show that the Romanians represent the main minority in three European states, Hungary, Italy and Spain (in the last two being already considered actual diasporas), ranking third after the Turks and the Russians in Austria, Bulgaria and Germany¹³.

The only significant aspects are derived from the fact that some of the communities have to manage image issue, to fight cultural stereotypes or are faced with a lack of information concerning the procedures of legal insertion within the host society (illegal employment, absence of identity documents).

Generally, Western or distant communities have not been faced with significant identity challenges. The Romanians managed to fit in these societies without encountering insurmountable difficulties and without being aggressively assimilated. A society open to multiculturalism, plurality of opinions and religious or linguistic tolerance is a favourable environment for the manifestation of a distinct, minority identity.

4. Romanians from the neighbouring regions and the right to identity

Speaking of the oldest communities of Romanians, situated in the Romanian historical space, respectively those territories which had belonged to the Romanian state (without debate the Republic of Moldova), transiently being included in it or which comprise waves of Romanians, who had settled there several hundreds of years before, the situation is different. The historical communities of Romanians are distinguished through the rather difficult, at times complicated relationships with the host-states concerning the state, the recognition and their representation in spite of the efforts and actions of the Romanian State.

Thus, in Ukraine, Serbia or Hungary, the Romanians participate to the political life of these countries, but, generally, on the lists of other political parties. This reality substantially reduces the representation power of the community and diminishes the potential of political cohesion around topics of interest for the community. Even more worrying is a clear series of tendencies to sponsor the appearance of concurrent speeches and other names for the communities of Romanians. This phenomenon of creation of new ethno-linguistic groups is extremely damaging and could concern the artificial reduction of the communities of Romanians, with multiple repercussions: the funds they should receive from the host-states, the erosion and loss of credibility of the Romanian associative environment, marginalising the Romanian identity, intimidating Romanians in order to declare themselves Romanians, affecting the potential for the development of the Romanian community.

¹³ <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5578320/KS-SF-11-001-EN.PDF/d5fa928a-ca87-490b-96a7-2051dcd53f57>, accessed March 21, 2015.

In Ukraine, the process of “moldavianising” the communities of Romanians, especially in Odessa region still goes on, along with the introduction of the terminology of “Moldavian language” with the afferent didactic materials.

We notice similar measures in Serbia. The largest part of the historical Romanian community on the Timoc Valley is placed under the name of “Vlach”, accrediting the idea that the Romanians from Timoc use the so-called “Vlach” speech. In Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, there have been signalled problems concerning the “băieși”, existing forums / authorities which promote the idea of the existence of “băiașă” language¹⁴, actions which could be considered acts of interference and identity-related aggression, causing significant prejudices to the communities of Romanians and to Romania as well.

Given these situations, the Romanian state and the concerned communities have the duty and obligation to internationalize and treat them, according to their competences, responsibilities and existing procedures, all the matters concerning languages, speeches, dialects and the use of languages should make the object of some serious, non-political researches, initiatives which should take place in the academic environment, in the international context, in a productive exchange of ideas.

The right to an opinion should not serve to legitimate historical untruths or artificial theses, born out of the desire to contest identities, ethnic or linguistic groups.

Another problem identified is the size of the community. Generally, the guide of good practices recommends us to work with the official statistics of a state, the most credible official instruments, the source and authority which reports the numbers concerning the structure of the population; however, there are some doubts as to the accuracy of some censuses, the unofficial estimations often revealing other realities.

The recorded situation is not entirely the same, existing differences between spaces, generated inclusively by the proportion or geographical distribution of the community. The analysis, far from being an exhaustive one, revealed however a series of common elements which question the nature of the legal and legitimate assertion space which the communities of Romanians should have benefitted from, in these regions, the Romanians being faced with serious identity challenges.

The status of a minority is a decisive, crucial element for its destiny and the legal regulation of this state of fact is the exclusive privilege of the state on the territory of which we find that minority. The consecration of a status must, however, take into consideration the international regulations concerning minorities, the actual recommendations made by the competent international organisations and the identification of some problems along bilateral channels. After all, the issue of minorities remains an important component of external policy, a relevant indicator concerning the dynamics of bilateral relations. Consequently, Romania must redefine its relationships with its neighbours taking into account the issue of the Romanian minority in these countries as well. An insufficient or inappropriate status inevitably creates problems. Thus, not recognising a national minority (the case of Romanians from Bulgaria) or registering it as ethno-linguistic minority (the Aromanians from Albania) automatically leads to the absence of funds directed to the states where these minorities live. In the absence of an actual support given by the host-state, the Romanian minority is, most of the times, unable to maintain a consistent cultural, media and spiritual presence.

¹⁴ Biljana Sikimić – *Băieșii în contextul sud-slav*, document available on: http://www.academia.edu/1112407/B%C4%83ie%C5%9Fi_%C3%AEn_contextul_sud_slav, accessed March 21, 2015.

5. The security of Romanians from all over the world - priority of the policies of the Romanian State

The importance attributed to the observance of human rights and, in particular, to the observance of the rights of the persons belonging to minorities and ethnic communities, is a part of the democratic “basic package” which the international and European institutions, as well as each state must undertake.

In the context of globalisation and multiculturalism, the notion of security in the modern world has changed over the last 20 years. The role of the state in ensuring security also changed. Concepts such as the global civil society and human security clearly blur the borders between internal and external and draw the attention to the security of individuals and communities in the context of globalisation.

An interpretation of globalisation is the fact that we have become aware of the existence of a singular community which contributed to the sense of the common consciousness which is reflected by an increase in the number of laws and norms on human rights¹⁵.

The current security policies changed after the end of the Cold War and moved on from threats to states and classical military capacities to a new take on security and development, the security of individuals and communities, combining human rights with human development.¹⁶

The Human Development Report of 1994 of the United Nations Development Programme identified seven central elements of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security and political security.

The supremacy of human rights is the one that distinguishes the human security approach from the traditional approaches based on the security of states, thus being necessary to overcome institutional and cultural obstacles.

In economic terms, the supremacy of human rights means development policies and the absence of an employment means personal insecurity.

Human security depends on the existence of legitimate institutions which gain people’s trust and enforce respect¹⁷.

The human security approach must be global and multilateral, the initiative of several states and in agreement with the decisions of the international organisations and multinational institutions (UN, NATO, OSCE, ECOWAS etc.), functioning according to strict rules, regulations and standards.

Human security must be founded on the existence of a legal framework. EU must act within the international law by creating a unique and coherent set of international laws, which must be enforced by the Member States as well.

The construction of the European security in an age of globalisation is another important element, as the Union means to strengthen its security through the integration of the candidate countries.

In spite of all the legislative efforts, the states and the minorities feel the need to increase the security of individuals and communities, the globalisation and enlargement of EU creating some lines of separation in Europe, which must be removed.

Although according to the *National Security Strategy*¹⁸, it “*answers to the need and obligation of legitimate protection against the risks and threats which endanger fundamental*

¹⁵ Mary KALDOR - *Securitatea umană - Reflecții asupra globalizării și intervenției*, page 187.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, page 214.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, page 220.

¹⁸ The National Security Strategy defines *national security* as “*the fundamental condition of the existence of the Romanian nation and state and a fundamental goal of governing; its area of reference is represented by the*

human rights and freedoms, vital national values and interests, the foundations of the existence of the Romanian state”, it does not clearly and unequivocally refer to the protection of the rights of the Romanian citizens abroad, although, in article 17 of the Romanian Constitution¹⁹ it is stipulated that “*Romanian citizens benefit abroad from the protection of the Romanian state and must fulfil their obligations, apart from those which are not compatible with their absence from the country*”.

From the analysis of the current legislative framework²⁰ it transpires that it must be updated, including regarding the “*National strategy concerning the relationship with the Romanians from all over the world 2013 – 2016*”²¹ which, although it declares as priority goals “*the preservation, affirmation and promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the Romanians all over the world in accordance with the applicable European and international standards and practices*”, “*the development of the connections of the Romanians from all over the world with Romania, by ensuring the proper environment for the assertion of the Romanian identity and spirituality specific to them*” delays the adoption of concrete measures for the fulfilment of these goals.

As a conclusion to the above, it is obvious that these strategies are not as up-to-date as the concerned issue, as they are not connected to the daily realities and they only deal roughly with the need of security of the Romanians all over the world, the need of involvement of the Romanian state in ensuring the security of its citizens and of the diaspora.

Practically, we cannot speak at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century of a national security without relating it to local, regional and global security, all of these being a whole and not being considered separately.

Therefore, the analysis of the current development on a regional, local and global level reveals the fact that the Romanians from all over the world feel the need to create a culture of security which concerns them directly and leads to a better consolidation of the relationships between Romania and the Romanians who live abroad.

Although the last 5 years have marked a rather faint change in the position of the Romanian state towards the Romanians from the diaspora, of the image the citizens who live in country have formed concerning those who left or who live in the neighbouring territories, the efforts of the institutions of the Romanian state are still far from what they should be in the next years.

All these steps must benefit from the support and contribution of the communities of Romanians from the diaspora and from the Romanian historical space, they must take into account the way in which these communities wish and understand to keep in touch with the Romanian state and raise awareness of the fact that their status of minority in a society of diversity and multiculturalism defines, characterises and represents them in terms of identity and ethnic belonging.

Conclusions

In the last years, the situation of the Romanian communities from the immediate neighbourhood degraded visibly, and in the Member States of the European Union, the Romanians who migrated after 1990 (out of social, educational or economic considerations)

national values, interests and objectives. National security is an imprescriptible right which derives from the complete sovereignty of the people, it is founded on constitutional order and is achieved in the context of the European construction, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and global development”, document available on: <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>, accessed March 22, 2015.

¹⁹ Document available on: <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339>, accessed March 22, 2015.

²⁰ Law 299/2007 the support of Romanians everywhere.

²¹ Document available on: <http://www.dprp.gov.ro/legislatie/proiecte-acte-normative/>, accessed March 22, 2015.

are still faced with problems of ethnic discrimination, non-observance of human rights, therefore, it is necessary to adopt some security strategies which take into account both the migratory phenomenon from the last years, the effects of the accession of Romania to EU and the right to freedom of movement, as well as historical and ethnic elements which characterise the South-East European space.

Official statistics show that only in the states of the European Union there are over 3.5 million Romanian citizens, and worldwide over 8 millions persons, therefore, creating and promoting a security strategy is more than necessary.

The problem of the Romanians living abroad should be treated conceptually, globally and unitarily and, according to the problems identified within each community and space, the strategy for the protection of their rights and identity should be adapted to international norms, to the laws of the host-state and approached as a distinct subject within the bilateral relations existing between Romania and the respective state.

The achievement of the security of all the Romanian ethnics, wherever they are, presupposes a complex, multidisciplinary and multi-institutional activity. The security of the Romanians from all over the world and from the diaspora is only little discussed, the new security doctrines and strategies having to adapt to the risks, vulnerabilities and threats to their security in the regional, local and global context.

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REGULATING INITIATIVES FOR THE STATUTE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

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Abstract: *The transition from by-polarity to multi-polarity, combined with the decrease of the size and budgets of the national armies and the recrudescence of the intrastate conflicts have boosted the emergence of a new actor of the security environment, which undermines the Westphalia paradigm of the national states’ violence monopoly holding. Thus, the private military companies (PMC) are privately-owned economic entities, which integrate functions traditionally owned by the armies. The challenge resides in that these companies operate within a generic and non-specific legal framework, which can lead to the extant international humanitarian law breakings. This paper briefly analyzes the main initiatives of regulating PMC activity, aiming to draw conclusions that could further help to integrate these entities into the current international humanitarian law framework.*

Keywords: *PMC, international humanitarian law, Montreux, ICoC*

Introduction

The emergence of the private military companies on the security services market does not represent a new phenomenon, but an old one, with historical roots. The development of these entities was, however, accelerated by the acute need of military services, due to the reducing budgets and size of the national armies, on one hand, and the recrudescence of the intrastate conflicts after 1990, on the other hand. The fast pace of the killing technology advances, as well as the standardization of the military know-how, have also made the marketing of this expertise possible, just like any other commodity.

These changes, in addition to the intrinsic determinations in the military field, generate new aspects of the security dilemma. The Westphalia pattern of the security has, at its base, the premise that the national state is the only holder of the organized violence monopoly. The international security organizations are no more than an extension of this principle, since the member states maintain through the voting mechanisms the right to apply coercion. In applying the violence, the national states or their will extension, the international security organizations, are constrained by a series of provisions of the law of war and the international humanitarian law (IHL). These standing legal provisions are part of the current security paradigm. The PMCs are, on the other hand, economic entities, which follows the economic laws of supply and demand and of the pursuit of profit and are yet to have a clear position on stage of the security environment. Thus, a situation has been created, in which an economic actor, through its undertakings within the military field, generates consequences in the security domain, ignoring (at least, in theory) the current extant provisions of warring wars.

This paper treats the PMCs statute matter from their conformity with the legal framework point of view, as well as the existing regulating initiatives of these entities. Part of the problem, namely that of the existing international legal framework, has been treated in a previous paper, so it will be approached here only for its conclusions.

The fundamental question underlying this article is if PMC operations are regulated at international level. It is obvious that, from the very beginning, the question is limitative, in

that it is questioning only global rules, ignoring the national arrangements. Therefore, the conclusions of this article will be somehow limited. However, the international legal framework can provide a good starting point in obtaining a response to the fundamental question.

The paper structure will firstly include the provisions of the international law relating to mercenaries, this being the closest category to the PMC concept. Another chapter will address the regulatory initiatives of regional security organizations, while the third chapter will deal with the problem from the point of view of the security industry. These three chapters will provide partial conclusions, which will enable conclusions to be drawn with a higher degree of generality in the last part of the article.

International law provisions

From the outset, it should be noted that the term "private military companies" is not to be found in any of the texts of the international law in force. This reflects not just the novelty of the phenomenon, but also the difficulty of the concept legal framing and the fact that it equally belongs to the realm of security and economic domain. Therefore, we will consider the closest similar, mercenaries, in order to see to what extent it applies to these companies.

Indeed, both mercenaries and private military companies have the same activity: sale of a set of military skills to entities wishing to use these skills and able to pay for them. The mercenaries are an old concept on the stage of history and have established a lucrative industry "as old and war itself"¹. Anyway, after the XIVth century, the mercenarism has declined, with two main exceptions (Dutch East India and East India Companies, which have striking resemblances with the current PMCs), knowing a resurgence at the beginning of the XXth century, against the backdrop of decolonization and peoples self-determination movements of Africa. The mid of the XX century also marks the emergence of global legislation relating to mercenaries and mercenarism. The Protocol Additional I of the Geneva Convention of 1949, adopted in June 8, 1977, stipulates, at its art. 47th, the cumulative conditions that a person should meet to qualify as a mercenary. Thus, mercenary is any person:

- a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
- c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
- d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
- e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
- f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces².

A few observations can be made on the text of Protocol I, with reference to the assimilation of the PMC with mercenaries. Firstly, the conditions laid down in article 47 and the need for them to be cumulative make it difficult, if not impossible, to fit the PMC within the mercenary definition. This thing has been previously noticed by Geoffrey Best, who wrote

¹ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Cornell University Press, 2003, page 4-5

² Protocol Additional I of the Geneva Convention of 1949, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9EDC5096D2C036E9C12563CD0051DC30>, accessed on 18.03.2015

that any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot - and his lawyer with him³.”

Secondly, the mercenary’s definition resulting from the I Protocol is appropriate to individual mercenaries, acting as individuals, determined by the desire for private gain. Private military companies operate out of the same desire, but in the name or at the request of an entity with legal personality, usually a State. More than that, some states regulate the PMCs statute, integrating into the regular forces (American private contractors, under contract with U.S.A. Department of Defense), thereby invalidating the e. and/or f. point of the article 47 of the Protocol I.

Thirdly, given the shortcomings of the Protocol I, any subsequent legal norm which is based on this Protocol, will perpetuate these shortcomings. This is the case of the O.A.U. (Organization for African Unity) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, signed in Libreville on 3 July 1977 and entered into force in 1985, whose article 1⁴ is almost identical with the article 47 of the Protocol I. Two are the main differences that O.A.U. Convention introduces: first one, the size of the private gain (“in excess”) is no longer a condition to define the mercenary. The second one, the mercenarism is also judged, as a “crime against peace and security in Africa”. The use of mercenaries against national liberation movements and independence was, however, sentenced by the U.N. in the text of the resolution 2465 of 20 December 1968⁵, namely the Declaration of independence to the colonial countries and peoples.

It is also the case of the U.N International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, whose art. 1⁶ includes two sets of conditions to be considered mercenary. It is obvious the pattern of the Protocol I of the Geneva Convention; however, the field is extended through the recruiting for the purpose of participating in an concerted act of violence which is not necessarily an international armed conflict. Thus, persons participating to governments overthrowing territorial integrity undermining are also labeled as mercenaries.

Some preliminary conclusions can be deduced from the analysis of the texts of international law. First, all the provisions of the international norms refer to mercenaries, as individuals fighting for profit. The current military companies do not fit this model; the existing provisions do not therefore apply to them. Secondly, these international treaties are not ratified by all actors in the field of private security, in some cases even by the most important ones (for example, the U.N. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries has been ratified by a total of 33 States and signed by 10 States, with two exceptions, the United States and United Kingdom, States providing a significant number of PMCs).

³ Best, Geoffrey - *Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflict*, Littlehampton Book Services Ltd, 1980, p. 328

⁴ Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=0C24F4AAE67230CAC12563CD002D6D42&action=openDocument>, accessed on 18.03.2015

⁵ Declaration of independence to the colonial countries and peoples, la <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/244/25/IMG/NR024425.pdf?OpenElement>, accesat la 18.03.2015

⁶ International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=8E7340DFAA839EEDC12563CD0051F3EB>, accessed on 18.03.2015

Regional organizations initiatives

Impetuous development of the PMC also generated appropriate attitudes among regional organizations, who have tried to introduce into their legislation provisions to regulate the activity of these companies.

The African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are two intergovernmental organizations firmly committed to the path of security sector reform. The AU is the successor of the O.A.U., which has, as previously seen, created the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. The AU has a vested interest in regulating PMC, since its member states are, concomitantly, both consumers and providers of private security services. However, the Convention is the only regional regulatory tool; more tools can be found at the national level, among them, the legislative framework created by the South Africa seeming to be the most trenchant.

The Organization of American States is another regional organization, whose member states are also both consumers and providers of private security. As consumers, the main side of the activity consists of private security firms, nationally employed, which counts more than four millions employees, according to some estimates⁷. As providers, the Latin America's countries send employees for PMCs, usually for national companies, intermediating their hiring by foreign companies, especially the American ones. It is the case of Chile and Uruguay, significant providers for the Iraqi theater of war⁸. However, O.A.S. still lacks a coherent legislative framework to govern the activities of PMCs. The national regulations are not coherent and harmonized, so it could be assessed that there is no clear legal framework at regional level.

European Union (EU) does not also have a coherent pack of laws for the PMCs' regulation. Nonetheless, various European institutions have developed regulating policies which, even though they do not provide a full framework, give principles and guidance to follow. Thus, the EUROPEAN Defense Agency (EDA) has undertaken a first step, defining and classifying the operating environment for contractors⁹. Later, in 2011, in the European Parliament resolution text on the European Security and Defense Policy, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty¹⁰, two new provisions appear, in regard to the activity of PMCs. The first one, at internal level, asks the Commission to issue a Directive for harmonizing the member states national regulation on PMCs. The second one, at external level, asks for drafting a Code of Conduct which should further conduct to the issuing of a Directive regulating the export of PMCs services to third states, in those fields not covered by the above mentioned Directive. Also, at its 66th article, the Resolution tasks the High Representative of EU for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) with providing the European Parliament with detailed information regarding the employment of PMCs in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and Common

⁷ Dammert, Lucia - Private Security: An Answer To Public Security Needs In Urban Centers?, document prepared for the Public Security Department of the O.A.S., at <https://www.oas.org/dsp/documentos/Publicaciones/PUBLIC%20SECURITY-%20URBAN%20CENTERS.pdf>, accessed on 19.03.215

⁸ Mike Hager - Chile's Iraq Mercenaries under Investigation by U.N. Group, in *The Santiago Times*, June 9 2007, at <http://www.worldpress.org/americas/2853.cfm#down>, accessed on 19.03.2015

⁹ Definition of Operating Environments, [http://cso.eda.europa.eu/TPLS%20Documents/\(3\)%20Definition%20of%20Operating%20Environments.pdf](http://cso.eda.europa.eu/TPLS%20Documents/(3)%20Definition%20of%20Operating%20Environments.pdf), accessed on 19.03.2015

¹⁰ European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, art. 54 și 66, at http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/regulations/regional/european_union_parliament_resolution_policy_lisbon_treaty_2011.pdf, accessed on 19.03.2015

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) missions. The HR/VP should specify the professional requirements and the corporatist standards necessary to be fulfilled by contractors, the regulations and legal responsibilities applicable, the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as well as incumbent costs.

Further, on 27 February 2012, among the priorities of the Council of the EU at the UN Council of human rights, we find the initiative of HR/VP to express EU support for the Montreux document regarding to „pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict^{11.}”.

Same year, on 25 June, the European Council issues EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, which reiterates, at 21st¹² measure, the support given to the Montreux document. This paper (Montreux document) is a good practices collection, jointly initiated by the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the aim of providing guidance for the PMCs, within the international law framework. We will come on this initiative in the next chapter, since it represents a major undertaking of some actors which are not included in the above mentioned categories (internationals, regionals).

Therefore, it could be concluded that, though interested in regulating this field, the EU made shy steps on the matter, its legal initiatives being rather declarative or in support of others enterprises.

Another regional organization partially legalizing PMCs statute is the Commonwealth of Independent States. This organization has promoted a law counteracting the mercenarism, including the ideological and religious motivated mercenarism. This law considers also the required assistance that the different agencies of the member states should grant and try to offer an explanation of the phenomenon roots through socio-economic condition and population hardship, but do not include the appropriate effective mechanisms to counteract the mercenarism. Also, there is no single provision on the PMCs.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the regional initiatives regulating the PMCs activity either fall into the same trap as international security organizations do, assimilating the PMCs profile with mercenarism, or recognize the extant differences, but limit themselves to general support declarations of the international law. Fortunately, these are not the only actors in the field. Governs, non-governmental organization (NGO) and representatives of the security industry have a vested interest in regulation the domain. Their initiatives make the object of the next chapter.

Global stakeholders' initiatives

It is more than obvious that the vertiginous expansion of the PMC number leads to an increasing need of regulating the field. Therefore, the third source of regulating is the security industry itself, which started to draw provisions to ensure a fair and legal competition. Thus, in 2008, at the initiative of the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 states signed the „Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security

¹¹ Council conclusions on EU priorities at the UN Human Rights Council, February 27 2012, at http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/regulations/regional/european_union_council_conclusions_eu_priorities_hrc_2012.pdf, accessed on 19.03.2015

¹² EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, p. 21, at http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/regulations/regional/european_union_strategic_framework_action_plan_hu_man_rights_2012.pdf, accessed on 19.03.2015

companies during armed conflict". It took two years to draw this document¹³, its purpose being to ensure that the activities of the PMC comply with international humanitarian law and human rights. The document itself is not a legal provision, but rather a collection of legal interpretations of the already existing legal framework, as well as a pack of good practices, whose compliance would allow the fair and uniform evaluation of the PMCs activities. It is included within the introductory part that the document is not legal binding and that it does not legitimize the use of PMC in any particular instance.

Its body consists of a preface and two parts. The preface defines the working concepts of the document, what private military and security companies (PMSC) are, as well as their personnel. Also, the states are classified into Contracting States (that is, the states contracting the services of PMSC), Territorial States (defined as the states on whose territory a PMSC operates) and Home States (States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered or incorporated)

The first part comprises a collection of international legal obligations, differentiated according to the category of States, as defined in the preface. It is one more time stipulated that the document itself is not legal binding and that the responsibility totally lay with the national states, the companies and their personnel.

The second part endorses 70 provisions (good practices), offering assistance and guidance to the states, in order to legally frame the companies. Again, these provisions are not legal norms and do not totally cover the full spectrum of the situations that may arise for a state or a PMSC. Anyway, part of these recommendations constructively addresses past particular situations: it is, thus, recommended to the states to consider the historic past of any company from the international humanitarian law point of view or their economic viability, the company's personnel training level or equipment, the international humanitarian law and human rights policies implementation or labor governing laws conformity.

Five years from the issuing of the Document, the Swiss Government, in close cooperation with the ICRC and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), hosted, on 11-13 December 2013, the *Montreux +5 Conference*, with the aim of analyzing the progress made in PMSC regulating. Following this event, it has become clear that the document has gained followers. Thus, from the 17 participating states in 2008 (EU has also joined the initiative then), in 2013, 49 states and two major international organizations (namely NATO and OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) declared their support for the document provisions. The document has enabled the identification of the States concerned by the shortcomings in the national legislation and prompted a second regulatory initiative of the industry, the international code of conduct for Private Security Providers (International Code of Conduct, the ICoC). The final report of the Conference¹⁴ showed that progresses made in terms of regulation exist, but are insufficient. It must be said that the report is not exhaustive, it analyses mainly the two home States (United States and United Kingdom, as the world's largest exporters of private security) and two States on whose territory the PMSCs work: Afghanistan and Iraq.

As a result of Montreux, the Swiss Government has launched a series of workshops on the topic of PMC regulation. Based on the findings of these workshops, the Swiss Government, along with its partners, the Academy of International Humanitarian Law and

¹³ Letter dated 2 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, at https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/topics/Montreux-document-4_en.pdf, accessed on 21.03.2015

¹⁴ Montreux Five Years On: An analysis of State efforts to implement Montreux Document legal obligations and good practices, la <http://ihrib.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv31.pdf>, accessed on 21.03.2015

Human Rights (ADH) in Geneva and DCAF, began the development of an International Code of conduct (ICoC).

The first draft was drawn up in January 2010, followed by a series of other workshops, intended to review and adjust some elements of the code, so that on 9 November 2010, the final version¹⁵ has been signed by 58 companies. The code is essentially a large development of Montreux document. Just like that, it does not introduce new international legal rules but sets up the framework for the application of the existing rules of the security industry. From this point of view, the code is a positive initiative, since it sets out clearly the relationship between PMSCs and States, thus establishing the supremacy of States against the companies.

At the same time, at the Code signing ceremony, it has been established the appointment of an Organization Committee, responsible for the initiation and implementation of an independent external mechanism of governance and oversight. In order to create this mechanism, the Organizing Committee (Temporary Steering Committee, TSC) held a series of meetings, which finally led to the establishment of the ICoC (ICoCA) Association in February 2013. The aim of the Association is to promote, conduct and oversee the implementation of the code (ICoC) and to responsibly promote the provision of the security services, with due regard for human rights and national and international laws, as well as the provisions of the code.

The mandate of the Association is divided into three strands: first, the certification of the member companies and evaluating them in terms of the Code. The second direction includes monitoring of compliance with the code, and the third direction of action provides for managing complaints regarding violations of the code, including notices concerning the inappropriateness of such complaints management by member companies¹⁶. The main bodies of the Association are the General Assembly, the Board of Directors (with the role of decision and execution) and a Secretariat, which operates under the direction of an executive director. Association members are grouped by three pillars, private security companies, civil society organizations and the national States, being proportionately represented into the Council. Currently, members of the Association are organized on pillars as follows: 6 States (USA, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Australia), 708 PMSC and a number of civil society organizations, on the American continent and in Africa, with one exception, an organization in the United Kingdom.

The initiative does not stop here, because in the section 7 a. of the code it was established a period of time of 18 months for “the establishment of objectives and measurable standards for PMSC based on the code, aimed at the achievement of common and internationally recognized operational and performance standards in affairs¹⁷”. As a result, the U.S. Department of Defense pledged ASIS International¹⁸, an organization that aims to increase the efficiency and productivity of its members, professionals in the field of security, to develop these standards, in accordance with the provisions of the code. ASIS has developed these standards using the procedures of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), these procedures being considered optimal for further proliferation. Thus, they have designed 4 standards, ANSI/ASIS PSC. 1 & 2-2012 and the ANSI/ASIS PSC. 3 & 4-2013, to standardize the entire spectrum of PMSC activities, from operating in the territory, to the complex auditing of the companies. A fifth standard, ISO/PAS 28007: 2012 has been

¹⁵ International Code of Conduct, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf, accessed on 21.03.2015.

¹⁶ <http://www.icoca.ch/en/mandate>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

¹⁷ *Supra* note 17

¹⁸ <https://www.asisonline.org/Pages/default.aspx>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

developed by the International Organization of Standards (ISO), which refers to maritime security and is not based on the principles of the ICoC. It is estimated that this standard, which is now in force, will be replaced, perhaps by the fourth ASIS standard.

It is obvious that there are still regulatory initiatives of the field, but they were the ones who produced the greatest effects. In short, The Montreux and ICoCA are professional approaches of security industry. One thing can be observed, that in both cases are listed as major contributors to the Swiss Government, the U.S. and the U.K. (the last two members hold, estimate, over 70% of the relevant industry in the world). Similarly, we can find that both initiatives does not alter the current structure of the security environment, the Westphalia paradigm remained unaltered thereafter.

Conclusions

Thus, regulatory initiatives of the PMC activities come from three main directions: international humanitarian law and human rights, regulating sources of regional organizations and global stakeholders' sources.

It has been concluded that the international humanitarian law and human rights do not properly fall the phenomenon of private military companies, because they start from the premise that this is similar to mercenaries. While these PMCs can have some similarities with it, they essentially differ, in that they operate in a different security environment. In addition, in today's environment, PMC can very easily escape the charge of being mercenary.

The regional organizations take the same approach and fall into the same trap, the similarity with mercenaries. Moreover, their mechanisms of surveillance and coercion are quite limited, so their effectiveness in regulating the field is reduced.

The most comprehensive approach seems therefore that of the state-industry-civil society organizations partnership. These succeeded to define a detailed code of conduct, brought together a large number of representatives of the security industry (even if the continental distribution is relatively heterogeneous) and defined security standards for PMCs. Although there are no enforcement mechanisms (in our opinion the lack of them is normal, because their existence would break the Westphalia paradigm of the monopoly of violence) and the consensus is the basis of the Association (ICoCA), we believe that this is the most comprehensive and efficient approach.

The shortcoming of this approach, that of constraint mechanism, could easily be overcome, through acquisition, adjustment if necessary and the legalization, by the international security organizations, of the ICoC provisions. In fact, this is not a new idea; it has been expressed by Todd S. Milliard¹⁹, which has drafted a proposal for an "International Convention for the prevention of illegal transfer of military service to foreign armed forces". Also, the open Intergovernmental Working Group of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations has come to the same conclusion, the need for regulation by the United Nations of the PMSC operating legal framework, even proposing the text of a resolution²⁰ (International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the activities of Private Military and Security Companies). We consider of paramount importance the

¹⁹ Milliard, Todd S. - Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: a Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, in *Military Law Review*, Volume 176, June 2003.

²⁰ Documents of the Second session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies, at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGMilitary/Pages/OEIWG_MilitarySession2.aspx, accessed on 22.03.2015

regulation of the PMCs statute under the current system of international relations, if it is to preserve the national State in the center of gravity of the existing security mechanism.

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HYBRID WARFARE, LAWFARE, INFORMATIONAL WAR. THE WARS OF THE FUTURE

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Abstract: *The 21-st century came with challenges to the very nature of the international relations and with huge threats to the security. And it came with new forms of conflict presented to us by entities and states using new types of wars. The 4GW, fourth generation war, is the general approach to the new types of conflicts characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians. Carl von Clausewitz spoke about the war as a continuation of the politics with different means¹, 4GW makes a concrete passage to this reality, with the fusion between the two principles, politics and war.*

In this context we witnessed the emergence of the hybrid war – a combination of conventional, irregular, economic, energy, cyber war, plus informational, identity and proxy war, combined, in a very tricky and unstable form, with a limited and, at the same time, unrestricted war, in the sense of deployment of capacities of all kind, without rules: criminal capabilities with economic, informational ones, propaganda and irregular proxy war, insurrection, insurgency and terrorism in the same theatre where, according to the Machiavelli's realistic approach, tous les coups sont bons!

The hybrid war also raised questions about the rules of engagement, about the laws on the war and rights of combatants in the field. Sure, those are not updated to the new form of the war, on the contrary, the use of non-registered and non assumed soldiers and the invention of the “little green men” introduced the instruments necessary to use the gaps of the international legislation, a position that also helps avoiding responsibility. This is the new type of war, the legal warfare or lawfare, speculating the international legislation in order to take advantage of your capabilities and dominant position for national advantages.

Last but not least, a component of a hybrid war is the informational war, creating alternative false realities and spreading them by using the free speech and the free communication of ideas. It is about perverting the reality and truth, twisting it by using a combination of facts, syllogisms, sophisms, propaganda, interpretation and a lot of lies. All of this is used for creating an alternative reality that leads a targeted population to a pre-designed model or way of seeing things, in a combination that uses at the same time psyops, misinformation and propaganda.

The present article represents overview, a first charted analysis on the evolution of 21-st century conflicts, and our original contribution to the debate of the modern warfare, the evolution of those concepts and, especially, the way that those concepts are applied in practice, on the ground, in real combat.

Keywords: *hybrid war, lawfare, limited war, unrestricted war, informational war.*

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Antet Publishing House, 2007.

1. Fourth Generation War - 4GW

At the end of the Cold War, William Lind² came with the idea of the periodisation of the modern type of conflicts and introduced the term of “generations” for the different ways of making war. This type of division is proposed, in accordance to the evolution of warfare tactics and the technology of the weaponry. Lind presented the development of warfare in the modern era in three distinct generations of the traditional inter-state confrontation with big armies and different tactics, and, later, added the fourth one.

That one was about a return to decentralized forms of warfare, blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians, due to nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, prompting a return of models of conflict common in pre-modern times³. Lind accepted at that time the idea that organized combat operations are no longer reserved to the state, that does not have the monopoly of the violence any more, that technology used for all types of weapons is available on the black market as soon as any weapon is produced, and that inventive tactics result even from the merging of traditional fighters and modern technology.

His work was published in 2004. Some characteristics of this fourth generation war were the result of numerous findings resulting from experiences on the ground. First, the main difference between wars from the fourth generation and the previous ones is that we are talking mostly about ad hoc warriors and moral conflict. The motifs behind this evolution are coming from the globalization of power, technology, access to techniques and tactics or, if you want, a technological integration of the world.

At the same time, the loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence came with the raise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict, involving groups far less equipped, but much more inventive and creative at using the modern technology they possess in a way neither creators of the technology, nor strategists or even the soldiers use it in regular armies. And since we mentioned tactics, it is about undermining enemy's strengths from within its ranks and not avoiding them. At the same time it is also about exploiting enemy's weaknesses and vulnerabilities on the field by using all the means available, namely asymmetric operations, with weapons and techniques that differ substantially from the opponents⁴.

4GW is about the confrontation of societies within the nation states, rather than armies, fighting using psyops, the psychological operations, including terrorism tactics and harsh insurgency activities that extensively use terror against the civilians of the society and, certainly, using the enemy's strengths against it. The latter takes advantage of the inertia of the state decision making systems, low capacity of movement on the field, difficulties to deploy in urban areas and populated environments, and the low level of flexibility when it comes to irregular warfare and human shield tactics.

Even though this fourth generation war is not new, some changes in international relations and the security environment are clearly placing it in this post-Cold War era and even in the post - 9.11 era, where terrorism became more visible and has access to better tools, challenging the world order and the state primacy. There are important differences to how it is applied today. These include:

² William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, Pages 22-26.

³ *Idem*.

⁴ 4GW - *FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE*, in Global Guerrillas, Networked tribes, system disruption and the emerging bazaar of violence. A blog about the future of conflict, Saturday, 08 May 2004, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/4gw_fourth_gene.html, visited 15-th of March, 14.pm.

- The existence of modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations.
- The decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW, especially when it is about confronting an enemy with higher capabilities and resources, in an asymmetrical manner.
- The emergence of small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict permits polarization on different grounds, and complicates the complex task of solving each and every dispute that generated the conflict, at the end of the combat operations.
- The existence of democratic open societies and economies provides a space with enough vulnerabilities, including the presence of “the enemy inside the gates”, with no front line and no limit in the rules of engagement, involving civilians becoming overnight fighters and being versatile enough to switch between this statuses several times per day.
- The new technologies are more or less globally available and this leads to an increased effectiveness of small groups in fights against regular armies or police special units in crowded spaces.
- Media access offers the possibility of manipulation and promoting a particular vision and perception of facts
- International networks and social media are providing across the world new means of communication used for spreading organized structures, improving technology and gaining access to information that improves the groups’ capacity to learn, survive, and act in a confrontation⁵.

In the end, there are four basic principles of the 4GW⁶:

- Missions and operations are done in small groups of fighters, acting in any place where the enemy lies or acts, in the entire society.
- Flexibility and capacity to fight with a high degree of autonomy, without huge centralised logistics, with a high level of mobility and space to move and act.
- The capacity to maneuver is much more important than the fire power in modern confrontations. This ensures the superiority in the field.
- Destroying the enemy from within. Its center of power, credibility and strength are targets for attacks and dictate the way combat is addressed.

2. Hybrid war

The introduction of the theoretical approach to 4GW offers us the possibility to analyze the sources of inspiration for the hybrid war concept. We put such an emphasis on this concept and its developments, including the very recent ones, because this represents the source of inspiration for strategists and planners in order to create advantages for small groups and little armies confronting huge military mechanisms and powers. And, in our opinion, that’s the direction in which the future wars are heading.

It’s also important for the analysis of the examples on the ground that inspired those evolutions. This could help us find out how these theoretical approaches have been developed, sometimes naturally, through the empirical study of the adaptation of the strategies to the evolution of the tactics and technology and sometimes we can realize that we have witnessed the thorough application, in a planned manner, of the type of military engagement conceived in advance in a laboratory.

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ Sergiu Medar, *Hybrid warfare in Ukraine*, CPCEW, under publication.

The primary theoretical source of the hybrid warfare is a Chinese book: „Unrestricted War” by col. Qiao Liang and col. Wang Xiangsui, a book published in 1999 at the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House⁷. The book is about innovative thinking and finding ways of fighting against whatever adversaries and capabilities are in front of you⁸. And that’s how the first characteristic of the hybrid war, a war without any rules or restrictions, was introduced. The hybrid war is unrestricted and unlimited in that particular sense.

The main idea of the Chinese authors was that unrestricted war means multiple attacks on the social, economic and political system of the opponent, together with asymmetric attacks in the irregular military warfare context, planned in a specific rhythm and synchronicity, in order to achieve the goal of weakening the adversary. The unrestricted war „ignores and transcends the limits of the battle field and what doesn’t represent the battle field, between what is and is not a weapon, between military staff and civilians, between state and non state actors”⁹. The scope is to grant equal chances to the weakest party in a conflict.

While the content of the concept is there, the real use of the name of hybrid war appeared first in the thesis of William J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*¹⁰. Nemeth thesis is that countries are under the of the violence of the decomposing states, the new unstable entities, with a high degree of violence inside those societies, with anarchic communities where traditional norms and rules are mixed with laws, norms and modern socio-political constructs. This, combined with the modern technology, creates this hybrid society. The basic result comes from the fact that this mix of traditional and modern components leads to a special kind of creativity and innovation when it comes to the proto-state’s society use of modern technology and weapons, and this manner of thinking creates surprises and tactics able to overcome the difference of power between the two armies.

But the hybrid war is also a limited war, in the sense that the parties involved choose, in a mutual acceptance, due to the its toll on image and symbolic capital, not to involve in this combat all their capabilities, but only a limited part of them, in order to solve their dispute. Lawrence Freedman noticed limited nature of the hybrid war¹¹. The concept comes from the time of the Cold War, and the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which forced the US and USSR to solve their disputes through intermediaries and proxies and to avoid sitting one in front to the other, in order not to escalate and reach the level of conflict where using nuclear weapons was necessary, therefore destroying the planet. Freedman underlines the characteristics of the hybrid war that fit into the definition of the limited war: avoiding the escalation above a certain threshold convened directly or inexplicitly by the parties, avoid a long war to limit its operations in time, limiting the area of the operations and avoiding the expansion of the combat outside of the established area, limiting the intensity of the combat.

The concept was not build on empty ground, since 4GW already prepared the coming of the hybrid war. The content of the concept has been defined by the Chinese colonels as unrestricted war, the name is due to William Nemeth and Lawrence Freedman contributed

⁷ No official English translation of the book is available, but there are a lot of references and samizdat as well as partial translations of the book. We use as reference James Perry, *Aerospace Power Journal*, summer 2000.

⁸ “The venue for publication and the laudatory reviews of the book in official publications suggested that Unrestricted Warfare enjoyed the support of some elements of the PLA leadership. The Western press quoted various sensational passages from the book and described it in terms that verged on hyperbole. The book was not a blueprint for a “dirty war” against the West but a call for innovative thinking on future warfare”, said James Perry.

⁹ Steve Metz, *Strategic Horizons: In Ukraine, Russia Reveals Its Mastery of Unrestricted Warfare*, World Politics Review, 16 April 2014.

¹⁰ William J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare* (Monterrey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002), Thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in National Security Affairs.

¹¹ Lawrence Freedman, *Ukraine and the Art of Limited War*, „Survival”, vol. 56, nr. 6, December 2014 –January 2015, pp. 7-38.

with the component of limited war to refine the concept, however the parents of the concept of hybrid war, as we know it now, are James Mattis and Frank Hoffman¹².

The essence of the definition resulted from thinking like the enemy of the US and identifying niche solutions that can be used to fight a superpower: modern technological combinations and unusual tactics used by opponents in order to achieve strategic advantages¹³.

Therefore the hybrid war is fundamentally an irregular war, according to Mathis and Hoffman, using instruments like terrorist, guerilla tactics, criminal actions, cyber operations, informational attacks, in a planned combination that could be able to affect the security interests of the state. Its impact targets different fields that are transformed in strategic ones, like those of the informational operations made with the support of friendly media. The objective is to alter and transform the will and support of the target state's population for the engagement.

We also propose an approach to the concept of hybrid war: a combination of conventional, irregular, economic, energy, cyber, plus informational, identity and proxy war, combined, in a very tricky and unstable form, with a limited and, at the same time, unrestricted war, in the sense of deployment of capacities of all kind, without observing any rules. Criminal capabilities with economic, informational ones, propaganda and irregular proxy war, insurrection, insurgency and terrorism could be deployed in the same theatre in order to achieve a specific objective. This follows Machiavelli's realistic approach where *tous les coups sont bons!*

And another characteristic introduced by us is referring to the fact that hybrid war is not used only by insurgent groups and small, weak armies, but also by all actors, even strong states, with incredibly well prepared, trained and equipped armies, who use this form of engagement in order to dissimulate the involvement, to avoid costs and to have access to credible denial. This allows them to avoid recognizing the involvement of its own regular forces and usage of Special Forces, civilians or military regulars in uniforms without distinctive signs. With that being said, we reached the other component of the hybrid war, a distinct way of planning and conducting conflicts, the legal warfare or lawfare.

3. Lawfare

The concept of International Law Legal Warfare or lawfare first appeared in the 1975 article "Whither Goeth the Law - Humanity or Barbarity" by John Carlson and Neville Yeomans in reference to the peaceful resolution of conflicts¹⁴. But even the already quoted book "Unrestricted Warfare" addressed this concept, as a part of the unrestricted war. In that case, lawfare meant the use of law and judicial processes as an instrument of warfare, a strategy of using (or misusing) the law in place of, or in addition to, traditional military strategies to achieve military objectives.

In this field of debate lawfare become "positive" when it is about the legitimate use of law to achieve military objectives, in a way which is in full observance with the spirit of the rule of law. "Negative lawfare" could be defined as the misuse of the law to achieve military objectives, the practice of manipulating judicial processes to undercut military objectives of other states, the use of law to prevent or hinder a nation or non-state actor from carrying out

¹² James N. Mattis & Frank Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine, November 2005, p. 2.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

¹⁴ Harriette Hill, *Lawfare and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers*, January 14, 2008, United Nations Association of the United States of America, www.amicc.org.

legitimate military operations¹⁵. It is also about “offensive lawfare” designed to include efforts to deny enemy forces sanctuary, to blunt their abuse of courts, and to use both foreign and domestic courts to better support the national security strategy¹⁶.

The idea of lawfare has been first developed and explored by the US Air Force Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.¹⁷, who defined it as “*a strategy of using - or misusing - law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective*”. This is rather a “neutral” concept and is designed in order to assist militaries in the conflict areas in order to avoid any legal consequences, but also to make sense of the fact that planning any military operation should take into consideration the legal aspects and the possibility to use law for supporting legitimacy of military and special operations, as well as to block them or to blow up the legitimacy of a cause, in the case of enemy operations, thus creating problems with the polarization and public support for a war.

Later on the evolution of lawfare as a concept leaned more towards the misuse of the law and using trials in order to undermine military operations or their legitimacy. It is not about the legitimate defense of human rights, but more about abuses. At the same time it is also about achieving a planned military objective using legal means by different actors. In this area, we can give the example of the politicization and use of legal means in politics domestically in order to undermine military objectives¹⁸ or important studies discussing the misuse of the legal grounds and treaties, used by some actors in order to accommodate or to fit inside the existing legal framework their actions, operations and wars designed to achieve their own interests and military objectives¹⁹.

„*The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation practiced manipulation or exploitation of the international legal system to supplement military and political objectives, or lawfare, via the definition of aggression and aggressive war, from 1933 through 1999*” concluded Christi Scott Bartman²⁰ in a thesis discussing the aspects of aggression and intervention. The twisted reading, understanding and miss-interpretation of the international law was used by the Soviet Union and Russia in order to obtain some legal grounds and legitimacy for its military operations and wars.

The neoconservative-sponsored group called “The Lawfare Project”²¹ used the definition of lawfare in the sense of “*manipulation of international law and legal proceedings*

¹⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁶ Colonel Mark W. Holzer, *Offensive Lawfare and the Current Conflict*, National Security Journal, Harvard Law School, April 10, 2012.

¹⁷ Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, *Lawfare Today: A Perspective*, speech presented to the American Bar Association’s 17th Annual Review of the Field of National Security Law Conference, November 16, 2007, Yale Journal of International Affairs, winter 2008. See also Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., *Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts*, Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Washington, D.C., November 29, 2001.

¹⁸ See the Brooke Goldstein speech *International and Domestic Legal Recourses: Responding to Lawfare and the Goldstone Report*, at Fordham Law School on Lawfare & Combating the Goldstone Report, Tuesday, April 27, 2010.

¹⁹ Christi Scott Bartman, *Lawfare: Use of the Definition of Aggressive War by Soviet and Russian Governments*, dissertation for the title of Doctor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, August 2009.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.181.

²¹ The Lawfare Project is a New York-based organization devoted to exposing alleged abuses of the international legal system. *About Us*, The Lawfare Project (last visited Dec. 16, 2010), <http://www.thelawfareproject.org/about>. When references are made to the hijacking of the term, the Lawfare Project is usually the chief culprit. The Lawfare Project defines their goal as analyzing *lawfare* as it used (via the Western legal system), nationally and internationally, to: (1) Thwart and punish free speech about issues of national security and public concern, (2) De-legitimize the sovereignty of democratic states, and (3) Frustrate and hinder the ability of democracies to defend themselves against terrorism. The primary goals of the Lawfare Project are: (i) To raise awareness about the phenomenon (and specific instances) of lawfare assuring the subject

to make claims against the state, especially in areas related to national security". Examples of lawfare would be the case brought to the International Court of Justice on the legality of Israel's security barrier, human rights cases sponsored by organizations sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and litigation in support of terrorist detainees²².

I think that the last developments in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the Islamic State activities in Iraq and Syria, Chinese construction of artificial islands and actions in the South and South East China Sea, the developments in technology and cyber space, are all enriching the concept. We propose that the concept of lawfare should also include the component related to the speculation and abuse of the International Law loopholes and lack of legislation in order to use military instruments or to achieve military and strategic objectives through those means. This includes the premeditation and strategic planning needed for achieving those goals. It is not a random action, neither one that just speculates the opportunities available due to the vulnerabilities of the target country that are present at a certain moment.

Examples are all around us: creating the new form of the war, hybrid war, with the use of non-registered and non-assumed soldiers, the invention of the "little green men" as military force and instrument for avoiding responsibility, both for an aggression and regarding the right of those soldiers and their families; speculating and using the gaps of the international legislation in order to take advantage of your capabilities and dominant position for national advantages in cyberwar and energy driven aggressive actions, since this is not sanctioned yet as an aggression by the international law; creating artificial islands on the sea in order to increase the offshore rights as well as create new strategic strongholds, including by using natural grounds and using the appearance of natural development of those artificial islands; and, last but not least, the case of groups of adventurers that want to establish and have, by buying or taking by force, their own state on the territory of weak states, and use lawfare to control territories of states with weak and unprepared armies.

4. Informational war

Another component of a hybrid war is the informational war. Here the discussion is far more complicated because the definition has to be nuanced and adapted through a family of actions, legitimate, legal as well as illegitimate and profoundly illegal. On one hand we have the expression of fundamental human right of opinion, free thinking and free circulation of ideas, as well as the democratic principles of the freedom of speech. Then we have the legal use of communication and PR, but also immoral and illegitimate polit-technology and agit-propaganda²³. Last but not least, in the same family, we can find the illegal use of components of psychological operations and informational war.

Informational war, according to our own definition of the concept, is creating alternative realities by perverting the truth based on data, facts and concrete arguments and twisting it by using a combination of facts, syllogisms, sophisms, propaganda, interpretation and a lot of lies. The alternative reality perverts the perception of a targeted population employing a combination of psyops -psychological operations, misinformation and propaganda which use basic beliefs, feelings and created images in order to lead the public to

matter receive the credibility and immediacy that it warrants, (ii) facilitate (legal and non-legal) responses to the perversion and misapplication of international & national human rights law, (iii) identify and mobilize human and institutional resources, and (iv) bring diverse and interested parties together in a common forum to discuss the threat. Reference from Michael Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, *Is Lawfare worth defining? Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting*, September, 11, 2010, p. 2, at http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/43_Lawfare_Report.pdf.

²² *What is Lawfare?*, The Lawfare Project, Dec. 16, 2010), <http://www.thelawfareproject.org> quoted by Michael Scharf & Elizabeth Andersen, *Is Lawfare...*

²³ Greg Simons, *Mass media and Modern Warfare*, Ashgate, 2010.

a pre-designed perception. At the end of a day, since the public already has an opinion, its perception has taken the place of the reality²⁴ and whatever argument and proof of the truth would face this blockage of the perception already established.

In a world where information reaches quickly a large amount of people, in real time, via television, internet and social media, the perception of a specific event is easily formed, derailed, twisted and imposed. Presenting the truth at a later time will have a limited impact on the opinion at a large scale due to the lack of critical thinking of the majority of the general population, as well as the conservative approach in accepting its own mistakes at a large scale and the easiness associated with the use of the explanation already interiorised by an average person, especially in a community that has developed a conformism and has its own description, perception and „truth”.

Conclusions

We did assess the multiple developments and definitions, but also contemporary evolutions of the hybrid war, rationalized and updated with our own definitions of the different categories of conflicts. We need to remind that these are components of the hybrid war, but at the same time distinct instruments. But not all that happens in a hybrid war theater and even components that are helping in achieving the objectives of a hybrid war are its parts, belong to that war, but only those who are directly coordinated, put in a sequence and planned to develop that way by a unique command of this war.

In the developments of the concept, we used the evolutions of ISIL in Iraq and Syria, as well as the distinct evolutions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The concept, in its modern form, is 10 years old and is developing at the same time with the speed of theorizing those evolutions on the ground and the forms of manifestation of this type of war. I think that this is the new type of war of the future, that the beginning of the 21st century is proposing to the humanity.

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HYBRID WARFARE IN CURRENT CONFLICTS

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***Abstract:** Current conflicts are quite complex, dynamic and unpredictable. The complexity of security environment demands strong cooperation and integrated response among allied states and different agencies. The development of techniques and means of warfare possess new challenges to regular military forces, for which they have to be prepared. Hybrid warfare is a broader conceptual framework than different ways of using military assets and other means as direct weapons.*

***Keywords:** Hybrid war, ISIL, Ukraine, Current conflicts characteristics, Hybrid war definition*

Introduction

Nowadays we are in the era of enormous complexity, interconnectedness and interdependence not only in warfare but also in political, social and private life of any one of us. This complexity has been facilitated by the proliferation of new technologies this in reality made the world a global village by spreading information in real time. This complexity does not just influence security environment, but is an integral part of it, with growing importance. This complexity is influencing and changing the whole philosophy of warfare. The military should take account of the great opportunities for the flow of information; they must use the available information in their interest and minimize the possibilities for obtaining information about their actions and intentions.

1. Hybrid warfare definitions

About hybrid warfare as well as about terrorism there are many definitions. The definitions for hybrid war are since 2008-2010, but are obsolete already.

From theoretical point of view first were the Small wars, than we talk about Low intensity or Light intensity conflict, after that irregular and asymmetric war and in the end Hybrid war appeared.

According to the report to the U.S.A. House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities on Sept. 10 2010, "hybrid warfare might be used informally to describe the ever-changing complexity and dynamics of the battlefield", but there is no official definition term and has no plans to do so, claiming existing doctrines on traditional and irregular warfare is sufficient to describe the current and future operational environment¹.

US Senior military officials have repeatedly said that the United States have adversaries practicing "hybrid warfare" tactics, which will include attacks on computer networks and other forms of technology, more commonly known as cyber attacks or cyber warfare. The audit, conducted in 2010, found that from 2008 to 2010, U.S. military officials used "hybrid warfare" to characterize methods of war used by U.S. adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹ <http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2010/09/defense-lacks-doctrine-to-guide-it-through-cyberwarfare/47575/>

“The term is used to describe not just cyber attacks, but also attacks by biological, nuclear, radiological, and chemical weapons; improvised explosive devices; and information and media manipulation, among other forms of attacks.”² “Hybrid warfare” blending conventional and irregular approaches across the full spectrum of conflict.

Nathan Freier from the U.S.A. Center for Strategic and International Studies defined hybrid warfare involving four threats: (1) traditional; (2) irregular; (3) catastrophic terrorism; and (4) disruptive, which exploit technology to counteract military superiority.³

The mentioned definitions show pure military approach to hybrid war. They focus on the battlefield and military capabilities for action in the contemporary security environment. To some extent they constitute a development of the concepts of asymmetric conflict and irregular warfare.

2. Hybrid warfare in current conflicts

2.1. *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*

ISIL is widely known for its extensive and effective use of web and social media. ISIL's propaganda includes Internet videos of the beheadings of soldiers, journalists, infidels and aid workers, as well as the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage. Propaganda distributes through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), al-Hayat Media Center, which targets a Western audience and produces material in English, German, Russian and French and the Ajnad Media Foundation. ISIL's puts more emphasis on social media than other jihadi groups and its use of social media has been described by one expert as "probably more sophisticated than that of most U.S. companies.

A year and a half ago ISIL started to become known for its military expansion in Iraq and Syria. ISIL gained notoriety after it drove out the Iraqi government forces of key cities in western Iraq. It gained control on wide territories after an offensive, initiated in early 2014. In Syria it conquered and conducted attacks against both the government forces and rebel factions. ISIL already rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. The ISIL's leadership is dominated by Iraqis; most of them are former members of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The Wall Street Journal estimated in September 2014 that eight million Iraqis and Syrians live in areas controlled by ISIL. ISIL seeks to subjugate population under its control and dominate every aspect of lives through terror, indoctrination, and the provision of services to those who obey. ISIL uses beheadings and has released a series of videos to intimidate population worldwide. ISIL has become "well entrenched" among the population, despite being as brutal as before. ISIL's control is based not on permanent and massive presence all over the invaded territories but on fear as a result of terror shown as punishment about crime and/or against infidels.

The Islamic State attracts different people with different beliefs, usually younger ones, without perspectives in their lives from different parts of the world by promoting the image of holy war in the light of giving meaning to life and adventure. In February 2015, U.S. intelligence estimated at around 20,000 foreign fighters, including 3,400 from Western countries.

ISIL has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, India, and Russia. Estimates of the size of ISIL's military vary widely from tens of thousands up to 70,000 fighters⁴. In July 2014, ISIL recruited more than 6,300 fighters, according to the Syrian Observatory for

² <http://www.darkreading.com/risk-management/auditors-find-dod-hasnt-defined-cyber-warfare/d/d-id/1092427?>

³ <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/>.

⁴ "Sa është numri i xhihadistëve të ISIS-it? - Lajme - Top Channel". Retrieved 22 February 2015.

Human Rights. In late January 2015, an ISIL representative said that ISIL had smuggled 4,000 fighters into EU states, and that the smuggled fighters were planning attacks in Europe.

The main difference between ISIL and other Islamist and jihadist movements is its strong belief that the arrival of the Mahdi is imminent. ISIL transforms this belief in direct actions for creation of state on the base of conservative Muslim values. ISIL believes it will defeat the army of "Rome" at Dabiq, the town of northern Syria in fulfilment of a prophecy. A prophecy associated with doomsday and the end of the world.

In mid-2014, Iraqi intelligence release information that ISIL had assets worth U.S. \$ 2 billion. To finance its activities, ISIL is stealing artefacts and sending them worldwide to be sold. According to media reports, ISIL has established a system for harvesting and selling human organs. The majority of ISIL funding comes from the production and sale of energy. It controls around 300 oil wells in Iraq. It has captured 60% of Syria's total production capacity. ISIL earned U.S. \$ 2.5 million a day by oil selling. ISIL is widely reported as receiving funding from private donors in the Gulf States.

Undoubtedly, the Islamic state has very strong international support from powerful countries at the world and regional level even this support is not so visible for ordinary people. A proof for this is that there is not enough clear and definite resolution of United Nations Security Council about the position of the world community on Islamic state. There is a lot of information that ISIL have been supported by some countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, even U.S.A., Russia and about the last two I guess in some ways they have matched interests with ISIL.

2.2. Crisis in Ukraine

Ukraine has been seen as a portion of the sphere of "privileged interests" by Russia. In regard to Ukraine, Moscow pursues a modernized version of the Brezhnev Doctrine on "limited sovereignty" (ближнего зарубежья), that dictates the sovereignty of certain state (Ukraine) cannot be larger than that of the Warsaw Pact times.

Almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in early 90s conclusion has been made - Russia is a Great power with Ukraine, without Ukraine it is just a strong regional power - and the struggle for Ukraine began.

After Russia's attack on Georgia in 2008, some analysts suggested that this was a warning for Ukraine and Moldova and may be, a warning for some other former Soviet Union satellites states too. Russian activities in Ukraine are motivated by Russian fears of NATO's expansion to its western borders. The crucial military strategic point in this struggle is access to Russian Black Sea Fleet naval base at Sevastopol as in the Russia-Goergia war in 2008, crucial military strategic point was access and control the Roki tunnel through the Caucasus.

In February 2015, Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta reported that it obtained documents which showed that Russia's government developed a strategy for invading and breaking up Ukraine. Plans are for annexation of Crimea and the southeastern part of the country, including Donetsk and Luhansk to create ground corridor to Crimea. According to Dr. Taras Kuzio⁵, since 2005, Russia's relations with Ukraine deteriorated, prompting the Russian security service (FSB) and Russian military intelligence (GRU) to expand their covert support for pro-Russian forces in Southern Ukraine and Russian separatists in Crimea⁶. The influence of Russian security services in former Soviet Union territories and in its satellites is so strong that some analysts voiced doubts that even nationalist political parties in these countries are managed by them. This influence is also still strong among the military in these countries.

⁵ Dr. Taras Kuzio is an academic and expert in Ukrainian political, economic and security affairs. He has written articles on contemporary Ukrainian issues

⁶ "Crimea – from playground to battleground". opendemocracy.net. February 27, 2014.

To justify its invasion Russia launches in advance an appropriate information campaign details of which are visible on international and national level in many countries. It has been stated that the information campaign has become especially proficient and systematic, becoming particularly intense in last 2-3 years.

As a culmination of more than a year there is a social and political unrest in Ukraine; between February 18 and 20. 2014, 103 people were killed and more than 1400 injured. Following that, beginning on February 26, pro-Russian forces began to occupy strategic positions across Crimea. Media sources reported the presence of military personnel equipped with Russian weapons and in Russian-made uniform without insignia – “little green men”. After the annexation of Crimea in March – April 2014, pro-Russian groups in the Donbass area of Ukraine escalated their activities into an armed conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and the Ukrainian government. The conflict is ongoing and develops the tide.

If Russia wanted peaceful accession of Crimea to it, in an appropriate manner a referendum could be held. Choosing way of escalation and confrontation with such a “friendly” country like Ukraine shows that Russia has much bigger ambitions than be accepted peacefully even by Ukraine.

We can find and write down many facts and circumstances about these two conflicts, but it's more important how we analyze them, to find common characteristics and derive correct and useful conclusions. Here I focused mainly on the last few years and on the military uprising of conflicts, otherwise I need more pages to express facts and circumstances in information, economic and social life in the last eight-ten years on territories covered by two conflicts and about the states involved.

2.3. Common characteristics of current conflicts

- *Successful information and propaganda campaign* in two directions on international level and among chosen target audiences conducted for years, reaching domination in the information sphere as minimum to target audiences and over chosen regions / territories. ISIL put special efforts in their campaign to Arabic and Muslim people. Russia put special efforts to Slavic people and former Soviet Union satellites where the Russian influence is still very strong.

- *Weak economy* brought to this point and as a result of intentional actions of the aggressor / active side;

- *Financial and banking sector should have collapsed* or on the edge of collapse;

- *Comprising problems in social and economic life* which bring to civil disobedience and unrest transformed or used for excuse about insurgency and political movements;

- *Failed state* (Iraq and Syria) or *weak central government* (Ukraine), on the base of above mentioned characteristics, who lose control over part of territory or in specific region as a prerequisite for conflict.

- *Support from local population ... on the base of fear* for military wing of aggressor / insurgency. Some opinions may appear that support from local population is voluntary. In ISIL case it is visible even on international level. About Russia I just quote a sentence from a Bulgarian newspaper which shows almost all about the feelings in former Soviet Union satellites „... more impudent, arrogant among us mask the fear of the slave as gratitude to the liberator“ („...по-наглите сред нас маскират страха на роба като благодарност към освободителя.“)⁷.

- *Presence of ethnic/religious minority* which is served as a basic reason for conflict and for expanding formal local population support.

⁷ Украйна – изоставена. Какво да прави България? (Ukraine - abandoned. What to do Bulgaria?) http://www.dnevnik.bg/analizi/2015/02/12/2471268_ukraina_izostavena_kakvo_da_pravi_bulgariia/

- *Strong and firm international support* even not so visible for the ordinary public.
- *Some unique symbols very well-known and easily recognizable* among the population and internationally - ISIL's philosophy is well represented by the symbolism in the *Black Standard* variant of the legendary battle flag of Muhammad that it has adopted. *Orange prison jumpsuit* for beheaded infidels. Symbol of Russian power - "*Little green men*" in eastern part of Ukraine very well recognizable by the local population as soldiers from regular Russian armed forces.
- *Sources for recruiting personal.* For ISIL these are all rebels and insurgency group in Middle East and individuals in western democracies influenced by radical Muslim and ISIL propaganda. For Ukraine crisis these are local separatists and Russian armed forces.
- *Constant and steady sources for financing rebel / separatists / insurgency activities.*
- *Demoralization of state or governmental armed forces.*
- Both conflicts have been aroused significantly as military struggles from the beginning of 2014.

3. New dimensions of hybrid warfare

Hybrid warfare demands strong and a long term commitment and capabilities in different areas such as information, financial, social, economic, religious/ethnics and in the end military. There is necessary the power using hybrid approach to have strong international influence and strong unified political system that can allow it to follow long term, may be no less than a decade, strict strategy. Usually the opponent / passive side should be weaker than an aggressor / active side. First necessary, seeking conditions should be formed in information, economic and social life of the opponent / passive side. Than it is time for expansion and usage of military force to take control over the territories, meanwhile political movement occurs and stating political and territorial claims.

Necessary conditions include but are not limited to:

- Convenient for aggressor / active side information environment,
- Economic and financial instability,
- Social unrest,
- Losing control or weakness of central government in certain region,
- Intentionally created conditions for weakness government,
- Intentional support,
- Strong and effective military power.

The state situation in eastern Ukraine and situation in part of territory of Iraq and Syria just before arising of military struggle as a part of whole conflict shows

3.1. Expanding definition

Hybrid warfare is not a military strategy or concept. Hybrid war is complex information, social, economic, political and military approach to conquer an adversary. As part of struggle in information sphere are all actions in cyber space because the essence of existing cyber space is dealing with information.

Hybrid war includes coordinated long term gradual stepwise increased and expanded efforts in different domains such as Information; Economic; Social with special attention to ethno-religious characteristics; Political; and in the end Military. It should be conducted under strong complex united, unitary strategy seeking for synergic effects. Hybrid war comprises effects achieved in social, information, economic sphere and in the end on their base use military and political tools.

All actions in different spheres are linked, interconnected and overlapping among different spheres directed by one long-term strategy. Nevertheless there is a logical sequence.

Actions start in information sphere after that continued in economic-financial and social in the same time. When the actions in mentioned spheres constituted appropriate conditions is time for military.

Full spectrum of weapons and/or means used as weapons from conventional rifles through geo-climatic weapon up to psychotropic and psychotronic weapons are suitable for hybrid war.

“Unlike conventional warfare, the “centre of gravity” in hybrid warfare is a target population”⁸, which must change their attitudes on the causes of conflict and easier to accept changes pursued by the aggressor.

3.2. NATO and the hybrid war

NATO was established as military alliance. Since end of the Cold war it began to transform into a military-political alliance. Nowadays we can clarify NATO as political-military alliance. NATO has a wide range of instruments at its disposal but all of them are in political, military and technological sphere and of course in information as part of military and technological sphere. The Alliance has expended a great deal of effort in recent years to stay abreast of new threats. Nevertheless, NATO, as a politico-military alliance, will never successfully address the entire spectrum of challenges embodied in hybrid war. Undoubtedly, prevailing characteristics in hybrid warfare presents for NATO an institutional challenge.

The NATO deterrence policy for reacting on arising conflicts (hybrid warfare) is focused on a rapid military response. This policy has some potential weaknesses. First: member states may find it difficult to agree on the source of a conflict and about appropriate collective actions. Second: to counter hybrid threats, military power alone is insufficient. Regardless of how rapid and massive a response may be, deploying military force to an area swept by hybrid warfare will turn out as “too little too late”. Too often, the conflict evolves below critical levels on the indicators set for monitoring, “under radar”. Finally, a deterrent built upon military force alone will not be credible. To deal with hybrid threats, NATO cannot simply rely on the strategy of massive retaliation, or rely exclusively on pure military course of action.

NATO should consider a more flexible, preventive and preemptive policy and strive to deter prospective adversaries with a wide range of instruments.

Hybrid warfare evolves in the information, social, economic, political and military spheres of life of the affected countries. NATO can affect to information, political and military spheres of life. It does not have tools to influence in social and economic life.

Another big disadvantage of NATO is that conducting or counteracting hybrid warfare requires a sustainable, stable and permanent long-term strategy, at least for a decade. Such kind of strategy can be achieved only by a unitary state. Within NATO is very difficult to be achieved such a long and stable unities among member states, it is practically impossible. The situation around Iraq in 2003 shows how difficult is sometimes Member States to reach unity on certain issue.

NATO has its own unique advantage this is information, more precisely the ability to collect and use information. On this base NATO can inform on time affected member states because reactions in social, financial and economic life are predominately national responsibility.

⁸ <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Also-in-2014/Deterring-hybrid-warfare/EN/index.htm>

Conclusions

Hybrid warfare is new practice and theoretical concept which arise as a unified approach in antagonism, enmity that go beyond warfare, as we considered it until recently. The traditional perception of warfare involves confrontation in information, political and military spheres of life. Hybrid warfare includes active and direct confrontation in other spheres of public life such as social, financial and economic as a part of warfare.

NATO has to change approach to counter hybrid threats. It has to focus on proactive strategy and action first in information sphere of life. The crucial part of this is sharing sensitive and intelligence information strictly following the necessary procedures. May be, there are an examples on that in mid-2014 Bulgarian MoD launched a Vision 2020 in which were mentioned some conclusions on hybrid war and its characteristics.

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CONVENTIONALITY AND ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE

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Abstract: *The article analyzes the essence of the conventional concepts and asymmetric in terms of military applications. Consider the adoption of a weapon from unconventional to conventional and contemporary unconventional means of influence in the military sphere. Asymmetry is part of military confrontation; each commander strives to create advantages that give him superiority of inequalities, asymmetries. In warfare, the asymmetry is manifested in the forces, facilities, organization, leadership and management and fighting spirit. Can distinguish the following types of asymmetry: quantity, quality (technological and organizational) and conceptual*

Keywords: *Conventionality, conventional weapons, unconventional leverage, asymmetry, asymmetrical confrontation, asymmetries - quantitative, qualitative and conceptual*

Introduction

Military confrontations are always based on the demand and achievement of several advantages such as: the use of new "unconventional" means of warfare; achievement of advantage based on asymmetry or surprise. When you achieve a definite advantage in one of the ways described, the rest can be ignored. For example, if you have a new effective weapon it is not necessary to seek asymmetric advantage or surprise. An example is the use of nuclear weapons in World War II against Japan. On the other hand if you own a strongly asymmetric advantage you do not need to look for surprise, an example is the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany.

Very often we use different concepts and terms that we believe are well-known and familiar enough to not be explained further. At the same time the development of the theory in different directions leads to a change in the content of commonly used terms.

We assume that when talking about conventionality we see conventionality of the means of conducting armed clashes, conventionality refers to the weapons used in military confrontation, but when talking about asymmetry we see asymmetry in the way of confrontation, asymmetry refers to the methods of warfare.

1. Conventionality in warfare

In the military theory, practice and terminology the conventionality is most commonly associated with "conventional weapons". The word convention has legal origin and matters of international treaties or agreements (interstate), something which is perceived and accepted as such in some way. "Conventionality" is perceived as a traditionally established practice. In this sense, a conventional weapon is a weapon that has been adopted for use in military clashes on the basis of tradition or is referred to such in the international legal document.

In the most general sense under existing international legal instruments, conventional weapons are weapons that do not use chemical or biological agents or nuclear reactions to destroy the target or producing casualties in an object. It is assumed that these are all weapons

whose destructive power is based on some explosives (shells, bombs) or launch different kinds of ammo (pistol, machine gun, etc.), and cool weapons. Laser guns, flamethrowers and incendiary bombs, now are also perceived more as “conventional“ weapons, but some international treaties by the end of the 20-th century prohibit blinding laser weapons. Conventional weapons are relatively safe for storage. They are very diverse in nature and can be used both for a single purpose, and against large military formations or clusters of civilians. In principle, they do not pollute the environment, like weapons of mass destruction do. A major disadvantage of the conventional weapons is that they can not provide a country or alliance effective strategic superiority, because they are not deterrent such as nuclear weapons.

Conventional weapons are known as such and are based on a series of international agreements initiated and supported by the United Nations and open to accession by States all over the world.

1.1. Development of concepts for the conventionality of weapons

Any new weapon or means used as a weapon in the beginning of its appearance was unusual in the sense of not adopted, “unconventional” and only after its mass adoption and use of various opposing players, it becomes common - conventional weapon. Thus, the development of means of war marks the overall development of the warfare. Depending on many factors, primarily qualitative leap that represents, each new weapon, was perceived as unconventional for a longer or shorter period of time. Something with which humanity can not be proud of is the fact that every human achievement always used first in the warfare

The first known unconventional weapon that changes the nature of warfare is 4-7 m long spear - sarisa¹ used by the Greek and Macedonian phalanx. It is believed that it was introduced by Philip of Macedon and contributed greatly to the success of Alexander the Great. So, with their appearance, sarisa, intricate bow in antiquity, gunpowder and firearms, they were the unconventional means of his time.

The crossbow is the first weapon which is considered to be "against the law" and was declared unconventional. In 1139 Pope Innocent II and Second Council of the Lateran took a firm stand against the crossbow as a weapon, which they consider to be morally unacceptable in terms of its ability to kill. The Pope and his cardinals do first early attempt to arms control. They state that the weapon is unacceptable in a war between Christians. Several decades later, they approved it of the Crusades.

Just like the invention of firearms, they represent new unconventional means of war which require revolutionary changes in the methods of warfare and require a long period of adaptation to its perception as a conventional mean of warfare.

The German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun "FlaK 36 in more recent times has become a textbook example of the use of anti-aircraft guns against tanks during the Second World War. It is used very often as anti-tank gun and was later mounted on the tank "Tiger" because of the high initial velocity and sufficient drilling force of the projectile, which makes it very effective against tanks.

The development of artillery systems and placing them on a mechanical power - tanks and self-propelled guns, and the development of rocket systems in the 20th century are two innovations, practically perceived as conventional weapons with their establishment. The reasons for that are the rapid and massive adoption from the opposing states and the insignificant qualitative leap that they represent. Another reason is the almost simultaneous development of the nuclear weapon. It is such a revolutionary leap in the development of the

¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarissa>

means of warfare that require a global agreement for their nonproliferation after a single use thereof.

1.2. Main treaties and conventions control of the means for warfare

Since 1978, the United Nations has been presenting the status of multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements - 25 counted, publishing data on signatories and parties of relevant agreements.

The main Disarmament Treaties related to Euro-Atlantic Area are:

- *1925 Geneva Protocol* prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war,
- *Biological Weapons Convention* banning the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction,
- *Chemical Weapons Convention* outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors,
- *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, states agree to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes. Not entered into force due to the non-ratification of eight specific states,
- *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons* seeks to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which are considered excessively injurious or whose effects are indiscriminate,
- *Convention on Cluster Munitions* prohibits the use, transfer and stockpile of cluster bombs,
- *Convention on Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)* bans weather warfare, which is the use of weather modification techniques for the purposes of inducing damage or destruction,
- *Mine Ban Convention* aims at eliminating anti-personnel landmines (AP-mines),
- *Partial Test Ban Treaty* prohibits all test detonations of nuclear weapons except underground,
- *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)* establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment in Europe,
- *Treaty on Open Skies* establishes a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants,
- *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)* has an objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament

1.3. Modern unconventional weapons

The armed forces are the most conventional state institution for the exercise of violence, but this does not restrict us to be informed about new tools for impact and destruction and this is not a reason to stop the use of such methods on ourselves.

A characteristic example is the so-called "dirty bombs" or other "dirty" ammunition. The term "dirty" ammunition/bomb refers to ammunition where there are radioactive materials, but not as a charge. The aim is after blasting radioactive materials spread in populated areas and thus impact on the people, causing various diseases in the long term. It is considered that dirty bombs are most likely to be used by terrorists primarily to scaremongering and prolonged exposure the population on radioactive contamination.

Terrorists don't need a lot to create a dirty bomb, it is low-tech, its creation is not a technical challenge, because dirty bomb use a conventional explosive, mixed with a slightly radioactive material. At the end of the war in Afghanistan was made an alarming discovery -

Al Qaeda is interested in a new kind of weapon. One of these documents showed in detail how to make a dirty bomb. The dirty bomb and the use of radioactive materials to influence people is a new kind of unconventional means of impact.

Adaptation of different means of producing casualties on selected objects, including people, is developing quite dynamically and years ahead of the reaction of the international community to ban them or at least to regulate their use. In some cases, especially when a means for impact is extremely revolutionary and / or it have been owned by limited number of countries decades or even centuries it is not recognized as a means of destruction. Such is the case with some of the discoveries of Nikola Tesla, and so far not officially recognized that they are used and developed for military purposes.

Seeking for new means of destruction can be seen in several directions depending on financial, political, moral and motivational, educational and technological capabilities of the entities which have an interest in the use of new means of destruction. According to these criteria, we can divide the subjects into several groups:

1. financially powerful and technologically advanced countries and unions;
2. highly motivated and sufficiently financially supported separatists, criminal and terrorist organizations;
3. hybrid organizations, including elements of the intelligence agencies of failing states, incorporated with criminal and terrorist elements, most typical for Eastern Europe and South America.

The first group has a strong military-industrial and scientific potential and formally implements the policy of the state or union. They have the greatest opportunity and they are the most focused and consistent in development of new types of weapons in the full range of its capabilities. This includes the use of nanotechnology, geo-climatic (scalar) weapons, psychotronic and psychotropic drugs to influence people, psychological methods of influence on the type of Neuro-Linguistic Programming - NLP and controlled dreams, and probably other ways to impact and destruction of which we are not yet informed.

Speaking about the characteristics and examples of the second and especially the third group can be very dangerous.

Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology is a new field of knowledge that deals with the possibilities of manipulation, restructuring and management of individual atoms and molecules in the structure of a substance or organism. Although of several decades work in this scientific field, the application of nanotechnology in warfare can be assumed that it is still unconventional. This does not mean that it is not sufficiently developed and applied by the leading countries. Nanotechnology provides advantages over other technologies using differences in physical, chemical and biological properties of the objects in the level of nanoscale

Developed countries spend significant funds for nanotechnology research for over twenty years now. Nanotechnology attracts the experts from different scientific fields, suggesting various routes of applications. MNT (molecular nanotechnology) hostilities will be very different. They will have unprecedented destructive force and will be led by invisible weapons and directed against ... people. Furthermore invisible nanoweapon will be reversible, self-sustaining. It is obvious that such weapons can destroy the Earth quick and easy.

The great interest in nanotechnology is based on the possibilities of obtaining fundamentally new materials and on their basis, tools and devices quality superior to existing ones.

From the standpoint of living organisms nanotechnology allows influence on their biophysiological processes at the cellular level, a change in the level of DNA, genetic engineering, and even the creation of new organisms.

Geo-climatic weapons

In an article in the newspaper "Times" from November 23, 2000, world-renowned scientist Dr. Rosalie Bertel argued that American scientists developed methods to influence climate changes. After Hurricane Katrina in the US, a large number of versions showed up and tried to explain the causes of this very major upheaval. According to the US meteorologist Scott Stevens deadliest hurricane in fact was created by human - climatic weapon based on the principle of use of some type of electromagnetic generator. Electromagnetic generators affect different parts of the atmosphere, land, electromagnetic spectrum, the magnetic field of the earth and people. They are the basis of some modern unconventional weapons. According to some researches and publications those principles are discovered by Nikola Tesla.

The largest installation in the US dealing with the electromagnetic spectrum the High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) as part of the ("Star Wars") Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

Although it is accepted that there is no direct evidence for the use of such methods of influence, it's a fact that the US has not signed international agreements binding environmental measures and avoid discussing the topic of "ecological weapons". US does not adopt or enforce obligations under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which obliges developed countries, almost only to limit the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. USA seeks to focus the discussions on climate change on the planet only in the problems of the consequences of the greenhouse effect and generally avoid discussions of "the influence of military technology on climate change."

Russian scientists involved in the development of similar programs in the era of the USSR, say that the creation of "new integral geophysical weapons to influence the ionosphere around the Earth is a qualitative leap in human civilization and can be compared with the transition to Firearms or from conventional to nuclear weapons.

In this direction there are timid attempts to limit research and experiments, due to the lack of opportunity to explore the negative impact on the climate of experiments relating to impact on the magnetosphere and ionosphere of the planet, especially in the long term.

Psychotronic assets and psychotropic drugs to influence people - Mind control

Systems for control of the mind and affect the perceptions and psyche and human reactions is a new direction in the development of unconventional weapons. These impacts are carried out in three main ways: by technical means - psychotronic effects; medical means - psychotropic effects and by suggestions - neuro-linguistic suggestions and controlled dreams.

Psychotronic means of influence are generators that affect people with waves close to the human brain waves and thus shape the perceptions and behavior of individuals or even whole groups of people. There are quite general publications on this topic, but relatively detailed and accurate information about the possibilities of this type of impact is very difficult to find, and it will most likely represent classified information. However, in some Internet sites can be found portable psychotronic generators even for sale. Their advertising is directed to techniques for stimulating human and his health, but it is clearly stated that they have abilities to negative impact. There is sparse guesswork that such generators have been used since the mid-80s of the 20th century to impact on certain groups even in my country. In modern conditions it is assumed that combined with psychotropic effects generators are likely to be used for mass effects at certain time, such as during elections or at major public events even during sport events. Another potential way to use it is to stimulate individuals as prominent athletes or any type of leaders. The problems are related to the effects on the individual in the long-term and unintended collateral effects.

Psychotropic agents for effects are drug agents which can be absorbed by humans by inhalation, transdermally, in foods or medicines. Some of them have a connection and are distributed as nerve warfare agents.

Neuro-Linguistic Programming

Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) is a relatively new area of manipulative psychology, but it is common enough and applied even for commercial purposes. In warfare it is used for several decades organized.

Attitude towards the possibility of such effects in everyday life is very lightly and they usually belong to the realm of science fiction and hype. Most people addresses such opportunities from the position "that can't happen to me!" or "I know about it and it can not affect me!" Perhaps such opinions are suggested by those who use such tools.

Each state, alliance and self-respecting organization is obliged to pay attention to these new unconventional means of influence as far as possible to inform, protect and defend their staff from possible negative impact.

2. Asymmetry in warfare

2.1. Historical Chronology

Most often, the term "asymmetry" is used to describe the relationship between non-comparable in power and status opponents. In the analysis of military confrontation we use the concepts "asymmetric threats", "asymmetric warfare", "asymmetric conflict".

Asymmetry is a inherent characteristic of military confrontation, from antiquity to the present day, every military leader seeks to create advantages for their own troops to secure its dominance on the base of inequality, which includes besides surprise and use of the operational conditions in their favor also creation of asymmetry. Asymmetric warfare/threats are those where the potential opponent with relatively small resources can cause very severe damage.

Some military theorists are in position that asymmetry at all, is not a new category in the understanding of warfare. It is assumed that it is in the skillful creation and use of a certain asymmetry in a given situation, a certain section/region or in the whole conflict is the secret of victory. Asymmetry means superiority and can be sought and achieved in forces, means, organization, leadership and management and fighting spirit, morale and motivation.

Modern asymmetric warfare is represented in conflicts in which traditional knowledge and rules for conducting conventional war will not be enough, and some of them will be void inadequate the situation and even harmful. Clashes between countries are increasingly moving away from armed conflicts between states to another type of confrontations. They are led by different social, ethnic and political groups, which are often in conflict not only with the official governments of their countries, but but also with each other. However, often in such type of confrontation many armed groups; various in tribal and political characteristic and with different foreign policy orientation act in concert and achieve impressive military successes against the regular army. This feature manifests itself in a number of conflicts: in Afghanistan in the 80s of the 20th century, in more recent times in Chechnya, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan again.

The main elements of "asymmetric" military concept are imbalances in some of the dimensions of the military power of the opposing parties and the skillful use or successful overcoming of the weaker party, which gives a chance for victory of the weaker over the stronger. Asymmetry comes from perception, culture and the general situation in the conflict, and manifests itself in thoughts, decisions and actions of the parties. Modern asymmetric wars have shown that success depends mainly on three factors and the interaction between them: adequate preparation; sacrifice of soldiers and high fighting spirit, reaching fanaticism and

modern weapons. Even if a group does not have enough modern high technology weapons and owns only first two qualities, it can successfully oppose any aggressor.

Clash between Israel and the Lebanese radical Shiite group Hezbollah in 2006 can be assumed as typical asymmetric collision. Some military experts confirm that modern non-state military structures not inferior to regular armies and familiar ways of war are ineffective against them. Military circles in Israel acknowledge that invaded Lebanon they have not achieved their objectives. And we should not forget that the power of the Israeli armed forces and that of Hezbollah are simply incomparable. From this collision which lasted 34 combat days (July 12 to August 14, 2006) can be concluded that this is a model of asymmetric conflict between very well prepared and equipped regular army and radical militant group, in which each Party shall endeavor use advantages as overcome or eliminate the benefits of the other. Hezbollah's main advantage is the support of the local population.

We can conclude that the success of such conflict in the greatest extent depends on the interaction between the military-strategic factors and specific, tactical methods of influence on the one hand and non-military factors on the other. Victory requires support from the whole society for the purpose of war.

In the biblical sense a forerunner of today's asymmetrical confrontation is the clash between David and Goliath, enshrining the entire contents of this concept, and also shows compelling advantage to defend homeland.

As today's analogue to the biblical story is considered an attack on the American destroyer "Cole" in the Yemeni port of Aden on 12 October 2000. This modern warship with unique opportunities for warfare, with high-tech tools for the detection and destruction of the enemy, run by elite crew and worth a colossal amount is attacked successfully by a fishing boat with an outboard motor, of which there are only two suicide fanatics and a good amount of explosive. The result was 17 killed and 46 wounded American sailors and damages for hundreds of millions of dollars, mental shock for fleet and military bases around the world, tension among politicians and diplomats. The episode shows that today anyone can fight a war that is "affordable" for player, according to "pouch", on the possibilities, a war in which nearly any ability of countries can adapt and become a weapon. As long as the country uses an unusual way to compensate the lack of capabilities with appropriate training and ideas it can gain victory.

2.2. Types of asymmetric confrontation

Asymmetric war today can be described as a conflict in which the resources of the two opposing sides differ significantly, especially in qualitative terms. Each Party shall endeavor to use the weaknesses of the opponent. Asymmetric clashes often use strategies and tactics inherent in guerrilla and insurgent tactics weaker combatants seek to use strategy to compensate the shortage in quantity or quality.

Usually one of the parties involved in the conflict can be determined or is perceived as guerrillas or insurgents, relatively organized group, which has the support of the local population. So, the history of asymmetric collision is inextricably linked to guerrilla warfare. Important features of guerrilla warfare as asymmetric collision are the availability of official military force - regular army or invader and support the resistance of the local population, without these features is difficult to talk about guerrilla warfare. The absence of one of the above mentioned characteristics leads to failure. A good example is the failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia - the lack of sufficient support from the local population determines the failure of the initiative for "export of revolution". Perhaps that is why in recent years, the great powers moved straight to "export of democracy".

In “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, Andrew Mack² argues that the power capabilities of the two warring parties can depend on the asymmetry of the attitude towards the war, the ability to mobilize society for the pursuit of success in military confrontation. He concludes that the most frequently lost war, that party which has lost the political will to win and the most important condition for the existence of such will is public support for the war.

In warfare, the asymmetry is an integral part of the antagonism; the question is how it manifests itself. Asymmetry can be *quantitative*, *qualitative* (technological and organizational) and *conceptual*.

Most used over the centuries is the *quantitative* asymmetry, which we can call classical asymmetry. It is creating numerical superiority in the ratio of the opposing sides. Quantitative asymmetry occurs when the opposing sides use similar means of warfare. The sides in war possess firearms, tanks, airplanes and ships, which are comparable in category with each other, even if they are from different generations. The most common option of *quantitative asymmetry* is by focusing efforts at a desired direction. We can define this as "linear" asymmetry - a conflict between unequal of opponents in characteristics of the same type weapons.

The second type of asymmetry, the *qualitative asymmetry* can be on the basis of technological, organizational advantage or a combination of both. It is expressed in various capacities on the basis of qualitative differences. It shows up most often in different technological and organizational level of the opposing sides. Qualitative asymmetry occurs when the opposing parties use different categories of means of warfare, which affects the organizational structure.

In a classic guerrilla war, guerrillas usually do not have the full range of weapons and platforms for them and do not have fully symmetrical organization of the state army, so they rely on surprise and depletion opponents.

Another example are the wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003), in which opposing parties are comparable in some indicators as countries but they are qualitatively different in economic and military capabilities. The level of information technologies used by the "coalition of the willings" excel significantly information technologies used by the Iraqi army.

The third type - *conceptual asymmetry* occurs when the opposing sides are incomparable as subjects, organization, preparation and sometimes technological equipment of structures designed to inflict defeat the enemy, this is the asymmetry in perceptions and means for applying defeat example in this respect are terrorists' organizations who oppose to unitary states or even strong international organizations.

The main characteristic of asymmetric threats is that no single organization or institution within the country and globally, which is able alone to deal successfully with asymmetric threats as manifestations of these threats are multi-faceted in different areas.

We can not apply reciprocal approach against asymmetric threats in the meaning of assets and in the purpose. Counteraction must be addressed to causes that give rise to these threats and to their specific manifestations. This requires the creation of a strong potential for the collection and processing of information, analysis and forecasts. Truly effective response, however, should be directed to the roots, the preconditions causing these threats, which inevitably shifts the focus of opposition from counter by force to act in the social, cultural and religious spheres, to prevent the causes of threats.

2

Conclusions

Someone might not see the link between conventionality of the means and asymmetry of the methods, but analysis of the actions of individual countries and alliances easily detected connection between them. An example is the development of the Russian position on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) from 2006-2007 until nowadays . Russia step by step refuses to comply with its commitments under this contract and this is the political prerequisite for establishing and maintaining strong asymmetric military superiority over its neighbors realized in conflict against Georgia in August 2008 used in the complicated situation around Ukraine in 2014-2015 and in the current situation of increasing tension between Russia and NATO.

The armed forces are the most conventional and most traditional means of state to exercise violence but this does not prevent them from unconventional influence, on the contrary precisely because of that they are subject to such influence.

Regulatory mechanisms in the international law on the use of different means, assets and methods in armed conflicts and beyond is doing aftermath and sometimes with considerable delay.

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CONSIDERATIONS ON HYBRID WAR

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Abstract: *The XXI century conflicts has unique features that cover the entire spectrum of social action: economic, identity, religious, social, military and may consist in particular of massive refugee movements, terrorism and organized cross-border crime, or other subversion actions. Hybrid war capabilities, by merging conventional and irregular lethal and non lethal with elements of organized crime, is mainly aimed at achieving a decisive advantage over opponents. Understanding the environment under which the hybrid conflict acts requires a multifactor approach that includes both classical aspects of the situation analysis of factors and societal factors such as culture, religion, population situation and satisfaction. Applying the results of knowledge, human potential, comprehensive interagency approach, capitalizing the intelligence and not at least multidisciplinary education and training should be priorities for addressing specific hybrid war.*

Keywords: *hybrid war, hybrid threat, hybrid confrontation, terrorism, crime.*

Introduction

The war is an objective reality, which is part of human life, especially human communities for which is vital to know and understand the reality of human existence. Economic disparities, widening disparities and the division of the population living in areas with different life levels may produce tension and conflict. In this versatile context, uncertain, complex and ambiguous definition of future wars physiognomy has become a concern almost feverish. As Toffler highlights, "logic, deduction, epistemology - in short, brain activity, human and machine - is the actual premise of military power."¹ Physiognomy reveals conflicts therefore a strong need for continuous improvement of the theoretical and practice associated approaches fighting methods and means of action.

Today the widening spectrum of threats, conflicts and crises typology diversification generates multiple challenges requiring multidimensional reactions based on adaptability, diversity, complementarity and coherence both domestically and internationally. Security analysts have acknowledged the confusion of war lines models. Conflicts of tomorrow will not be easy to categorize in conventional or irregular simple classifications. Conventional and irregular forces, combatants and non-combatants and even physical dimensions / kinetic and virtual of the conflict are confusing. Thus, we must admit that the future does not foresee a series of distinct challenges with various alternative methods used, but the convergence of multimodal wars or hybrid.

From Clausewitz's assertion, saying that war is "more than a chameleon" that continuously adapts every time, we want to bring to your attention, the issue of hybrid war as a form of future war but also his manifestations.

¹ Alvin Toffler, *Puterea în mișcare*, Editura Antet, București, 1995, p. 25.

Concepts such as combined wars or wars of fourth generation were prevalent in the literature in recent years. Current Conflicts regarded as "new wars" have unique characteristics which cover the whole spectrum of social action: economic, identity, religious, social, military, may consist in particular of massive refugee movements, terrorism and organized cross-border crime, subversive nature different and represents many challenges for political-military analysts.

The XXI century war will be hybrid, which will design all elements of national power, along complex continuous action, evidenced by a wide variety of military and non-military activities, resources of all kinds, structured and employed to maximize use persuasive political and economic influence, so as to positively influence the overall situation of the states. It includes information capabilities, unconventional weapons (including lethal), support units and combat equipment available for immediate use in cases where adverse elements - regular, irregular (insurgents, terrorists), or other non-state actors exceed a certain threshold hostility and become a direct threat.²

1. General considerations: definition. Main features

The term "hybrid warfare" is a concept that has no universally accepted definition, but subscribes to the laws of war and are explained in particular by the "law of flexibility and active interdependence", highlighting the complex nature of warfare in its various forms of expression, from the information war to the economic war, from threats to use force to media and psychological aggression, from guerrilla insurgencies to military confrontation.

Technological development urges political, economic, military, diplomatic and religious culture to combine with one another. Connecting points are ready, and the trend to unify the various fields is very clear. All these things are outdated interpreted trough the idea of military war and using war victims as a number for the measurement of war intensity.³

The Hybrid War incorporates a range of different ways of war including conventional capabilities, tactics, techniques and procedures and irregular terrorist acts including coercive and confused violence and criminal activities.⁴

According to other authors, hybrid war is "a combination of symmetric and asymmetric armed conflicts in which carrying riot traditional military operations against enemy forces and military targets, while simultaneously acting decisively to gain control of the indigenous population area of operations by stability operations."⁵

The Hybrid War, in our opinion, requires a complex involvement in a confrontation, undeclared by states or other actors, where the aggression seeks generating synergistic effects by exploiting combined social weaknesses (ethnic tensions, weak and corrupt institutions, economic dependence / energy etc.) and military, but the latter is not made explicit. Proposed effects can be achieved at all levels of war.

From this perspective we can say that "hybrid warfare" has multidimensional features that include:

- A *political dimension* - resulting from the diversity of interests of general policy or sequential setting objectives and the exploitation of the target state's political weaknesses. Highlighting the impact of policy cohesion to one or other of the actors was a fundamental

² Colonel Margaret S. Bond, United States Army Reserve, *Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States*, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle - PA, 30 March 2007, p. 4.

³ James N. Mattis & Frank Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

⁴ James N. Mattis & Frank Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings Magazine, November 2005, p. 2.

⁵ Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired, *Hybrid Wars*, Military Review, March-April 2008, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 107 - 108.

aspect of Clausewitz's criterion, but the idea fulfill indirectly rather than in the military forces from the field way stresses the growing, multimodal character of the conflict. We witness also the increased role of unconventional actors that can operate beyond state control, evading borders, rules and agreements⁶. Some of them belong to the global terrorist networks and cooperates with other criminal elements to destabilize certain areas;

- *An economic dimension* - resulting from the use of economic resources, especially the resources as a weapon in dealing hybrid confrontation. A state who is economically dependent on potential enemy states, corroded by corruption, easily penetrated in the strategic decision level, may constitute a potential target in the hybrid war;

- *An ethnic-cultural dimension*, which derives from the ability to exploit ethnic and cultural tensions in the target state, leading to centrifugal action and creating so-called "Trojan horses";

- *A diplomatic dimension* – targeting the ability and the capacity to create and develop an enabling environment through diplomatic means discrediting the target state;

- *A technological dimension* - includes capabilities of combining high technology, such as anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare directed against the opponents;

- *Information – media dimension* – aims the aggressor ability to exercise influence over the population. In direct relation to this aspect will be considered the influence of enemy public and temporary isolation of own population in order to reduce the scope of influence. A weak state can be the favorite target of a hybrid war because the enemy can exploit the discontent of the population. Dealing hybrid is "a struggle beyond the physical elements of the conflict, the media manipulation, use of the Internet and the integration of information operations with strategic communication programs are as important as weapons systems on the battlefield"⁷;

- *A strategic dimension* implies the need for complex actions, prepared in advance, diverse and constantly updated which have the purpose to dominance the potential opponent. Hybrid opponents seek victory by merging irregular tactics and by the most lethal as possible in order to attack and achieve political objectives.

- *An operational dimension* - combining hybrid lethality war conflict means with irregular warfare. In such conflicts, opponents will explore military capabilities including access control systems and other modern lethal systems, as well as promoting the insurgency extension that involves ambushes, IED's and assassinations⁸. Unlike combined wars, the purpose of hybrid approach is not to cause regression of the enemy force in operational phase or conventional forces but to support the emergence of a decisive battlefield. The Hybrid War destructive component derives not from the revolutionary technology but from crime. Criminal activity is used to support hybrid force or to foster disorder on target nation. The purpose may include protracted conflicts with confusing sets of capabilities to counter resistance forces or conventional defense oriented government⁹.

- Essentially, hybrid war materializes a combination of conventional and irregular capabilities, lethal and nonlethal which ensures a decisive advantage over opponents, following, in our opinion, whit the following principles:

⁶ Colonel Steven C. Williamson, *From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid War*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March 2009, p. 15.

⁷ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force* (Norfolk, VA, November 2008), p. 39.

⁸ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington – Virginia, December, 2007, p. 27.

⁹ Christopher O. Bowers, *Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle-PA, *Parameters*, Spring 2012, pp 40 – 41.

- *Political dominance principle*, which implies that military decisions are taken at all levels based on political decisions and commanders must find ways to take action to support those goals in line with national legal regulations and / or international;

- *Omni directionality* principle implies an approach to multiple space of confrontation, both in terms of traditional land, air, sea, information, cyber space and in terms of knowledge. Politics, economy, culture, morals can become real spaces of confrontation. In developing action plans and engaging forces must be considered all resources that can be mobilized.

- *The principle of unity of effort* aimed at synchronization, interagency cooperation and integrated actions. Military leaders should harmonize their actions with other governmental or non-governmental actors in the conflict zone. Commanders must find solutions to the puzzle confrontation, multiple spaces in different areas, taking into account the temporal dimension of confrontation, which implies the ability to drive action at the same time but in different environments confrontation.

- *Principle of asymmetry* If the principle of asymmetry was investigated in operational terms, in the traditional military dimension, the principle of asymmetry in hybrid warfare aimed at achieving victory over the space of confrontation, including by putting military leaders in difficulty to understand the purpose and nature of such a war, the wrong approach of forces training and plans development.

- *The principle of adaptability* - the ability of structural and action adjustment, development of new techniques, tactics and procedures to effectively address specific situations arising. Inflexibility, combined with the efficient exchange of information is the great vulnerability of a hybrid conflict, because it does not understand the importance of each organization, thus neglecting cooperation and is a waste of effort and resources, and the results will soon appear.

- *The principle of perseverance*, aimed at long-term goals at the expense of short-term success. Hybrid conflict has no clear onset and no final state marked by decisive action.

- *The principle of legitimacy* is derived from the desire of the conflicting parties (government, group, agency) to impose their own decisions.

We can say that the understanding of the hybrid conflict environment requires a multifactor approach that includes both classical aspects of the situation analysis of factors and societal factors such as culture, religion, population situation and satisfaction. As stressed by American specialists "Armed conflicts are beginning to reflect a mixture of models - conventional and unconventional - while many fighters simultaneously engages modern assault bridges, machetes prehistoric and modern cell phones in their operations."¹⁰

Understanding hybrid threats thereof, as elusive, fluid, should be a constant concern of the military leaders, both in terms of developing operational plans and in terms of driving forces actions.

2. The need to know. Possible courses of action

The possibility of a renewed outbreak of conventional war, although small, should not be totally excluded. Hybrid War will not replace conventional war forms but we will see a combination of their various forms, hybrid form is given just that he,, is generated by threat fusion and led by merging capabilities, thus preserving convergence opponents, methods and means in order to achieve the political goals of belligerents "¹¹, which in our opinion implies first of all, his knowledge.

Knowing as human action is "the ability to understand the present reality, based on information, perceptions and evaluations, and the ability to support actions in order to shape

¹⁰ Frank G. Hoffman, *op cit.*, p. 33.

¹¹ *Idem*, p. 7.

future realities."¹² Modern management, exercised at any level, is based primarily on knowledge; it must change uncertainty in risk, manage opportunities and reduce the hazard¹³. For these reasons we believe that the changes approach in knowledge-based operational environment must be conducive to useful action. The management of new types of conflicts involves multidimensional training. The military, as Toffler said, "can be taught in all areas, from unknown weapons handling to inter-cultural sensitivity"¹⁴.

The success of hybrid war actions depends on the application of knowledge results, as specialized planning and organization, but especially of execution process.

Without being exhaustive we want to bring to your attention some possible courses of action for managing hybrid conflict issues:

Multidisciplinary education and training - hybrid operations driven by the dynamic and ambiguous environment, values the leadership at all levels. Admiral Michael Mullen outlined changes required in institutional education in an era marked by conflicts include different methods to determine specific training, education and different outreach from those that occurred in the past.¹⁵

So, there are rules of moral conduct and that can be prevalent in hybrid operation. It is necessary that military leaders to have competencies for a variety of tasks, to accommodate rapidly in terms of cognitive and emotional challenges, to suddenly acquire skills in new contexts of action and provide moral support to subordinates, as they carry out different actions in this complex environment.¹⁶

Interagency approach involves a joint effort based on well-defined strategy to establish roles and responsibilities for congruent interagency actions, both at the governmental and nongovernmental level. Agencies, whether governmental or non-governmental, tend to govern independent activity, giving out many times to military advice, for various reasons and by this gesture, engaging resumption of the planning process. These reasons are necessary to be identified, to determine their impact on the action and, not ultimately, must be negotiated in such a way as to reduce both the number and especially the effects on the action.¹⁷ This strategy should then form the basis for civil and military more detailed planning leading to operationalize them. Civilian agencies should be consulted early in the development of civilian and military plans and vice versa.¹⁸

Intelligence products employment. Intelligence is the main form that provides a risk management decision input, challenges and threats detection, as well as the opportunities¹⁹. This requires an integrated approach to political, economic, cultural, societal, providing a comprehensive understanding of the situation, historical background, civilization and ethnicity. Intelligence community involvement is essential in our view for the management of hybrid war issues.

Cultural awareness is also an important factor for leaders. They must study mostly all aspects of local culture and establish their new environment requirements in carrying out operations.

In different cultural contexts, effective leaders adapt to new situations, realizing that their actions can be interpreted differently in different cultural contexts. Like other skills,

¹² George Cristian Maior (coordonator), *Despre Inteligence*, Editura RAO, București 2014, p. 10.

¹³ *Idem*, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ Alvin și Heidi Toffler, *Război și anti-război – supraviețuirea în zorii secolului XXI*, Editura Antet, 1995, p.86

¹⁵ Allison Abbe, Stanley N. Halpin, *The cultural imperative for professional military education and leader development*, in Parameters winter 2009, USArmy War College, p. 24.

¹⁶ FM 6-22, *Army Leadership, competent, confident and agile*, Department of the Army, USA, 2006, Chapter I

¹⁷ Aall, Pamela, Miltenberger, Daniel, Weiss, Thomas, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in peace and relief operations*, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2000, p. 25.

¹⁸ Dennis, E., Skocz, *A front-line view of the interagency*, USArmy War College, courses, 2007

¹⁹ George Cristian Maior (coordonator), *Despre Inteligence*, Editura RAO, București 2014, p. 10.

cultural awareness requires self-knowledge, self-learning and adaptability. Addressing cultural field, we find a comprehensive definition at Rey Micheline who claims that "Who says intercultural say necessarily fully based on the meaning of the prefix inter: interaction, sharing, openness, reciprocity, solidarity objective. It also says giving full sense of the term culture: recognizing values, lifestyles, symbolic representations to which the human beings, individuals or companies."²⁰

To achieve this requirement leaders have formed the foundation of knowledge and cultural learning from the time they were military students.

Organizational culture. Hybrid war poses a great organizational challenge for military. Simultaneously with the need to conduct multiple missions they will have to work and within the civil - military and non-combatants protection and control, especially in large cities. Civil - military cooperation has an important role because of the need to obtain local resources and actions carried out in an international legal framework. Terms and political pressures require cooperation between civilian and military landing on a highly diverse framework. Therefore we consider necessary to start training experimental design programs focused on understanding the operational hybrid operations.

Organizational modeling from adaptive systems to perspective²¹, in which roles and functions are adjustable while interfering or fading into the context. This model characterizes entities able to continuously learn and adapt to environmental pressures, being able to take on tasks, functions or additional tasks on a model similar to biological organisms. The ability of opportunities and technological advantages exploitation and risks avoidance depends on organizational flexible formulas achievement, ability to adapt to the challenges of sustained theater who understand the new rules of the game and are able to develop operations in pace, regardless of the geophysical challenges.

Background doctrine derives from the need for key elements of physical fields, informational and cognitive involved in command and control of military action, considered basic and necessary command and control process modeling, have well-defined structures with the ability to perceive phenomena, to use and transmit information, knowledge and transmit knowledge, understand, acknowledge and communicate beliefs, decide, act, work in planning and synchronize military actions with non-military²². Doctrinal approach should aim primarily to important changes of the operational environment, the impact these changes have on the environment in specific actions of new types of wars with direct influence on the generation and forces training process.

Conclusions

Hybrid war is a combination of conventional and unconventional capabilities, lethal and non-lethal, in different spheres of social life, aimed to achieve a decisive advantage over opponents.

Hybrid war covers both intra as well as inter-state plateau, and can take very diverse manifestations while integrating regular forces, guerrilla formations, terrorist or criminal elements and using various weapons and tactics, without regard to the laws of war.

Hybrid confrontation exceeds the physical side of the conflict, media and image war, where media handling and opponent discretization may be priorities, where integration of

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ John H. Holland, în *Journal of System Science and Complexity* nr. !9,2006 ,pp 1–8, disponibil la http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/41486/11424_2006_article_1.pdf?sequence=1 (accesat martie, 2015)

²² Roceanu, Ion, *Războiul bazat pe rețea - dincolo de tehnologie*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare București, 2005, p. 66.

information operations with strategic communication programs are as important as weapons systems on the battlefield. The border between regular warfare and "new wars" is more diffuse, non-state groups have access to those weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of states. Amplification means, techniques, methods and unconventional strategies can lead to a real security dilemma, meaning growth trends of power manifestation, especially military of states.

Management of hybrid warfare requires a multidimensional approach based on hybrid responses to conflict, including almost all walks of life: political, economic, financial, societal, environmental. The success of the operations is given by synergy effects, effects that can be achieved at all levels of war. Applying the results of knowledge, human potential, and comprehensive approach, interagency, capitalizing the intelligence and not least multidisciplinary education and training must be a priority.

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THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION VECTORS IN HARMONIZING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM, WITH THE EMERGING CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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***Abstract:** The major concerns of both the leaders of international actors and the participants in the development of power strategies are national security and foreign policy; this will keep the traditional international system under the constant pressure of different views to the social systems of values. Throughout history, the phenomenon of globalization has used its vectors to try and harmonize the social values of different geographical areas, or at least to make them mutually accepted. Due both to the free access to and the globalization of information, the capacity of the nation-state, as it was understood after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), to influence and control the development of different social events and to influence the citizens' attitude, is reduced by a variety of non-state actors that succeed in going beyond the formal boundaries of states and influence people with their ideas and/or interests. As a consequence of these actions and reactions at a global level, the international system has been confronted with states that failed socially, states which are undergoing a failure of their governing policies or regions without governing bodies. The potential positive impact of globalization and of the information revolution must be used to counter the exceptional cases like cross-border terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, the spread of drug use and disease, the destruction of the environment etc. In this context, the current system of international relations must rethink the structure of the on-going relations, roles and interactions between the state and non-state actors on the one hand, and coalitions and alliances on the other hand.*

Key words: actor, cultural, economic, globalization, governing, military, policy, power, religious, state, strategy.

Introduction

The nation-state is, at the beginning of the 21st century, the dominant concept of international politics, even if in today's interconnected and interdependent world, the phenomenon of globalization has imposed a new type of border, the informal border between communities. This type of frontier tends to replace the formal frontier of the state, in its capacity to influence events, individuals or communities as, in our opinion, this informal frontier is extended through non-state actors and their actions both within the globalizing states or alliances and, in an even more powerful way, in the globalized areas, in failed states, in failing states or regions without governing bodies.

The main concern at an international level is that the new influence of non-state actors is manifested in today's globalized world simultaneously with the proliferation of transnational terrorist threats, of weapons of mass destruction, with rising criminality, surging drug sale, the emergence of potentially epidemic diseases, the degrading and destruction of the environment. Thus it's become increasingly difficult to ascertain if the actors, through their usually positive actions, have participated in these social problems or have fuelled them.

In our opinion, we need to examine why these negative phenomena influencing the development and security of human society, are proliferated, given the fact that together with the globalization of information, which we think is a factor that has a positive impact on society as a whole, the main globalization vectors, the military, the economic, the political, the cultural and the religious vector, acquired, as early as the beginning of the 20th century, a strong social component directed both towards the preservation of general or specific social values and towards the validation of communities.

Today's system of international relations can be defined as a structure that exists at an international level and functions through the action of the globalized society, on two levels: one defined by the parts and the importance that actors have within the system and the other by the action and reaction between states and non-state actors.

In our opinion, which is shared by most analysts of the international system, there are three categories of non-state actors: international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations¹.

Brief analysis of the international system

States build foreign policy strategies and develop their national security policies in the context of an existing system of international relations but also taking into account the changes in the security paradigm which envisage a change of this system. These changes that the international system undergoes, continuously generate opportunities for action and reaction, for cooperation or for crises/conflicts and last but not least, for benefits or losses.

After the end of each major conflict, the international community tried to find solutions for preventing conflicts and maintaining an international order/balance, by creating and using international institutions such as the United Nations or by conceiving and enforcing international agreements such as the Geneva Conventions². Through the systems of analysis

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_corporation - A *multinational corporation* or *multinational enterprise* is an organization that owns or controls productions of goods or services in one or more countries other than the home country. It can also be referred as an *international corporation*, a "transnational corporation", or as a *stateless corporation*. A multinational corporation is usually a large corporation which produces or sells goods or services in various countries. It may be attributed as multinational corporation, when a corporation is registered in more than one country or has operations in more than one country. The problem of moral and legal guiding behaviors of multinational corporations, given that they are effectively "stateless" actors, is one of the urgent global socioeconomic problems that emerged during the late twentieth century. One of the first multinational business organizations, East India Company, arose in 1600. After East India Company, came Dutch East India Company, founded March 20, 1602, which would become the largest company in the world for nearly 200 years. Accessed March 26, 2015.

² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions - *The Geneva Conventions* comprise four treaties, and three additional protocols, that establish the standards of international law for the humanitarian treatment of war. The singular term *Geneva Convention* usually denotes the agreements of 1949, negotiated in the aftermath of the Second World War, which updated the terms of the first three treaties, and added a fourth. The Geneva Conventions extensively defined the basic rights of wartime prisoners (civilians and military); established protections for the wounded; and established protections for the civilians in and around a war-zone. With three Geneva Conventions revised and adopted, and the fourth added, in 1949 the whole set is referred to as the "Geneva Conventions of 1949" or simply the "Geneva Conventions". The treaties of 1949 were ratified, in whole or with reservations, by 196 countries. Moreover, the Geneva Convention also defines the rights and protections afforded to non-combatants, yet, because the Geneva Conventions are about people in war, the articles do not address warfare proper—the use of weapons of war—which is the subject of the Hague Conventions (First Hague Conference, 1899; Second Hague Conference 1907), and the bio-chemical warfare Geneva Protocol (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925). The 1949 conventions have been modified with three amendment protocols: Protocol I (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol II (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol III (2005) relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem. Accessed March 27, 2015.

they devise for formulating their strategies, the actors of the international system should permanently classify into patterns of analysis, the action and reaction forces that manifest themselves at a global level, the evolution trends of events from a local to a zone level and the influence of such international movements on the security policies specific to each event.

This analysis should result in the understanding of the interests and aims of all the actors involved in a certain situation and, moreover, to stress who are the state and non-state actors and their level of involvement in an international event.

In today's globalized world, it has become very important that the analysis structures and those that devise the strategies of state actors, simultaneously analyse the competition value and the objectives of both state and non-state global actors, in an international event. In this type of analysis of the international system, we must take into account the capacity of an actor to resort to and mobilize other state and/or non-state actors to support it, so that both the decision makers who create and/or implement strategies and the decision makers in the field of foreign policy know as thoroughly as possible which coalitions or alliances can be empowered to intervene in an event.

Another element of research that we deem should be taken into account in the analysis of the international system is the economic state/power of an actor and the influence that the economic vector of globalization has over it, both as action and as reaction is concerned. Through this analysis, we can foresee both the positive and the negative aspects, which will emerge in an economy, due to the globalization phenomenon, as well as the distribution of power to the actors that influence and those that could influence the system in the future. It is important to those who analyse and devise the strategies and policies of an actor, to be able to identify national and international doctrines, international structures and regimes which prompt a situation, in order to timely understand the threats to the existing order of the current international system, threats that can be represented both by classical international entities and by new transnational entities.

The creators of strategies and security analysts are looking for solutions to assess all these factors that are influencing the international system swiftly and appropriately, because thus they could effectively determine the constraints and the capacity of an actor to act in relation to the restrictions inherent to the contemporary global world. In the 21st century, opportunities, challenges and threats to security are manifested under different forms and on different levels, which most of the time do not fit the classical patterns.

The careful analysis of the action and reaction of a community to the globalization vectors could offer the response so that an actor, coalition or alliance, which can intervene to maintain the balance of the international system, can decide if to use hard power or soft power methods, and when, where and for how long they will be used to balance the system.

Classically, a threat to the international system can be defined as a nation-state which owns an army of mass destruction and has an aggressive attitude or a revisionist aggressive attitude to the other state actors or to the system of international relations in its current form. In our opinion this type of threat to the international system can also come from a non-state actor, as it can transfer its values and ideas more easily to a community or even an individual. Non-state actors can and are working directly with communities and individuals; they have a different type of authority, most of the time informal, and can reach individuals to persuade them to fly a plane into a building.

In the 21st century, in today's interconnected and interdependent world, the collateral constraints that can be used by the actors of the international system, cannot be classified as hard power or soft power, as they are less direct, but are specific to the globalized society. These constraints may vary from the political and/or economic isolation of a state actor to the

denial of aid by other international state or non-state actors. This isolation or denial of aid can take different forms, like the veto within a meeting of an international organization such as the United Nations, NATO, or an international regulatory structure such as the International Atomic Energy Agency³ or the diplomatic rejection by which, for example, a state actor will not allow the passing of another state's armed forces on its national territory.

Due to the continuous computerization and globalization of information, the system of international relations of the beginning of this century has succeeded in "narrowing distances" and facilitating any type of intervention from state to non-state actors, which have the required capacity and capabilities, to communities, geographical areas or state actors which directly or indirectly request support.

This type of opportunity could also be a natural disaster, an economic crisis or an epidemic, event that can be used by an actor to show its willingness to offer support and subsequently intervene for solving the event. Once the challenge created by the event has been stabilized or solved, the said actor gains the right to influence the community or the actor it helped, and the globalizing actor can easily transfer such influence to soft power mechanisms.

The changes of political regime, that occur peacefully or through conflict within a community or a state actor, fall within the same category of opportunities specific to the 21st century that could be used for the stability of the international system. This type of events is characterized by the existence of a transition period absolutely necessary for moving to a democracy; simultaneously or immediately after this transition period, there emerge two periods of economic transition of the community to a market economy, that can be rightly engaged in the global economy. A special situation is represented by the states that accept the coordination of an international regime, by signing a peace treaty and weapon control, for a determined period of time.

In analyses of the system of international relations, we can outline the fact that in the 21st century, state and non-state actors manifest their influence simultaneously and on increasingly close levels, which increases their individual and joint sphere of action. World globalization and this diversification of the sphere of action create opportunities to influence other international actors but also to harmonize or at least to mutually accept social values of different geographical areas and the order of the international system.

It is generally accepted in academia that the concepts of *Nation* and *State* are two different concepts, even if in different contexts parts of their definitions or characteristics overlap in meaning. From the point of view of the nation, we can define the sum of these communities as a national entity. The state, assimilated in the academic literature with the concept of nation-state, is more complex from an administrative point of view, namely it implies an administrative and a legal authority at the same time, having legitimacy in the

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Atomic_Energy_Agency - *The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The IAEA was established as an autonomous organization on July 1957. Though established independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, the IAEA Statute, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The IAEA has two "Regional Safeguards Offices" which are located in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA also has two liaison offices which are located in New York City, United States, and in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, the IAEA has three laboratories located in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria, and in Monaco. The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide. The programs of the IAEA encourage the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials, and promote nuclear safety (including radiation protection) and nuclear security standards and their implementation. Accessed March 28, 2015.

international system; it is endowed with rights and obligations as basic principles of international law and of its existence within international relations.

An important element that must be taken into account when analysing security and not only, is the fact that all the actors involved in the international system, either state or non-state actors, are based on communities and work with communities. Each community, irrespective of its level of social development, is based on a cultural identity matrix. This cultural identity matrix is defined as the amount of major information, which has coagulated the social structure and generated social relations within the matrix. The cultural identity matrix conveys the information which is structured within a society within the communitarian « DNA » from one generation to another, along its historical evolution.

When we talk about the globalization phenomenon, we must analyse and understand the communitarian matrix, as it is this matrix that prompts the reaction of a community to internal or external stimuli generated by globalization in a certain way, specific to the said community. The reaction force of the matrix makes the response of the community unitary well structured and directed towards the immediate or long-term benefit, and towards the material or spiritual benefit of the Community. All this helps us give a brief definition to the concept of nation in the 21st century, namely a group of communities that have developed communitarian connections, have common values, have a common ancestry, a unitary language, even if there are local dialects, have a common history accepted by the community and most importantly, have developed a communitarian culture.

To conclude our brief analysis of the international system, we would like to mention a major event in the history of international relations, namely the 1933 Montevideo Convention⁴ on the rights and duties of states. This moment is considered to be the onset of the classical legal definition of states, as this Convention ascribes the following components to states: a clearly defined permanent population, a defined territory with determined boundaries, a governing body capable of exercising authority by its effective control on the territory and stable and mutually accepted international relations with other states.

The performance of the international system

In the 21st century system of international relations, the actors, either state or non-state actors, appear in four versions: they act alone, they act jointly, they act simultaneously but separately, and, the most interesting type, they act by continuously looking to collaborate with other actors of the system. This last type of manifestation in the international system makes it possible for collaborative relations of any type to be established, either formal or informal, within a security paradigm prompted by an event, for re-establishing order at a zonal and global level.

Relations can be established between all state or non-state actors, including non-governmental⁵ and international organizations, coalitions and groups of states, as well as

⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montevideo_Convention - *The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* was a treaty signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933, during the Seventh International Conference of American States. The Convention codified the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law. At the conference, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared the *Good Neighbor Policy*, which opposed U.S. armed intervention in inter-American affairs. The convention was signed by 19 states. The acceptance of three of the signatories was subject to minor reservations. Those states were Brazil, Peru and the United States. The convention became operative on December 26, 1934. It was registered in *League of Nations Treaty Series* on January 8, 1936. Accessed March 29, 2015.

⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization - A *non-governmental organization (NGO)* is an organization that is neither a part of a government nor a conventional for-profit business. Usually set up by

informal non-state actors, such as groups formed around religious or cultural leaders, so that during the event and before entering a post-crisis/conflict period, they find a means of action accepted by all the parties involved or interested in the event. In the 21st century, collaborating within the international system is vital for surviving the system and this is precisely why state actors are free to choose to enter a coalition, to form or join an alliance, to collaborate with all the forms of non-state actors, to have collaborations that are not always officially recognized by the other members of the system.

In the international system, an *Alliance* is a formal agreement, formalized in well-defined structures between states, with the aim of providing common security. An alliance is created between two or several states to create a common security system and structure, which takes into account the existing paradigms at a certain time, but it can also be created so that state actors join forces against a common threat to their national security. By joining a certain alliance, actors aim at enhancing their position within the international system and at the same time to boost their security and defence capacity, as opposed to other non-member states or to protect themselves against the threats that can be prompted by already existing international events or by events predicted to happen in a strategically determined future.

Through the agreements they reach or through their bylaws, the members of an alliance can mutually consolidate their resources, they can act together in different situations, so that they can become stable or even reduce their defence spending and not least of all, if there are no clauses preventing it, states can use joint defence capabilities and even mutually supplement their manpower with manpower from other members of the alliance.

From the point of view of theoretical logistic considerations, an alliance is, or at least should be, less costly than if a state unilaterally approaches the enforcement of its security strategy. In modern history, the best-known alliances are NATO, which is still in place, and the Warsaw Pact, officially called the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, which was officially dissolved in Prague on 1st July 1991. The same system of alliances is developed at a global level by the economic vector, through economic alliances by international actors. This leads to higher security and the boost in the actors' domestic and foreign trade, but also to their enhanced economic capabilities by mutual financial assistance and by financial support or loans between partners.

From a point of view of the international system, coalitions are agreements between international actors, less formal than alliances. As a means of formalization, we can liken a coalition to an open group, usually involving actors who are different. We can note that coalitions are temporary, created for a much shorter period than alliances, and that all the actors involved in a coalition have a common, well-defined aim. Once this aim is attained, the

ordinary citizens, NGOs may be funded by governments, foundations, businesses, or private persons. Some avoid formal funding altogether and are run primarily by volunteers. NGOs are highly diverse groups of organizations engaged in a wide range of activities, and take different forms in different parts of the world. Some may have charitable status, while others may be registered for tax exemption based on recognition of social purposes. Others may be fronts for political, religious or other interest groups. The number of NGOs in the United States is estimated at 1.5 million. Russia has 277,000 NGOs. India is estimated to have had around 2 million NGOs in 2009. NGOs are difficult to define, and the term 'NGO' is rarely used consistently. As a result, there are many different classifications in use. The most common focus is on 'orientation' and 'level of operation'. An NGO's orientation refers to the type of activities it takes on. These activities might include human rights, environmental, or development work. An NGO's level of operation indicates the scale at which an organization works, such as local, regional, national or international. The term "non-governmental organization" was first coined in 1945, when the United Nations (UN) was created. The UN, itself an inter-governmental organization, made it possible for certain approved specialized international non-state agencies—*i.e.*, non-governmental organizations—to be awarded observer status at its assemblies and some of its meetings. Later the term became used more widely. Today, according to the UN, any kind of private organization that is independent from government control can be termed an "NGO", provided it is not-for-profit, non-criminal and not simply an opposition political party. Accessed March 30, 2015.

coalition is dissolved. Being less formal than alliances and stretching over a shorter period of time, coalitions give international actors the possibility of entering this group either for creating a positive image or out of convenience. By contrast with alliances, coalitions are usually military. The best-known coalitions are those led by the USA both during the first conflict of the Persian Gulf, Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and during the second conflict of the Persian Gulf, the operation to free Iraq.

The vectors of globalization, military, economic, political, religious and cultural, influence state actors, prompting them to join coalitions or alliances, as the transfer and sharing of knowledge and technology in our globalized world generate social and implicitly military security, which means more power and opportunities of survival for an actor than if they performed by themselves in the international system. In the 21st century, the latent vector of globalization, the cultural vector, is increasingly gaining importance in the structure of the system of international relations, as the globalization of information has made it possible for civil society, from a community to an individual level, to be able to know in real time what happens anywhere around the world and moreover, to be able to speak out and fight for their ideals and beliefs at a local, zonal or global level.

Each state or non-state actor is based on the community or communities that it is made up of and, as previously shown, each community has its own cultural identity matrix. This matrix makes a community react to internal or external stimuli generated by globalization, in a certain way, specific to the said community. This will prompt actors to join coalitions or alliances for three main reasons: for the balance and security of their existing social structures; for a spiritual or material advantage and/or for a communitarian system of values which fit their cultural identity matrix.

These decisions to join a coalition or an alliance relate to two components which act simultaneously but on different levels: the *authority* and the *power/willingness* to do so, taking into account the fact that the two components have two fundamental characteristics, namely a conscious and subconscious action in their relations with the other actors of the international system. An actor joins an alliance or a coalition to enhance its potential strength and implicitly its power as an actor or to counteract the influence of another actor or group of actors against whom it competes in one way or another within the international system.

The regulation and the balance of the international system are vital to the existence of all the actors. Therefore we could argue that a group of actors comes into existence when less powerful international actors deem unacceptable the influence or the domination of a powerful actor and the interests affected and the costs are greater if things do not change and the powerful actor is allowed to continue its policies without being controlled than if they start an action against it.

The balance of the international system can be attained by actions from outside, when less powerful actors form a coalition or an alliance against the more powerful actor, thus trying to transfer power to their side, and from the inside when the actor decides to enhance its economic capacity and capabilities and, in case of state actors, their military and economic capacity and capabilities.

In the system of international relations, there are two main types of action for balancing the system: hard and soft. By a hard balancing action, we understand an activity to boost military force and/or a direct threat to use armed forces by an actor against another actor. The soft balancing action can be defined as the context in which the less powerful actor or actors want and have to slow down or stop the activity of their powerful opponent, but consider that they cannot take into account the option of directly using military force and therefore the actors use non-military actions or elements of non-military power to neutralize the more powerful or uncontrollable actor in the international system.

The elements of non-military power and non-military actions are unlimited in terms of type of action and manifestation and they are usually enforced by non-state actors who choose the means of implementing them in the chosen area based on the economic, political, religious and cultural vectors of globalization.

We would like to draw attention to the fact that we must not take the decision of an actor to join an alliance or a coalition for the balancing of the international system, as they represent different levels and most importantly, the decision of a state to join a more powerful actor is unilateral. The fact of joining a coalition or an alliance is the result of a decision made by the government of a state actor following a complex analysis that could be reduced to the name of cost-benefit analysis. In reality, a less powerful state actor analyses and weighs the conclusion that they would have to pay more for the reaction and the opposition to the unwanted more powerful actor, than the benefits they would gain by joining an alliance or a coalition, which comes with support and assistance. When international events are important and tend to change from crises into conflicts, the powerful actors of the international system who wish to maintain a state of balance can encourage the less powerful actors to join the pro-balance group, which can mean gaining territories or different economic or commercial agreements.

In the international system, decisions are made by actors taking into account three main objectives: national interest, social well-being and national security, so that we can say that both state and non-state actors decide to join an alliance or a coalition and enforce certain policies that would be agreed at a group level according to their own assessment, namely the power they will gain in the international system through joining.

This type of analysis reflects a basic principle of the concept of balancing the system, namely the natural limitation of a single actor's hegemony. It is necessary that the analysis of the system of international relations draws a distinction between the balance of power politics, which is a system of actions looked for and deliberately applied by the actors with a view to preventing the hegemony of a single actor in the international system, which is a natural action system generated by the interaction between the system's actors, by which they limit or restrict any attempt to gain hegemony by an actor due to the system's stability.

The 21st century international system reacts to the changes of balance by opposing the action of a more powerful actor to dictate the policies of a less powerful actor, as in fact the opportunity for one actor to dominate is limited from the beginning. This power balancing mechanism is enforced to protect the system and to provide its stable structure by maintaining in the system the sovereign and especially independent states. In reality it is obvious that power in the international system is unevenly distributed, but the survival of the system consists precisely in the actors' capacity to act and regroup against the unbalanced power, which poses a threat to stability. These pressures on the international system, generated by the appeal of power, are the factor of coalescence and reasoning so that state and non-state actors undertake forming alliances or coalitions to enforce balancing policies of the system in order to oppose potential dominant actors.

Our point of view is that one of the keys to controlling the system's stability is protecting state sovereignty within the international system, as it is very interesting both to the dominant actors and for the least powerful ones in the context of our globalized work, where we cannot effectively control either the movement of people or the movement of information. In this context of inequality in the distribution of power, of the possibility of violent threats and the need of social safety, the balance of power is based on a big compromise between the actors of the international system, prompted by the need of security for development and the human instinct of survival and its simple explanation is that the state of stability is definitely more profitable than anarchy.

We can say that in the international system, the concept of balance of power has three main objectives: to protect the system against the possibility of being turned into a global empire by conquest by a dominant actor, to maintain a local power balance for the protection of zonal actors against the dominance of a regional actor and, maybe most importantly, to create the conditions for the development of complementary balance components such as diplomacy, culture, technology, knowledge.

The stability of the performance of the international system in the foreseeable future is the direction of analysis for all the actors involved in maintaining the balance and, at a community level, it has become apparent that in our interconnected and interdependent world, collective defence and the provision of security within an alliance or a coalition is much safer and much more profitable than isolation based on one's own power.

The most important objective for the actors of the international system is to provide national security, as it is the main element of progress and development of a society. In an abstract sense, security can be translated by the lack of threats against an actor but also a lack of threats against its interests. If until the 19th century the threats to an actor's security were predominantly military, as of the 20th century we can talk about a broader concept of security by including in the concept other social dimensions imposed by the increasingly well-informed, globalized society. The new approaches to the concept of security have widened due to the need of sustainable development for food, environmental and economic security.

An important element that an actor takes into account when analysing the security strategy it wishes to adopt is *national interest*. In the context of world globalization on all levels, from information to knowledge, an actor, whose behaviour in the international system is determined by its cultural identity matrix, has to take into account its national interest. That is because in order to participate in the international system, individually or in alliances or coalitions, it must have both the authority to mobilize resources of any kind required for a certain security strategy and the power/will to do it. Going from one policy level to another, generated by the enforcement of a strategy is a reality at must be fully borne by an actor's leader/leaders.

We consider that in the 21st century, due to the action of the globalization vectors – military, economic, political, religious, cultural - and to the fact that they perform in an almost fully interconnected and interdependent world, actors do not rely only on their direct power anymore, when acting in the international system, but follow a nuanced strategy with regard to their interests. The new strategy of manifesting one's power is based both on influencing other actors by the implicit manifestation of power as well as by intimidation and means by which the other actors are made aware of the power resources that one actor has.

In the international system, the active vectors of globalization – the military and the economic vectors – are the action base that can be used when an actor wishes to use the hard component of power, which can manifest itself by direct military and economic means. They can either threaten force, using military power or economic sanctions, trade blockades, funds for bribing the decision-makers of the aggressive system, funds directed to the support of opponents or economic assistance for non-state actors of the opposition or opposing state actors. We can state that hard power is an international actor's capacity to influence directly and by force and to be able to prevent another actor from performing aggressive actions.

The soft method is based on globalization's latent vectors, the religious and the cultural, together with the mixed vector, namely politics. The most frequently used means in this case are diplomacy, cultural movements and traditional religious movements, and this type of action can be enforced in most cases with the help of non-state actors and sometimes by also using modern or traditional communities of that area, which are opposed to the aggressive actor. In short, we can affirm that the soft method is the capacity of an

international actor to influence indirectly, by cultural and ideological methods and to be able to prevent another actor from performing aggressive actions.

After the end of the Second World War, using force was a means preferred by powerful actors and unfortunately accepted by less powerful actors and thus the most visible form of regulating the international system was using hard power. The social traumas generated by the Second World War were enormous and maybe it is then that you could find the justification for using direct force in security strategies. Thomas SCHELLING, one of the classical analysts of the theory of force and intimidation, describes in his works of the 1960s that using force or threatening to use force must be seen as a sort of „flawed diplomacy”. In his works, which were very much appreciated between first publication and the 1990s, the author describes four different ways of using force: intimidation, imposition, constraint and brute force.

If we analyse what Thomas SCHELLING⁶ presents and argues, everything is logical and clear but relatively simplistic and more similar to the way of dealing with naughty children than to an attempt to harmonize social values. The author, together with his team of analysts and researchers, built an entire scientific argument at the time, which, if taken out of the military context and transferred to the social context, can still be useful. In short, we can state that: intimidation is meant to prevent another actor from doing what they would otherwise do and for a certain period of time the intimidated actor is convinced that they can no longer continue their actions; imposition is used when the aim is to stop the unacceptable actions of an aggressive actor for a well determined period of time; constraint is the direct manifestation of the intent to cause damages and losses if the aggressive actor does not respect agreements; using brute force allows for coalitions or alliances to choose the means of military intervention to stop an aggression.

Continual changes in the security environment at an international level, due to 21st century world globalization, put the state and non-state actors in the situation of having to test at all times their real capacity and capabilities to influence the international system. This need to measure the capacity of an actor to exercise their power in the international system is an inherent characteristic of the system, due to the very architecture of the system which is made up of competitive actors on two main levels of action: following their own interests and established objectives, which we can define as profit; and the fight for the position to globalize or be globalized, which we can call potential energy to dominate.

Our analysis suggests that in the case of the system of international relations, even if it is made up of all the types of formal or informal relations which manifest themselves at a certain point in history, between all the types of state or non-state actors, within the system, the starting point when talking about using power is the cultural identity matrix of the communities that governs the dominant actor or the actor capable of dominating. As

⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Schelling - SCHELLING, Thomas Crombie, (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign policy, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He is also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis". *The Strategy of Conflict*, which Schelling published first time in 1960, pioneered the study of bargaining and strategic behavior in what Schelling refers to as "conflict behavior". It is considered one of the hundred books that have been most influential in the West since 1945. In this book he introduced concepts like focal point and credible commitment. Chapter headings include "A Reorientation of Game Theory," "Randomization of Promises and Threats," and "Surprise Attack: A Study of Mutual Distrust." Schelling's theories about war were extended in *Arms and Influence*, published in 1966. The blurb states that it "carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960) and *Strategy and Arms Control* (with Morton Halperin, 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and diplomacy". Chapter headings include *The Diplomacy of Violence*, *The Diplomacy of Ultimate Survival* and *The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm*. Accessed March 31, 2015.

previously shown, there are two levels of power, and that of potential energy is the one that provides an actor with the specific power elements that, at a certain moment, are available to be used.

Our analysis of the evolution of human society and the phenomenon of globalization shows that the cultural identity matrix is the major element that influences the capacity of an actor to transform their potential power into operational power at a given time and for a certain period. This analysis of the cultural matrix shows us that beyond the authority that the leaders/government have at a given time, they will also have the political will/capacity to go from virtual to real and enforce the elements of power required to influence the system.

Conclusion

The beginning of the 21st century brought about an almost fully globalized world and by the globalization of information, it turned the global world into a known world. In this known world where communities and their cultural identity matrixes meet on multiple levels but in two different worlds, that of reality and that of virtual space, the globalization vectors – military, economic, political, religious and cultural – are meant to harmonize, by the transfer of knowledge and information, the performance of the system of international relations, so that the actors involved in the system, either state or non-state actors, would jointly create and accept a minimum set of social values by which to provide stability for human society, to create the bases for its development and to provide the survival of the species.

The international system, made up by state and non-state actors, is competitive by definition and moreover, it needs this competition because it ensures the bases for the evolution of society, which prompts changes on three levels in the international security environment: local, zonal and global. As we have shown in the chapter “The Performance of the International System”, actors can use various methods of regulation within the system, by creating coalitions or alliances that could enhance the potential energy of the newly formed actor up to the level of dominance, so that an actor that becomes aggressive to other actors and/or tends to ruin the stability of the system, can be stopped both by hard and soft power.

In our opinion, the 21st century will be a century of realistic quests for the methods and strategies for applying the lessons learned from the 20th century, mainly from the two world wars, from the Cold War and the social movements that changed the political governing systems of the 1990s in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The term vital is often applied to this interest with mention that the stake is so important for the wellbeing of the state that it cannot be compromised » and can demand the use of military force to support it.

In our opinion, the 21st century will definitely not be a time of harmony, but will definitely be a century of harmonisations, much needed for regulating the system of international relations towards two clear objectives: development and survival. It is obvious that the international competition system is based on national interest, but the globalization of information, of knowledge and understanding, does not allow anymore for international actors to have action strategies with just two components, military and diplomatic.

The most important part in harmonizing the performance of the system of international relations in the 21st century will be played by the globalization vectors, because by the analysis of the actions and reactions of communities to the stimuli of the system and of the actors of the international system as well as by the research and understanding of cultural identity matrixes, society must be able to change its future, being aware of and acknowledging its past. The most favourable world order is built from one security paradigm to another and this evolution bases its structure on the security changes that emerge in the

local, zonal and global security environment. The phenomenon of globalization⁷, a natural complex process of the development of human society, which is manifested through five main vectors – military, economic, political, religious, cultural – vectors that directly and indirectly influence the evolution of the intra-communitarian and international social relations. The world order that the international system aspires to and the balance it requires are determined by the two characteristics of globalization: the first main characteristic of the phenomenon is that one of the vectors can never be null (zero effect) and there will always be an action on the globalized zone, even if not an immediate one; the second main characteristic, globalization, generates a force of action from the globalizing actor to the globalized zone, but there will always be a force of reaction of the globalized area towards the globalizing actor, which will influence the globalizing actor in their future actions.

The Western world at the beginning of the 21st century, and increasingly more state and non-state actors, coalitions and alliances, started to apply the lesson learned after the inter-European fratricide wars of the past centuries and to understand the changes following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648⁸. This is even more true today, when weapons of mass destruction are used as assets in negotiations, when for a state actor their national interest has and can have many faces and can be oriented towards military, economic, political, religious or cultural objectives. The most important objective and interest though is the survival and the security of the very state, irrespective of the evolution of its structure during the 21st century and implicitly the survival of the international system.

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⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Westphalia - *The Peace of Westphalia* was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in Osnabrück and Münster. These treaties ended the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic, with Spain formally recognizing the independence of the Dutch Republic. The treaties did not restore peace throughout Europe, but they did *create a basis for national self-determination*. The treaties resulted from the big diplomatic congress, thereby initiating a new system of political order in central Europe, later called Westphalian sovereignty, based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states. Inter-state aggression was to be held in check by a balance of power. A prejudice was established against interference in another nation's domestic affairs. As European influence spread across the globe, these Westphalian principles, especially the concept of sovereign states, became central to international law and to the prevailing world order. Accessed March 31, 2015.

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CURRENT HIGHLIGHTS ON ACQUIRED INSECURITY SYNDROME, COMPLEMENTARY EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION

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***Abstract:** Security of human society, both after the Cold War and also after the time of September 11, 2001, has become a constant concern of the modern world, currently under the process of globalization. Complex phenomenon of globalization analysed by type and form of manifestation (targeting economic, political, military, religious and cultural sectors) and mode of evolution indicates that human society has started to realize that it has a potential self-destructive factor, which become, over time a generator system of insecurity. The emergence of this phenomenon affects the complexity of the mechanisms underlying the operation and networking of a system, which ensures the survival and sustainable development in the future.*

The study aims to present the phenomenon called insecurity syndrome acquired as a complementary effect of globalization, as a result of the transformation of society structure, transformation possible through the manifestation process which indicates a dominance of quantitative relations at the expense of quality. Analysing how communities coexist within human society destabilizing elements can be identified, because the current manifestation of civilization shows that self-destructive tendency may occur due to ambiguous statements, leading to failure and distrust by installing confusion states at the level of organizations and leaders responsible for maintaining transparency of the society.

Identifying these negative aspects requires fundamental and lasting changes both of attitude as well as social practices, by identifying new forms of cooperation and security policies, thus to respond the globalization of the phenomenon of insecurity.

Keywords: human society, globalization, security, risk, uncertainty, change, effect.

Introduction

After the year 2000 in the social landscape were frequently imposed global meetings that had as theme of debate both the current state of human society, as well as the security status and / or insecurity whether it was local, national or international.

Debates focused on the complexity of the evolutionary process in time and space, of the economic, political and social domains which obliges, in fact, to accept reality, thus inviting pillars of decision involved in communication and transparency in decisions, as well as to develop optimal and realistic solutions to the persistence or worsening of the contemporary world problems.

A number of experts, theoreticians and practitioners in this field like the idea that change, especially through modernization, is the feature that govern human society, and knowledge and information are essential in the survival mode.

Disputes arising on change appear due to the style in which it is presented and promoted by media systems, be they national or international, because it turned out over time, that the rendering mode only provides some information about the various events taking place on Earth, regardless of the geographical location of the territories involved or their nature.

1. General aspects regarding the state of security and the phenomenon of globalization

After the 1990s, tests on the way of evolution of human society, the development of trade, financial investment and implicitly of technology in the national systems reported that they have undergone significant and rapid changes, thus succeeding to overcome geographical boundaries of countries, new trends being imposed also at an international level. The first sign that evolutionary trends in different fields impose an uneven development was that of the emergence of new types of threats, dangers and risks, thereby, what was meant to be a new system of global relations affected the security environment of the countries involved, through the confirmation of state of insecurity.

To understand why what was intended to be a general feeling of safety has turned into a state of uncertainty, in the present study I will review some of the aspects aiming the action of globalization over time.

For example, in the „*Globalizare și identitate națională*” – 2006 Symposium the articles and presentations published on the subject of this phenomenon highlights that this was understood as a phenomenon which „*unites in a single unit the dispersed elements*”, „*a phenomenon which transforms permanently*”, with a manifestation „*at the scale of the globe*” that would actually represent „*a compression of the world and strengthening of its vision as a whole*”.

On the other hand, International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) defines the term of globalization as being „*...increasing on economic interdependence of countries worldwide through increasing volume and variety of transactions of goods and services across borders ... free and quick international capital flow, but also wider diffusion of technology*”¹ (translation by International Monetary Fund).

In fact, the significance of this process are much deeper.

For example, in recent years, the phenomenon of globalization manifests itself in a fast pace, emphasized after the Cold War, When electronic field imposed an acceleration of the communication mode, increasing pace of change to the point that people started getting harder to keep up.

This globalization accepted or not by the human society, overall, managed to create controversy both within important high-level international meetings (either it took place in the US or in Japan or South Africa), as well as street manifestations, where divergent opinions were silenced often using law enforcement.

Globalization has proved to be a complex process, that through the changes made marked humanity and multidimensional, that transformed quickly and deeply relevant activities and relationships established over time, with the social environment. The pace of integration of transformations through its character allowed in fact the installation of the phenomena of disintegration or fragmentation of society.

The bridge of communication developed between the phenomenon of globalization and the state of security, at present, turned into a state of insecurity. Thus, problems in the evolution of human society, after some historical events such as the end of The Cold War or the moment of September 11, 2001 and also other terrorist actions have become a constant concern of the globalized world.

Security studies aimed at the development of this domain, often found in a controversial position, assign to the security concept built initially, on the basis of human existence, then the welfare, prosperity and stability, a new posture respectively that of universal problem. In winning this status the process of globalization has contributed in a

¹ *International Monetary Fund*, <http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4941>, accessed on February 15, 2015.

significant proportion, giving it a multidimensional scale, where components forming the system are interdependent.

Subject to permanent transformation the concept of security whether the situation spoken was of an empire, kingdom or nation-state, appeared frequently in the past 25 years, political speeches, underlining the need to protect communities and people in their structure in the face of global evolution or better said against threats generated by it.

One of the most popular and old definitions of security belongs to Arnold Wolfers: „...*security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, absence of fear that such values will be attacked...*”².

The factor called population whether it represents a rich or poor country, is targeted by a lot of threats, such as: human rights violations, crime, drugs, pollution, unemployment, etc., which are genuine and in the process of development, even if their intensity varies from one geographic region to another. The identification of a threat in a particular area involves, in fact, all nations could always trigger the installation of some consequences, both at the regional and global level, such as hunger, epidemics, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic tensions, social disintegration, etc.

These events confirm that it is easier to prevent than to intervene after the onset of the event, because it is less expensive to act on threats, dangers, when they appear, until after they become permanent.

2. Current highlights regarding the acquired insecurity syndrome

This writing aims to highlight the effect of the globalization phenomenon, called acquired insecurity syndrome, which according to experts in the field, is presented as the result of the complex process of transformation of the structure of human society, In general, of traditional, industrial, cultural and political societies etc., transformation possible through the dominance of quantitative relations at the expense of quality.

Type and manifestation of the globalization phenomenon are parameters that indicate in a significant proportion, if human society has begun to realize that it has a potential self-destructive factor, regardless of the circumstances and / or regional media / private.

If this potential has been identified, the parties concerned (governments and various non-governmental organizations) should report objectively by many means of information that the environment has turned into a generator of insecurity, thus affecting the complexity of the mechanisms underlying the operation and networking of a system that ensures the survival and sustainable development in the future.

Theories and debates launched over time, indicate that the process of modernization should be the main trigger of insecurity. Sociologist Ulrich Beck points out, since the 80s, identification of failures in the relational and functional system of a company³.

Also Sachidanand Siha said from the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly of India that „*the decline of a civilization appears when the wise are removed because they dare to be honest, and those who are immoral are rewarded for flattering people, later to betray it*”⁴.

Currently, some analysts claim in their writings that this acquired insecurity syndrome appeared once with the moment of terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2011,

² Arnold WOLFERS, *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4., 1952, pp. 481-502.

³ Ulrich BECK, *The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity*, In British Journal of Sociology, 2000, 51(1): 79–105.

⁴ Jeremy POPE, *The TI Source Book: National Integrity Systems*, Transparency International, Oho Suhr Alle, Berlin, Germania, 2002, p. 19.

being emphasized after other terrorist events in other geographical areas, such as in Spain, UK, Indonesia, Kenya etc.

Also, this state was further enhanced by the support and subjective exposure of the events through means of communication specific to the media system. On the other hand, representatives of international organizations claim that everyday reality highlights that globalization is the engine of insecurity amplification, that to the amplification and support of this new emerged syndrome among the world population, have participated also other risk factors specific to non-military fields (political, economic, social, cultural, environmental).

For example, according to world statistics⁵ in 1920, the world population was estimated at two billion, in 1960 we were already three, and in 2011 the population was seven billion and it is estimated that until 2045 we will be nine billion.

The demographic explosion is characteristic to the Indian subcontinent, the Far East, some parts of Europe, Africa and Central and South America. Population growth in the twentieth century is considered the most important long-term phenomenon of post-war history and the unequal distribution of population is the source of: future tensions and conflicts; intensified migration process (either rural - urban, from one country to another); development of new infrastructure.

Also, the analysis on the world resources provide essential information that can influence the evolution of society over time. Since 1783 scientists predicted that the Earth's population would exceed the possibilities of food, because resources are limited. Progress made in agricultural productivity after the Second World War has only delayed the global crisis in decades. Studies indicate that in 2030 the need for food, water and electricity will reach a critical level.

Food crisis arises from the increased demand for food determined by the increasing number of inhabitants. This state of necessity if it is not getting a solution will allow the inevitable emergence of shortages, followed by hunger and social unrest. It is known that we already witnessed the problems of the years 2007 - 2008 when due to increased oil prices, extensive drought installation at planetary level, reduction of agricultural subsidies, financial speculation already caused rising prices worldwide. The result was food crisis manifested, in general, in developing countries.

Increasing global population determined climate changes. The impact of human activities on the environment was significant in particular through: land use, increased levels of carbon dioxide, pollution, use of fossil fuels, deforestation, etc., all have left a footprint on global warming. Analysis of average air temperatures indicate a growth leading to melting polar ice caps, rising sea levels, reduced arable land, species extinction, floods, droughts etc.

Even if politicians and environmentalists discuss and seek solutions together with large industrial operators and scientists, there are some industrial powers who systematically refuse to accept proposed solutions, allowing full installation of global warming in coming decades. Despite efforts however a viable solution was not found.

Industrial activity at its turn generated an accentuated degradation of the natural environment. Support for modern industrial systems which ensures an increased production, the possibility of housing, transport and communication creates additional risks. Also, companies that failed the process of modernization, where the industrial and political society have found the element of communication and optimal survival, most associated with non-Western societies, become sources of global risks, promoting poverty, disease, migration, terrorism, trafficking etc.

Poverty, seen as a heavy burden on developing nations, forcing many countries to depend on the generosity of other nations, all aid comes with certain obligations, most

⁵ *United Nations Population Found*, <http://www.unfpa.org./publications>, accessed on February 20, 2015.

followed by political, economic nature. Uncertainty arises from the fact that the new economic reforms and the existence of loan repayment terms have the same straitjacket and helplessness effect. The persistence of poverty prevents proper nutrition of population, education and proper medical care, thereby increasing the birth rate and thus increasing the number of people to be maintained.

Currently by comparing and confronting global situations, we can say that the acquired insecurity syndrome appeared due to factors such as: abuse of human rights, international hierarchy, political activity, the process of modernization, the monopoly of information, resources, economic crises, macroeconomic vulnerability, financial capital mobility, labour mobility, demographic changes, failures resulting from alliances and cooperation, international disputes, science, technical and technological progress of the developed countries, technology transfer, GDP / inhabitant, poverty, deprivation of basic human needs, financial aid, environmental degradation, natural disasters, manmade disasters, various epidemics, ideological confrontation, reappearance of fundamentalist groups, phenomena of regionalization, territorial disputes, new models of performant weapons , drugs, crime, discrimination, dehumanization, violence, manipulation, social tensions, war, failed states, etc.

Other analyses conducted over the years and subjected to public attention support that the phenomenon of modernity that included various areas of traditional structures, industrial, political, etc., were able to degrade the basic structure of communities that originally formed family, tradition, State, nation, indicating that trends have emerged and were manifested by transformation and sometimes destruction regardless of company involved.

After the 1990s, communities and nations were obliged to comply with the requirements of modernity everyday reality (political equality and democracy, human rights, professions, science, etc.), although the global impact conflicts with the limitations imposed by the industrial field developed in the late XIX. Thus consequence of this rapid change both locally as well as internationally consists in the appearance of a number of risks: social and community; economic; political; environment.

Conclusions

The title of this study and implicitly the presentation mode is inspired by an older concern and driven by the reality in which we live, respectively identifying the climate where macro - micro connections are made in an alliance, but also the challenge of the moment which allows such a connection.

In view of the UN, achieving security is possible through some essential elements such as respect for human rights, economic and social development. Therefore, in the XXIst century, both the traditional community as well the one of security should identify and fight against destabilizing elements.

These efforts should materialize through fundamental and lasting changes in attitudes and social practices from both the state and private sector and civil society, to identify new forms of cooperation and security policies to respond, thus, the globalization of insecurity phenomenon, because the complex process of globalization actually means, how communities coexist within human society.

The complexity of recent developments, both political and economic and social imposed the knowledge of reality by inviting areas involved in communication and transparency, forcing them to give a spatial dimension of old and new concepts, theories and analysis models.

For example, Ioan Deac in „*Introducere în teoria negocierii*” says: „*Negotiation is the form of communication that involves a communicative process, dynamic adjustment,*

agreement establishing in case of the occurrence of conflicts of interest, whereby two or more parties, animated by different motives and having its own objectives, mediate their positions to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement”.

Answers to questions developed by human society offers partially solutions, despite the in-depth analysis and explanation of the mechanisms that ensure the operation as a whole. Amplification requires the creation of new political, economic, military and social instruments to be closely linked to the development of international cooperation.

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AN OVERVIEW OF MODERN WORLD INSECURITY FACTORS

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Abstract: *With regard to security factors, they may associate modern security resources: sources, reserves and complementary factors, called generic sources, that can be harnessed to ensure normality, into the general functioning of a state entity, and not only, in a globalized/ global context*

The traditional security paradigm has undergone a number of changes over the centuries, reaching a maturity stage in the aftermath of the Second World War: if initially security was based on ability to survive war, in the context of the war it emphasizes the theoretical foundations of its shortcomings, such as safety factors (egocentrism concepts and relations; bipolarity of the international system; dependence on small countries and medium power centers; oversize of military power, economic and environmental risks, due to military arming).

Keywords: *insecurity, threat, risk, vulnerability, national security*

Introduction

Between terminological clarifications assigned to the national security, is to be found the definition offered by Law 51/ 1991 on Romania's national security, according to which national security is defined as “legality, balance and social, economic and political stability related to the existence and development of the Romanian national state, as sovereign, united, independent and indivisible state, maintenance of the legal order, as well as the climate for exercising freely the rights, freedoms and fundamental duties of the citizens according to the democratic principles and norms established by the Constitution”¹.

In addition to the ones above mentioned, there are two strategic documents which refer to the national security The National Security Strategy of Romania in 2007 and The National Defence Strategy in 2010, both documents being adopted by the NDSC (National Defence Supreme Court), but non-approved in the Parliament.

Compared to the Law 51/1991, both the strategy from 2007 and also that of 2010 provides an extended definition of the national security, following the Copenhagen School concept, including a series of domains such as: “legality, citizen’s safety; public security; prevention and counteraction of terrorism and other asymmetric threats; the ability to protect; protection against natural disasters, living conditions degradations and industrial accidents”. According to this law, the national security is achieved through “appropriate measures of political, economic, diplomatic, social, legal, educational, administrative and military nature, through work of its information, counter intelligence and security, as well as through the efficient management of crisis, in accordance with the rules on professional conduct of the European and Euroatlantic Community and the International Law provisions”².

¹ Legea 51 din 29 Iulie 1991 privind securitatea națională a României, Republicată în Monitorul Oficial nr. 190 din 18 martie 2014, disponibilă la link-urile <https://www.sie.ro/pdf/legislatie/51.pdf>, http://legislatie.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/51_1991.php, accesed on 10.02.2014 and on 15.04.2015.

² www.m-securitynews.ro, rft.forter.ro, „Buletin de teorie militară editat de Statul Major al Forțelor terestre”, accesed on 10.02.2014

The Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language defines (the term) security as “the state of being protected against any danger; the feeling of trust and calmness which is provided to a person in the absence of any danger”³.

Thus, most of the times, the security is associated to a precondition of the functionality of any (micro) formal and informal social group, of any social, economic, political organization with respect to any disruptive factor leading to insecurity, internal or external to the respective organization.

In this regard, the national security is “the synergy of the actions made through the means and regulations of the Romanian state institutions, which are to achieve, protect and claim the interests and fundamental values in Romania, counteracting the internal and external factors which threat these interests and values”⁴.

On the other side, the expression “national insecurity” is the immediate result of the actions occurred by the internal and external factors which jeopardise the Romanian interests and fundamental values. In this regard, the insecurity is the opposite of security and it can be defined as “the loss of state’s ability to produce and use information, energetic and human resources in order to maintain cohesion, homogeneity, unity and identity, as a consequence of the inefficient management of the politics, aggressions and crises resulting from pathological social situations, system crisis or tightropes”.

The insecurity may arise from joining a set of factors which, at first view, are not directly related⁵.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the elites ”are denationalising and are more and more extended worldwide, while the population is renationalising and become more and more local⁶.

Source of instability and insecurity, the culture globalisation generates a traditional culture location which represents a rebirth of the regional old identities⁷.

Therefore, the strong states are considered exporting security providers, while the white states, insecurity providers.

1. Difficulties in differentiating the security indicators and insecurity factors

In his volume “The national security-ambiguous symbol”, Arnold Wolfers granted the security concept as a valuable one, from which “a nation can achieve more or less and it can also expect to achieve it, more or less”. From this point of view, the security has many common points with other two considerable values “power” and “welfare”⁸.

But, while welfare measures the amount of a state material possessions and power represents the ability to control “the other actors actions”, in an objective manner, the security “measures the absence of threats for achieving values”. From another point of view, seen from

³ Institutul de Lingvistică „Jorgu Iordan - Alexandru Rosetti” al Academiei Române, Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române, DEX, ediția a II-a, 1998.

⁴ Balint, Mario, *Triunghiul cu geometrie variabilă al insecurității naționale*, disponibil la link-ul <http://www.ecronica.ro/tag/senat>, accesat la 15.04.2015

⁵Ibid, online source cited

⁶ HUNTINGTON, P. Simon, *Who Are We: The Challenges to Americas National Identity*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2004, pp. 45

⁷ SAVA, I.N., *Studii de securitate*, Centrul român de studii regionale, 2005, pp. 100 – 142.

⁸ WOLFERS, Arnold, *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*, The John Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp.147, în „*Security Studies – A Reader*”, edited by HUGHES Christopher W., MENG, Lai Yew, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2011, p. 5.

a subjective manner, this identifies the absence of the beliefs that these values can be prevented⁹.

From both perspectives, the security of a state may benefit from a wide area of “states”, from “complete insecurity to complete security”¹⁰.

So that, the only discrepancy between the subjective and objective connotations of the concept are significant in external relations, even though the chances of a future attack cannot be measured objectively.

It is known that the nations or nation groups have a different/specific approach in case of the same external situation: some of them tend to give huge dimensions to the “danger”, while others can underrate, all of them being evaluated on their own and according to their own speculation. Therefore, the danger can be defined as “the characteristic of an action or inaction prejudicing the society, persons values or their goods. In case of danger, source, address, purpose, the objectives and effects are probable”¹¹.

Furthermore, in case the states act differently to similar threats, it can be considered that even their way to achieve a more stable security mood is different. By analogy, a part of the states can label as “normal” the danger they are exposed and corresponding to the security modest expectations, while other nations considers it as “unconceived”.

Consequently, the security is defined as “the absence of insecurity factors”, for counteracting the external threats, many internal factors such as the national character, tradition and prejudice will influence the security level which is considered as objective by any state.

In order to extend the meaning of the security concept, another alternative is exposed by Ole Weaver, who has imposed the necessity to include non-military threats within it. This approach brings the security dimensions to the fore, emphasizing on the awareness threats, vulnerabilities and defence. At the same time, Egbert Jahn “has turned” threats into challenges¹².

During the Cold War, the main insecurity factors were founded in the absence of a political consensus, the state law distribution and inefficient management, their existence causing regional instability¹³.

Moreover, overpopulation, the economic underdevelopment and environment degradation were considered to be some of the insecurity factors of the Third World states and labelled as non-military threats¹⁴.

In this regard, in the absence of a stable constitutional framework, maintaining a political regime meant violent street conflicts; in this environment, the decision-making factors instinct for conservation were prior to the interest of the state security.

2. The awareness of a clear distinction between security and insecurity factors. Threat. Risk

The security indicators and stability in Romania are the following: the internal political stability, demographic, economic and military capacity, external reliance, Romania’s option for its integration in the European and Euro-atlantic security and cooperation

⁹ *Ibid*, source cited

¹⁰ *Ibid*, source cited

¹¹ ALEXANDRESCU, Grigore, *Centrul de Studii Strategice de Apărare și Securitate, Amenințări la adresa securității*, Ed. Universității Naționale de Apărare, Bucharest 2004, pp. 8.

¹² WEAVER, Ole, *Securization*, în „*Security Studies – A Reader*”, edited by HUGHES Christopher W., MENG, Lai Yew, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2011, pp. 5

¹³ HUGHES Christopher W., MENG, Lai Yew, „*Security Studies – A Reader*”, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2011, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, source cited

structures, cooperation policy and good neighbourhood, Romania's evolution towards democracy.

2.1. Threat, factor caused by insecurity

According to George Cristian Maior's opinion, "risks, threats and vulnerabilities have changed, this century, not only from a qualitative point of view, but also from a quantitative one", and the "the evolution of technology and the continuous advance, sometimes dramatically in this area, but also the economic interdependences grow, the speed of the action ongoing process and political interactions or geopolitical at the societies and states level, the pressure arisen from communication and information cause more and more complex and various problems to the decision-makers"¹⁵.

In this respect, threat, as an insecurity factor represents a risk (the cautious monitoring of the security environment is required); it is effective/real/clearly expressed; it has an author (state, group of states, organizations); it has a purpose and objectives (political determination on state sectors; it has a target (decision-maker factor, security factors)¹⁶.

According to professor dr. Onisor Constantin, as far as the threat typology is concerned, external force threats can be considered (political, economic, financial, military states/group of states); military (the military force is required to impose the political class will); political (against state or legal order of an external entity (internal instability, the state failure, terrorism), social (culture, religion, national identity, etno-cultural conflicts, overpopulation, organized crime, cross-border illicit traffic, immigration, epidemics/pandemics, illegal commerce, etc); economic (poverty, economic development time gap, financial and raw materials crises, the impact and control of developed states regarding the economically unstable areas, etc have access to raw materials, competition, advance, etc), ecological (environment protection, the quality of the environment factors: nuclear disasters, ecological disasters, nature degradation, insufficient food and resource provision, etc).

Thus, the information community is facing one of the most complicated situations regarding the achievement of a differentiation between threat and risk, which, in most of the cases, are used with an "interchangeable" meaning.

On a first view, the comparison between the terms "threat" and "risk" is required. Consequently, threat can be defined in multiple ways, but within national security, this can be defined as follows: "The threat represents the person's or group's potential to exercise, accidentally or on purpose, an action which exploits a vulnerability". In this statement, the key-term is "potential"; the use of "threat" concept dose not automatically involve the level of the existing danger.

For instance, it can be considered that it is a threat the fact that the cross-border terrorists can obtain weapons to cause attacks in the metro stations; nowadays, that is possible. But, only because threat exists, it is not absolutely necessary to occur. In this regard, the threat character "is pointless", as long as it does not provide an indication regarding the actions which must be completed.

The attempts to define the concept of "power" on an international level are continously changing. A series of political analysts offer a general examination for the concept of "state", granting it the value of main unity of the "international arena". This cannot be admitted, but, surprisingly, there are some small groups of individuals or even own entities who have power and capabilities to have a major influence, not only on a national level, but also on

¹⁵ MAIOR, George Cristian, *Intelligence, servicii de informații și cunoaștere strategică în secolul XXI*, Rao, 2010, p. 10.

¹⁶ ONISOR, Constantin, *Repere ale paradigmei securității moderne*, course of National Intelligence Academy "MIHAI VITEAZUL"

international one. In this respect, clear evidence is provided by the attacks from 11 September 2011 of USA and those from 7th July 2005 from London, these attacks being caused by a small-number groups of individuals, occurred over a “power” and defined asymmetrical threats¹⁷.

The actors who cause these attacks can be either state actors, as well as non-state ones. Currently, the most frequent issues in the field of national security do not arise from the state actors threats. These are generally associated with terrorism or violences led against the political class.

On the other side, the threat is characterised by more effective indicators, representing a “statement of an intention to punish or hurt a person, especially in case that the person does not want to have any clue or to be warned in case of a possible danger”¹⁸.

In case the threat becomes more specific, the targets and sources become more clear, the analyst Barry Buzan proposed an explanatory model which renders the threat type and intensity¹⁹.

As follows, the types of threats can be included to the political, economical, social, military and environmental areas.

A graphic presentation of the indicators which customise each concept can provide a synthetic and clear picture of the value, place and their role in elaborating the speech on topics from security and defence areas.

At the same time, it can also be considered that threats related to the economic field are difficult to be identified, as they are based on factors which do not respect rules, norms and its related institutions, and their reference objectives are represented by a large area of entities.

Simultaneously, the forms of their display are subordinated to the accepted economic competition, economical realities on the market, economic disproportions and are not led directly against institution-state.

Considering the military field, the state military force represents the reference objective, and for the advanced democratic states, the state protection has become the single function of the military forces, the traditional security studies labelling all these military matters as threats regarding the security.

2.2. General definition capacities of the risk and vulnerability terms

Related to the threat concept, the term risk can be defined as “the probability of negative consequences occurrence, arisen from an action carried out by an entity, in order to exploit a vulnerability”. Also, one of the most frequent definition which is used for the risk term is represented by its equivalence with “the consequences intensity multiplied by the probability of an event occurrence”.

In this respect, when it is used as a proper meaning, the risk concept can be very useful to the beneficiaries, in case this regards „the action or their reaction”.

According different authors’ opinion, threats can be also be defined on the risk basis representing risk factors which become real, and in a certain situation or an appropriate occasion gains direction and intention, such as: possible negative evolutions at subregional level, the proliferation of arms mass destruction; the proliferation and development of terrorist networks, cross-border organized crime, dealing drugs; the illicit migration and the occurrence of huge masses of refugees; the actions of instigating to extremism, intolerance,

¹⁷ QUIGGIN, Thomas, *Seeing the Invisible, National Security in an Uncertain Age, Risk Assesment and Horizon Scanning*, ed. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2007, p. 145.

¹⁸ OXFORD Dictionary of Current English, Oxford University Press, 1988, Second Edition by Christina Ruse.

¹⁹ Buzan, Barry, *Popoarele, statele și teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Ed. Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, p. 147.

separatism and xenophobia, time gap between the level provision security and the stability level of the states from proximity; reduction of the Romanian state access to some resources and regional opportunities, which are important for the completion of the national interests.

In an extended meaning the risk is represented by the difference between the expressions of “positive expectation” and “negative event”, probability of occurrence, being caused by the incapacity to be determined and to have clear evidence about future events.

From a sociological point of view, the risk is associated to an expression of “structural indetermination’ of reality and insufficient knowledge regarding the real and complex processes where they subordinate”.

At the same time, the social psychology increase the risk subjective nature, defining it as: “complex psychological phenomenon” arisen from the report between the probability of success and failure of an action led to the achievement of a certain objective (benefit) with social or individual meaning.

The concept of “vulnerability” is frequently defined in relation with the risk and threat. A simplified definition provides the terms the role of “weakness which can be easily exploited by an attacker”. For example, “the weak point” of a software program which can allow the infiltration and occurrence of attacks/cybernetic incidents.

There is often a confusion between the concepts of “threat” and “vulnerability”: the vulnerability of an website may give to the hackers the possibility to take control over the graphic elements, such as banners; this aspect does not affect the basic interests of the website’s owner. In case that, the hacker has access to additional information such as the access passwords of the clients’ credit cards, it can be considered the expression “critical vulnerability”.

The states vulnerability when facing the threats has been identified by the lack of material and human resources and institutional capacity to manage these issues and to minimize the influence at international level.

The analysis of regional conflicts related to the assessment of modern security is based on a large area of insecurity factors, that involves state and non-state actors, military and non-military challenges.

Among the vulnerabilities of “contemporary world”, it is found: energetic and raw materials resources, limited and which are not equally distributed on the planet’s surface; the industrial expansion and the economic globalisation; insufficient water resources; environmental degradation.

3. Analysis of the new conceptual elements identified in The National Defence Strategy in 2010, versus The National Security Strategy of Romania in 2007

The present analysis followed to identify the ways of semantical convergence of the concepts from the national security domain, in order to compare the terms used in The National Defence Strategy in 2010, versus The National Security Strategy of Romania in 2007, by using the software of semantic analysis “Tropes”.

The analysis of regional conflicts in the context of modern security is based on a wide range of factors of insecurity, involving state or non-state actors, military challenges and, in this respect, it is noted, in particular, the interdependent nature of the new types of risks and threats, which may not be analyzed individually, but to be put in an integrated assembly. In this context, the capacity for anticipating and forecasting, and, subsequently, to prevent and combat, are derived and reduced.

In addition, beyond terminological clarifications and new asymmetrical shape of the threats, which is located underneath the unconventional sign, it is difficult to quantify and forecast modern threats, in comparison with that of conventional type.

Compared with the national strategy for the security of Romania, in the National Security Strategy of 2010, there is a clear demarcation between risk, threat and vulnerability, at both conceptually, as well as in the plan of examples of each of these categories.

As compared to 2007, when, in his turn, as asymmetric threats, have been located international terrorism, in 2010, its importance derives not only from its simple existence, as well as from the fact that there is the possibility of new ways of manifestation, in particular by technological means which facilitates the support base and recruitment diversification (jihadist sites, whose prolific users have never been known since 2008, help to spread groups leaders insurgents in real time messages and generates the appearance of new risks as well as religious radicalization, cyber warfare terrorism and propaganda in virtual environment.).

Also, National Security Strategy of 2010, places the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, terrorism and regional instability, natural disasters, cyber security or energy, in the category new types of risks and threats to national security.

The document placed the enhancement and development of the capacity for action of the phenomenon of organized crime in the context of economic and financial crisis.

Increased risks and threats to the national security, both qualitatively and quantitatively, can be generated by customizing of new vulnerabilities, among which are situated: the capacity loss over time for the implementation of the law by some state institutions; low administrative capacity at central and local level; excessive politicization of certain institutions, both at the local, as well as national level; corruption, with implications on the functioning state institutions and could have adverse effects on citizens' life; tax evasion, smuggling operations and specific practices underground economy; critical infrastructure protection.

Also, have been identified: lack of a coherent mechanism foresight, planning and control, to support management of the budget in the system multiannual; fiscal imbalances, caused by wrong political decisions; the decrease of public services quality of health; organized crime, pressures and the influence which it is trying to exercise them on state institutions, over the mass-media and on certain representatives of the political class, the phenomenon press campaigns to control, with the aim of denigrate institutions of the state, by spreading false information about their activities; the pressures exerted by the press trusts on political decision, in order to obtain the benefits of an economic nature or in their relation with state institutions; the delay Romania's development between the regions; cohesion degradation of families as a result of the phenomenon of migration.

Setting the objectives and priorities of the Community information can be found in accordance with the two ways of which Romanian state may combat risks, threats and vulnerabilitatile: by concentrating on its own national resources and through cooperation with allies and international partners.

According National Security Strategy of 2010, in general, through the objectives of the information services, which must have in view the dynamics of current risks, threats and vulnerabilitaties, include: knowledge, prevention and bounce back, threats and vulnerabilitaties against national security, in accordance with its own powers and improving the capabilities of early warning concerning developments potentially hazardous.

Thus, in a restricted plan, the objectives and objectives of the information Community fall: combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the employment in the fight against terrorism; development of national capabilities for the management of civil emergencies, in particular those relating to natural disasters; ensure the security energy; ensure the safety phishing scams; increase of contribution to reducing the phenomenon of organized crime.

Compared to 2007, when, in the semantic field may be observed the intention of participation, in 2010, the objectives are situated in the sphere of protection.




Figure no. 1. Objectives - SNAp 2007




Figure no. 2. Objectives - SNAp

With regard to the risk, important account may be taken in four types of response, among which: transfer, tolerating risks (some of the risks may be maintained to acceptable levels only by disruption to business involving risks), mitigate risks (operates with a view to reduction of importance, deferral or elimination of the possibility of identifying risk).

From the category of nouns, concepts like “security”, “Romania”, “state”, followed by “action”, “process”, “threat”, had the the most occurrence.




Figure no. 3. Nouns - SNAp 2007




Figure no. 4. Nouns - SNAp

The pressures for the acquisition of mass destruction weapons and ballistic missiles carrying such weapons are large, and their limitation through legislative means, military or economic are still small and questionable.

For the good of our country, which promote projects of strategic importance for the south-eastern Europe and Black Sea area, and the interest for secure routes for hydrocarbons and of increasing the capacity of the European Union is its implementation of major, in the context in which Romania is part of the trans-European transport system of energy. Potential attack detection and prevention of falls in cascade are vital for securing energy systems, having regard to their interconnection that creates major systems at the European level.

A supported and based collaboration on procedures and standards, on mutual trust and benefit sphere, between civil and military, between the public and private sectors, between individual and institutional actors, may also consist in the success in the fight scrolled in the space have risen.

From the adjectives category identified by the software of semantic analysis “Tropes”, can be observed, for the SNAp 2007, the concepts “national”, “main”, “military”, versus “new”, “strategic”, “efficient”, “democratic”, “international”, for SNAp 2010.




Figure no. 5. Adjectives - SNAp 2007




Figure no. 6. Adjectives - SNAp 2010

Conclusions

Thus, the security and insecurity do not represent : the security is determined by a situation resulting from a problem security occurrence and the measures taken as response, while insecurity is rendered by a security problem: “with no response”(counteracting action)²⁰. Both cases have in common the security problem. On the other side, in case that there is not a security problem, the situation cannot be conceived in terms of security: “the security is always relative and nobody lives in complete security”²¹.

It is also maintained the appellant questions, “What/Who threatens the national security?” or “Whom we should protect of”, without considering that the phenomenon should be treated in terms of security (what is specific to security?) versus insecurity.

In this regard, even though an extensive definition of the concepts danger, threat, risk and vulnerability has been provided, when discussing various theories and doctrinaire approaches from the security field, it cannot be determined a non-sense related to the unitary terminology.

The emergence of asymmetrical threats of national security is not “controllable only at national level”. More than that, the risks of national security are often “worldwide” from their origin point of view, even though their impact may be “located”. At the same time, economic, social and health aspects regarding the state threat can be, as well as the military conventional threats.

²⁰ *Ibid, op. cit.*, p. 6.

²¹ *Ibid, op. cit.*, p. 6.

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THEORETICAL ASSESMENT REGARDING FACTORS GENERATING RISKS AND CONFLICTS TOWARDS THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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***Abstract:** The negative consequences caused by the existence of risks and threats to the security environment have always a major impact on the entire society up to the individual level. The neglecting of vulnerabilities of a system can lead to a situation that creates a very prolific environment in generating risks which ensure the necessary conditions of threats to emerge and, why not, of possible conflicts to appear.*

The aggressions that precede a conflict may sometimes be discovered and stopped quite late. Thus, there should always be the need of a rigorous analysis within the State's relation with its own institutions and other international organisms.

Conflicts, once started, may expand and diversify in multiple shapes and directions that would impede the process of fighting them. Therefore, it is of vital importance, that threats are early discovered, especially when they are the onset of potential conflicts and aggressions against security environment.

Keywords: *consequences, aggressions, risks, threats, environment, impact, conflict.*

Introduction

The negative consequences caused by the existence of risks and threats always have a major impact on the entire society up to the individual level. Neglecting the vulnerabilities of a system can lead to a situation that creates a very prolific environment in generating risks which ensure the necessary conditions of threats to emerge and, why not, of possible conflicts to appear.

The aggressions that precede a conflict may sometimes be discovered and stopped rather late. Thus, there should always be the need of a rigorous analysis within the State's relation with its own institutions and other international organisms.

Conflicts, once started, may expand and diversify in multiple shapes and directions that would impede the process of fighting them. Therefore, it is of vital importance, that threats are early discovered, especially when they are the onset of potential conflicts and aggressions against security environment.

Processes affecting the social component of the security environment are being generated by risks and threats which produce disruptive socio-political phenomena, damaging national and individual values and goals and enhancing the necessities of security environment. Risks are perceived as circumstances or internal and external conditions that support or facilitate the implementation of a threat towards security environment through the existence of vulnerabilities, causing thereby serious repercussions on maintaining stability and security.¹

¹ Aurel V., David, *Doctrine, Politici și Strategii De Securitate*, „România de Măine” Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 42 apud Decebal, Ilina, *Factori de risc interni și externi pentru securitatea națională*, in “Gândirea militară românească”, no. 4/1996.

The security environment is a state of equilibrium which could be easily disturbed in case of the occurrence of any vulnerability and even transformed into an environment of insecurity. The current security environment holds both bipolar and dynamic elements. In other words, the emergence of new actors such as terrorist organizations or the permanent inter-state competition can lead to the involution or to the development of a state / some states or of one or more organization(s), from the political and economic point of view.

Forces acting on a national or international environment may have conflicting or divergent trends, the result being one of "confrontation"². In this context, it is important for a state to be able to take the necessary steps in order to avoid, prevent or stop the internal / external vulnerabilities that might affect security at any level.

These measures may be of a military nature (by improving and supply with new types of weapons), economic (by enhancing competitiveness, increasing foreign exchange reserves, export promotion, import controls, achieving a balance of payments and trade balance), political (development cooperation with other countries at the diplomatic level, addressing policies and strategies that may facilitate the signing of treaties or international agreements), cultural nature (improving cooperation between state-level institutions, experience exchange) etc . All these do not exclude the existence of vulnerabilities, but creates opportunities to strengthen the support means of a state and to find, in a more accurate and easier way, the optimal and precise solutions to potential problems that could cause or become vulnerabilities.

1. Vulnerabilities, risks, threats and conflicts

Security vulnerabilities are the preceding stage to risks, on the scale of a potential conflict. Risks are born as a direct consequence to the existence of vulnerabilities that are not properly reduced or eliminated and that could get amplified until becoming a source of insecurity. Vulnerabilities become risks as a result of negligence or lack of awareness.

According to Aurel V. David, security vulnerabilities are shaped as "status quo, processes or phenomena of the internal life of social organizations or socio-political entities, which diminish their capacity to respond to existing or potential risks or which favor the emergence and development thereof. Ignorance or their mismanagement can lead to risks and threats to the values, interests and security needs."³ Vulnerabilities can develop, leading to risks and threats far greater and harder to manage or eliminate at this level.

Vulnerabilities are sometimes ignored, so as a consequence they grow and give rise to risks and threats which are more difficult to stop or dim. One can encounter vulnerabilities by choosing the wrong people for certain responsibilities or positions that concern national security, by misinterpreting some decisions, by incomplete or incorrect performing of tasks, by late identification of signs or evidence regarding potential danger, by delaying or failing into taking strong security measures at the right time. These vulnerabilities turn into risks that should be taken into consideration when security is involved.

Risks lead to threats, threats lead to a crisis, crisis leads to conflict and conflict extends to repercussions, which often may continue the state of crisis. (see Fig. no.1)

² Eugen, Bădălan, Laurian, Zaharescu, Vasile, Bogdan, *Sisteme globale de securitate, ediția a III-a*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 8.

³ Aurel V., David, *Doctrine, op.cit.*, p. 42.




Fig. no. 1 - Axis conflict

Terrorism is a phenomenon whose success is based, in fact, on creating or identifying security breaches, the niches, vulnerabilities that allow access or the infiltration of spy elements within the security systems. Deep knowledge of an opponent can turn it into an easy target, whose vulnerability can be exploited for illegal actions and against the security of a state. Such an example is the terrorist attack on the "World Trade Center" from 11th of September 2011. At that time, there was a series of coordinated suicide attacks of the terrorist group "Al-Qaeda" against the US, which has diverted four commercial passenger aircraft. The 19 terrorists destroyed two aircrafts through the impact with the Twin Towers of the "World Trade Center" in New York. The third plane was destroyed in the Pentagon building from Arlington, Virginia, near Washington, DC, and the fourth plane crashed on a plain near Shanksville in rural Pennsylvania. Following these massive attacks, 2.993 people died, including terrorists. Another example of vulnerability that should be taken into consideration is the currently popular character, Edward Joseph Snowden. According to media sources, E.Snowden worked in the security service and technical department of the American spying service of CIA and NSA, being undercover in the administration and consultation system within "Booz Allen Hamilton"⁴ company. Serving as technical collaborator it allowed him the access to top secret information belonging to American intelligence service, such as those which had been taken over by the monitoring program and Internet spy networks within the "NSA PRISM" agency. E.Snowden was accused of treason by the US government and is now wanted by the authorities. He fled to Hong Kong, but was forced to leave the territory of PRC, on the 23rd of July 2013 following the decision of the Chinese authorities for extradition. On the 1st of August 2013, the Russian Federation has granted political asylum for a period of one year⁵.

Therefore, vigilance regarding potential events which may be inconsistent with national interests must be increased permanently. Supervision of state's own systems and of the people who produce, provide access to and exploits these systems is very much needed in order to develop a safety and protective climate.

According to some authors, *risk* is seen as a measure of "structural indeterminacy of reality (objective probabilistic nature of the event) or of the uncertainty, of our insufficient

⁴ US consulting firm, founded in 1914, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia. The company holds approximately 21.000 employees on six continents, providing services for the US government and other public organizations, companies and institutions. Earnings are estimated around \$ 4 billion / year.

⁵ Information obtained from http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden, accessed on 29.05/16:31.

knowledge of real processes"⁶ and from the perspective of social psychology, it is perceived as a "complex psychological phenomenon resulting from the ratio of the probability of success and failure of an action aimed at achieving a certain goal ("winning") with individual or social significance."⁷

Risks are perceived at potential level and can become real in a context in which the security environment is influenced by concrete vulnerabilities. This is uncertain, but if the risk becomes real, it can be seen as a threat. Risks are more of a statistic result of different types of analysis or states of insecurity associated to existent and perceived vulnerabilities. Risks can have effects at social, but also at individual level, they can become the ethalons for insecurity or can become the expression of insecurity. To be more precise, uncertainty can express itself by taking into consideration a possible risk or can be measured by the rise of multiple risks whose consequences may be extremely severe.

In "European Union: Contemporary Issues and Perspectives" book, risks are categorized in terms of geopolitical and geostrategic concepts, as following (also see Table no. 2⁸):

- * in accordance to the domains refference;
- * in accordance to the Community entities and existing religions;
- * in accordance to time;
- * in accordance to space and geographical area.

| CRITERIA | TYPES OF RISKS | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-----------|
| Activity domains | 1. economic | |
| | 2. political | |
| | 3. informational | |
| | 4. social | |
| | 5. cultural | |
| | 6. environmental | |
| | 7. tehnological | |
| | 8. military | |
| Community and religious entities | 1. ethnic | |
| | 2. religios | |
| Time | 1. current | |
| | 2. future | Immediate |
| Close | | |
| Medium term | | |
| Long term | | |
| Space and geographical area | 3. permanent | |
| | 1. external | Global |
| | | |

⁶ Isabela, Ancuț; Ioana, Leucea, *Uniunea Europeană: Probleme Contemporane și de perspectivă*, „Carol I” National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 178 apud Cătălin, Zamfir; Lăzărescu, Vlăsceanu, *Dicționar de sociologie*, Babel Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, p. 516.

⁷ *Ibidem op.cit., loc.cit.*, apud Ana, Bogdan-Tucicov; Septimiu, Chelcea; Mihai, Golu; Pantelimon, Golu; Cătălin, Mamali; Petru, Pânzaru, *Dicționar de psihologie socială*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1981, pp. 215-216.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 179.

| CRITERIA | TYPES OF RISKS | |
|----------|----------------|----------|
| | | Regional |
| | 2. | Internal |
| | 3. | Cosmic |

Table no. 1 - Types of risk

Unlike risks, *threats* are seen as an assessment of a potential danger towards security environment, which could be described by certain characteristics, as the method of representation/manifestation, form, field of action/scope, severity, duration, intensity and scale, as following:

| TYPES OF THREATS | | | | | | |
|------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|-------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| MANIFESTATION | FORM | DOMAIN | SEVERITY | DURATION | INTENSITY | SCALE |
| Latent | Unknown factors or authors | Economic | Human damages | Short term | Imperceptible | Isolated – individual level |
| Potential | Unofficial | Political, military, political and military | Material damages | Medium term | Alleged | Societal / population level |
| Imminent | Official | Social, environmental | Human and material damages | Long term | Perceptible | Large scale - global |

Table no. 2 - Types of Threats

As individuals, human beings have always perceived threats on their person as a danger for their own survival and had to search and find solutions for solving the issue. Furthermore, humans have developed numerous strategies and measures for avoiding confrontation with such phenomena, like associating with others and forming groups/societies, creating/adopting rules agreed upon by the other members of society, exchanging information, changing their daily routine, accepting collective necessities as their own, taking productive measures, etc.. As an example, this is why a state would feel more secure and more powerful when being part of an organization like NATO or the EU and why it can look upon international events not as a single state with limited options, but as a member of the organization.

For Aurel V. David, threat is "a set of non-violent actions, which, most frequently, generate an imminent danger or forms of potential aggression (political, psychological, informational, economic, social, military etc.) towards values, interests and security needs. Threats reveal capabilities, strategies, intentions, plans that enhance a danger for the fundamental attributes or the ontological qualities of the social organization or of a certain socio-political entity. They produce perverse consequences on the economic, constitutional order, fundamental rights and freedom of citizens. Threats represent an indicator for assessing an imminent danger or prejudice to the security environment".⁹

If there is a threat to the security environment, there is definitely the possibility of an emerging crisis or conflict, which requires taking initial action for diminishing the impact the crisis might have, in case the threat could not be eliminated and the threat becoming real could not be avoided.

⁹ Aurel V., David, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

In this situation, even if the threat becomes real, already taken measures can lead to an action of successfully eliminating the danger. In other words, it is the speed of the measures taken that dictates the final result. If these are established faster than the threat increases, eliminating or reducing the consequences or the threat becomes successful.

According to the authors of "Crisis, Conflict, War" book, crises, conflicts and war are part of human social life. Thus, crisis is not automatically perceived as a fatality, but as a social, political, economic, informational and military reality that can be controlled, improved and even prevented.¹⁰

A crisis generally appears when the measures taken to stop the threat from becoming concrete are poorly managed. A crisis can last for years or can stop as soon as it begins, if the strategies for planning the measures are in accordance to the accurate perception of the danger. What becomes of high importance in the development of a crisis is the accurate perception on the situation and on its causes.

Conflicts, a constant part in life, develop out of a number of causes and are expressed in different ways adaptable to the environment and can generate unexpected crisis and effects.

According to the author of "Theory notions and security paradigms", Corvin Lupu, international conflict can generate international crimes¹¹. The author identifies the following international crimes¹²:

1. crimes against peace, which refers to planning, preparing, and leading a war of aggression, which violates treaties, agreements or international conventions or to the participation in a plot or a general plan aimed at committing some of the listed above acts;

2. war crimes, in other words the actions that violate the rules and customs of war enshrined in international treaties (killing and torture of prisoners, mistreatment or raising the civilian population of the occupied territory to be taken captive for slavery or for other purposes, looting public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, unjustified devastation done by the militaries etc.);

3. crimes against humanity, including murder and mass murder, slavery obedience, deportation and any other act committed against the civilian population, before or during the war, mass persecution for political, racial or religious reasons, genocide, apartheid, usage of mass destruction weapons.

Conflicts can escalate and increase, turning into wars, leading to the emergence of serious and lasting consequences. Wars are of several types, depending on certain criteria, established by analysts and researchers, such as those related to the objective, form, participants, area and scale. Thus, *depending on the objective*, wars are:

- wars of conquest;
- wars of extermination;
- alliance wars.

depending on the form:

- psychological warfare;
- information/cyber wars;
- armed wars.

depending on the participants:

¹⁰ Mircea, Mureșan; Gheorghe, Văduva, *Crisis, Conflict, War*, in „Strategic Impact” magazine, „Carol I” National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 106.

¹¹ "serious crimes against peace, humanity, laws and customs of war, by defying, grave violation of international law." (professor Corvin Lupu *Noțiuni de teoria conceptelor și paradigmelor de securitate*, Techno Media Publishing House, Sibiu, 2005, p.110).

¹² Corvin, Lupu, *Noțiuni de teoria conceptelor și paradigmelor de securitate*, Techno Media Publishing House, Sibiu, 2005, pp.110-111.

- civil wars;
- military wars;
- *depending on the area:*
- wars between two state actors;
- inter-state/regional wars;
- world wars.

depending on the scale:

- biological wars;
- atomic / nuclear wars.

War is the most developed form of the conflict, characterized by extreme aggression and serious consequences. Among the types of wars listed above, biological and nuclear wars are some of the most violent forms, not so much by their force of destruction, but because of the duration effects on living organisms.

In theory, wars can be divided into two broad categories: wars of interest and necessary wars. Usually, wars of interest have an offensive character, unlike the necessary ones which hold elements of a defensive nature. More specifically, wars of interest are those worn over other countries and are aimed at obtaining resources, expansion, gaining greater influence in the area etc.. Necessary wars usually include those wars against terrorist actions like electronic attack, psychological or cyber attack.

Instead of defining the concept of "war" and "peace", the German analyst, professor Ragnar Müller, proposed a scheme which involves two variants of the same moment of conflict - one in which one takes the decision of either consensus and cooperation or discord and violence.




Fig. no. 2 - "Continuum Peace - War"

In other words, when two or more parties get to the point of conflict, when ideas and actions do not converge, there are some measures to be taken which may prove to be beneficial or destructive. Choosing, however, encounters many variables.

Given the decision taken, the effects would amplify or diminish, and the conflict would escalate or would reduce its intensity.

2. Unconventional aggressions

Aggressions usually appear as a result of biases, misunderstandings or misperceptions of the existent situation.

According to the author of „The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes”, Morton Deutsch, international conflicts emerged as defensive actions against expected hostility. As an example, The First World War started as a result of the mistrust within the European powers and the idea that the one who strikes first would have strategic

advantage. Another feature of confrontation is that the parties view their own actions as more legitimate and well-intended than the actions of their opponents¹³.

Armed conflicts are becoming increasingly elaborate and present, being influenced by "innovations in computer technology [that] allow combining precision weapons, improving surveillance capabilities, precision and targeting, increased command and control, expanding the use of artificial intelligence and robots . Weapons of long-range precision will allow a greater number of countries to threaten with rapid destruction of economic, energy, political, military and informational infrastructures owned by the opponents. Some states will use weapons for destruction or removal of the information, sensors, networks and communications systems, like anti-satellite, laser or radiofrequency weapons. Other states will exert sustained pressure in order to build unconventional weapon systems. The spread of light infantry weapons, including tactical precision portable systems, as well as information and communication technologies will significantly increase the threat of unconventional weapons forms over the next 15-20 years.¹⁴"

Modern communication technologies (such as satellite and cell phones, Internet and commercial labeling) combined with manual navigation devices and high capacity informatics systems which contain large capacity of texts, maps and digital images or video, will allow future unconventional forces to organize, coordinate and also execute dispersed operations.¹⁵.

Conflicts may be considered of a minimum level when losses for all sides involved are minimal and of a maximum one when the losses of only one side of the conflict are significant, to the opponent's advantage. According to the authors of „Introduction: The nature of conflict and conflict resolution”¹⁶ (Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk și I. William Zartman), „zero-sum conflicts” are those maximum level conflicts, when there is no compromise alternative and the cooperation with the adversary is out of question. More often than not, when the interests are of a common ground, conflicts may amplify on a higher level than when the interests are divergent.

Morton Deutsch says that for understanding a given conflict, first of all, one should know¹⁷:

- the characteristics of the parties in it (their values and motivations, aspirations and objectives);
- the prior relationship to one another (their attitudes, beliefs, and expectations about one another);
- the nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict;
- the social environment within which the conflict occurs;
- the interested audiences to the conflict (their relationships to the parties);
- the strategy and tactics employed by the parties in the conflict;
- the consequences to each of the participants and to other interested parties (the gains and the losses relating to the immediate issue in conflict, long-term effects etc.).

Aggressions leading to conflict are not always declared, detected (in a timely manner) or claimed. They might have the role of experiment for testing certain weapons or of

¹³ informații preluate de pe site-ul <http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Conflict-and-its-meaning.php> accesat la data de 20.04, orele 22:00.

¹⁴ Teodor, Frunzeti; Vladimir, Zodian, *Lumea 2011. Enciclopedie politică și militară. Studii Strategice și de Securitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 614.

¹⁵ *Idem* apud „Tendințe globale 2025”, from „Lumea 2009”, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, pp.1050-1051.

¹⁶ Informații preluate de pe site-ul http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/24632_Bercovitch___Intro.pdf accesat la data de 20.04, orele 22.35.

¹⁷ Informații preluate de pe site-ul <http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Conflict-and-its-meaning.php> accesat la data de 20.04, orele 22.45.

influencing the aggressed ones for the benefit of the aggressors. Such an example is the psychological and radio-frequency attacks.

Professor C. Lupu recounts in his "Theory notions and security paradigms" book that, according to a report from 1962 of the American Intelligence Agency, the Russians had bombed the US Embassy with electromagnetic waves for a long time, thing that had produced severe lasting physical effects. That type of wave, called "Psichotronics Mind-Control" can reduce intellectual functions and, sometimes, even can cause disease. According to the American magazine "Aviatron Week and Space Technology", broadcast on the market in January 1993, US missiles were fitted with equipment capable of producing electromagnetic pulse ("electromagnetic pulse" - "EMP") in order to annihilate the enemy or, at least, to produce disorientation, by affecting the orientation instinct on a range of about 2.500 km.¹⁸

Other examples of biological aggression are those of created viruses in the laboratory, as well as influencing means of climatic factors. According to some documents, in 1975¹⁹, in the US, there were nine climate experiments conducted. In 1973, Honduras had accused the US for capturing the rainfall²⁰, causing drought²¹. Another similar example is that the US government had, allegedly, redirected the course of "FIFI" hurricane to save tourism in Florida, which brought dissatisfaction of El Salvador state, because it was, allegedly, affected by the operation²².

The individuals or the organisations which are exposed to different forms of aggression create tension, frustration, dissapointment, intimidation, instability and uncertainty, predictably leading to the emergence of conflicts against those actors that generate the aforementioned effects. While the conflict is escalating, the aggression takes the form of offensive and counter-offensive actions and the actors involved become only puppets of these mutual forms of aggression.

Conclusions

Aggressions have always existed and they were manifested in accordance to the interests of global actors, but not necessarily to the society or individuals interests.

Conflicts are part of human life and, sometimes, they may amplify and become uncontrolled and massive.

National security is closely correlated with the international one and regarding state hierarchy, this is usually determined not only through economic means, but also by the type and speed of response towards the existing global threats.

Terrorism has always had a great media impact, mainly due to the actions of terrorist organizations operating in many parts of the world, trying to obtain power and financial resources, and, sometimes, recognition of their ideologies and frustrations. By creating regional and global security organizations, leaders have tried removing or reducing terrorism and the existence of its negative influence on society and / or in the worst case, repairing the effects that this phenomenon had produced. Thus, threats, risks and vulnerabilities are gaining new connotations and increasing importance in the context of larger dangers, such as the expansion and organization of terrorist groups. The main way to combat all these is, actually, maintaining sharp vigilance and a high training level.

¹⁸ Frunzeti Teodor; Zodian Vladimir, *op.cit. loc.cit.*

¹⁹ Corvin, Lupu, *op.cit.*, p.121.

²⁰ States like Japan, Zimbabwe and Israel were, allegedly, accused of redirecting rainfalls.

²¹ Corvin, Lupu, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

²² *Ibidem op.cit., loc.cit.*

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ATLANTIZATION – TWO LAYERED INFLUENCE OF NATO ON NATIONAL STATES

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Abstract: *Over the last decades, there has been substantial amount of literature dedicated to study of so called Europeanisation. It means, that the impact of EU on domestic politics has been well known phenomenon. However similar impact of NATO on domestic politics and on the armed forces is lagging far behind that. Especially in the field of political science NATO received much less interest over the years – despite the fact, that for the post-communist countries obtaining NATO memberships was usually at least equally important as becoming members of the EU. This proves that there is “political” dimension of Atlantization.*

However NATO obviously very strongly influences also national armed forces – so there must be “military” dimension of Atlantization. Thus, in its first part the article seeks to define Atlantization and in its second and third part describes various mechanisms through which NATO influences or changes domestic politics as well as the armed forces.

Keywords: *Atlantization, armed forces, democratization, NATO, domestic politics*

Introduction

Is there any connection between NATO and democracy? Is the influence of NATO strictly limited to just military field or can political level of domestic politics be influenced as well?

With so many complicated questions in mind, research on this field constantly brings up many challenges. Especially literature covering this topic is not consistent. While lot of effort was dedicated to studying domestic factors influencing democratization, there is much less numerous literature about so called „international“ or „external“ factors of democratization. And even despite the fact, that TV news are simply plagued by reports indicating, that international organizations such EU, OSCE or NATO play very important role in promoting democracy, there is no existing universally accepted theoretical concept covering this topic.

Judging by the sheer amount of literature, EU and related process of “Europeanization” is very well researched. Europeanization describes changes in domestic policy, politics and polity in the context of European integration¹. However this so called “top-down” process is not the only way to look at it. Less frequent “bottom-up” approach, studying the changes of the EU itself under the influence of nation states, is also possible².

While Europeanization may be very popular within Political Science and International Relations fields, there is much less attention devoted to analyzing influence of NATO on domestic affairs of its member states – so called “Atlantization”. There is even no definition of “Atlantization” as such. The term itself is in some cases understood as antithesis of

¹ Dančák, B., Fiala, P., Hloušek, V. (2006): Evropeizace Nové téma politologického výzkumu.

² Havlík, V., Pšejja, P., (2007): Evropeizace jako předmět výzkumu v sociálních vědách.

Europeanization – in the context of relations with the USA instead of EU. It however seems to be rather obscure usage³.

Very rare – and also very basic - framework for understanding Atlantization in connection to Defence Policy has been proposed by Czech author Zdeněk Kříž in 2009. In his definition “Atlantization is adapting to requirements coming out of NATO membership”⁴. Kříž also noted that Atlantization is affecting whole country in question – and not just its armed forces. But the rest of his research focuses strictly on Atlantization on so called “military level”. However NATO is not just military - but also political alliance. This means, that assessing NATO’s influence only on armed forces is not necessarily painting the full picture. Omitting analysis of how NATO influences political level especially in context of democratization seems to be a mistake - because Alliance has been often seen as symbol of Western world, guarantee of Democracy and embodiment of western values⁵?. It can be well documented in the 1997 Madrid Declaration following NATO summit that stated clearly that democracy is a prerequisite for membership. After all NATO enlargement since the Cold War have resulted in many new members from Central and Eastern Europe and are generally regarded as a success in terms of contributing towards democratic consolidation⁶.

Thus aim of this paper is to sum up current research in the field of Atlantization in two steps. First it will assess political level of Atlantization and identify tools with which NATO spreads democracy and helps democracy promotion – and why does it do that.

In the same time however one must not forget about the military level of Atlantization, which will be looked at more in detail in the second part of this paper.

Even though, that this research is based mostly on the experiences from Czech republic, there is strong reason to believe, that findings may apply to broader spectrum of other states from Central and Eastern Europe

2. Political level of Atlantization – how NATO influences democratization?

If we are to study Atlantization on political level, there are two main questions to be answered. First “why” does it happen and second “how” does it happen.

2.1. Motivation behind political Atlantization

Why would NATO member states pressure non-democratic states to become democracies? First, as a way to boost their own international status and distance themselves from allies or neighbors, young democracies may pressure former authoritarian partners to make a similar transition. The act of foreign policy reorientation can lend internal legitimacy to new democracies. Thus new democracies will have incentives to treat autocracies (especially former political allies) as pariah states to establish their own legitimacy. This can be particularly true for state such as Czech Republic. For example Prague’s very close relationship with Cuba during communism (before 1989) is in stark comparison to very cold relationship nowadays.

But even established democracies within NATO member states may make the promotion of democracy a major foreign policy priority for reasons of domestic legitimacy. Using the words of J. C. Pavehouse⁷ ”success in supporting democracy abroad has served to reinforce the legitimation of the democratic order at home, and to boost national pride and

³ <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63846>

⁴ Kříž, Z., (2010). Obranná politika. In. Veřejné politiky.

⁵ http://sreview.soc.cas.cz/uploads/4121e91ca5dc6bec656fed35cc868e78c2e112a8_366_103MARES.pdf

⁶ <http://fride.org/publication/128/nato-s-role-in-democratic-reform>

⁷ <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=164563>

self-confidence. Certainly the efforts of the United States to promote democracy can be viewed largely in this light.

Second, if scholarly research concerning the economic and political advantages of democracy is correct, then one would expect democracies to rationally desire to have more democracies in the world. Research shows that democracies prefer to trade, cooperate, and ally with one another - which is particularly true for democratic states within NATO as these possess sufficient security guarantees enabling them to operate in safer environment. In addition, democracies better promote economic growth and stability. Thus, expanding the number of democracies expands interaction opportunities for existing democracies. Given the opportunity, a democracy may well attempt to push a non-democratic neighbor or trade partner to liberalize.

Third, multilateral efforts will often be a favored mechanism of democracies because they minimize the perception of overt meddling on the part of one particular actor. For example, the United States has been widely criticized for its unilateral efforts at democracy promotion in Middle-East and Balkans. If efforts to promote democracy are widely perceived as illegitimate and a violation of sovereignty in the target state, such intervention often backfires, creating support for the authoritarian regime⁸. With the support of regional institutions, however, similar efforts can gain legitimacy because of their multilateral nature. As was the case of NATO interventions led by the USA in Kosovo and elsewhere.

2.2. Tools of political Atlantization

Much of the scientific literature is mixed in what are the “tools of Atlantization”. Most of the discussion is related to NATO potential to establish civilian control of the armed forces through joint cooperation between non-member and member states in foreign operations etc. Logic behind this approach is that by common deployment abroad, NATO is able to transfer its norms and values⁹. However looking at Georgia with thousands of troops serving alongside NATO soldiers in Iraq and yet still using its army in (unsuccessful) 2008 attempt to settle its dispute with separatist republic of South Ossetia proves that tools which NATO used to „Atlantize“ Tbilisi were not effective.

Dan Reiter categorizes three distinctive tools with which NATO can influence or promote democracy. First of them is “carrot and stick” policy¹⁰. The proposition is straightforward: NATO promises to admit states that make democratic reforms, and potential new members respond by adopting such reforms. *Compliance with this democracy requirement would be relatively easy to verify, through inspection of a state's electoral laws and constitution and by election monitoring (note that transparency is also a democratic characteristic, facilitating verification). “Stick” on the other hand means that any new member that reverts to authoritarian rule would be ejected from the Alliance.*¹¹ Significantly, the stick must be credible to make the carrot incentive work. Without the threat of ejection from NATO, a tyrannical cabal within a state could permit democratic reforms, earn alliance membership, and then reimpose authoritarian rule (perhaps through a military coup) without jeopardizing the state's membership status. The stick argument also would carry more weight for new East European members, given that all former East European states have already taken significant steps toward democracy, most of them enjoying an uninterrupted two decades of democratic governance. The other two tools are support of civilian control of the armed forces and rewarding democratic progress with membership.

⁸ Drake, P., W. (1998): *The International Causes of Democratization, 1974-1990*.

⁹ <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524708.pdf>

¹⁰ https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v025/25.4reiter.html

¹¹ Reiter, D. (2001): *Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy*, *International Security*, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pp. 41-67.

Several other authors however took different approach and considered specific tools how NATO spreads democracy. If aggregated together, two of them appear. Firstly it is “coercion” and then “socialization”.

2.2.1. Coercion

Coercion means that states get punished if they reject the rules of the game¹². First, it can create economic difficulties for the regime if part of the pressure by the organization is the suspension of trade and financial benefits. This can further exacerbate economic crises that can undermine the regime. However it is not very likely, that NATO will be directly involved in such actions. But several of its important members use this tool quite often. Second, diplomatic pressures and the resulting international isolation can help to further delegitimize a regime at home since, during these times of crisis, a regime’s international posture may be especially important¹³. However cases of Libya in 2011 and NATO campaign over Serbia in 1999 proved that Atlantization may also be violent.

Non-violent forms of coercion are especially evident when domestic political elites are pressured by NATO to increase defence spending. However statistical data - at least in the case of Czech Republic - reveal that the influence of Atlantization on MoD budget was apparent chiefly before the NATO accession (in 1999). Recent development is very different. And big discrepancy between positions of NATO and the Czech Republic has been noticed on Wales summit in September 2014. The Wales Summit Pledge on Defence Investment stipulates commitment of member states to finally increase defence spending targeting 2% GDP level. There indeed is a consensus among the coalition parties in the Czech government signed in August 2014 to gradually increase our defence budget – but only to 1.4 % of the GDP by 2020¹⁴. This timeframe is not only quite distant, but it is after next elections which may result in completely different ruling coalition without any need to honor even the agreed level of 1,4 % of GDP on defence¹⁵. Thus it is evident, that coercion itself is not very effective form of Atlantization and must be coupled with socialization.

2.2.2 Socialization

Socialization describes the way the states make new choices in order to secure their survival under new conditions¹⁶. Importantly socialization may include both military and business elites. While the latter is negligible within context of NATO and this paper, the former are considered to be powerful organized group with potential to pursue its own interests in political arena. Often, the military stands in the way of political liberalization out of fears for its autonomy (i.e. Spain after the death of Franco etc.). In this case socialization as a form of political Atlantization will take place if for example externally supported security guarantees are provided and when military officers are reoriented away from their interest in domestic politics¹⁷.

Favourite form of socialization seems to be “imitation”¹⁸. It can work on state level since most states try to do what the successful states do¹⁹. And more importantly it also works on personal level. It happens often non-intentionally during joint training and maneuvers. By admiring alliance proficiency, selected military leaders usually come to the conclusion, that

¹² <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/eng/publications/Documents/Democracy%20Managers.pdf>

¹³ <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=164563>

¹⁴ http://www.mzv.cz/nato.brussels/en/news_articles_speeches/the_nato_summit_in_wales_czech_republic.html

¹⁵ Dyčka, L., Mičánek, F. (2014): Czech Republic in NATO – From Admiration to Reliance

¹⁶ <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/eng/publications/Documents/Democracy%20Managers.pdf>

¹⁷ <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=164563>

¹⁸ <http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=502>

¹⁹ <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/eng/publications/Documents/Democracy%20Managers.pdf>

by copying also institutional model of western democracies, they may attain the same level of military efficiency²⁰²¹²². Thus important role of several NATO military institutions which are often accepting elites from non-member countries (such as NATO School in Oberammergau) must not be overlooked.

3 Military level of Atlantization – total reliance or mere inspiration?

Assesing Atlantization on military level is by far more difficult than on political level. Biggest problem seems to be complete lack of literature – on the other hand it is relatively easy to get to “first-hand experience” by interviewing relevant personnel within the Czech Ministry of Defence (MoD) and armed forces.

Atlantization on military level – at least in the case of Czech Republic – is apparently very strong in the case of security environment analysis. There the influence of NATO's assessment of future threats (which is described in classified document MC 161) is paradoxically more accessible to conceptual bodies of the MoD, than our own national assessment from Czech intelligence agencies. Thus the process of “transplanting” every finding about every possible threat from NATO perspective on Czech Republic has grown enormous proportions²³. Needless to say, that some of those „transplants” – however important for the whole Alliance - were rather distant for Czech Republic and our Armed forces. Usefulness of MC 161 is also doubtful since it is “Agreed” document and thus any finding must be agreed upon by all 28 members of NATO – which naturally leaves many important issues omitted. Nevertheless it serves as a perfect example how NATO influences day to day business on the military level.

Another sphere, where Atlantization can be witnessed particularly strongly is Defence planning. Unlike some “bigger” allies, the Czech Republic does not have a proper nationally codified defence planning system enabling an assessment of capabilities identified for accomplishing politico-military ambitions. It is sometimes said, that national defence planning is fully compatible with the NATO one's. However, in reality the national defence planning often processes findings derived from the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) on capability assessment, including identified capability shortfalls and their prioritization. There is only rudimentary harmonization with NDPP, and capability tasks from NDPP cycle are accepted very selectively.

This rather poorly functioning defence planning partially resulted in a Czech commitment made on Wales Summit in September 2014 to contribute to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). VJTF is supposed to be a tool to help meet shared goals in both collective defence and crisis management²⁴. At this moment Czech republic envisage providing a special operations unit and an airborne unit (roughly 150 personnel in total) with two days “Notice To Move“. Further contributions will be considered once the VJTF concept is specified in NATO. 150 soldiers may not seem as a lot until we calculate 3:1 necessary rotation which suddenly increases the number to 450 soldiers – at least part of them on 24 hour alert. With chronical shortage of manpower, this would constitute heavy burden for the Czech Republic and may hinder training of these troops – not to mention their private lives. Not knowing their exact mission, it might be waste of their potential to use these highly specialized units as an ordinary infantry. There is also unanswered question of how this will impact on our already existing commitments to NATO and EU. However political

²⁰ <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=164563>

²¹ <http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=502>

²² <http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/eng/publications/Documents/Democracy%20Managers.pdf>

²³ Dyčka, L., Mičánek, F. (2014): Czech Republic in NATO – From Admiration to Reliance

²⁴ http://www.mzv.cz/nato.brussels/en/news_articles_speeches/the_nato_summit_in_wales_czech_republic.html

representation pledged support in this matter with no regard to this issues. This illustrates, that Atlantization is not necessarily always a “good thing”.

In the period shortly after gaining membership in NATO, Atlantization could have also been witnessed in many other areas such as establishing crisis management processes or strategic documents hierarchy.

Conclusion

Not yet well know term “Atlantization” seems to be ideal topic where our understanding of NATO importance may be enhanced. This text attempted to illustrate, that there is link between NATO and democratization and that indeed democracy promotion is one of the forms in which Atlantization occurs. This made it possible to establish “political level” of Atlantization – which shows which tools and why NATO uses to influence quality of democracy in nation states.

Motives behind political Atlantization are numerous. They mostly relate to some kind of hunt for prestige or legitimacy. But important motivation seems to be also NATO’s willingness to surround itself with other democratic countries in the notion of well know motto “Democracies do not fight each other”.

How exactly political Atlantization looks in the reality may be harder to answer, but coercion is one favourite tool, while socialization is the other. Coercion can be either diplomatic or even violent. Economical coercion as a tool of Atlantization seems to be less important as NATO is not so strongly related with economy such as for example EU. As for the socialization, one of the important variations seems to be imitation – both on institutional and personal level.

But Atlantization also has its military level. It is harder to study it on a wider list of states – so only the case of Czech Republic has been covered. However it proved that Atlantization is very strongly present in security environment analysis and defence planning. Both of these “disciplines” are heavily “Atlantized” – sometimes not with good results.

As for the future research it could be very useful to study both forms of Atlantization on wider spectrum of states. Results we can get may be particularly useful for non-member countries under NATO influence – with Ukraine in mind, the importance of this topic needs no further explanation.

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POSITION OF THE CZECH PUBLIC TOWARD CURRENT SECURITY THREATS AND MEASURES TAKEN

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Abstract: *The paper is devoted to the attitude of the Czech public to threats, which have recently emerged in the security environment, and measures that these threats have triggered. The Islamic State and the conflict in Ukraine - these are new phenomena, which have led to re-evaluation of the security and defence policy (not only) in the Czech Republic. The media coverage, political, and professional debate over these new threats as well as the revision of the security strategy of the country and the political consent with the increase in both financial and human resources for the army have led to an increase in public interest in the defence and security issues. The paper aims to describe briefly these trends in public opinion and try to interpret them. During preparation of the paper, I used especially surveys performed by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic and the Public Opinion Research Center (part of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences), realized during the period between November 2014 and March 2015.*

Keywords: *Islamic state; Ukraine; threats; public opinion; public survey;*

Introduction

Compared to previous decades, the current security situation in the world is considered worse and more dangerous. There are two factors that significantly affect the current debate over the level of international security. The first one is the establishment of the Islamic State and its successful physical control of major parts of Syria and Iraq, as well as much broader ideological effects. The second factor is the assertive and aggressive foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation, whose specific manifestations (annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine) represent violation of the established international order and international law.

A number of countries and international organizations respond to the deteriorating security situation in the world, trying to adapt their security and defence policies to the existence of above described threats. This year, the U.S.A. have adopted a new National Security Strategy, where current authoritarian Russia and its aggressive behavior are clearly perceived as a threat. A similar view is reflected in the debate within the European Union, where the analysis of the security environment is currently in progress under the leadership of Federica Mogherini. Its result will most likely be the impulse to review the European Security Strategy, though in 2015. The updates of strategic security documents in connection with what is happening in the Middle East and in Ukraine have also taken place (Poland, Czech Republic, etc.) or are being processed in individual NATO member countries.

NATO countries respond to the deteriorating security situation, especially the activities of the Islamic State and the war and Russian involvement in Ukraine, on several levels:

In the first place, it involves the creation of joint alliance and national military capabilities and instruments, which are designed to have sufficient deterrent potential on the

one hand, and on the other hand they should be sufficiently functional in the event of actual direct military or hybrid attack on any of NATO member states (in particular, the Baltic states are in question).

The second level of response is the increase in military spending, which has been deep below 2% of GDP for the vast majority of European NATO nations in the long term. The NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 brought among others the common commitment to increase spending to that level by the end of the decade.


The third type of response is the effort to strengthen the so-called strategic communication. Direct or hidden propaganda activities seek to increase the public support for the above-mentioned steps, and to balance the massive Russian propaganda aimed at the west as well as domestic Russian public.

In the case of the Czech Republic, it may be said that the intense political debate, media coverage and propaganda actions lead to an increase in the public interest in security and defence issues. The information about the security situation leads to shaping public attitudes, changes in perception of a range of threats as well as shifts in views about the way in which the country should respond to the current security situation. The mentioned changes in behaviour, attitudes and concerns are well detectable in opinion polls, whose short interpretation is also addressed in this paper.

1. Interest in the issues of security and defence of the country

In the long-term, the Czech public does not pay much attention to the problem of security and defence of the country. This fact has been testified by a number of researches taking place already since 1990s, and freshly also by the research entitled "Army and Public 2014", which is compiled annually for the needs of the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic. At the present time, majority of citizens do not find the information on the international security situation alarming, or citizens feel safe enough in the Czech Republic, that they do not find it necessary to be concerned with the security and defence of their country. However, in the context of activities of the Islamic State and the Ukrainian crisis, there has been a growing share of citizens who are interested in the situation and who are able to formulate their opinion on these factors. In particular, in comparison with 2012 and 2013 there is an apparent statistically significant increase in interest in security issues and national defence.

Figure no. 1: "Are you interested in issues related to security and defence of the country?"¹




¹ Army and Public 2014 (Armáda a společnost 2014), public survey performed by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, November – December 2014.

2. Perception of threats by the public in the CR - Islamic State and Ukraine

In the past few years, the most significant military threat perceived by the public at large as well as by the official security policy, was unambiguously international terrorism. Despite the fact that this phenomenon has not disappeared from the range of identified threats, from 2014 onwards the attention of the state, security community² and the general public is still more significantly turning to the Islamic State and the crisis in Ukraine. In March 2015, the Public Opinion Research Center (CVVM) has implemented a survey, the aim of which was to find out whether the citizens perceive the Islamic State and the conflict in Ukraine as threats to security of the Czech Republic, Europe, and peace in the world. The results show a high interest and even a relatively high level of awareness of the two phenomena.

Figure no. 2: Interest in the development of the situation - so-called Islamic State³ and Ukraine⁴ (%)⁵




² See e.g. Stojar, R., Konflikt na Ukrajině a ruský zásah: Nový způsob vedení hybridní války, nebo aplikace klasických postupů? *Vojenské rozhledy*, 2015, vol. 24 (56), no. 1, pp. 26–37, ISSN 2336-2995 (on-line), available from: <http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/kategorie/konflikt-na-ukrajine-a-rusky-zasah-novy-zpusob-vedeni-hybridni-valky-nebo-aplikace-klasicky-ch-postupu#jak-citovat-tento-%C4%8D1%C3%A1nek-how-to-cite-this-article>

³ Text of the question: "Are you interested in the development of the situation in relation to activities of the so-called Islamic State? Definitely yes, rather yes, rather not, definitely not."

⁴ Text of the question: "Are you interested in the development of the situation in Ukraine? Definitely yes, rather yes, rather not, definitely not."

⁵ Czech Public on So-Called Islamic State - March 2015, public survey performed by the Public Opinion Research Centre. Available from: <http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/en/international-relations/czech-public-on-so-called-islamic-state-march-2015>

Figure no. 3: Do the activities of the so-called Islamic State / the situation in Ukraine pose a threat to ... (%)⁶



The results of the survey (see Figure 3) show that the vast majority of the Czech public perceives the activities of the so-called Islamic State as a threat, in particular to the peace in the world (84% total, including 50% "definitely yes") and the European security (83% total, including 46% "definitely yes"), but to a lesser extent also to the security of the Czech Republic (67% total, including 32% "definitely yes"). Although in relation to the situation in Ukraine, a relatively significant majority tends to agree that it is a threat to European security (74%, including 34% "definitely yes"), peace in the world (68%, including 32% "definitely yes") as well as the security of the Czech Republic (65%, including 29% "definitely yes"), compared to the so-called Islamic State, the feeling of threat is less strong, especially in the case of the world and European security, while the intensity of perception of threat to the Czech security is statistically comparable.

3. Support for NATO

In relation to the growing concerns with the development in the security situation, we can observe also the increasing public support for measures that are taken in order to increase the defence capabilities and security of the country. The membership in NATO is perceived very positively in the Czech Republic as a form of external security. Support for this organization and its positive image have an increasing trend.

⁶ *Ibid.*





Figure no. 4: Is NATO as a military organization needed at the present time?⁷

Figure no. 5: How does the existence and operation of NATO affect the security of its members? (%)⁸




⁷ NATO and National Defence from the perspective of Czech citizens - January 2015, public survey performed by the Public Opinion Research Centre. Available from: <http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/en/international-relations/nato-and-national-defence-from-the-perspective-of-czech-citizens-january-2015>

⁸ Ibid.

4. Support for Armed Forces

There is also an increasing trend in the support for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. Compared to previous researches in the 1990s and in the last decade, continuous growth of support for the Armed Forces can be observed. This growth accelerates in 2014 and continues in the present. In particular, the comparison of the situations in 2012 (since when the question has been directly monitored by the "Army and Public" research) and in 2014 brings a clear and statistically significant shift. The question for the necessity of the army in 2012 was answered positively by 69% of the respondents, while last year it was already 81% of the total number of respondents.

Figure no. 6: In your opinion, is the army indispensable for the defence of the country?⁹



5. Preparation of the population for crisis situations

Compulsory military service in the Czech Republic was abolished in 2005 and the Army of the Czech Republic is fully professional. Ten years ago, the basic military service was extraordinarily unpopular especially among the young and university educated men (80% avoided conscription). In addition, a large part of the public saw no use in the conscription army in a situation when the country was not facing any identified military threat. In the last few months, however, the public opinion in the Czech Republic begins to change - there is a growing support for introducing some form of preparation of the population for crisis

⁹ Army and Public 2014 (Armáda a společnost 2014), public survey performed by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, November – December 2014.

situations. There is also a growing support for implemented measures aimed at mapping the available manpower in the event of danger to the country. The Government of the Czech Republic is currently preparing renewal of conscription of men and women¹⁰ who meet the proper age, health and qualification criteria for possible service in the Armed Forces in case




Figure no. 7: Do you believe that it was correct to abolish conscription in the Czech Republic and introduce professional army?¹¹

of declaring national emergency or state of war. The public perceives more intensively the fact that a fully professional and modern, yet small army (around 21,000 soldiers and 1,200 members of active reserves), is not able to perform all the tasks related to defence of the country and in the event of danger it needs to be selectively reinforced by conscripted recruits.

In a research carried out in 2012, the question whether it was right to abolish the compulsory military service in the Czech Republic, was answered positively by 65% of the respondents (39% definitely yes and 26% rather yes), while 21% answered negatively (13% rather not, 8% definitely not), and 14% had no opinion. In 2014, the number of positive responses significantly decreased and became almost equal with the number of negative ones (47% yes, 45% no).

¹⁰ While male conscription is viewed positively among the public (58% agree vs. 42% disagree), female conscription is refused by the public (15% agree vs. 85% disagree). However, the government measures in this case rely on consistent application of equality between men and women guaranteed by the Constitution.

¹¹ Army and Public 2014 (Armáda a společnost 2014), public survey performed by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, November – December 2014.

Figure no. 8: The abolishment of compulsory military service led to an increase in the capacity of the army to defend the Czech Republic.¹²





Figure no. 9: Do you agree with compulsory military training?¹³

¹² Ibid.


¹³ Research by STEM/MARK for Mladá Fronta Dnes daily newspaper, 11.3.2015. See ŠVEC, Pavel and Jakub POKORNÝ. Politici se vojny bojí, ale voliče by jim nesebrala. *Mladá Fronta Dnes*. 11.3.2015. p. 4

6. Support for increased defence spending

In 2014, after a long time, a wide political debate developed involving the increase in defence spending, its target percent to GDP as well as the pace of achieving it. This debate was linked on the one hand with a deteriorating international security situation, on the other hand it became current in the context of the preparation for the Czech position on the NATO summit, which took place in September 2014. Throughout the last year, an intense debate was taking place both within the Czech security community and on the level of all political parties - government and opposition - represented in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. The agreement between the government and opposition parties was not eventually successfully achieved, however, all the parties, following the years of continuous decline in defence spending, agreed on the need for an increase in military budget. The opposition insists on the increase to 2% of GDP by 2020, the government coalition has approved an increase to 1.4% of GDP by the end of the decade.¹⁴

Large political and media attention to spending on the military, as well as the exceptionally frequent, open and widely published complaints of Chief of the General Staff Gen. Petr Pavel regarding the insufficient financial resources were also perceived by the public. The Government's decision to increase spending to 1.4 percent of GDP (from 1.04% in 2015) is supported by 44% of citizens, while 28% are against it.

Figure no. 10: "NATO recommends that member countries attribute 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence, but the Czech Republic fails to meet the recommended commitment. Do you consider the current decision of the Czech government to increase the defence budget to 1.4% of GDP as sufficient and adequate to threats, which the Czech Republic and NATO countries may face?"¹⁵



¹⁴ In March 2015, the Government approved an updated Security strategy of the Czech Republic, which provides for the increase in defence spending to 1.4% by 2020. This was despite the fact that a few months before, at a NATO summit in Wales, the Czech Republic joined the commitment to increase the defence expenditures to 2% of GDP by the end of the decade.

¹⁵ Army and Public 2014 (Armáda a společnost 2014), public survey performed by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, November – December 2014.

Conclusion

The development in the security environment, in particular the establishment of the Islamic State and the conflict in Ukraine, increased the sensitivity of the citizens of the Czech Republic to information concerning security and national defence. Despite the long-term low interest in this kind of information as well as the low level of motivation of citizens to be directly involved in defending the country, it is possible to observe gradual shift in the public attitude. The citizens pay attention to information about the problems which may endanger their security and more than in the past they perceive and support the moves made by the Government which aim at an increase in military capabilities of the Armed Forces and the defence of the country. There is a growing support for the short-term military preparation of male population and a conservative consent with the increase in military spending has been also observed. The confirmation of trends identified in the current opinion polls, however, will need to be confirmed in the following period of time with another investigation.

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STATUS QUO AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract: *Looking only to Saudi Arabia to Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Syria or Iran understand that the interests of multiple lead to divergence. Saudi Arabia is one of the basic US allies in the Middle East and a major supplier of oil, with a daily export over 9 million barrels. The world is on the move! Russia watches over Syria, Europe seems increasingly the more reserved, while the United States manifests attitude force against the need for democracy. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser on Jimmy Carter, said that "the United States is first, last and only superpower". How true it is or not, it is difficult to assess, however, is still remembered Osama Bin Laden's name to conduct a war against terrorism? Is this the reason for fighting until the Iraqi oil resources will be exhausted? What place Saudi Arabia lies in maintaining stability in the Middle East? The question is all the more as the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United State are quite controversial for the Arab world.*

Key words: *democracy, national security, force, fighting, terrorism, stability*

Introduction

From the perspective of international order, the beginning of the third millennium began abruptly and violently, through a planetary political earthquake - terrorist attacks from 11 September 2001 that have targeted major symbolic targets for the democratic world and instantly killed thousands of innocent civilians. These events were followed quickly by other criminal activities, like in many parts of the world, triggering a process of profound transformation of the security environment and resulting consequences affecting the long term and depth international community.¹ The questions are multiple required. We summarize only the explaining a less customary sense, respectively is moving humanity toward a new world order? What is at stake great powers?

Clearly, the world is constantly on the move! Saudi Arabia has launched strong attacks on the Houthi rebels in Yemen! Iran looks to the port city of Aden! Russia watches over Syria, Europe looks like becoming more reserved, while the United States manifests attitude of force against the need for democracy. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to Jimmy Carter and founder of the Trilateral Commission, said that "the United States is first, last and only superpower" . What are the real reasons of these movements of force? It became Osama Bin Laden's name a "Brand" of evil to conduct a war against terrorism? Why do we need a new war in the Middle East? Who wants control of oil resources in Iraq? What place Saudi Arabia lies in maintaining stability in the Middle East? Legitimizes non action helplessness major actors in the international security sphere? Who also wants peace?

¹ Strategia de securitate națională a României, 2007, p. 11.

The theory of facts

As an arch over truth, conspiracy and quatrains attempts of September 11 changed the world. On 24 July 2001, the American billionaire Larry Silverstein acquire World Trade Center complex and assures him against terrorist attacks for the fabulous sum \$ 6 billion.² With just five weeks before the attacks! What all this mean? As tireless in seeking rummaged through the meanders of time that has elapsed since the tragedy, the United States is the one that got out winning all this "story". Hard to believe, but everything is possible in practical today!

The collapse of the Twin Towers remains surrounded by mystery, even if they have killed thousands of innocent people! Why the twin towers fell so quickly, just in their places after some floors fires lasted only an hour or two? According to the conspiracy Theory, the towers were destroyed in controlled explosions, given the collapse duration (10 seconds) and the fire burned only 56 minutes in the World Trade Center 2 and 102 minutes in World Trade Center 1. There were reports of explosions noise even before the crash and the violent flames which were visible from several windows on the lower floors. Official reports serve as the scientific argument extensive survey of the National Institute of Standards and Technology that concluded that planes were seriously damaged pillars of buildings, they finally succumbing. Almost 40,000 liters of aviation fuel has been spilled on the floor and led to development of the fire. Temperature up to 1,000 degrees Celsius caused the floor to buckle and pillars to collapse, causing a noise similar to an explosion. Controlled Demolition always start from the bottom floors to the top, but this collapse took place from top to bottom. No traces of explosives were found in the building, although extensive searches were made and there is no evidence that anyone had previously cut structural pillars or walls, as is done in a controlled demolition.³

Strategic reconfiguration

The reconfiguration of power in the Middle East, what role goes to the Al - Qaida? Islamic State mean a new project of the US? Hard to believe, but not impossible! Voices are heard from the power circle! Alastair Crooke, agent of MI6, the British secret service, and adviser to senior European officials on Middle East issues, believes that the main international actors, from US President Barack Obama to Putin and Russia, is related to a terrorist group "Islamic State " from Iraq and Syria to achieve their own interests.⁴ Acts become more stringent, especially with the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States are quite controversial. Strategic interests are obvious, which even US President Obama said. Increasingly more voices talking about the interests of Westerners for "black gold". In Iraq, the Americans brought chaos, not democracy, wrote, on 12 January 2007, the daily "Financial Times" in an article entitled "Surge toward debacle in Iraq".

Conspiracy The theory does not avoid Saudi Arabia, especially since it controls the structure of the world economy. World demand for oil is projected to increase to 99.7 million barrels per day in 2035 compared to 87.4 million barrels per day in 2012. Currently, global demand is slowing down by the return of recession in Europe and slower economic growth in

² *World Trade Center – cronica unui dezastru anuntat* în <http://www.descopera.ro/teoria-conspiratiei/4222615-world-trade-center-cronica-unui-dezastru-anuntat>

³ *11 septembrie 2001: Teoriile conspirației, la 10 ani de la atentate*, în <http://premonitii.ro/printthread.php?tid=28376>

⁴ *Opinia unui fost agent MI6: Toată lumea folosește „Statul Islamic” în propriul interes. Iar ei se folosesc acum de noi* în <http://www.gandul.info/international/opinia-unui-fost-agent-mi6-toata-lumea-foloseste-statul-islamic-in-propriul-interes-iar-ei-se-folosesc-acum-de-noi-13351682>

China.⁵ To these factors are added and a constant production of the Member States Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia has died at the beginning of the year 2015 at the age of 91 years, his brother Salman, aged 79, was appointed the new king. Diplomacy King Abdullah, sincerity and subtlety of speech, suitable alliance with Israel and the United States, all of which have made Saudi Arabia to remain a dynamic player, active in international power table. King Abdullah has introduced several reforms in the education sector, inaugurated in 2009, "King Abdullah University of Science and Technology", the first mixed institution in the country and has made investments of about 36 billion dollars to create jobs, unemployment and housing construction. Among the most notable achievements of the Saudi Arabian monarch was the granting of voting rights to women, funding a study program in the laic West (about 100,000 young Saudis have received scholarships, of which 80,000 US only), and reviving economic base state that substantial progress during his reign. Saudi Arabia's GDP in 2013 was 745 billion dollars, ranking No. 20 in the world according to the CIA Factbook.⁶

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia covers an area of 2,240,000 square kilometers and is bordered to the west by the Red Sea, east by the Persian Gulf, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman, to the north by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait and Yemen on the south. Saudi Arabia covers 80% of the Arabian Peninsula located at the crossroads of three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe.⁷ This situation incites multiple debates. According to the Diaconu, across the substantial differences ethnic and religious nature, Israel and Saudi Arabia, constantly, some clear common interest: to prevent an Iranian regional hegemony; to prevent the transformation of Iran into a nuclear power (as in the days of Saddam Hussein, both countries were interested to block Iraq to bear of nuclear weapons); to prevent terrorist entities to achieve key policy objectives throughout the region⁸. Will know and can maintain the new Saudi Arabian king the facto strategic cooperation with Israel, in order to achieve all these goals, but without alienating too much ultraconservative religious and political circles in his own country? The chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, expressed hope that Algeria "will continue to be a factor of stability in oil markets, especially in these difficult days." What can this mean?

In the last years Middle East has been marked by fundamental political changes. Additional modernization of the road network and airports in the Kingdom, the Saudi government started a large project to modernize the railways by building new routes and upgrade of old, the most significant being connecting the capital of Jeddah, Dammam, Karj and Tabuk, improve and modernize the fleet Saudi Arabian Airlines (government already bought commercial aircraft worth more than \$ 6 billion from companies Boeing and McDonnell Douglas) and the Ministry of Posts, telephones and telegraph was awarded a contract the US company the AT&T 4 billion USD to update and expand the Kingdom telephone network.⁹

Saudi Arabia is one of the basic US allies in the Middle East and a major supplier of oil, Washington is interested in maintaining the highest degree of status quo. Isolated events took place here, but the wave of dissatisfaction is slightly off. With a GDP / capita of \$ 24,200 (55th), Saudi Arabia has mineral resources oil - 20% of global resources and natural gas. Egypt, with a GDP / capita of \$ 6200 (No. 137), it is essential to carry oil from the Middle East. Jordan, led

⁵ Cel mai mare importator de petrol din lume: Ce tara a depasit SUA în
<http://www.ziare.com/articole/record+productie+petrol+sua>

⁶ CRĂCIUN, L., *Moștenirea unui rege*, în, Qmagazin.ro/ 11.03.2015

⁷ *Îndrumarul de afaceri Arabia Saudită 2014* în

http://www.dce.gov.ro/Materiale%20site/Indrumar_afaceri/Indrumar_afaceri_ArabiaSaudita.pdf

⁸ Florin Diaconu, *Arabia Saudită: Rege nou, probleme vechi; și multe în*

<http://www.lapunkt.ro/2015/01/23/arabia-saudita-rege-nou-probleme-vechi-si-multe/>

⁹ *Îndrumarul de afaceri Arabia Saudită 2014* în

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by King Abdullah II (1999) with a GDP / capita of \$ 5,300 (instead of 142), is another key ally of the US in the area, while Syria, led by Bashar al-Asad (of 17 July 2000), is one of the opponents of Israel and the US in the region, with strong ties to Russia, Iran and Hezbollah.¹⁰

Looking only to Saudi Arabia to Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Syria or Iran, we understand that the interests lead to multiple divergences. Oil reserves in the Arab world represents 60.17% of the world's oil reserves confirmed, and totals an amount of 683.5 million barrels of oil that, not once, Western countries have shown great interest.¹¹

Accordingly, are we surprised what happened recently in countries such as Yemen, Egypt or Bahrain? Let us wonder why France declared war against Libyan Colonel Moamer Ghadafi, never ends? The need for resources is becoming more apparent. Countries like the US, China, Russia and France are among the largest consumers of energy resources, access to resources being, most often only a matter of time. As is well known, the intervention of the US and its allies in Kuwait 1991 was motivated primarily by the need to secure oil in the area and prevent Saddam Hussein to extend his control over it. In the second war, according to the distinguished Prof. PhD Vladimir Paști, the objective was different, as it is a strategic positioning: "Iraq is like a cover over the entire Arabian Peninsula. From Iraq can be controlled also Syria and Saudi Arabia and even if Iran is not controlled, you keep under continuous threat etc. Iraq is vital for anyone who wants to control the Middle East ".

The world looked to the Islamic State rather than to signs of a new war in the Middle East. Huth militias attack, rebels organizations by the Shiite origin, the presidential palace in Sanaa region, led him Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to leave the capital Sanaa refuge in Aden, Yemen city of. Huth militia, loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen and supported by Iran still besieged city of Aden. Why was it necessary for such an intervention?

Bab el-Mandeb

Operation "Storm decisive" led by Saudi Arabia and the attack on rebels in Yemen urges strong reflections. Details are sketchy. Given that US wishes well to Hadi, President of Yemen, Iran and wants back at management the former President Saleh. Beyond sympathies or antipathies, US Energy Information Administration, justified the attack by Yemen's geographic position at Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a key crossing point for international deliveries, a position that makes Arab state an important wheel in the mechanism of energy trade. Over 3.4 million barrels of oil transited the strait of Bab el-Mandeb daily in 2013. Closing the strait would mean that tanks would be forced to sail around the southern peak of Africa to reach European markets, North American and South American. "¹²

The need for resources is increasingly apparent. Countries such as China, USA, Russia and France are among the biggest consumers of energy, access to resources representing, most often only a matter of time. As is well known, US intervention and its allies in Kuwait in 1991 was motivated primarily by the need to secure oil in the area and to foil Saddam Hussein to extend control over it. Should repeat the script in Yemen?

Instead of conclusions:

- In 2015, we are witnessing a confrontation between East and West of the world where Islam is not just a tool of riposte to new theses and orientations of modern social sciences, but also a topic addressed by obsession as the only cause of this new

¹⁰ Yossef Bodansky, *After Osama bin Laden*, în <http://iss.ucdc.ro/revista-pdf/us6.pdf>

¹¹ Nicolae Popescu *Emisarii saudiți și bătălia pentru resurse*, în <http://foaienationala.ro/emisarii-saudii-btalia-pentru-resurse.html>

¹² *Război în Yemen. Incendiu pe piața petrolieră - implicații globale*, în, dcnews.ro/ 28.03.2015.

confrontation? Could it be just a flurry of speeches which have as subject not contemporary Islamic phenomenon, but interest in oil Arab countries? We say this knowing that the Arab states have the monopoly of deposits around the globe. Oil reserves represent 60.17% of total world oil reserves confirmed, and totals an amount of 683.5 million barrels for oil that, not once, Western countries have shown great interest.

- The world economy is still dependent on conventional energy resources and energy crisis continues to deepen. The price of a barrel of oil evolves almost every week, so just a day after the intervention of Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen, the price increased by 6, 7%.
- Great giants of the global economy are in a fierce competition to gain supremacy on "black gold" market.
- Clearly, the battle for resources is no longer in backstage!

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COORDINATES AND LANDMARKS OF WESTERN BALKAN'S SECURITY DYNAMIC

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Abstract: *The present paper contains an assessment of Western Balkan security environment's main evolution trends, laying an emphasis on the sources of tension and on the recent security challenges characteristic to this area. At the basis of these actors' security evolution, there are two major aspects – firstly, the perpetuation of some specific characteristics, related to their historical background and, secondly, the Euro-Atlantic integration process.*

The premise of the present study is the existence of a certain stability in Western Balkans concomitantly with a major destabilization potential. This even more in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, which can generate negative effects in terms of security on the entire European continent and, even more, on space situated relatively close, with actors in course of development, characterized by considerable vulnerabilities.

The subject of this paper represents the departing point of a more extended analysis, developed mostly on the line of the evolution of Western-Balkan actors on the economical-military level¹.

Keywords: instability, ethnical heterogeneity, tensions, extremism, integration.

Western Balkans have had a central place within NATO and EU security preoccupations ever since the violent disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The potential of this region to become a destabilizing factor for the entire European security environment determined the two organizations to launch various initiatives meant to favor the evolution of this space towards a higher degree of stability, security, and predictability.

Despite the fact that the range of the crises having marked the destiny of these states at the end of the 20th century are in their final stages of evolution, Western Balkans being presently a relatively stable and predictable space of security, the consequences of the armed conflicts of the end of the previous century as well as their causes are still defining aspects of Western Balkan security dynamic. In this case, “(...) although the peak of the crisis has been overcome, it has long term effects. Tensions have only been blurred. Under the proper circumstances, these tensions are very likely to become active again. (...) The wars of the Southern Slavs led only to the disintegration of the Federal Yugoslavia and to the independence of the states in this space – Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro –, but not to the resolution of the ethnic, economic, social, national, and political issues which the communities in this area have to face in present and will also have to face in the future”².

In our opinion, it is necessary for the study of Western Balkan security to be based first of all on the analysis of the possible internal sources of instability, on the ethnic, economic, social, national, and political evolution of these states. Secondly, another major

¹ For details, see Cristina Bogzeanu, *Balcanii de Vest: studiu militar-economic*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014.

² Mircea Mureșan, Gheorghe Văduva (coord.), *Criza, conflictul și războiul. Vol. 1, Definierea crizelor și conflictelor armate în noua configurație a filosofiei și fizionomiei naționale și internaționale de rețea*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 243.

coordinate of the study of this region's security is represented by the evolution of the relation between Western Balkan actors and NATO and EU, the main regional institutions with responsibilities in the area of security.

1. The main characteristics of the Western Balkan security environment

The main feature of the space under discussion resides in the fact that the majority of the state actors are still in full process of post-conflict reconstruction, depending at a considerable extent on foreign actors both in terms of economic development and security. These states' economies are in course of development and foreign assistance plays a major role.

The wars that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia have remained in Europeans' memory as the most tragic events after the end of the Second World War. The states resulted after the disintegration of the Yugoslavian federation – Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – are, at present, as far as security is concerned, relatively stable, being clearly enrolled on the way of normalizing relations between them.

In this respect, an eloquent example is Kosovo-Serbia relation which knew notable improvements in 2013, by the signing an agreement on the normalization of their relations, an initiative facilitated by the EU Representative for foreign affairs and security policy. The document is considered a landmark for the relations between the two regional actors, being a compromise of both parties so as to each of them could continue their EU integration process. According to this agreement, “neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side's progress in their respective EU paths”³.

All Western Balkans actors have consolidated their relations with NATO and EU, being at different stages of their integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. Western Balkans play a key role in the security equation of the entire Europe. Their destabilizing potential has been already proved during the conflicts determining the disintegration of Yugoslavia, explaining EU major interest unto this region. Moreover, the Union is the main actor involved in stabilizing these states, especially through the efforts to integrate them.

Although Failed/Fragile States Index⁴ shows a constant decrease of the level of instability, Western Balkans still carry the seeds of possible sources of conflict. In other words, Western Balkan actors' stability has constantly improved, but this doesn't also mean that they came out of the area of instability (see figure no. 1).

³ *First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations*, 19 April 2013, URL: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?&blog itemid=1723>, retrieved at 12 December 2013.

⁴ Failed/Fragile States Index is a classification of the states of the entire world depending on their level of instability. Thus, on the first places of this classification, there are the most unstable states in the world. For details, see: URL: <http://ffp.statesindex.org/>, retrieved at 10 January 2015.




Figure no. 1: The evolution of Western Balkan states' instability between 2009 and 2014⁵

Even more, if we take into consideration the recent political-military crisis happening in the Black Sea region, implying military confrontations and territorial annexations, then we could expect a regress at the level of regional stability's dynamic. In this respect, it is useful to recall the declaration of the German chancellor, warning that the destabilization of Ukraine calls in question the entire European peace as the crisis under discussion doesn't exclusively regard Ukraine, but also the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and even Western Balkans⁶.

Despite stability and the considerable decrease of a large armed confrontation risk, the multiethnic and multi-religious character of Western Balkan states and, especially, the maintenance of tensed relations from this point of view, represent one of the constant challenges of organizing and managing any domain of public life, inclusively the economic and the military ones.

The violent process of the former Yugoslav republic disintegration left behind highly heterogeneous states from ethnic and religious points of view, characterized by major economic challenges, often translated in low standards of living for their citizens. Even more, most of these states are still in course of post-conflict reconstruction, of developing democratic systems.

According to the data valid for 2008, Kosovo population was composed of 92% Albanese and 8% Serbs, Bosniaks and other ethnic groups⁷, the main problem being the fact that the majority of Serb population is concentrated in the northern part of the separatist province. Also relatively ethnically homogenous is Serbia, which, in 2011, had a population composed of 83.3% Serbs, 3.5% Hungarians, 2.1% Roma, 2% Bosniaks. Similarly, Albania has a relatively uniform ethnic profile (82.6% Albanese)⁸.

But, there is also a group of states which are extremely heterogeneous from this point of view. BiH is the most eloquent case, given that, in 2011, its population was composed of 48% Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats, being followed by Montenegro – 45% Montenegrins, 28.7% Serbs, 8.7% Bosniaks, 4.9% Albanese. FYROM's ethnic groups numbered, in 2002, 64.2% Macedonians, 25.2% Albanese⁹.

⁵ The data laying behind this image were taken from Failed/Fragile States Index, the editions between 2009 and 2014. For details, see: URL: <http://ffp.statesindex.org/>, retrieved at 10 January 2015.

⁶ Roland Oliphant, „Angela Merkel warns Russia could seek to destabilise 'whole of the European peaceful order'”, in *The Telegraph*, URL: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/angela-merkel/11236622/Angela-Merkel-warns-Russia-could-look-to-destabilise-whole-of-the-European-peaceful-order.html>, retrieved at 7 December 2014.

⁷ CIA, *The World Factbook*, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html>, retrieved at 10 January 2015.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

All these data, corroborated with economic instability, with high rates of unemployment, with political instability and state institutions still in course of formation/development create the image of an unstable environment. Even the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia* (2009) mentioned that “security situation in the region is characterized by distinct national, religious and political extremism and the destruction of cultural heritage, which, in addition to existing economic and social problems and lack of state institutions, drags out the process of faster and more successful democratic transition of the countries in the region”¹⁰.

Nevertheless, ethnic tensions are not the only sources of instability. An analysis on the data provided by Failed/Fragile States Index reveals that the lack of state’s legitimacy and of political elites’ cohesion represent areas in which these actors constantly register extremely low performances. One of the structural instability sources, with a consistent contribution to maintaining these actors at a low level of economic development, is represented by corruption, to which it is added the wide spread of organized crime.

2. Sources of tension and the issue of extremism

Although there are more than 15 years since the end of the armed conflicts between Western Balkan states, all of them being at different stages on their paths to the Euro-Atlantic integration, tensions haven’t ceased affecting the relations between them. The most significant issues are related to the relation between Kosovo and Serbia. Belgrade still doesn’t recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Pristina, and the process of their relations’ normalization hasn’t reached its final objectives, despite of making significant progresses. Additionally, the northern part of Kosovo which is, in its majority, Serb, doesn’t recognize the actual delimitation of the borders between Kosovo and Serbia, this also being the region with the most frequent violent confrontation.

At least equally significant for the region’s stability are the secessionist tendencies in BiH, where Srpska Republic¹¹ aims to separate from BiH and unite with Serbia. There are also unresolved disputes regarding the delimitation of the border between BiH and Croatia (small border parts allowing the access to sea block the ratification of 1999 agreement on border) and between Croatia and Slovenia. As far as the latter are concerned, both sides require sovereign rights on Pirin Gulf and four villages. Slovenia opposed to Croatia demands regarding the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic Sea. In 2009, the two countries signed an international arbitration agreement for defining the disputed land and sea borders, which determined Slovenia to give up its objections regarding Croatia’s EU adhesion. Nonetheless, Zagreb continues to impose harsh conditions to Croatia regarding its accession to Schengen area¹². Additionally, there is also the dispute between FYROM and Greece regarding the former’s name.

Beyond the maintenance of these sources of tension, Western Balkan security environment is characterized by a range of cross-cutting risks, common, at a smaller or higher extent, to all the entities in this space. Endemic corruption, organized crime, fragile state institutions, which are in course of development, inter-ethnic tensions are all parts of the red line of any security analysis centered on this area.

¹⁰ ***, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, October 2009, URL: <http://www.voa.mod.gov.rs/documents/national-security-strategy-of-the-republic-of-serbia.pdf>, retrieved at 5 October 2014, p. 7.

¹¹ Srpska Republic, with a Serb majority, is one of the two entities composing Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a Bosniak majority, of Muslim religion. For details regarding BiH political organization, see Cristina Bogzeanu, “Bosnia and Herzegovina – political impasse and security issues. Repercussions on the relation with the European Union”, in *Strategic Impact*, no. 3 [36]/2010, pp. 50-63.

¹² CIA, *The World Factbook*, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hr.html>, retrieved at 10 October 2014.

Another security risk which, has recently known a tendency of increase is related to the development of extremism, especially in the case of Kosovo and BiH. State with a majoritarian Muslim population, Islamist militants have been present in BiH ever since 1992, when foreign fighters came to support Bosniak Muslims during 1992-1995 war. Presently, most of them are moderates, although the Islamic community has begun to assert itself more and more on the political arena, assuming the leading role in leveraging the frustrations and anger of population and filling the vacuum of power left by the other political parties in BiH¹³.

Additionally, there were also identified a series of cases in which combatants from BiH left to fight in Iraq or Syria, thus, appearing the risk that, when returning, these fighters would have more radical orientations and would be better trained, which will contribute to the increase of the terrorist threat in the region. It is eloquent the arrest, in September 2014, of 16 persons suspected of having taken part in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, as well as of having recruited and financed Bosniak citizens to join the Islamic militants in these states¹⁴.

Similar events took place in Kosovo, where central authorities estimated, in August 2014, that between 100 and 200 Kosovar Albanese had joined extremist combatants in Syria and Iraq. Also, there were made arrests of some extremist leaders trying to recruit young men for becoming Islamic combatants in the two states.

Kosovo has a majoritarian Islamic population (95%), with a low standard of living (the poorest population in Europe). 70% of the Kosovars are young men under the age of 35 and the unemployment rate is extremely high (over 30%)¹⁵. BiH population is composed of 40% of Islamists and the unemployment rate also reaches record levels (44.3% in 2013)¹⁶. Thus, the two Western Balkan actors seem to be an extremely favorable land for recruiting young men, easy to be radicalized, in extremist networks.

| State | Declared surplus (2011) |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Albania | 258,992 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 53,000 |
| Croatia | 0 |
| Montenegro | 13,000 |
| Serbia | + 90,000 |

Table no. 1: The surplus of armament declared by Western Balkan states¹⁷

It is also noteworthy the fact that the tendency of extremism's development, corroborated with other risks, specific to the region (organized crime, transit space for various illicit activities, especially for armament traffic) can form into a veritable security risk at Europe's boundary. Even more, in Western Balkans, there are still substantial stocks of weapons (table no. 1), despite all the international initiatives carried out in this respect.

¹³ ***, "Bosnia's Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism", Europe Briefing No. 70, International Crisis Group, 26 February 2013, URL: http://www.crisis_group.org/~media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b070-bosnias-dangerous-tango-islam-and-nationalism.pdf, retrieved at 25 April 2014.

¹⁴ ***, „Bosnia detains suspected Jihadists”, RFE/RL's Balkan Service, 3 September 2014, URL: <http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-detains-suspected-jihadists/26564672.html>, retrieved at 3 September 2014.

¹⁵ According to CIA, The World Factbook, URL: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>, retrieved at 3 September 2014.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ Pierre Gobinet, *Significant Surpluses: Weapons and Ammunition Stockpiles in South-East Europe*, Special Report, Small Arms Survey, Switzerland, December 2011, p. 26, URL: <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR13-Significant-Surpluses.pdf>, retrieved at 14 August 2014.

There also should be considered the existence of paramilitary groups, constituted on ethnic principles, remnants of the groups involved in the conflicts having determined Yugoslavia's disintegration, which can target attacks on other ethnic groups, governmental authorities or international institutions.

3. Historical heritage and Euro-Atlantic integration

The evolution of the Western Balkan security environment can be analyzed departing from the identification of a set of common characteristics. Among them, in our opinion, the most relevant are the following: a) the long term repercussion of the wars of the end of the 20th century; b) the dependency on foreign actors in the economic and security areas; c) the maintenance of a range of sources of tensions between Western Balkan actors.

The series of political-military crises determining the disintegration of Yugoslavia begun in 1991, with the movement of independence from Slovakia and Croatia, continuing with the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and the one from the separatist province of Kosovo (1998-1999). The confrontations between the armed forces of the parties, as well as the involvement of foreign actors (NATO in Kosovo's war) have had a range of serious consequences in economic and military terms. Thus, the newly formed states had to face the economic losses resulted after the armed confrontations, as well as after the economic embargoes imposed not only by the neighboring states, but also by the entire international community. Actually, the disintegration of Yugoslavia triggered the disintegration of the economic and commercial connections, as well as a deep economic recession and, implicitly, the delay of the necessary reforms.

The economic restructuration constituted in a long term process and the performances of the Western Balkan states from this perspective are not very good even presently. In this respect, it is relevant the fact that, until 2011, three out of these states (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina) hadn't reached the GDP level they had in 1989¹⁸.

Even more, Western Balkan states were and continue to be represented as a space of instability and unpredictability regarding the security dynamic which reflected in the direct foreign investments, necessary during the post-conflict economic reconstruction and the transition to market economy. Thus, the very mentioning of the term "Balkans" rather evokes images of conflict and war than a space of investment opportunities and economic potential¹⁹.

Also, from a military point of view, Western Balkan states' profiles have consistently modified ever since the end of the 20th century's wars. The passing from the escalation phases of the crises, culminated with direct armed confrontations, to those of de-escalation and post-conflict reconstruction, imposed modifications not only in the number and structure of the armed forces, but also in the area of military equipment and armaments. One of the main changes regarding the reform of the defense sector was represented by the consistent reduction of both military troops and equipment, so as to become compatible with the state of peace²⁰.

There are also military and economic repercussions of the Yugoslavia's disintegration in the area of the rights of property on the military assets. For instance, after Montenegro's

¹⁸ Saul Estrin, Milica Uvalic, *Foreign Direct Investment into Transition Economies: Are the Balkans Different?*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, LEQS Paper No. 64/2013, p. 8, URL: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper64.pdf>, retrieved at 10 October 2014.

¹⁹ Christopher Cviic, Peter Sanfey, *In Search of the Balkan Recovery: The Political and Economic Re-emergence of South-Eastern Europe*, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 124 apud Saul Estrin, Milica Uvalic, *Op. cit.*, 2013.

²⁰ Marina Caparini, „Security reform in the Western Balkans”, in ***, *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, URL: <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2004/files/SIPRIYB0408.pdf>, retrieved at 19 October 2014.

declaration of independence from Serbia (2006), each one of the two resulted state entities maintained the right of property on the military assets on their territory. Given the fact that, after Montenegro's secession, Serbia became a state without seaside, its naval forces were fully transferred to Montenegro, Belgrade keeping just a small flotilla on the Danube River.

Presently, all these actors are on the Euro-Atlantic integration path, which means they have to pass through a program of modernization and transformation of their armed forces.

After the end of the wars which led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, most of the resulted states manifested a high degree of dependency on foreign actors in economic and security terms.

NATO and EU have plaid significant roles not only in the context of the crisis management process. Subsequently, both of them contributed not only to maintaining stability and security in this space, thus having a major role in the creation of the necessary conditions for the post-conflict reconstruction and offering a constant support to the respective states. Thus, NATO and EU have plaid important roles from military, security and economic points of view. Even presently, there still are military and civil mission carried out under NATO and EU aegis (table no. 2).

| | Previous tasks | Current tasks | Troops |
|--|---|---|--|
| KFOR (Kosovo Force) ²¹ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Assistance for the return or relocation of the internal displaced persons or refugees; - Reconstruction and de-mining; - Medical assistance; - Ethnic minorities' security; - The protection of patrimonial sites; - Security and public order: - Border security: - Safeguarding the ban of weapons smuggling at the borders; - Implementation, throughout Kosovo, of an amnesty program in terms of weapons, ammunition and explosives; - Destruction of weapons; - Support for the establishment of civilian institutions, law and order, of judiciary and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of political, economic and social developments in the province. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disbandment of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)²²; - Support for the development of Kosovo Security Force (KSF). - Establishment of a civilian organism to supervise KSF. | 2014: 4,704 |
| EULEX Rule of Law Mission ²³ (Kosovo) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supporting Kosovo institutions, the judicial authorities, law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in the continuation of their further development and strengthening of independent and multi-ethnic justice, police, and customs systems, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices. | | 2008: 3,200 Febr. 2014: 2,065 Oct. 2014: max. 1,600 |

²¹ The data were provided by KFOR official webpage URL: <http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor.aspx>, retrieved at 1 October 2014.

²² Post-conflict transition arrangement, under UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), whose operational activities ceased in June 2009 and was official dissolved.

²³ The data was provided by ***, *Common Security and Defence Policy. Eulex Kosovo. EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo*, Updated October 2014, URL: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/factsheet_eulex_kosovo_en.pdf, retrieved at 15 October 2014.

| | Previous tasks | Current tasks | Troops |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| EUFOR Althea ²⁴ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discouragement; - The supervision of the fulfilment of the responsibilities from the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH; - Contribution to the maintenance of a stable security environment. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Providing support for the building of the capacity and the training of BiH Armed Forces; - Support for BiH efforts to keep a secure and stable security environment; - Support of EU general strategy for BiH. | 2004: 7,000 2014: 600 |

Table no. 2: Ongoing NATO and EU missions in the Western Balkans

The evolution of the relations between these states, on the one hand, and the two organizations, on the other, is relevant for the level of stability reached by the Western Balkans actors. The decrease of these missions' troops and the modifications of their tasks are indicators of the increase of their own capacity to ensure their own security. This even more if we take in consideration the fact that each step towards the Euro-Atlantic integration supposes the implementation of certain reforms, the reach of certain standards in economic, political, social, military, and international relations terms.

| State | NATO | | EU | |
|-------------------------------|---|------|---------------------|--|
| <i>Slovenia</i> | Member State (2004) | | Member State (2004) | |
| <i>Croatia</i> | Member State (2009) | | Member State (2013) | |
| <i>Serbia</i> | NATO accession is not a strategic objective; PfP (2006) | | Candidate state | |
| <i>FYROM</i> | PfP (1995) MAP (1999) Security and defence sector reform | | Candidate state | |
| <i>Montenegro</i> | PfP (2006) MAP (2009) | | Candidate state | |
| <i>Albania</i> | Member State (2009) | | Candidate state | |
| <i>Bosnia and Herzegovina</i> | PfP (2006) Intensified dialogue (2008) Security and defence sector reform | | Potential candidate | EUFOR Althea (military mission) |
| <i>Kosovo</i> [*] | | KFOR | Potential candidate | EULEX Rule of Law Mission (civilian mission) |

Table no. 3: Western Balkan states relations with NATO and EU

From the perspective of the evolution towards the Euro-Atlantic integration, Western Balkan states can be grouped in three main categories: a) states included in the Euro-Atlantic structures (Slovenia, Croatia, and Albania); b) states relatively advanced regarding Euro-Atlantic integration (Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM); c) actors with difficult evolution (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo).

²⁴ The data was provided by ***, *Common Security and Defence Policy. EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation EUFOR Althea*, Updated April 2014, URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf, retrieved at 1 October 2014.

* The Republic of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008. Romania doesn't recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

KFOR effectives gradually decreased from 60.000 militaries in 1999 to 4.882 militaries at December, 1st, 2013, which can be considered an indicator of the stabilization of security in Kosovo and of the increase of the local capacity to manage the evolutions in this area. However, there are opinions according to which the reduction of NATO's presence in the region augments the range of regional security risks, given the fact that there are still social tensions which can escalate to a violent conflict.

With an extremely violent history, which is not very far away, a still uncertain international status, an economy looked upon as the most weakly developed economy on the entire European continent, highly dependent on foreign economic and military support, Kosovo is still in full process of self-governance capacity construction. The gradual reduction of foreign presence, especially on the military level, can represent a proof of the reduction of the risk of regional destabilization represented by this entity. This fact is supported by the evolution of the missions carried out in the course of time by NATO and EU, as they have had the tendency to reduce the assistance provided for the local institutions in building their own capacities.

Conclusions

The wars at the end of the 20th century have fundamentally changed the political map of Western Balkans, leaving behind a series of young states, strongly affected by the military confrontations both from economic and military perspectives. In the first instance, it was necessary to reduce the arsenals, the number of weapons held by the population and the state. This type of measures were justified not only through the need to keep new states' stability and security, but also to build armed forces adapted to the missions specific to the state of peace.

Euro-Atlantic integration represented the main stimulus both for the economic development and for the reforms in the military sector. Overall, Western Balkan actors can be considered relatively stable in security terms, but they still have to take major steps towards reaching Euro-Atlantic standards. This is the reason for which, at a first sight, the assessments of the progresses registered in this direction could seem contradictory. The most eloquent example in this respect is Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state with multiple indexes of instability, but positively appreciated from the perspective of its evolutions since the end of the war until presently.

Having in view the close relations between the states in the region and NATO and EU, their positive evolution in terms of stability, security, economic development is likely to continue. However, one shouldn't underestimate the destabilizing potential of some factors such as the maintenance of inter-ethnic tensions reflected on the political, economic and military levels, the dissensions between the actors, endemic corruption, the extent of the organized crime and extremism etc.. In the context of notable economic difficulties, mostly generated by the world economic and financial crisis, and of state institutions in course of determination and construction, all these factors can form into genuine challenges not only to Western Balkan security, but also to the European security.

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BELLIGERENCY IN AFRICA

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Abstract: *Nowadays, the civil and intra-state conflicts are the dominant form of belligerency in Africa. The large number of refugees, famish, diseases, etc. are just few of conflicts’ consequences. The diminution of conflicts’ number and growth of human security stands as great challenge for the African states and international community. The “Conflict Barometer 2013” study achieved by Heidelberg Institute for International Conflicts Research emphasizes the great number of wars (20) or limited wars (25). The conflicts on the African continent generated and generate a series of serious effects against human security. Among these, the effects of women and children use in the armed conflicts became a phenomenon for which the international community and the African states must find adequate and timely solutions.*

The overall scientific goal of this article consists in emphasizing that the recently conflicts are complex issue of the African continent. In our regard, a mean to diminish and stop the conflicts is the involvement of the international community in finding some adequate solutions.

Keywords: *Africa, security, conflicts, belligerency, human security, implications, international community.*

1. Africa or black continent – a few aspects

Africa is the second larger continent with a surface of 30,065,000 km², after Asia, with 44,579,000 km².¹ The African continent is also on the second place as concerns its population number – 1,110,635,000 inhabitants while on the Asian continent live 4,298,723,000 inhabitants.² In the top done regarding the number of countries: Africa - 54; Europe - 47; Asia - 44; North America - 23; Oceania - 14; South America - 12; Oceania – 0.³

The most populated countries in Africa are: Nigeria – 173,611,131 inhabitants, Ethiopia – 95,045,679 inhabitants, Egypt – 82,196,587 inhabitants, Democratic Republic of Congo – 67,363,365 inhabitants and South Africa – 52,914,243 inhabitants.⁴

The least populated African countries are: Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (UK) (non-sovereign) – 4,000, Seychelles – 93,033, São Tomé and Príncipe – 194,161, Mayotte (France) – 217,000 and Cape Verde Republic – 501,674 inhabitants.⁵

Africa neighbours with Europe (N-V) on the Gibraltar strait line and with the northern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, with two important gulfs – Great Sirte Mare and Small Sirte. With Asia, the neighbouring limit starts from Suez Channel, passes through the Red Sea, Bab

¹ *Continents: by size*, available online at: <http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/continent.htm>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

² *Continents: by population 2014 estimates*, available online at: <http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/continent.htm>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

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⁴ *Most Populous Countries in Africa*, available online at: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population/>, accessed on December 21, 2014.

⁵ *Least Populous Countries in Africa*, available online at: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population/>, accessed on December 21, 2014.

el-Mandeb Strait and Aden Gulf. On East, it is washed by the Indian Ocean waters, to the West it is washed by Atlantic Ocean. Equator and the both Tropics (Cancer and Capricorn) trespasses this continent.

Africa is divided in five regions as follows: *East Africa* including the following countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; *Middle East Africa* including: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe; *North Africa* with: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara, The Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish territories in North Africa, The Madeira Islands are Portuguese territory; *South Africa* including: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland; *Africa de Vest*, with the next countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.⁶

The African continent can be shared in three groups: Low Africa – Sahara, Sudan, Guinea and Zaire Basin with an overall altitude below 500 m; High Africa - Abyssinia, Somalia; South Africa – built by high plateau over 1,000 m. From the climate perspective, this continent is divided in many areas: one with equatorial climate (with yearly medium temperatures with less season variations and great quantities of precipitations); two areas with subequatorial climate; two tropical areas (with extremely reduced precipitations – between 50-150 mm yearly); two subtropical areas with two opposed seasons, one wet and one dry. It is the continent with the highest temperatures on the globe, the values over 40 degrees are frequent in Sahara Desert.⁷

In relation to the continent's name there exist many explanations. Etymologically, it seems to come from the Latin *aprica* – *sunny*, or by Greek *aphrike* – *without cold*. There are also other hypotheses: a derivate of Semitic root *faraga* – *to separate from ...*; the name of a Berber population from South of Cartagena, *afriqi*, a least known population.

Africa is a great continent and in order to show this fact in 2013 it was publicized an article showing on this continent could fit many countries meaning: China, USA, India, Mexico, Peru, France, Spain, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, Japan, Germany, Norway, Italy, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Nepal, Bangladesh and Greece.⁸

The wealth of African continent is given by its lakes (Tanganyika with a maximum deep of about 1,470 m, shared between Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo; Tanzania (45%) and Zambia (41%), the deepest fresh water lake on the continent; Victoria, Chad etc.), rivers (Nile, the longest in the world, with 6,650 kilometres; Congo; Zaire; Niger; Zambezi; Orange; Limpopo; Senegal), vegetation (equatorial forest, savannah, tropical steppe, tropical deserts, Mediterranean), fauna (diverse species of monkeys, birds with vivid and different coloured feathering, carnivores, herbivores, rozarials, reptiles, insects), diverse mineral resources (gold, diamonds, platinum, magnesium, chrome, cobalt, copper, vanadium, wolfram, etc.), traditions, faiths and habits etc.

⁶ *What is the Size of Africa?*, available online at: <http://www.dimensionsinfo.com/what-is-the-size-of-africa/>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

⁷ *Africa*, available online at: <http://www.ipedia.ro/africa-451/>, accessed on December 21, 2014.

⁸ William Turvill, *Africa as you've never seen it before: Clever comparison shows it's really as big as China, India, the United States AND most of Europe put together*, available online at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2445615/True-size-Africa-continent-big-China-India-US-Europe-together.html>, accessed on December 22, 22.00 hours.

To this continent richness also contributes the great number of population who in regard to statistics is expectable to reach in 2050 to at least 2.4 billion⁹.

Referring to its wealth, the academician Mircea Malița considers Africa is for the other continents „*the equivalent of a strange celestial body*”¹⁰.

2. Conflicts in Africa

Africa stands as a hard tried continent as regards the conflicts (Table no.1¹¹), their number is increasing and they have different intensities.

| Year | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Number of conflicts | 42 | 44 | 60 | 54 | 74 | 74 | 78 | 79 | 85 | 85 | 92 | 90 | 97 |

Table no.1. *Conflicts recorded in Africa in-between 2001-2013*

The profound reasons if the conflicts in Africa were subject of many debates. Unfortunately the nature of violence was often wrongly understood because differently from the ethnical conflict stereotypes, in Africa the proofs seem to show it rather diminishes not increases the chance for a conflict apparition¹². In 2003, the Human Security Commission emphasized the reasons of internal conflicts, respectively: the competition on land and resources, sudden and deep political and economic transitions, cultivation of inequities between humans and communities, growth of criminality, corruption and illegal activities, weak and unstable political regimes and institutions, the policy of identity and historical heritage, as the colonialism.¹³ In regard to other publication¹⁴, the causes of conflicts are many and frequently reappear: interstate frontiers, ethnical appurtenance, political reasons, political internal reasons, political international reasons, persecutions, poor economic performance. As concerns the Mali conflict (debuted in January 2012), the motivations are older and are consequence of disputes among the Northern and Southern parts of the country, emphasized following the Gaddafi regime collapse in the neighbouring country, Libya getting religious connotation by the involvement of Islamist and terrorist organizations.

Among the African continents’ regions, Sub-Saharan Africa stands as the most belligerent region. In 2013, it registered about a quarter of whole conflicts in the global plan, their number being 97. The 97 conflicts includes: 29 disputes, 8 non-violent crises, 42

⁹ In conformity with: <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2013/2013-world-population-data-sheet/data-sheet.aspx>, accessed on December 26, 2014.

¹⁰ Horia C. Matei, Silviu Neaguț, Ion Nicolae, Caterina Radu, Ioana Vintilă-Rădulescu, *Enciclopedia Africii*, Editura Meronia, București, 2002, p.7.

¹¹ The data were taken from the website: <http://www.hiik.de/en>, Conflict Barometer 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, accessed on December 23, 2014.

¹² *Armed conflict a threat to regional cooperation*, 2006, produced by Division of Early Warning and Assessment (DEWA), United Nations Environment Programme, available online at: <http://www.unep.org/dewa/Africa/publications/AEO-2/content/200.htm>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

¹³ *Ibidem*, accessed on December 23, 2014.

¹⁴ *Africa: Causes, Sources and Types*, available online at: <https://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conflict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-sources-and-types/>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

medium intensity conflicts, 7 limited wars and 11 wars (Figure no. 1¹⁵). The fights for the control of natural resources as diamonds and gold are combined with political ambitions and this determines the growth of armed conflicts' intensity.




Figure no. 1: *The picture of conflicts registered in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013 comparatively to 2012*

In regard to Heidelberg Institute for the Research of International Conflicts, the motivations of the wars undergone in 2013 in Sub-Saharan Africa were resources, disputes for local power, system/ideology, autonomy and local supremacy.

In order to show this painful reality of Africa, Francisco Dans, student to the Centre of Spatial Analysis from the College University in London created, in 2012, a map showing the great number of armed conflicts taking place in 14 years period (1997-2011). The conflicts were shared in four categories: violence against civilians (red), riots/protests (blue), fights (green) and others (yellow) (Figure no.2¹⁶).

Beyond the great number of conflicts it is also important their geographical position. The majority of events taking place along the equatorial limit focusing in countries as: Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Somalia. A notable red point is mentioned in Zimbabwe, where there were reported many violent acts against the civilians. Also, there were pointed out some hotspots in the North Africa in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, the so-called *Arab Spring* and its consequences.

¹⁵ *Conflict Barometer 2013*, p. 44, available online at: http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2013.pdf, accessed on December 23, 2014.

¹⁶ The map is available at: <http://www.citylab.com/politics/2012/09/depressingly-crowded-map-conflicts-africa/3264/>, accessed on December 23, 2014.




Figure no.2: *Conflicts in Africa in-between 1997-2011*

The overwhelming number of conflicts determines a series of effects over all the human security components.

3. The impact of conflicts in Africa over the human security

No matter their nature, the conflicts are an obstacle ahead the development, education and progress. The African countries suffer very much because of these conflicts; civilians and militaries are killed, migrations growth, there appear and amplify the number of diseases and also the economic, environmental consequences, etc.

In-between 1960-2002, about 1,550,000 persons were killed in conflicts in Africa, respectively 40% from the total of the global conflicts. Yearly, the average number of deaths in fights was about 3,350, while in other regions of the world were situated between 1,500-2,700 deaths. This cruel reality does as Africa to become the continent with the great number of deaths in conflicts.¹⁷

¹⁷ Anke Hoeffler, *Dealing with the Consequences of Violent Conflicts in Africa. Background Paper for the African Development Bank Report 2008*, Centre for the Study of African Economies University of Oxford, p.8, available online at: <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/consequences.pdf>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

Following the conflicts it took place a significant growth of people migrating to other countries from 15,813,000 in the middle of 2010 to 17,228,000 to the middle of 2013¹⁸.

Nowadays, for many people, the African continent is synonym to diseases, conflicts, war, poverty, and famish.

In top 10 of the most mortal diseases in Africa there are: syphilis (almost 12.2 million persons each year), meningitis (more than 1 million persons took different forms of meningitis in each year and were recorded about 174,000 deaths in each year), tetanus (500,000 cases yearly), convulsive coffin (200,000-300,000 mortal cases each year, particularly babies and children under 5 years), smallpox (30 million persons affected yearly, particularly babies and children under 5 years), tuberculosis (more than 2 million person die in each year), diarrhoea (almost 2.2 million death each year, mostly children under 2 years – the disease is responsible for 8% of registered deaths), malaria (there affected more than 500 million, recording between 1-3 million deaths), HIV/AIDS (33 million persons, practically neither region of Africa was not avoided by this disease; South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana numbering among the countries with great spread of HIV/AIDS), pneumonia and other infectious diseases of the inferior respiratory tract (800,000 yearly deaths).¹⁹

Famish became a daily life component. The macabre periods of famish with the most number of deaths were recorded in: Somalia – 2010-2012, have died 260,000 persons; Sudan – 1998, have died 70,000 Sudanese; Somalia – 1991-1992, along the 300,000 deaths, about 2 million persons were displaced from their houses as result of massive famish; Ethiopia – 1950-1973, over 60,000 Ethiopians died by famish; Uganda – 1980-1983, 30,000 Ugandans died; Nigeria – 1967-1970, over one million persons were famished, etc.²⁰

The unemployment is on the list of negative consequences of conflicts and maintains to a high level particularly in South Africa and North Africa with a percentage of 25.2% and 12.2% registered in 2013.²¹ The projection for 2015 and 2016 achieved by the International Labour Office in Geneva is not very hopeful for these regions, 25.1% and 12.1%. The young with ages between 15 and 24 years suffered very much because of the lack of jobs; the unemployment became persistent in their row and it had very high level (Figure no.2²²).

¹⁸ Assefaw Bariagaber, *International migration and development in Eastern and Southern Africa*, 2014, printed in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa, p.5, available online at: <https://books.google.ro/books?id=O7WQBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=migration+in+africa+2014&source=bl&ots=vP18KgJekK&sig=AuM8-EBrKvzKfsaCiLkoUwivpdo&hl=ro&sa=X&ei=39SZVJ2pOubOyQPR2YD4Cg&ved=0CCcQ6AEwADgU#v=onepage&q=migration%20in%20africa%202014&f=false>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

¹⁹ *Top 10 diseases in Africa – most deadly*, available online at: <http://answersafrica.com/diseases-in-africa.html>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

²⁰ *10 most deadly famines in Africa*, available online at: <http://answersafrica.com/starvation-and-famine-in-africa.html>, accessed on December 23, 2014.

²¹ Followed in the Middle East with a percentage of unemployment of 10.9% for 2013, North Africa is situated on the first place between the world's regions with the highest level of unemployment in 2013. *Global employment trends*, International Labour Office Geneva, 2014, p.18, available online at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_233953.pdf, accessed on December 26, 2014.

²² *Where is the unemployment rate the highest?*, available online at: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-employment-trends/2014/WCMS_233936/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on December 26, 2014.




Figure no.3: *Situation of young people unemployment on May, 2014*

Violence against women is a complex issue emphasized along the conflicts and it is manifested by diverse forms (traffic of persons, forces prostitution, intimidation, etc.). In certain modern wars and violent conflicts, women proved are able to participate equally as men in the violent acts. In regard of some studies²³, many African women participated or participate as combatants in wars fulfilling different roles. For example, young woman or girls are or were members of governmental forces, opposition armed forces, paramilitary forces or militia forces in a series of countries (Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Libya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).

It is surprising many children are used in the conflicts of the African continent for military goals, they take part directly to hostilities (about 300,000 serve as soldiers), or are used in support actions (carriers, spies, messengers, etc.), or are used to get some political advantages by propaganda.²⁴

African states are appreciated as vulnerable to climate changes and there is the risk for violence growth owed to the shocks and climate requests. The studies on the local conflicts and data on environment observe the both conditions – excessively dry or excessively wet can lead to the growth of violence.²⁵ Other consequences of Africa conflicts, particularly the armed conflicts on human security are decaying the surrounding environment, loose of species, diminished access to water or other resources, altering the natural trophic chain, supplementary pressure on the biodiversity, etc.

²³ Chris Coulter, Mariam Persson, Mats UtasYoung, *Female Fighters in African Wars*, printed in by Sweden Elanders Sverige AB, Stockholm 2008, pp.8-9, available online at: http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:241304/FULL_TEXT01, accessed on December 26, 2014.

²⁴ *Problema copiilor-soldati pe continentul african*, available online at: <http://geopolitics.ro/problema-copiilor-soldati-pe-continentul-negru/>, accessed on December 28, 2014.

²⁵ *Climate Change & Conflict*, p.4, in *Climate Change & Security in Africa Clear Risks, Nuanced Impacts*, December 2014, available online at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gmaccc%20brief%20final_dec%202014.pdf, accessed on December 26, 2014.

4. Implication of international community in the resolution of belligerency issue

The efforts of the international community to diminish the belligerency in Africa are many and in diverse forms of materialization as humanitarian aid, diplomatic actions, concrete support to improve the situation in matters of security.

The European Union adopted the comprehensive approach on the situation in Sahel region, materialized in the EU Strategy for Sahel which is conceived on the duality of the ideas that development and security are interconnected and can mutually support and the complex crisis in Sahel region needs a regional answer.

In this regard, one of the European Union instruments to aid the Malian people in the restauration of the state of law and re-establishment of a democratic and authority government to the level of the whole country it represented the military training missions - EUTM Mali in December 2012. The goal of this mission consisted in offering military training and counselling to the Malian armed force in order to improve their military capacity and operational efficacy, in improving the functioning of armed forces' logistical and operational chains of command, as well as human resources and training capacities management. The initial mandate of this mission was set for 15 months and includes 200 trainers but also support personnel for the mission and deployment of forces' protection.

The development programs financed from the Union's and the European Development Fund budgets are part of the EU Strategy for Sahel. By these programs there were allotted 127.5 million euro for the countries in Africa seriously damaged by the food crisis, thus: Mauritania: 13 million euro, Burkina Faso: 17 million euro, Mali: 15 million euro, Niger: 42.5 million euro, Chad: 35 million euro, Senegal: 5 million euro and 37 million euro for regional initiatives in West Africa²⁶.

In the war against the Islamist groups' in Mali, EU support materialized in the international support mission for Mali under African leadership (AFISMA) in January 2013. Also, there was maintained the close cooperation between EU and other international agencies (African Union, UN, and ECOWAS – Economic Community of West-African States) to achieve some coherent actions on the international level as regards the situation in Mali. When they produced, the situation created by military actions of Islamist groups in this country was firmly condemned by the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Catherine Ashton, and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Mali, Tieman Hubert Coulibaly.

In 2013, in Africa, the United Nations missions lead or supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations –DPKO were the following²⁷: United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire started in 2004; UN Mission in Liberia, started in 2003; United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization in Mali, started in 2013; UN Mission in South Sudan Republic started in 2011; African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, started in 2007; the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, started in 2011; UN Integrated Office for peace building in Guinea-Bissau since 2009; UN Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, started in 1999.

In fighting against Ebola epidemics in West Africa, the United States of America created in September 2014 a permanent centre in Liberia, composed by 500 sanitary workers per week, and EU joined by mobilizing great number of doctors and caretakers as well as many other financial and logistical means, particularly in matters of transportation.

²⁶ *The European Commission's response to the food crisis and long-term food insecurity in the Sahel region of Africa*, available online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-215_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on December 28, 2014.

²⁷ *Conflict Barometer 2013*, p. 25, available online at: http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2013.pdf, accessed on December 28, 2014.

Conclusions

No matter the reasons, the belligerency remains a serious issue in Africa. The different initiatives of international community to diminish and stop the serious effects generated are far from ending. Worried by the existent situation, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon appealed in many times to dialogue and armed tensions to stop and the British prime-minister David Cameron, in its declaration in January 2013, sustained „*Occident forecasts “decades” of conflicts in Africa*”²⁸.

Famine or the use of women and children in armed conflicts are just few of negative consequences of conflicts in Africa. The physical and psychological traumas, inadequate education do as the teenagers, particularly, to fail to reintegrate in society in a peaceful form. In order to identify some adequate solutions, such problems are put on the priority list of many regional and international organizations.

At the beginning of 2015, Africa stands as a strong continent marked by belligerency with different motives, and with serious consequences. Despite this serious aspect against human security, Africa as the academician Mircea Malița wrote „*it has its noblesse. The rhythms of its music entered all the cultures. Its art overflew all over. The Negritude of Senghor wish to capture this community’s concept*”.

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²⁸ Available online at: <http://www.romanalibera.ro/index.php/actualitate/international/david-cameron--occidentul-preconizeaza--decenii--de-conflicte-in-africa-290883>, accessed on December 28, 2014.

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GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE BLACK SEA – PROSPECTIVE GEOSTRATEGIC GOALS OF PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN

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Abstract: *Today, the Black Sea becomes a region with a great strategic importance, mainly due to the changes in the political, economical and military environment. Russian foreign policy concept has undergone significant changes over the past twenty years; on the international scene, she began to promote the idea of a multi-polar world. The major consequences of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine for the European security order can be summarised in the following way: geopolitical struggle has returned with a vengeance and will not go away. In a direct way, this presents a fundamental challenge to the permanent formation of a liberal, rules-based security order in Europe. This has been at the center of political efforts in Europe during at least the last quarter-century.*

Keywords: *The Wider Black Sea Region, Eastern Europe, regional initiatives, NATO - Russian Federation relationship, European Union, crisis from Ukraine.*

Introduction

The Black Sea region is an area with many unresolved issues that originate in local developments throughout history. These problems constitute negative factor for the evolution of democratic, stable and prosperous region and are tools used by large regional actors, especially the Russian Federation, to dominate and shape development in accordance with their own interests. Great ethnic and religious diversity is skillfully used by Moscow to promote its external agenda; where this diversity is not sufficient to destabilize the area, the Kremlin uses the skilful history of the region for themselves, creating artificially disputes and military conflicts that generate intractable bottlenecks¹.

Membership of important parts of the Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR)) from the Tsarist Empire and later the Soviet Union allowed the redrawing of borders, moving people, imposing the Orthodox religion and creation of local elite closely Moscow, as is the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, more recently, of Crimea².

If the states in the region want and have the courage to try another path of evolution than that imposed by Moscow, conflicts and separatist movements are reactivated, revitalised and even the threat of military intervention gets an active instrument of pressure, as

¹ Alexandru Savu, *Direcțiile politice ale Uniunii Europene în Regiunea Extinsă a Mării Negre și modalități de implementare a acestora în scopul creșterii securității și prosperității regiunii*, (Teză de Doctorat), SNSPA, București, 2014, p.13, <http://doctorat.snsa.ro/sites/default/files/doctorat/alexandru%20savu/SNSPA-RO-Rezumato%20Teza%20-%20Savu%20Alexandru.pdf>

² *Ibidem*.

demonstrated by Russian-georgian war (2008), and more specifically, military aggression in Ukraine, which led to the annexation of parts of the sovereign territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation (2014)³. The events in Ukraine back to the forefront of policy as the main instrument of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, this putting into question the very foundation of the european security system in breach of all the principles of relations between states, as had been stipulated since the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and continued with agreements and treaties post-cold war-respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the states of the Euro-Asian, non-resort to force or the threat of force in their relations inter-state, the settlement of disputes arising from dialogue, etc.

But this flagrant violation of the State of the post-cold war security (not levied at its true value by the euro-Atlantic community) began the Kremlin some time ago, with the war in Georgia. In terms of military action, designed and prepared in detail beforehand, Moscow has sought, in august 2008, two main objectives: one-stop of geopolitical expansion of NATO to the East and the other image-reaffirming the status of great power able to influence history and deleting, dramatically, the military humiliation from the 1990s, one of the recurring themes of the political-military apparatus headed by Vladimir Putin. Both were met with success.

1. Russian Federation, an actor who want to destabilize the Wider Black Sea Region

Built after modern criteria of geopolitics and geostrategy, the vision of the Russian Federation concerning the security situation in the enlarged Black Sea proves "efficiency" in complex situations such as those in Ukraine, and enlightening, in caucaziano-Caspian area through actions of force, hard to predict and especially countered. Political-military leadership of the former empire propose ideas which must correspond to the strategic interests of Russia in the 21st century, as well as the internationalization of large seas-the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Adriatic Sea in the proximity of the South-East european space, in order to facilitate the access of its forces in various regions of crisis or conflict, now and in the future. Also, the Kremlin, the Eurasian geopolitical in its effort, intends to create an economic and political Union in the former Soviet space, to counterbalance the influence of the development of the European Union and the United States on the european continent.

Always in the past decade and a half, Vladimir Putin holds when the total power in the Russian State, the Kremlin said, and reaffirmed that Moscow's strategic objective is to return to the forefront of world politics as a true superpower in a multipolar international system. Unfortunately, this assertion has not been treated with the seriousness required in Western capitals, and felt that the Moscow authorities have become a predictable partner who plays by the rules of democratic community (media breaches was thought were addressed to reassure people and to "titillate" pride wounded by the loss of the Soviet Empire) by the way, the main objectives and directions of Russian foreign policy is contained in *the Security Strategy of the Russian Federation by 2020*, approved in May 2009⁴. "Close Vicinity - blizhnee zarubezhie" which means the former Soviet space as a whole, is seen by Moscow as an area, in full, within its sphere of influence⁵. To attain this objective, we used the geopolitical and using the tools of political, military, economic, cultural or propaganda.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Oleksandr Sushko, *Percepția Rusiei în România, Republica Moldova și Ucraina*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2010, p. 65.

⁵ David J. Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs, *The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Postcommunist States and Nations)*, Routledge, 2002, p. 161.

If the first decade of post-Cold War prevailed methods "hard" to retain control over Russian territory or newly emerged states (Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya, etc.), then they are diversifying pressures being more economical (for are known cases of Moldova and Ukraine), in conjunction with a cultural offensive, propaganda and intelligence offspring of KGB. Thus, on 27 March 2007 for the first time talking about the so-called "humanitarian direction" of Russian foreign policy, which covers four areas: 1) Human Rights; 2) protecting the interests of Russian communities that exist outside the Russian Federation; 3) consular issues, in terms of developing diplomatic network in neighboring countries and 4) enhanced cooperation in the cultural and scientific. Subsequently, this "humanitarian direction" became distinct chapter in *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, adopted on July 2008.

This concern for the fate of his compatriots "discriminated" companies where they live after the collapse of the USSR constitute an effective tool foreign policy, which can put pressure in the desired direction by the Russian authorities. Thus, the crisis in Ukraine, there are signals of "deep concern" President Vladimir Putin to his compatriots in the Baltic States, seen by analysts as the next target of Russia.

Although Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on September 17, 2014 that has not yet reached a point of no return in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, the events show the opposite - the rivalry between the two parties is becoming increasingly complex and extend deep into the former Soviet Union. Russia continues to threaten operated by levers of influence in Ukraine, especially in the energy, economic and military open at the same time, we "fronts". At an annual conference for Russian expatriates held in Riga in September 2014, the Human Rights of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Konstantin Dolgov, warned against the danger of discrimination of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States and that Moscow can not assist "indifferent" this phenomenon.

To further underscore the Kremlin's commitment to protect the interests of the former Soviet Union, Moscow reacted harshly to call (in a campaign speech held last year) Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, the unification of Moldova and Romania to 2018. Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the statements as "unacceptable" and urged authorities in Moldova and Europe to condemn these comments. Although the Romanian context was the European premier of words (reunification will take place after the Republic of Moldova to the EU and not through annexation by the Republic of Moldova Romania), vehement reactions were intended to alert the Kremlin that Russia's interests must be taken into account when talking about Moldova.

Especially, the Transnistrian conflict from the beginning of the 90s and subsequent developments, Moscow has achieved its strategic objectives related to the proximity of the former USSR, because no more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the Republic of Moldova does not have a course European evolutionary clear.

The current situation of Moldova um case is not singular, the Kremlin using the same scenario, of course taking into account local particularities, the entire former Soviet space. Russian diplomacy with neo-imperial ambitions of power, support and encourage secessionist regimes, using them as a tool to pressure leaders and influence. It promotes regulatory plans and negotiation mechanisms inconsistent and tends to meet their own security concerns to the detriment of the weaker partner.

This view is reinforced in the present, of Moscow's massive involvement in the Ukraine crisis, triggered by the overthrow from power of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 and the coming to power of the pro-Western Group. Russia has immediately adopted measures which they had lived for long in this eventuality-employment and the annexation of Crimea Peninsula with the strategic naval base at Sevastopol (March 19, 2014) and triggering some large secessionist movements in Eastern Ukraine, in order to stop the rocking Kiev towards the euro-Atlantic community. Through sophisticated means and methods to manage

the creation of two "people's Republic", Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern part of the country, who have declared "independence" and in April-May 2014. Since then, Russia leads in Ukraine an undeclared war, non-linear, which is based on hitting the opponent simultaneously throughout his, through a combination of special forces, conventional forces and protesting locals⁶. This new conception of struggle in adverse territory has proven the validity of the obligation of Kiev to conclude two-ceasefires on 5 September 2014 and 2015 on February 12, the Ukrainian authorities recognizing and thus inability to restore constitutional order in the country.

Unquestionably, the main beneficiary of the cessation of the military hostilities is Russia, which has forced Ukraine to recognise such on the separatists in the so-called "people's Republics Donetsk and Lugansk" as official interlocutors, considering that he was defining, Kiev until now, as "terrorists". Thus opens the process of federalization of Ukraine wanted by Moscow. In addition, the premises of appearance are created, on the model of Transnistria, a new "frozen conflict" of the kind that has existed for a quarter of a century in the post-Soviet area: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh enclave.

Analysts are agreed that, if the West's attitude toward Moscow's aggression will not be straightforward, Ukrainian statehood itself is in danger. Although it is strongly affected by the series of economic and financial sanctions adopted by the United States and the European Union last year, Russia still has the capacity to resume much wider-scale hostilities in the coming months, possibly after cracks in the European Community cohesion is emphasized.

EU Member States have agreed to extend until 15 September 2015 sanctions taken against 150 Russian officials or the separatist leaders of Ukrainian and Russian and 37 companies, but have ruled out for the time being, for the establishment of new penalties against those responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine. The decision was taken at a meeting of permanent representatives of the Member States of 28 (COREPER) and validated at the European Council meeting in Brussels on March 20, 2015⁷. However, there has been no decision on tightening sanctions, agreeing only that those already in place. Even countries that support a tougher line toward Moscow believes that it is time to take a step forward with sanctions, currently being implemented priority agreements from Minsk, says community sources.

States who demanded stronger measures to Russia are Poland, Britain and the Baltic countries at the other extreme hovering the Mediterranean, while France and Germany, who brokered the agreement reached on February 12, 2015 in Minsk, want also continue to leave a margin for negotiation before proceeding to more stringent measures (this version is still hypothetical, in Germany there is a very strong industrial lobby that opposes sanctions)⁸.

The affirmation of the rule in the former Soviet space is in fact, an essential step in strengthening Russia's place in the international system of the XXI century. Both the Russian elite and society, "normal position of Russia is a global player and regional essentially no power, second hand, as the leading European nations⁹" whose security is ensured by the United States. According to the Kremlin, Russia's nuclear arsenal provides sufficient room for maneuver in the international arena and is an essential tool in ensuring its strategic

⁶ *Doctrina Gherasimov și războiul non-liniar dus de Rusia pe teritoriul Ucrainei*, 24 iulie 2014, <http://www.romaniabreakingnews.ro/doctrina-gherasimov-si-razboiul-non-liniar-dus-de-rusia-pe-teritoriul-ucrainei/#ixzz3WkPWV6yg>

⁷ *Divergențe afișate în UE privind sancțiunile împotriva Rusiei*, 13 Mar 2015, <http://bucurestifm.ro/2015/03/13/divergente-afisate-in-ue-privind-sanctiunile-impotriva-rusiei/>

⁸ *UE nu va institui noi sancțiuni împotriva Rusiei, cele deja în vigoare urmând să fie prelungite cu 6 luni*, 11 martie 2015, <http://24-ore.ro/2015/03/11/ue-nu-va-institui-noi-sanctiuni-impotriva-rusiei-cele-deja-in-vigoare-urmand-sa-fie-prelungite-cu-6-luni/>

⁹ Bobo Lo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, Blackwell Publishing, London, 2003, p. 131.

independence, which strongly reaffirmed by President Vladimir Putin in August 2014 in a televised intervention.

Therefore, Moscow pleads with such vehemence against "US missile shield"; although currently it does not endanger the strategic nuclear balance, due to the huge US technological capacity, it is possible, according to experts, as in less than a decade the Russian strategic nuclear missiles could be intercepted successfully, thereby nullifying the only asset major that Russia owns¹⁰.

Note that strategic defense plan of the Russian Federation for the period 2016-2020 will be developed in accordance with the new *Military Doctrine of the Russian*¹¹, Kremlin made public late last year (December 26, 2014).

President Vladimir Putin has put his signature on the new Russian military doctrine for the further political crisis in Ukraine transformed into prolonged armed conflict, as well as changes in international relations and international security environment. However, the doctrine retains the characteristic defensive in tone and content, essentially retaining most of its core elements existing one in 2010¹².

2. Regional perspectives in the Wider Black Sea Area. Implications for Romania's national security

Crisis in Ukraine destabilizing regional and continental security situation causing mutations and amplification regarding the risks and threats to states in the region, including Romania. The need to know, evaluate and counteract potential negative phenomena in terms of national security is enhanced and official statements of the Russian administration. The planned construction in Romania and supply a command center for NATO troops (along with those of Poland and the Baltic states) as agreed at the summit of the Alliance of Newport in September 2014 is a "serious challenge" to Russia's security, says ambassador Russian Aleksandr Gruško, accusing that the increased military presence in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland violates the NATO-Russia Agreement¹³.

The presence in the Black Sea military forces of non-riparian states could create "a substantial change and regional strategic balance" and Moscow are exploring ways in which it can "counteract and neutralize potential threats," the Russian official warned, adding that the situation is valid and with regard to the Baltic Sea¹⁴.

Long-term implications of the new geopolitical situations in the Black Sea area are highlighted and known political analyst and specialist in international relations, George Friedman. It said in June 2014: "Whatever you thought at first, America realized now that Russia remains a permanent threat to Ukraine and that the crisis will have repercussions on the region's countries, such as Romania...Rusia needs Ukraine. Romania can not handle...But

¹⁰ Rozoff Rick, *NATO Expansion, Missile Deployments and Russia's New Military Doctrine*, February 13, 2010, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17593>

¹¹ *The New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, <http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf><http://stat.mil.ru/index.htm>

¹² The revised military doctrine replaces the previous 2010 version. Overall, the 2014 military doctrine is the fourth version, following doctrines released in 1993, 2000 and 2010.

¹³ *MAE: Deciziile de la summitul NATO sunt un raspuns la actiunile agresive ale Rusiei in Ucraina*, 12.09.2014, <http://www.revista22.ro/mae-deciziile-de-la-summitul-nato-sunt-un-raspuns-la-actiunile-agresive-ale-rusiei-in-ucraina-47487.html>

¹⁴ *Ambasador rus: Construirea unei baze NATO în România constituie o PROVOCARE GRAVĂ pentru Rusia*, 12 septembrie 2014, <http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/ambasador-rus-construirea-unei-baze-nato-in-romania-constituie-o-provocare-grava-pentru-rusia-13257278>

Russia can handle, can undermine. Russia wants to undermine Romania's partnership with the United States and may do so through political manipulation"¹⁵.

A new geopolitical situation is that with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, Romania are likely to have practically common border with the Russian Black Sea. Related to this reality, the central issue for the authorities in Bucharest is to know whether exploitation of subsoil resources by Romania to the Black Sea basin is somewhat jeopardized de jure or de facto.

From the perspective of power run game in the Black Sea, Moscow would argue that international instruments entered into by the Ukrainian authorities in the past, especially those of membership Crimea in Ukraine (such as the demarcation of the border or territorial sea) does not are binding, forcing a re-discuss them, not necessarily the desire to obtain a favorable solution, but rather to induce a state of uncertainty geopolitical area¹⁶.

Republic of Moldova (an area of interest strategic for our country) still remains relevant to Russia, where his constant support and attitude of the authorities in Tiraspol. Since November 1995, the State Duma adopted a resolution urging President Yeltsin to recognize Transnistria as an area of strategic interest to Moscow, "taking into account the trend of NATO's eastward expansion"¹⁷. Currently, Transnistria importance lies less in the presence of Russian-speaking population, as in the fact that through his Moscow,, can maintain the trust Moldova, Ukraine and the Balkans under surveillance control"¹⁸.

Therefore, in the foreseeable future, Moscow will continue to play the Transnistrian card, trying to prevent, for an indefinite period, the regulation of crisis, forcing Moldova remain in "a gray area" under Russian influence.

Opinion that our country is seen by Moscow as a regional competitor (and through the partnership Romanian-Moldovan) is shared by the American political scientist George Friedman:"Russia is interested in Romania for several reasons: it's Black Sea country, is a potential supply of fuel, so a regional competitor. And it is close to Moldova"¹⁹.

Conclusion

One of the key elements of the strategy in the post-Soviet Russia in the last two and half decades is the use of breakaway regions (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, more recently, the Crimea and eastern Ukraine) as a "Trojan horse" in within the states to which they belong de jure.

Attitude towards them differs depending on "the situation on the ground": some are recognized as independent states (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), others are supported economic and political (Transdnister), others are attached directly (Crimea). Russian Army guarantees, directly or indirectly, the security of the disputed territories. By creating conflicts followed implicitly peacekeeping operations, Russia fulfills many roles - aggressor, challenging and stabilizer - but does not occupy any of the territories.

¹⁵ George Friedman: *De ce România și Moldova sunt importante pentru Rusia*, 28 mai 2014, <http://www.adevarul.ro/news>

¹⁶ *Analiză Foreign Policy: Punctele nevralgice în care Rusia poate lovi România*, 15 iunie 2014, <http://adevarul.ro/news>

¹⁷ *Proiectul de Hotărâre a Dumei de Stat a Federației Ruse cu privire la unele probleme ale colaborării dintre Federația Rusă și Transnistria*, în Marian Enache, Dorin Cimpoeșu, Misiune diplomatică în Republica Moldova, 1993-1997, Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 379.

¹⁸ Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*, Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001, p. 171.

¹⁹ George Friedman: *De ce România și Moldova sunt importante pentru Rusia*, 28 mai 2014, <http://www.adevarul.ro/news>

With these separatist entities, Russia controls, indirectly, the states concerned; the restoration of the influence of Moscow in close proximity is a new form of unconventional warfare. Following the tragic experience of US intervention after 11 September 2001, Russia realized that wars can be short and cheap, but occupations incomparably more difficult to manage and costly. Threatening occupation, Russia created a climate of distrust and fear in target companies that could control the actions of sovereign states and their policies. There was thus a new concept in political science – nonoccupation²⁰, as an instrument of foreign policy of the post-Soviet Russian state, postimperial.

By generating territorial conflicts, Russia shall ensure that these countries will never be admitted into NATO or any other military alliance, since no organization should accept that a member state is a territorial dispute with Russia continues, nuclear power and a member of the UN Security Council.

Basically, it can be said that the idea of restoring internal and external greatness, as Putin-Medvedev government advanced-Putin meets modernized concept *samoderjavie*, fundamental principle organizer of the Russian state in the last five hundred years; when applied state, the concept involves the country's total independence from any foreign power²¹.

The perpetuation of the conflicts in the former Soviet space, temporary and limited solutions applied to them and halt the indefinite extension of European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, causes depletion capacity of the international community to resolve these conflicts. In addition, it creates favorable conditions for the emergence of new conflicts, with a wide range of causes and manifestations, as well as the proliferation of new risks, threats and threats to national and international security of states and peoples in this part of Europe²².

The validity of these statements is given by Ukrainian crisis that we still see now and which by its complexity, unknown anywhere in the ex-Soviet past two decades and a half, will mutate very complex in terms of European security, but not only.

In any case, the "dolce farniente" indulged in the Western Europe after winning the Cold War, has passed; failure to take appropriate decisions and, above all, breaking the Euro-Atlantic community cohesion in such a context security because of narrow national interests is great danger for the future of the European Union. US and NATO can counterbalance the influence of Russia and could put additional pressure on Iran, while strong support for Euro-Atlantic space from companies that conduct business activities of extraction and transport of hydrocarbons in the region²³.

However, despite efforts by the United States, the EU and NATO, Russian Federation continues to be the main factor shaping the security architecture of the area. Hesitation, lack of coherence and determination of the Euro-Atlantic community in sending a clear signal to Moscow have the effect of encouraging acts of Russian regional destabilization. NATO Summit in Wales failed to give a strong response of the Russian Federation, since it questioned the Founding Act on Mutual Relations Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (Paris, May 27, 1997), which means Russian Federation still retains that status partner of Euro-Atlantic community.

This was not well received by the members of NATO's eastern and shows that the Alliance is not yet united against the actions of Russian destabilization in the region. The security situation in the Black Sea Region launched a complex process at NATO headquarters in Brussels, resulting in the adoption of new important measures such as rapid response plan

²⁰ Michael Bobick, *Substituire, satiră și interpretare: statele de facto ale Eurasiei*, <http://www.revista22.ro/substituire-satira-si-interpretare-statele-de-facto-ale-eurasiei-45915.html>

²¹ Stanislav Secieru, *Rusia după imperiu*, Institutul European, București, 2008, p. 155.

²² Grigore Alexandrescu, *Amenințări la adresa securității*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare București, 2004, http://www.cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/amenintari_la_adresa_securitatii.pdf

²³ Alexandru Savu, op. cit., p. 15.

and initiatives on the NATO Response Force, which should ensure safety eastern flank in the event of the Russian military aggression²⁴.

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²⁴ *Ibidem*.

KONDRATIEV WAVES AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *The theory that the economic development can be divided in cycles about 50-60 years, known as "Kondratiev waves", make the link between phases of prosperity, recession, depression and economic recovery and the onset of military conflicts. The analysis of the cyclicity, in international relations, politics, economics, peace and war alternation, led to the development of long cycle theory, associated primarily with Modelski and Thompson.*

Starting from the economic cycle study reached at the hegemonic domination, maritime and commercial. All cycles are based on a hegemonic war, theorists identifying six cycles: Venice Portugal, Netherlands, United Kingdom (twice) and SUA. Even if the security environment has become increasingly dynamic, complex and unpredictable, in the fog of uncertainty can still distinguish the "Kondratiev waves" lines, disputed or refurbished.

This study looks at the relationship between economic cycles and war, the main effort is focused on Romania and Europe place in a security environment that degrades and becomes less predictable

Keywords: *Kondratiev waves, long cycles, hegemonic war, Europe*

Introduction

Cyclicity has been observed and studied in all domains, from mythology and religion to science, economics, politics, and society. War and peace, cycles of human history, there are not an discordant note in the assembly of all essential cycles.

Cyclicity, before the dawn of humanity, is one of the constants that mark human life. The alternation of the seasons, astronomical cycles, rhythms and phases of life are often neglected, being considered truisms and common places. Thus, for the ancient Greeks and Romans, and for Hindus, time is designed as an infinite sequence of cycles. For example, Hindus basic cosmic cycle - Mahayuga lasts more than 4 million of our years.

Mircea Eliade makes a clear distinction between the two stages in the attitude to time: a stage of lack of the future time, due to cyclical vision, which starts from an ancestor or primordial god, in "illo tempore", and the other cycles are considerate only an iteration of the first cycle¹.

Archaic concepts, in the meaning given to that term by Mircea Eliade, have as cosmogonic essence the symbolic recreation of the world, in a repetitive sequence of events, cyclical recovery, reshaping the world to its origins. This is done in an eternal cycle in which man coexists temporally with the founder god or hero, with the myth that the world was created. Thus, cyclic is a eternal return to the founding myths, actual events are considered repetitions, transpositions of the original sacred cycle, which is re-followed with every generation.

¹ Mircea Eliade- *Istoria credințelor și ideilor religioase*, vol. 1 Editura Universitas Chișinău 1992, (A History of Religious Ideas) pg. 287.

A second step is the "opening", the breaking of the cycle, which results in a linear view of the time. The two visions of time, cyclic and linear coexist until today, with consequences in multiple planes.

Commonly Romanian popular sayings used phrases that refer to the birth, maturity and extinction or sunrise/sunset as examples of finished developments that consist in a beginning and an end. For example, Romanian popular expressions like "the wheel will be returned ...", "the water passes, the stones remains", "waves of life" expresses senses of the cyclical alternation. Dimitrie Cantemir remarks the downward trend and fall of the Ottoman Empire, writing " Incrementa atque decrementa aulae othomanicae"².

From the empirical observations, the cycles generated a vast theoretical debate. Economists have noticed that the existence of cyclic alternations is related to increasing and decreasing trends of the economies.

Interest in long cycles in economic and social studies increased after World War I, although the term evokes a mechanistic vision, and the empirical intuitions are still not based on quantitative methods and data that can be analyzed. Fernand Braudel has shown the need to approach long time sequences (several decades, even centuries) to include the rhythms of development regarded to the studied systems³. Even if history is unrepeatable, in comparable situations people preserve behavioral patterns, which make the retrospect to have its own role in the reflection on the future. The unknowing of the past can not generate an accurate prediction of the potential futures.

In this study we try to outline the relationship between long economic cycles (Kondratiev waves) and possible developments of European security environment. To do this, first it is necessary to describe the evolution of economic theories aimed to the long cycles, particularly Kondratiev wave theory, and then relations between economics and war, then a look at hegemonic wars, as it has been seen by Joshua S. Goldstein and Modelski, to settle in this context the Romanian and the European security space, and finally to highlight the possible conclusions.

1. Long cycle theory

Oscillations between "expansion and recession" showed by J.B. Say, became "boom and boost" for the British economists David Ricardo and James Mill, will be reviewed by the soviet theorists. A fierce debate between the economist Nikolai Kondratiev and Leon Trotsky regarding to capitalist economies, led to the publication of the first of them, in 1928, of studies based on detailed and rigorous data, which defined the economic capitalist cycles in the form of waves, with a frequency of 50 to 60 years.

Between wars period, it was crystallized four economic theories - the theory of capital investment, innovation theory, the theory of capitalist crisis, and war theory.

Theory capital investment was approached by Nicolai Kondratiev a soviet economist. It noted the existence of cycles of economic growth and decreasing, each phase of the cycle is estimated to last for about 25 years⁴. In 1920 he led an institute study about all business cycles in capitalist economies. Even if he said that "we have no plans to substantiate a theory of long cycles (long waves)", nor he was the first economist to support this idea, he entered into a tough controversy with Leon Trotsky, founder and advocate of the theory of capitalist crisis. This controversy was parallel with the debate Karl Kautsky - Lenin. Kautsky, a socialist theorist, was the subject of Lenin's attack and Kondratiev's theory was associated with the

² http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitrie_Cantemir 20 march 2015

³ Fernand Braudel, *Dinamica capitalismului*, București, Corint, 2002 (Capitalism dynamics)

⁴ Kondratiev, N. D. 1925. *The Major Economic Cycles* (In Russian). Moscow. Translated and published as *The Long Wave Cycle* by Richardson & Snyder, New York, 1984

first. Kondratiev's approach is similar to two other German socialists, J. Van Gelderen and Sam Woff but it seems that their works were not known to it.

Identified by Nikolai Kondratiev(1925), cycles at the time were: 1790 to 1849 (between French Revolution and the 1848's Revolution), with an inflection point in 1815 (after the Napoleonic wars), respectively, 1850- 1896 with an inflection point in 1873 (Germany imposing as dominant power on the continent). Also, Kondratiev advance the hypothesis that a new cycle began in 1896. They are defined as regular cycles, sinusoidal, manifested in modern capitalist economy, whose extension varies between 40 and 60 years each, and consists of alternating periods of growth, stagnation and decline (recession), with an inflection point between the first two phases⁵.

Kondratiev's ideas are not accepted by the soviet leadership, and the author will be imprisoned, and then executed at the age of only 49 years old.

Theory will remain, and will know the consecration as "Kondratiev waves" because of Austrian economist Joseph Shumpeter (1942). He said: "except the few cases where difficulties arises, it is possible to count, both historically and statistically, six Juglars cycles at an Kondratieff and three Kitchins at an Juglar cycle - not as an average, but in each case in part" (Schumpeter 1939)⁶.

That was looming as a debate between Marxists, will be taken or disputed by other authors and theorists. The debate lead to profiling four economic schools, in the first period, which will last until the 50's, followed by a period of decline, due to post-war economic boom. The four theories are related to Kondratiev, Trotsky, Shumpeter and a group of European researchers, as follows:

Capital investment theory, which considers long waves, is due to massive investments in large-scale investment projects, such as canals, railways and factories. Excess depreciation and capital leads to a downward direction change. Key-variables are considered capital investment and production, the theory being linked to Nikolai Kondratiev.

Innovations theory set at the base of economic development an "sector leader" which benefited of major inventions and has created an overall economic growth, as long as the investments are geared towards those sectors, the other radical innovations are ignored or discouraged. Key-variables are inventions and innovations, production and employment. This theory was founded by Joseph Shumpeter, who will impose the expression "Kondratiev waves" in modern economic theory.

Capitalist Crisis theory believes that capitalism long waves are coming from the trend rate of profit to fall. Theory, supported by Trotsky, has the Key-variable profit rate, class struggle and production.

War theory links the major wars with the economic cycle, these long waves are resulting from inflationary effects of war. Key-variables are considered the prices rates and incidence of war and its size. It has been also developed a parallel theory, which considers that gold production affected prices more than war (or sometimes combined with it). In both versions the long economic waves are considered a monetary phenomenon.

The debates concerning the links between war, inflation/deflation, economic growth or demand and supply, the chaos created by the war, the demand for industrial labor in opposition to the request for troops on the battlefield, were studied by authors such as Johan Akerman a Swedish economist, Norman Silberling, Albert Rose or EM Bernstein.

Silberling notes that "Every war in which involved America direct participation was marked by an increase in prices, more or less violent", stating that the relationship between

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Schumpeter_joseph/business_cycles/schumpeter_business_cycles.pdf 10 april 2015

price and war is straightforward in US history⁷. Both the 1812 war and the Napoleonic wars, the Civil War, the two World Wars, Korean War and Vietnam War, correspond to a clear increase of prices.

Cycles of 50 years were studied in the fields of war, foreign policy, social values and public opinion, as follows below:

A. War

The role of war in long cycles was reviewed by William L. Thompson and Gary Zuk which started from three assumptions in their analysis:

- the initiating of a major war opens the Kondratiev period of growth cycle;
- completion of a Kondratiev cycle;
- major wars significantly influence the downward period of a Kondratiev cycle⁸.

After studies, they found that the end of a major war can initiate a period of decreasing of a Kondratiev cycle, but decreases may occur in its absence. Thus, the end of a war is not a necessary cause of Kondratiev decrease, but can be a sufficient cause. The 3rd Hypothesis is supported by the fact that major wars were preceded by economic growth.

Thompson and Zuk statistically analyzed the war impact on prices based on data regarded to the prices in the UK since 1850, and the United States starting with 1816 until today. They identified significant price increases during the war, preceded by a period of relocation that can last up to 30 years, but only the largest wars have a significant statistic impact.

B. Foreign Policy

In Foreign Policy domain, Klingberg's studies are based on a sequence of introversion and extroversion phase⁹. These Klingsberg phases closely correspond with long phases cycles, introverted phase correspond with the recession period and extroverted with the economic boom.

Klingberg's successors, Jack Holmes and Robert Elder, will confirm the studies about this theory¹⁰.

C. Social Values

Regarding to the foreign policy and its "states", social values have been studied by J. Zvi Namenwirth. It develops the theory cyclic change of values (measured by the United States party platforms analysis) which is closely synchronizes with long cycles. This finds cycles of different lengths, the most important being the 150 years cycle and a cycle of about 48 years with 4 alternative phases of social values that he named conservative, parish, progressive and cosmopolitan.

Independent by the Namenwirth, John Langrish studied the long cycles in social values and he finds periods of technological optimism and trust in science which are corresponding with ascension period of long economic cycles¹¹. This period of optimism can be seen both in the capitalist countries and also communist one, in the 1970s.

D. Public opinion

50 years-political cycles can be analyzed in terms of public opinion over foreign policy issues, a distinction between trends "internationalist" and "isolationist" being made by the

⁷ <http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgcyc02.pdf>

⁸ Goldstein, J. S. Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. Yale University Press, 1988.

⁹ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. The Cycles of American History Paperback – June 16, 1999.

¹⁰ *Idem.*

¹¹ <http://librarun.org/book/55260/118>

researchers. Thus, isolationist tendencies of the 30's, in the United States, correspond to a period of recession and the internationalist tendencies of the 60's correspond to a period of growth.

Analyzing the 50-years economic cycles and the role of war in these cycles has led to some theories of much longer cycles, which were called "hegemonic wars". The "hegemonic war", term used by Goldstein, is used by other authors also, but in other terms. Thus Toynbee and Levy uses the term "general war", Modelski "global war" and Wallerstein - "World War"¹²¹³¹⁴.

2. The relationship between economic cycles and war

"Hybrid" theories combines war theory presented above with innovation theory.

Gaston Imbert considers that economic growth leads to war: the economic momentum of the long phase leads progressively to the causes which generates war¹⁵. needs of the capitalist economies for raw materials lead to an political and colonial expansion of economical dominant countries. Increasing of the economic activity, markets, "Fevre boom", from increasing phase creates a fierce competition between capitalist countries which are disputing the areas of colonial influence. General tension causes a war between economical dominant countries, with the involvement of other countries.

Kondratief's theory is continued and validated by Imbert's theory (1956), these high tension in international relations creates ruptures in economic stability, states are spending more and more amounts of money to buy armaments, affecting both economic and human resources.

This causes a conflict between labor and military service, the latter absorbing part of the labor market, with effects in maintaining of employment and reducing of unemployment.

The result of these measures is the increasing of production, but the economy balance is destroyed "total national income generally increase, but the country not necessarily getting rich."

Despite short time boom effect, the war is preparing the area for the stagnation phase.

War "consumes" and physically destroy both a human capital part and material capital part also. The damage caused by conflict lead to economic downturn. After Imbert, war economy generates five causes who are leading to stagnation phase:

1. War forces the belligerents to abandon convertibility of currency and to print large quantities of banknote. This leads to leakage of precious metal reserves to neutral countries, where is accumulating gold, currency depreciation and prices rising;
2. War creates imbalances in the production system (demands are increasing sharply due to the destruction caused by war, resulting stagnation after a short period of postwar reconstruction;
3. War creates rigidities in economic output due to state control over the economy;
4. War leads to high levels of mortality among combatants and civilians, in the composition of the population is entering a large number of children and the people with disabilities. At the same time the active population is reduced, which increases the loading of the economy;

¹² Goldstein, J.S.: Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. Yale University Press, 1988

¹³ Modelski, G., *Long Cycles of World Leadership*, in „Contending Approaches to World System Analysis”, ed. Thompson, W.R., Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1983i

¹⁴ Wallerstein, I., *The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World- Economy*, in „International Journal of Comparative Sociology”, Volume 24, No. 1-2, March 1983,

¹⁵ Imbert, G., *Des mouvements de longue durée Kondratieff*, La Pens&Universitaire, Aix-enProvence, 1959

5. War trauma, war generation remembers his tragic experience, and strives to keep the peace¹⁶.

Stagnation phase described by Imbert is characterized by the absence of major conflicts between countries economically dominant, but can lead to insurrection and revolution. This stagnation phase continues until the economy is stabilizing with a minimal state control, preparing the foundation for a new phase of expansion.

In his book "Long Cycles - Prosperity and War in the Modern Age"¹⁷ Joshua S. Goldstein deepens the analysis of long cycles relying on a number of variables. These are:

1. Prices – there are synchronous long waves of the prices in the significant economically countries?

2. Production - there are alternative phases of rapid growth and slow of the production in main countries? In which countries and what periods of time can be found? These issues are central both to capitalist crisis schools and for some liberal critics who think long cycles as merely "prices waves";

3. Innovation and invention. Are directly or inversely correlated with stage of growth? Innovations are synchronous with long cycles? These issues are central to innovation school;

4. Are the capital investments correlated with changes in direction of long cycles?;

5. Trade - indicators of international trade and export levels are following the long cycle phases?

6. Real wages and working class behavior - Real wage fluctuates with long cycles? Strikes and labor protests are following long cycles? These questions are especially made by capitalist crisis school;

7. War - Major wars tend to occur at a particular point in a long cycle? Time of occurrence of major wars is correlated with long cycle phases? These questions aim war school.

Goldstein believes that these seven variables are common to all economic schools and their examination depends on the theoretical approach of every school¹⁸. Some of these variables can not be accessed because certain on historical period simply do not have such data.

The long cycles study was approached using six basic methodologies, which are:

- visual inspection of time series;
- dynamic averages - a dynamic average at a given point of time is the average of the data for a certain number of years;
- growth rates are calculated on predefined historical periods;
- deviations of the trend;
- analysis of long cycles in terms of shorter business cycles contained;
- spectral analysis and other statistical techniques related to the use of sophisticated statistical techniques orientated to seek regular intervals (not irregular periods as the other methods above);

These methods have led to the combination of the basic variables and default to a wide range of results depending on the economic schools;

War was discussed as one of the long cycles variables in parallel with another debate on war cycles separated from economic cycles, this debate was initiated by the research community in political science;

War-peace cycle combined with economic cycles occurred relatively late after the Second World War.

¹⁶ Imbert, G., *Des mouvements de longue durée Kondratieff*, La Pensée Universitaire, Aix-en-Provence, 1959, pp. 151-159

¹⁷ Goldstein, J.S.: *Long Cycles. Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. Yale University Press, 1988

¹⁸ *Idem*.

Quincy Wright in war cycles is playing a similar role as Kondratief in economic cycles. He studied the fluctuations in the intensity of the war, his conclusion is: "There is a trend in the last three centuries of concentration of wars to happen in periods of approximative 50 years, each period of concentration being significantly"¹⁹.

It defines the major wars:

1. Wars focus around War of 7 years from 1756 to 1763;
2. War of Spanish Secession 1701-1714;
3. Napoleonic Wars 1795-1815;
4. Concentration wars around the period 1853-1871 (Crimean War, War of unification of Italy, Prussian wars with Austria and France);
5. World War (1914-1918 renewed in 1939).

We can see an eurocentric conception, related to the researchers in that time, much later turns these views as such, challenged by Chinese researchers, such as Cui Jian-Shu., in his study "Cyclical Logic in the Transition of Hegemony: Modelski's Long Cycle Theory in International Relations and its Weakness(2007)"²⁰.

His conclusion is that "in modern times war and peace movements tend to stabilize at about 50 years"²¹. This conclusion is consistent with the economic theory of Kondratief, long wave.

Although Wright is circumspect about the Kondratief's theory, it is closer to that than Trotsky's theory. After Wright there are three types of factors that contribute to the war cycles, those are: psychological, economic and incorporation into an international system that leads to war: "the fluctuation of the war intensity in the history of a country tends to have a defined periodicity, if the international system exerts persistent pressure to the war and if the period necessary to recover, economic and technological, from war, and prepare for another period, are identical with political period, to psychological to delete antiwar feeling after such a war and restore national morale "²².

Between psychological factors Wright is advancing the idea of alternating generation - "fighter does not want to fight again himself and manipulate his son against war, but his grandchildren are inclined to believe that war is romantic"²³.

Between economic factors, the costs of war require a recovery period, in order to bear one another. The economic factor operates in the context of a balance of power that has an inherent tendency towards war. Countries are trying to build military capabilities as part of international economic power.

Possible causes of the war between Wright reveals:

1. Dissolution of social memory with the passing of a generation;
2. Economic factors;
3. Backwardness of policies and national constitutions to changing facing of the international conditions;
4. Tendency of not-cut disputes to accumulate, aggravating relations between states.

From his point of view, the development of military technology in Europe is linked with war cycles: 1450-1648, religious wars and experimental adaptation of firearms, 1648-1649 dynastic wars and professional armies, national wars and industrialization 1789-1914, 1914-1945 totalitarian wars and plane ²⁴.

¹⁹ Quincy Wright *A study of war* University of Chicago 1942.

²⁰ Cui Jian-Shu Department of International Strategy, PLA Institute of International Relations "Journal of World Economics and Politics", No.12, 2007, 24-32", Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

²¹ Quincy Wright *A study of war* University of Chicago 1942.

²² *Idem.*

²³ *Idem.*

²⁴ *Idem.*

3. Hegemonic war

Hegemony- sf (Ist.) The right of an ancient city to conduct the affairs of the confederation to which he belonged. Political or economic supremacy of a city in a country; (P. Ext.) supremacy, domination; leading role.²⁵ [Gen. -iei var. heghemonie S.F. / Cf. fr. hegemonia, gr. hegemony - leadership].

Hegemony theories are varied, with roots in the writings of Thucydides, his claims of "Peloponnesian War" are considered the first attempts to theorize the nature of international relations, based on differences in power between states and impose them on others by the way of war "An abandon of the Empire is not in our power; is unfair, perhaps, to acquire one, just as it is unjust tyranny, but it is dangerous to abandon it"²⁶.

In connection with the theory of long waves, Modelski has identified a number of hegemonic wars, final result of which marked the history of mankind for long periods as it follows:

| Cycle | Cycles period | The resulting final leader | Global war |
|-------|---------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 1 | 1518-1608 | Portugal | Italian wars (1494-1517) |
| 2 | 1609-1713 | Unit provinces of Nederland | Spanish war(1581-1608) |
| 3 | 1714-1815 | Great Britain | Wars against France(1688-1713) |
| 4 | 1816-1945 | Great Britain | Wars against France (1792-1815) |
| 5 | 1946- | U.S.A | Wars against Germany(1914-1918; 1939-945) |

Table nr. 1, The five global wars and winners after Modelski²⁷

Other authors have extended the period of time from the initial model. The period was extended to Chinese Sung dynasty, but is difficult to accept that at that time, China could be considered a global hegemon. There are long periods occur regional actors that were imposed and extended military campaigns, with civilizational vector role, as is the case of the Roman Empire, or the macedonian campaigns led by Alexander the Great. Other regional players, Huns, Mongols and Ottomans arrived to annihilate all other actors by military campaigns (Byzantines, Chinese kingdoms), without imposing an alternative civilization model, preserving or protecting the previous models. They will have a slow turnaround and will sometimes lead to the phasing out of conquerors, or their incorporation to allogeneous mass.

The development of transport has made possible the transition from regional hegemony, such as the Roman Empire, the Byzantine or Far East Empires, to global hegemony. The first were those who used fleets, Portuguese and Spanish, followed by the British. It is worth noting that although has had a considerable fleet, led by Admiral Zhen He (1371-1433), the Chinese empire did not become a global hegemon, even if the expedition came into contact with Europeans, before they "discover" the world.

Development of European sea powers, led to the unification of separate worlds, with an extremely Oriental world, with very low links, virtually separated from the European area, and a fabulous empire in the Andes, of whose existence no one knew in Europe.

²⁵ <http://dexonline.ro/> 15 aprilie 2015

²⁶ <https://istoriiregasite.wordpress.com/2012/09/17/razboiul-peloponeziac/> 16 april 2015.

²⁷ Modelski, G.: Long Cycles of World Leadership, in *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*. W.R. Thompson, ed. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA, 1983.

Global Hegemony is the hegemony of those who master the seas. World Conflicts opposed continental against maritime powers. Mackinder's vision is eclipsed and contradicted by Mahan's theory. Countries that have held Center, Heartland were not and are not hegemon²⁸. Russia has almost entirely considered Heartland area without never managed to become hegemonic, as well as his neighboring China.

Area of South Eastern Europe was characterized by confrontation between regional actors. Limitations related to transport (Suleiman the Magnificent retreating his armies in Istanbul for winter). confrontation between empires created over time around the Mediterranean sea, geographical limitations generated an area of confrontation and sometimes a buffer area. Imperial vocation, based on the glory of Rome or the model of Alexander, created models and patterns for great powers leaders, until nowadays.

Romania's case is customized in the geopolitical regional context. From the analysis of the five hegemonic wars described by Modelski, our country was involved only in the last. On the one hand, it is clear that the centers of power and poles of geopolitical, economic and strategic interest, were in other geographical areas, on the other, national objectives did not coincide with the wars objectives to which Romania participated.

If we follow the conflicts in which our country has involved, we can see that it was the interest of regional hegemony. Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, following the Crimean War, Russia aimed at repositioning in relation to other actors, the target of control to continental straits is not reached, in the context of access to the Mediterranean sea.

The conquest of independence in 1877 was made amid "winter" economic cycle of 50 years, the war generating, beyond the political class and popular enthusiasm, a period of economic decline, typical to post-conflict periods.

It is difficult to analyze increases and decreases of economic indicators in that period, due to lack of detailed economic data, the specific situation of a young state.

Romania's participation in the two world wars is preceded by a period of neutrality. The explanation may be, in addition to the high difficulty of political decisions, related to its economic cycle.

George Săvoiu, Lecturer at the University of Pitești and Constantin Manea, based on statistical data, have made a first boundary of Kondratiev cycles for Romania, identifying these three periods: 1920 - 1949, 1950-1989, 1990-2013 (annex nr. 2)²⁹. If these periods are or not in line with other countries periods in the region and in Europe, to be analyzed Austrian researcher Arno Tausch, identified in his work "The Hallmarks of Crisis. A New Center-periphery Perspectives on Long Economic Cycles", based on statistical data, "the specific fingerprint" of Kondratiev waves to order a large number of states, each with his own characteristics and temporal intervals³⁰. The differences may influence a state that is already climbing the economic cycle branch and can sustain hostilities, while another is forced to timed, due to limited financial or materials resources. Phase imbalance of these particular cycles to each other or to the global economic cycle may create advantages or disadvantages in the initial phase of a conflict. On the other hand, that the outbreak of war in consonance with Kondratiev cycles is particularly true for major conflicts, hegemonic type.

Differences between periods in which Romania is at war (between war of independence and First World War period is 39 years, 23 years between the wars, the revolution of 1989 after 44 years since the war ended) induce conclusion of "atypical" developments in terms of the theory of long cycles. This implies a deeper analysis of both

²⁸ http://militar.infomondo.ro/istorie/teorii-si-scenarii-geopolitice-in-secolul-xx.html#_edn2

²⁹ Săvoiu, Gh.; Manea, C., *Kondratiev type cyclicity of the Romanian economy, grounded in three key statistical indicators: GDP, CPI or CLI and debt*, in „Romanian Statistical Review”, nr. 1, 2014, pp. 3-22.

³⁰ https://www.academia.edu/4036894/The_hallmarks_of_crisis._A_new_center-periphery_perspective_on_long_cycles_Kondratieff_Waves_Almanac_2014_10 april 2015.

study phases towards cycles for each actor involved in the conflict, global cycles, and particular profile of economic development of Romania and Europe.

Conclusions

Economic long cycles, with intervals of about 50 years, theorized by Nicolai Kondratiev, are closely related to hegemonic type wars, the two areas interconditioned each other and complex.

Cycles wars can be classified according to objectives and stakeholders, local wars, regional or global, the end result being a global hegemon. The overall level is the result of ownership of strategic transport capacity, the level of development of technology and innovation.

Romania has been involved in the last hegemonic war (as Modelski's theory the two world wars are considered two phases of the same war), its objectives are in line with national interests and different from major actors objectives.

Area of South Eastern Europe has undergone major regional conflicts to reposition actors, the stakes are access / control of the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

The current period of financial and economic crisis in the European Region ("winter" Kondratiev) creates prerequisites for economic growth, and simultaneously increase the risks of a conflict.

Some regional major actors wants to reposition from the hegemon, without manifest intention end capabilities to reclaim his place, other regional actors being in the same alliance.

Issue of Kondratiev cycles and cycles of war, interdependence and mutual conditioning, can be studied in-depth, studies on this subject began to be more numerous in recent years, and interest in such analyzes increasing.

Aknowledgement:


This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title "Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - "SmartSPODAS"."

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
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
Kondratiev waves and Europe and Romania events




Annex nr. 2




GDP evolution in 1862-1914 period



GDP evolution in 1918-1946 period



GDP evolution in 1848-1989 period



GDP evolution in 1990-2013 period

The graphs were made by the author after data from http://www.revistadestatistica.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RRS01_2014_A1.pdf, 10 april 2015

FINANCIAL RISKS, THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES WITH IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *We find that, unlike the classic risks, threats and vulnerabilities that may impair national security severely, a new approach has been taking shape in these last years, by bringing to the foreground a new type of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, which relate to or whose source is the financial environment.*

Thus, this paper focuses on the identification of the main types of financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities with an impact on national security; here we can list: the financial crisis, tax evasion, the inscrutability and irregularity of political decisions and actions relating to budget policy, government instability etc. – by certifying the incontestable role played by intelligence in the process of mitigation/elimination of the said risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

Keywords: *Financial crisis, tax evasion, political factor, intelligence, national security.*

Introduction

From classic theories to modern ones, the concept of security has evolved in line with the international context. We need to acknowledge the fact that security, on the one hand in its doctrine approach, and on the other hand as objective of national or international politics, has been overwhelmingly influenced by geostrategic mutations.

The current, extremely controversial world context, characterized by the presence of vast areas of anomie and social disarray, where security threats generate, both at micro and at macro level, a state of profound generalized insecurity, triggers – given the high possibility of contagion and of propagation of the various types of risks, threats and vulnerabilities – the necessity to rethink security approaches and strategies and, thus, to transit from minimalist traditionalism to a global, open approach based on the anticipation of events according to the particularities and to the specificity of some time periods or socioeconomic circumstances.

The operation of the complex concept of security falls under the modern era, an era that emphasizes new types of threats. Thus, the singular threat of classic war is out of date, but it does leave room to new types of hazards and aggressions against states and against the international community.¹

We find that, unlike classic risks, threats and vulnerabilities that may impair national security severely, from among which we can name terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and corruption, drug trafficking and use, proliferation of extremist manifestations, social crises that generate unanticipated violence, cyber-attacks, natural calamities, deliberate devastation of the environment, and so on and so forth, - a new approach has been taking shape in these last years, by bringing to the fore the arguments of considering a new type of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, which relate to or whose source is

¹ Cristian Troncotă, *Aspects on modern security*, 2012, <http://studiidesecuritate.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/aspecte-ale-securitacii-moderne.doc>, accessing date 25.03.2015

the financial environment (financial crisis, tax evasion, inscrutability and unpredictability of political decisions and actions relating to budget policy, government instability etc.).

In this context, the expansion of the scope of unconventional risks, the diversification of the typology of crises and conflicts generate multiple challenges, which requires multidirectional reactions based on mobility, diversity, coherence and complementarity, both in the domestic space and in the international one, and the early identification of potential risk factors, threats and vulnerabilities of national security, as well as the development of specific modalities of managing and mitigating their effects should be one of the primary ongoing activities, in order to maintain economical security and achieving the security desiderates of the nation.

1. Financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities with an impact on national security

1.1 Financial crisis

International awareness of the importance to national security of financial risk factors, threats and vulnerabilities has arisen with the emergence and the propagation of the financial crisis effects. The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers banking giant prompted the beginning of the crisis for the United States of America, the impact on financial flow at the level of world economy, causing a real “tsunami” in most of the fields of socioeconomic life. Despite the quick and ample actions taken by Governments and Central Banks throughout the world, losses are considerable; investors have not yet managed to restore their trust in the financial system, while the most developed countries of the world are still struggling to escape the economic disaster generated by the recession. The financial-banking crisis turned quickly in a systemic one, with effects toward the diminution or interruption of economic processes and activities, marking and emphasizing the inherent structural deficiencies and the scope of the interdependence phenomenon existing between the economies of various countries, especially in relation to the financial field; this has led to the exacerbation of the risk of development of contagion effects.²

Given that the containment of the volume of banking resources to be made available to public/private entities can lead to a severe impairment of national security, joint efforts are required from the owners, administrators and/or operators of security infrastructures – in accordance with the legal competences in the field – toward the allocation of a sufficient amount of financial resources and, thus, the preservation at an adequate level of the financial resources relating to these sectors.

When the crisis began, Romania was, with Latvia and Lithuania, in the group of the most vulnerable Central and East Europe countries, both the public sector and the private one registering very high deficits, which meant they were extremely dependent on financing. The high dependence on financing of the public and private sectors in Romania hindered the adjustment of imbalances during the crisis and the funding of national infrastructure sectors.

Thus, the direct effect of the financial crisis was the diminution of the public/private investment potential, given that the primary strategy that needs to be adopted toward the improvement of the capacity of providers of critical infrastructure services and of the capacity of public authorities to fulfill their objectives – relates to ensuring sufficient financial resources in strategic interest fields.

² European Commission, *A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final*, 2010, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020>, accesing date 25.03.2015

1.2 Tax evasion

Another unconventional category of financial risk factors, threats and vulnerabilities with an impact on national security infrastructures is tax evasion. It is a maximally important, complex economic-social phenomenon that has been challenging countries in the last period, against the backdrop of the world economic crisis, increasingly more visibly and whose unwanted consequences are sought to be limited, since eradication is practically impossible.

Romania's national security strategy has identified the inefficient responses of state institutions faced with the aggravation of economic criminality phenomena, the prominence of corruption and the proliferation of underground economy (black market) as vulnerabilities in the domestic situation, with an impact on national security.

In Romania, the tax and duties system is characterized by weak levy practices, with an inefficient administration and excessive bureaucracy, and relatively low tax base, with many exceptions and legal exemptions, accompanied by high tax evasion.³

Tax evasion is one of the widespread forms of economic-financial transgression that damage the general consolidated budget while being an important pillar of underground economy.

The phenomenon is generated by the economic situation, by failure to comply with the law and by some shortcomings in the applicable legislative system. Against this general backdrop, numerous means to avoid the payment of tax duties have developed and materialized in two main directions: the speculation of legal deficiencies and the use of illegal procedures. It was found that, according to their severity, ways of occurrence, repeatability of actions and amount of budget damages, in the current socioeconomic context and against the aggravation of the effect of the world economic crisis, wide or generalized tax evasion actions impair national values, on the one hand, by an impact on public order conservation⁴, and overall national security, on the other hand.

Thus, the direct effect of tax evasion is the decrease of public/private investment potential, in a context in which, as shown in the previous subchapter, sufficient financial resources in strategic interest fields are the key element toward the attainment of national security objectives.

1.3 Political risk

The inscrutability and unpredictability of political decisions and actions relating to budget politics and government instability relate to the sphere of political risk which, if it does occur, may have severe consequences on national security.

From the viewpoint of the new types of vulnerabilities, the preservation of national security requires the decision-making agents to adopt a series of coherent, sustained policies of restructure, development, reengineering and proofing in front of various types of threats and risks regarding component sectors, as well as the initiation/development of public-private partnerships, as a premise of an increase of efficiency of national critical infrastructure.

Furthermore, to attain the listed objectives, considerable financial involvement is required, irrespective of the source of the corresponding funds (public, private), as well as the preservation of a constant financial flow, fitted to the requirements.

³ The World Bank and The International Finance Corporation, *Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs*, 2010,
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~//media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB11-FullReport.pdf>, accessing date 25.03.2015

⁴ Administration and Good Governance Council, *Socioeconomic analysis made at the level of the administration and good governance council*, 2013,
<http://www.fonduriadministratie.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/analiza.pdf>, accessing date 25.03.2015

From the angle of the “public finance” funding source, political risk acts mainly on the state budget by a various range of types of actions, in the following manner: ⁵:

- ad-hoc requests from the higher authorities or from the legislative body in the process of drafting/rectification of the state budget;
- hindrances to the drafting/rectification (revision) of the state budget, relating to the election year(s) and the appearance of extraordinary expenses;
- unpredictability of political decisions on budget amounts allocated to various categories of entities via state budget, irrespective of the type of budget (initial approved/rectified state budget);
- reserves regarding decisions made in relation to the objectives of medium-term tax policy;
- delay of the approval of stage budget law draft by the public authorities and social partners;
- inconsistency and lack of political support in the promotion of policies;
- possible deficiencies of institutional and inter-institution communication and cooperation;
- frequent changes of Government and/or government mechanisms;
- reserves in making decisions and reluctance regarding changes;
- and so on and so forth

We can thus see that, during the fiscal year, a series of modifications of all indicators, irrespective of their nature (income/expense) occurs in comparison with the figures initially approved by annual budget laws.

The uncertainty of tax-budget policy is a less visible and less quantifiable cost, but it does hinder the public entities’ task of developing medium- and long-term plans, while it fuels the long-term uncertainty of the main involved participants (public/private entities).

The unpredictable nature of the tax-budget policy, the instability of governments etc. represent a permanent risk-generating factor, with an increased relevance for the current period.

Practices such as: the lack of firm commitment to the notified budget shortage targets and the provision of possibilities to revise its level during the year; ambiguousness in the formulation of budget policies and of the parameters of budget policy (lack of transparency in the substantiation of some categories of expenditure), and so on and so forth could be perceived as major governmental slips⁶, while the effect of these practices at the level of the various national security institutions could be the postponement or even the cancellation of some activities, the sudden termination of funding in some sectors etc.

Therefore, the increase of transparency, of predictability and of stability in the tax-budget field will contribute, on the one hand, to the consolidation of trust of all the categories of public/private entities relating to the plans and actions to be run, and, on the other hand, to securing the national security objectives.

It is precisely for these reasons that we believe the continuity of a series of government policies and reforms, the stability of the political environment and the adoption of coherent decisions based first on the development of the national economic potential and then on covering the budget shortages with savings and resources from “smart” operations⁷ are the

⁵ Romanian Government, *Annual plan of action of the Ministry of Public Finance for the year 2014*, approved by Order no. 28, dated March 7, 2014, http://www.mf.gov.md/files/files/Activitatti%20MF/Planul_anual_de_actuni_al_MF_2014.pdf, accessing date 25.03.2015

⁶ Tax Council, *Opinion of the Tax Council relating to the State Budget Law and to the Social Security Budget Law*, 2012, <http://consiliulfiscal.ro/opinie-buget-2012.pdf>, accessing date 25.03.2015

⁷ Romanian Government, *Tax budget strategy for 2011-2013*, 2010, http://discutii.mfinante.ro/static/10/Mfp/strategbug/STRATEGIA_FB_27sept.pdf, accessing date 25.03.2015

expression of a national economy that truly takes part in the security of the individual, while it also ensures the decrease of the fateful potential involved by the buildup of social tensions caused by the citizens' excessive tax burdening.

The efficient management of economy and of public finance by the responsible use of financial instruments and the adoption of a new approach of the financial budget policies by the political factor that has to make choices of reasonable and smart expenditure, to analyze the cost of actions and to restructure expenses in order to obtain maximum effects when limited resources are available⁸, will have advantageous outcomes both in relation to economic security and in relation to national security.

The aforementioned financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities can entail severe damages to national security, as well as to its components.

Thus, the occurrence of financial risks (decrease of the available financial resources, decrease of the investment potential, decrease of the citizens' confidence in the national sectorial policies) or the existence of similar threats and vulnerabilities will also trigger damages to the economic security – a front-rank component of national security. Many national economies were destroyed or damaged because of the fractal-oriented approach and destabilization of economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis or of erroneous budget policies. The fall or imbalance of a national economy has extremely severe effects at all levels, starting from the individual's and his family's economic security and going up to the diminution of the state's economic safety, of the action and reaction possibilities, in case of conflict, with the amplification of the political, economic, social and military vulnerabilities of such a state.

The economic side of security implementation is increasingly important, since the economy has become "the engine" in the absence of which national power (whether political, social or military) cannot operate within the normal parameters⁹; therefore, we may state that, without a modern and strong economy, there is and there cannot be real security, prosperity and stability at the level of the individual and of the family, at the level of the state, at the level of the entire human kind¹⁰.

For these exact reasons, *Romania's National Security Strategy* emphasizes the fact that a strong, productive and competitive, macro-stable, dynamic economy in relation to growth and adjustable to the requirements of integration and globalization, is an important pillar of *national security*, by ensuring conditions for economic and social safety, the interest of most of the population in the support of democratic institution and the basis required for the promotion of initiatives relating to the nation's prosperity and security¹¹.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Energetic Security of Romania in european context*, 2010
http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/securitatea_energetica_a_romaniei_in_context_european.pdf
accessing date 05.05.2015

¹⁰ Doina Mureșan, *Economical dimension of the security in partnership and alliances era*, 2009;
<http://cnap.unap.ro/8B323259-CE7E-49AF-A2D417F404F9FE99/ForceRequestingFullContent/8B323259CE7E-49AF-A2D417F404F9FE99/Materiale%20bibliografice/cap2.doc>, accessing date 05.05.2015

¹¹ Presidency, *National Security Strategy of Romania*, 2007
<http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>, accessing date 05.05.2015

2. The role of intelligence (information) in the mitigation/elimination of financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities with an impact on national security

For the elimination of the aforementioned financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities, the directions of actions should concern the attainment of the following objectives¹²:

- Simplification of tax administration procedures, including by the introduction of new information technologies and modernization of existing ones
- Increase of the extent of damage recovery
- Promoting a tax policy oriented toward sustainable/inclusive economic growth
- Establishment of an efficient regulatory framework in the field of accounting and auditing in the corporative sector, by drafting the national regulations in accordance with the EU guidelines, an aspect which will contribute to the development and improvement of accounting, financial return and auditing included
- Promoting a high degree of management responsibility in the use of public funds
- Ensuring the allocation of public financial resources in close relation to the policy priorities on medium term, as well as the increase of efficacy and transparency in the process of budget drafting by the implementation of performance-based budgeting etc.

We find that the aforementioned main action directions rely on the strict need of information.

Irrespective of the field of activity, processes and phenomena are increasingly more complex, and their control can no longer occur only based on intuition and experience. The past operation of assimilation and “learning” is absolutely necessary, however not sufficient in the current period, since the world is no longer only continuity, it is especially discontinuity. In these conditions, national security with information is unlikely, inconceivable.

Information (intelligence) has become a symbol of power of the one who holds it and one of the three forms of manifestation of matter, and the need of information and communication is more acute than ever; new modalities of communication are established and they provide us with the possibility to issue or to receive, almost instantaneously, messages from any area of the world.

In contemporary society, information has become a raw material, it is ubiquitous, it has become a strategic asset.

Thus, military wars now have an increasingly more pervasive intelligence dimension: the outcome is no longer decided by the fighters’ courage, bravery, but by the intelligence the parties involved hold.

We may say that, unlike the military war as such, there is an intelligence and implicit war of technique, technologies and communication. This information war is present in all the fields of our social existence and it occurs in a continuous “struggle” to obtain the best and newest intelligence and to use it in the best manner, i.e. to exploit it to its maximum potential.¹³

Therefore, by taking into account the fact that intelligence has a determining role in the mitigation and countering of the various types of national security risks, threats and

¹² Romanian Government, *The annual action plan of the Ministry of Public Finance for the year 2014 approved by Order no. 28, date March 7, 2014*, http://www.mf.gov.md/files/files/Activitatti%20MF/Planul_anual_de_actuni_al_MF_2014.pdf, accessing date 25.03.2015

¹³ Ionel Enache, *Services planification and organization*, 2004, <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiinteCOM/planif/intro.htm>., accessing date 26.03.2015

vulnerabilities, we may state that, likewise, the role of financial intelligence tends to occupy a first rank in the mitigation of national security financial risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

Lack of knowledge or the deficient management of vulnerabilities is likely to generate – upon the gravity level – states of risk, danger or threats, on national security. It is precisely for these reasons that the identification of financial vulnerabilities, risk factors and threats, as well as the anticipation of effects of some corresponding national/international compartments of events are an overwhelmingly important challenge to the attainment of the objectives of a nation's security.

Given that world's nations face constantly specific types of financial risks and threats, the effects of the occurrence of such phenomena trigger the buildup of enormous destructive potentials which, in the current context – of strong interdependence and interconnection of the world's states – are likely to propagate quickly at world level.

In these conditions, we note that the introduction of advanced systems of management of financial risks based on financial information, should have a main role at the level of all the activities, for the identification, estimation, evaluation and approach of risks in the best fitting manner. It is no surprise that many developing countries have been required to adopt information systems in the fields of financial management, for the improvement of the public expenditure management system.

Better integration and comparability between governmental reporting systems are still in the challenge phase. The high pressure on budget resources, the evolution on the countries' credit rating and the necessity to promote a high degree of management responsibility in the use of public funds are the main constraints that determine the necessity of implementation of a new solutions having as final effect incrementation of the trust in public institutions. The group of the most developed G20 countries has emphasized lately the need for a transparent, comparable of public sector-related information, including the balances of the public sectors for the quick identification of any potential imbalance, for some comparisons between national or international public institutions, the increase of transparency and of responsibility in the use of public funds, as well as for the decrease of fraud and corruption risks.

Although it is not a universally applicable “cure”, the benefits of the implementation of such a system are deemed extremely efficient. First of all, improvements of how governmental financial transactions are registered and processed trigger a prompt, reliable and efficient access of financial information. This in turn will increase the executive's transparency and responsibility toward third parties. Second, the implementation of information systems in the field of financial management will reinforce financial control, by enabling a complete, current and continuous image of the public dues and expenses. Third, the system will provide information that will ensure the improvement of efficiency and efficacy in the governmental financial management.¹⁴

The recent emergence of the concept of *information systems governance* shows that these activities are starting to be considered in the leaders' strategic reflections, with beneficial effects on the activities in which they have been integrated.

By implementing such advanced management systems of financial information, a series of positive influences can be seen both at an individual level – by the decisions-makers' better comprehension of the aspects relating to some situations, which enables the increase of economic efficiency by the more reasonable allocation of public resources – and at the level of national security – by the mitigation or elimination of security financial risks and threats (increase of transparency at the level of the public sector, which leads automatically to the

¹⁴ Jack Diamond, Pokar Khemani *OECD Journal volume 5 – no 3, “Introducing Financial Management Information Systems in Developing Countries”*, 2006, <http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/43480378.pdf>, accessing date 26.03.2015

decrease of corruption and tax evasion, the adoption of realistic economic policies adequate to the time's circumstances and requirements etc.).

Conclusions

We find that, unlike the classic risks, threats and vulnerabilities that may impair national security severely, a new approach has been taking shape in these last years, by bringing to the foreground a new type of risks, threats and vulnerabilities, which relate to or whose source is the financial environment.

In this context, the national security goals can no longer be targeted only by the use of traditional resources (mobilization and channeling of considerable amounts of financial resources available to the authorities and institutions that hold responsibilities in the field of security and defense or the implementation of close and sustained inter-institution collaboration of these entities), because a reconsideration of the available resources is necessary, by the inclusion of new categories. Thus, we note the necessity to introduce advanced systems of financial risk management, which rely on specific information; the anticipated outcome is the improvement of the decision-making process.

Therefore, the use and optimal arrangement of classic, traditional and financial information resources will allow the state's full capacity to counter the *entire range* of domestic and foreign risks, threats and vulnerabilities in relation to national security and, respectively, to economic security.

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THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SINO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

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Abstract: *European Union - People’s Republic of China relationship was first established in 1975, and became governed in 1985. Relations between these two international players have constantly improved over time and materialized in annual summits, high level dialogues and in more than 50 sectoral dialogues. The economic crisis which peaked in 2008 rapidly became a global one with multiple implications on relations defined between international players. The European Union found itself in a descendent position that launched it toward its ideological collapse sustained by an economic and social destabilization. An important role in the rehabilitation of confidence in Eurozone and also in European economy revival was accomplished by China as the main upholder of the global financial stabilization. This paper concerns the main aspects regarding the cooperation between European Union and China in the context of economic crisis. The paper’s objective is to present the crisis’ effects upon these two economies and the implications of this cooperation upon China and EU.*

Keywords: cooperation, crisis, interests, investments, bonds, prosperity, security

1. Considerations regarding the economic and financial crisis and its consequences on the European Union

1.1. Causes and onset of the economic crisis

The economic and financial crisis which has been felt heavily from 2008 until 2014 among the whole international scene descended from mutations that took place at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels of the global economy. An empirical approach of the main causes assesses the sharp drop in house prices in the United States, as well as housing loans, while augmenting resources for investments.

The intensification of liquidities and the perpetual integration of new savings in the global system (China, Japan and India) generated low interest rates with a high level of volatility and super saturation with savings. Against this background, an acute tendency of underestimating risks and disinterested attitude of investors against potential threats were created.

According to a paper published by the first deputy governor of National Bank of Romania, in 2011, the economic crisis is the manifestation of multiple factors acting simultaneously.¹ The most significant factor leading to the destabilization of the economic system was the accumulation of balance of payments imbalances. These imbalances represent the product of the distancing between pay and work product, or the inequity in the distribution of wage-profit. In addition, the over funding of savings also had a major impact on the world economy. The abusive increase of the volume of loans, as a product of excessive relaxation of specific standards for payment and credit capacity, represents a conventional product of deregulation of financial markets and the irrationality of economic operators to act for a major and quick profit, involving minimal investment. The development of the financial sector and

¹ Florin Georgescu, *Anatomia cizei și schimbarea paradigmei economice*, Bucharest, 2011, p. 4, available at <http://www.bnr.ro/PublicationDocuments.aspx?icid=6885>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

economic growth may be achieved by maintaining a high level of quality regarding government institutions and by minimizing the level of bad loans and the interest margin, reducing the value of domestic credit to the private sector in GDP and by increasing the value of private credit in GDP. Excessive growth of the volume of transactions based derivatives (whose value is based on the value of another asset with which it's in a relation of dependency) and disrupting the relationship between financial institutions and capital assets in the financial system led to an excessive development of the financial sector.

The major opening towards certain sectors such as real estate or loans between financial institutions was a consequence of the banks' needs of funding, aspect that amplified the systemic risk. Also, credit institutions intensified sensitivity to fluctuations in the financial market due to the increased number of transactions in derivatives, causing mutations in financial institutions.

Starting with the year 2000, in the US, a strong reduction of the average interest rate was registered. From 2003 (Figure 1.1.), the average interest rate climbed, causing difficulty in loan repayment capacity.




Figure no. 1 Average interest rate²

Deregulation of the financial and economic system along with the uncontrolled evolution of financial innovation led to the development of an unsustainable banking system, the increase of financial excesses and increased concentration of financial institutions. These effects spread rapidly in all areas through the channels of globalization. In this context, the retention of interest rate value was registered at a low level. Poor evaluation of the crediting institutions' capacity to properly determining the major risks had a major impact on the economical and financial system, determining an unrealistic approach to risk, increasing the leverage effect and the rise of volatile capital requirements.

Its effects have spread rapidly all over the world, causing major imbalances in all branches of the economic system. The primary deficits have exploded, fueled by factors on the expenditure side, as well as the revenue side. The strengthening of the financial system protection mechanisms and funding schemes provided by the authorities increased government spending and economic recession has put downward pressure on revenues. Debt service increased, the cost of funding increased along with the stock of debt and repayment was affected by the depreciation of exchange rates.³

² <https://data.oecd.org/interest/long-term-interest-rates.htm>.

³ Florin Georgescu, *op. cit.*, 2011, p. 23.

The beginning of the crisis led to the decrease of costs by reducing consumer confidence. The onset of the crisis was registered in the US where investors lost confidence in secured mortgage, which resulted in reduced liquidities. To avoid negative consequences, American Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, along with the American Central Bank, introduced a high volume of capital on financial markets. 2008 was characterized by a high number of bankruptcy of some banks, lenders and insurance companies. What initially began as a simple turbulence in the United States quickly degenerated into a large-scale economic crisis in Europe and then in the world.

The financial crisis gave rise to resounding failures, restructuring of companies and financial institutions, mergers and acquisitions, direct financial support with significant funding from the US government (so far 700 billion USD were approved in order to only be used to save US financial institutions from the effects of the crisis). A large part of these institutions are or were listed on the stock exchange, their exit from the market affecting not only the credibility of capital in the US market but also the volume of stock transactions, price volatility, low yields.⁴

1.2. Implications and effects. EU's answer to the economic crisis

Imbalances in the euro zone (caused by accumulation, in some member states, of huge public deficits and debt) and economic imbalances which were overlapped by increasing differences in competitiveness led to a situation in which the financial and debt crisis were almost impossible to manage in some countries.

Member States, together with the European Central Bank and European institutions decided to meet these challenges together through measures of ensuring financial stability. Following this decision, the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism was created. This mechanism allows the Commission to borrow, on behalf of EU, funds that do not exceed more than 60 billion euro from the financial markets and to lend them further to those member EU states facing major difficulties. Besides all this, the European Financial Stability Fund was created – a fund destined for emergency situations, with a large credit capacity (up to 440 billion), aimed at helping countries in difficulty. The European Financial Stability Fund is functioning by collecting funds from financial markets on the basis of guarantees provided by euro zone countries.

“Troika” is a group of experts composed of personnel belonging to the European Commission, the Central European Bank and the International Monetary Fund (FMI). All these institutions are tasked with periodically evaluating the progress regarding the commonly agreed upon reforms.

In the fall of 2012, euro area countries created a new financial mechanism, this time a permanent one (unlike the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Fund which had temporary) - European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Currently, ESM has a lending capacity exceeding 500 billion euro, and with contributions from the IMF, the capacity increases to almost 750 billion euro and makes it an integral part of the overall EU strategy designed to ensure financial stability.

In order to prevent side effects of decisions taken in member states, the European Union decided upon the partial regulation of economic policies. The Stability and Growth Pact represents the main tool that coordinates and directs the process of economic policy making in member countries. It outlines two fundamental rules: public debt (the sum lent to a certain state) may not exceed 60% of the total value of production of a country in a year) and national deficit (the difference between expenses and revenues in a given year) cannot exceed 3% of GDP.

⁴ Cristian Păun, *Cauzele, propagarea și efectele crizelor într-o lume din ce în ce mai globalizată*, in Sfera Politicii, Volume XVIII, number 6 (148), Published by Fundația Societatea Civilă, June 2010, p. 20.

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was strengthened in December 2011 and brought more transparency and stricter supervision of national budgets by the Commission. SGP introduced strengthened provisions and penalties for Member States that exceeded the limits on public debt and budget deficit. When a country does not enforce the established rules, the Commission may initiate the procedure for correcting the situation. However, while issues of supervision and monitoring provided by the Stability and Growth Pact applies to all Member States, financial sanctions cannot be imposed to those outside the euro zone.

Also in December 2011, a new mechanism was introduced - The Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) for closer supervision of divergences between economies, especially the differences in competitiveness (a country's ability to sell products and services on domestic and foreign markets). MIP analyzes 10 economic indicators, thus identifying changes in the market share of exports, labor cost, private sector debt and housing prices. Imbalances may occur, for example, salary increases do not correspond to increases in productivity or sudden increases in housing prices.

Euro zone countries agreed in 2011 to impose a set of measures set by the Euro Plus Pact. This reflects the interdependence of their economies and intention to ensure better coordination of national economic policies. The pact was signed by six countries outside the euro zone: Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Moreover, 25 Member States have agreed on a treaty for stability, coordination and governance which entered into force on the 1st of January 2013 and reinforced budgetary discipline and economic governance between the Member States.⁵

In order to better coordinate economic policies, the European Commission has set a strict timetable called the European Semester. This timetable provides the framework for the analysis of member states programs regarding economic and structural reforms and for the establishment of recommendations for the next 12 to 18 months.

2. China's approach to EU's adjustment to the economic crisis

2.1. Penetrations of the economic crisis in Chinese society

P.R. of China is of central importance in the hierarchy of world economic power after the US and the EU. Assuming the role of regional and global power, it became a political, economical and military pole, and continues to establish itself as a prominent player in international organizations, such as UN, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, APEC.

After leaving the Maoist dogmatism, China resorted to conditional markets openings, so that imports or investments by global corporations do not lead to the blockage or the overtaking of developing domestic markets. For this purpose, certain fiscal rules were established. These rules gave advantage to its own economy, but also to foreign investors, who were left with the option of working in areas that could not be "covered" by local companies.⁶

The effects of the global economic crisis were felt in China which recorded growth but with a lower swing. In early 2009, the growth was approximately 6.2%, increasing, fluently, reaching 11.9% at the beginning of 2010⁷.

The financial crisis has further enhanced China's importance in the world economy. China had nearly 2 trillion dollars in its reserves of foreign currency in 2008. This huge

⁵ Margareta Căpîlnean, *Bilanțul crizei: Ce măsuri a luat Uniunea Europeană*, available at <http://europedirect.cdimm.org>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

⁶ Sergiu Tămaș, *Puterile emergente și criza globală*, in *Sfera Politicii*, Volume XVIII, number 6 (148), Published by Fundația Societatea Civilă, June 2010, pp. 52-53.

⁷ Cf. Yongheng Deng, Bernard Yeung, *China's stimulus may be a curse in disguise*, available at <http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/25/china-soe-real-estate-property-markets-economy-stimulus.html>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

reserve of USD contrasts with the US, whose budget deficit exceeded 2 trillion USD in 2009. Stimulus package worth 586 billion USD of the Chinese government showed Beijing's determination to keep the crisis under control. Wen, the Chinese Prime-Minister, said in early 2009 that his country would introduce a second stimulus package to boost China's economy, if necessary. The G20 Summit held in London in April, 2009, pointed out that Beijing wants to play a greater role in combating the crisis.⁸

China has reorganized the methods of planning, setting clear goals for society and only providing guidance only for the private sector. By creating a long-term plan, China wanted to give directives to ensure an increased standard of living and general welfare enhancement. Principles governing the Chinese market are attached to a system of political control exercised by the governmental power over society. There is a rising in dismissed policies of subordination to an ideology through the detachment of political will from pragmatism class struggle pragmatism.

China, through the establishment of "sovereign wealth funds" could benefit from greater freedom of movement in financial negotiations and was able to initiate investment policies in other developing countries using attractive conditions for the ones getting the loans.⁹

The excessive decline in demand from China's economic partners, which was registered with the outbreak of the financial crisis, had a negative impact on Chinese exports decreased by approximately 30% in May 2009 compared to May 2008, causing the bankruptcy of enterprises and increasing unemployment. In 2012, exports saw a rise in the amount of about 6%, totaling 2048.9 billion USD.¹⁰

China consistently influences demand, supply and prices of many commodities, goods and services, having a considerable impact, directly and indirectly, on the evolution of global markets. Its influence is transmitted through branch trade and materializes in economic growth for partners and, at the same time, the world. This reality became even more prominent during the years of crisis, when China's contribution ended up being four times larger than that of the United States.¹¹

The involvement of government authorities in saving the Chinese economy caused a low level of inflation that has experienced a value of 1.7% in the second half of 2012. The consumer price index has seen a positive value, increasing by 2.6% in 2012 compared to 2011 and oscillating around 2% in the first half of 2013.¹²

Investment value in fixed assets climbed in 2012 and real estate investments climbed increased by approximately 16% as opposed to the influx of foreign direct investment which fell by 3.7%.¹³

With the onset of 2013, China's foreign exchange reserves recorded a value of 3311.6 billion USD. Between 2004 and 2012, the country's foreign exchange reserves increased 7.2 times, ending up exceeding twice the value of gold held by all central banks in the world at

⁸ Jing Men, *Va face criza financiară o superputere din China?*, in „Revista NATO”, May 2009, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-Crisis-China/RO/index.htm>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

⁹ Sergiu Tămaș, *op. cit.*, June 2010, p. 53.

¹⁰ Jing Men, *Va face criza financiară o superputere din China?*, in „Revista NATO”, May 2009, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/Financial-Crisis-China/RO/index.htm>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

¹¹ According to John Ross, *China's Pivotal Role in World Economy in 2012*, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-12/27/content_14336395.htm, accessed on 30.03.2015.

¹² According to <http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/china/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-china-2010.aspx>, accessed on 30.05.2015.

¹³ Sarmiza Pencea, *China – incetinirea ritmului creșterii economice in 2012, accelerare moderată in 2013-2014 (part I)*, available at <http://www.iem.ro/publicatii/piaa-internaional/economia-rilor-lumii/557-china-incetinirea-ritmului-creșterii-economice-in-2012-accelerare-moderat-in-2013-2014>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

that time¹⁴. China is standing out on the international scene as a State with growing foreign exchange reserves.

In addition to economic growth, China wants an intensification of military force. China's military budget ranks second in the world after the US's budget. In 2008-2009 there was an increase in Chinese military budget, preceded by slight fluctuations, reaching a value of 112.2 billion US dollars in 2013, while the US and the euro region marked a descending line. The United States spent 618 billion USD on the military in 2013. The second figure represents the share of military expenditure in GDP for China, United States and European Union. There has been an increasing trend of military budgets reported to the gross domestic product since 2008 which is more pronounced for United States. Although, the share of military expenditure in GDP is oriented backwards since 2010. The value of China's military budget in GDP is slightly increasing since 2011, compared to the situation of the other actors whose values continue downline. The augmentation of military spending came during the economic crisis, but experienced a more active involvement of the Chinese government. Military exercises with partner countries accentuated along with the improvement of Chinese military forces, which resulted in participation in various military actions. Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has grown, materialized in the successful development of military applications as a result of common experiences of military cooperation. China, along with the European Union and the United States participate in military operations to remove piracy in order to maintain a stable climate on the coast of Somalia.




Figure no 2 Share of military expenditure in GDP¹⁵

Nationally, China wants "to say goodbye to poverty and to enjoy the good life"¹⁶, to become a prosperous society in all areas. The country also wants to become "the most responsible member of the international community, most civilized, most disciplined and with the greatest respect for the law"¹⁷. China's domestic agenda is formulated around interests to promote economic growth and maintain social harmony.

2.1. *China's role in the management of EU economic crisis*

Cooperation between the European Union and China has emerged in 1975, and has been highlighted by the launch of their strategic partnership in 2003. The first EU-China

¹⁴ Sarmiza Pencea, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/CN-US-EU?display=graph>.

¹⁶ Dai Bingguo, *Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development*, in Henry Kissinger, *Despre China*, Comunicare.ro, Bucharest, 2012, p. 418.

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

Summit took place in 1998 in London. It was the beginning of high-level meetings between the two actors.

Both the European Union and China exposed themselves as important players that advocate for international security. During their cooperation, the dialogue to promote weapons of mass destruction, nonproliferation and disarmament occupied a special place among other domains of cooperation.

Since 2011, the European Union and China have cooperated successfully in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden where the EU conducted operation ATALANTA since 2008. Another pertinent example of the enhancement of sino-european relations in the field of security is supported by China's active involvement in peacekeeping operations in Mali, alongside the Member States of the European Union.

Europe has emphasized itself as an essential partner in the development of economic relations with China. Although, with the exception of Russia, European states are far away from China, they became irreplaceable partners in achieving the common goal of a stable international environment. Both the EU and China follow a common path towards sustainable development, JM Barroso characterizing the two powers as "global actors in a multi-polar world that share the responsibility of building a safe world, prosperous and fair, with a comprehensive strategic partnership as an opportunity to pave the way for more cooperation and more exchanges".¹⁸

Although trade relations between China and the European Union have reached the highest rate in 2011, they proceeded on a downward path. In 2009, the share of China's foreign trade was 16.5%, at which point it started to decrease in value until 2011 when it reached 15.6%.

The share of EU activities in Chinese exports reached the highest value of 20.5% in 2008. With the onset of the economic crisis, it has fallen to 18.7% in 2011. The European share in Chinese imports decreased from 12.7% in 2009 to 12.1% in 2011.¹⁹ This downward trend of European actions do not necessarily reflects that Sino-European cooperation relations lost their significance, but China intends to expand towards other markets.

China has shown a willingness to take an active role in the European Union's crisis management, but its involvement was marked by some limits. Participation in the process of countering the effects of the crisis began with the manifestation of China's desire to be involved in the European Financial Stability Fund, and then in its successor, in the European Stability Mechanism. In 2009, China decided to purchase large quantities of goods and services, as well as bonds from European countries affected by the economic crisis.

In 2010, during his official visit to Greece, Chinese Prim-Minister Wen Jiabao reiterated the support provided by China to ensure stability of the euro and strengthen ties with the European Union. As published by Reuters news agency, during the same visit, the Chinese prim-minister said that Greek bonds have been purchased by China who will continue to keep a positive attitude for further involvement in the purchase of new bonds that Greece will deliver. Also, China is willing to sustain efforts in order to support a member out of the crisis. In October 2010, China submitted its offer and the two countries signed the agreement regarding investments, trade and tourism²⁰

¹⁸ Cf. Rajnish Singh, *EU-China strategic partnership 'paves way' for more cooperation*, 17 .03. 2014, available at <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/feature/eu-china-strategic-partnership-paves-way-more-cooperation>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

¹⁹ Cf. Chen Xin, *The financial crisis and EU-China trade interdependency*, 15, iulie 2012, available at <http://www.neurope.eu/blog/financial-crisis-and-eu-china-trade-interdependency/>, accessed on de 28.03.2015.

²⁰ Toma Tasovac, *China offers Greece cash injection to tackle debt crisis*, available at <http://www.dw.de/china-offers-greece-cash-injection-to-tackle-debt-crisis/a-6069926>, accessed on 30.03.2015.

At the end of 2010, China stated its willingness to purchase bonds worth 5 billion USD from the Portuguese government. In 2011 the negotiation process between the Chinese energy company, Three Gorges Corp and the Portuguese company Energias de Portugal ended, resulting in Three Gorges acquiring shares worth 2.7 billion euro.²¹ This transaction was a successful part in the privatization process started in Portugal.

In January 2011, during his visit to Spain, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Li Keqiang stated that the Beijing government is willing to support its interests in doing business with the Spanish partner and the achievement of bonds worth close to 6 billion euro. Sinopec, the largest company of petroleum and petrochemical products in China acquired 40 % of Spanish Repsol oil in the Brazilian arm for \$ 7.1 billion in October 2010.

China's involvement in supporting these individual European countries represented an important step in the economic crisis management and combating crisis effects. However, these measures were not sufficient to prevent the deepening crisis in the European Union. In the autumn of 2011, the European Union called for a new helping hand from China, which has resulted in investments in Europe's bailout funds and the stimulation foreign currency earnings.

Along with the purchase of bonds from Europe, China increased its interest in the European companies. The Chinese investment achieved an unprecedented rise. In 2010, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China's total investment in Europe had a value 53%, higher than the \$ 1.39 billion that were directed to the United States.²² Amid the crisis, some European countries, such as Hungary, Italy and Greece, took into consideration deepening trade relations with China, in particular, sales of public companies bonds.

It can be said that the spread of the economic crisis in the European space has led to China's strong involvement in giving Europe a hand. This assistance came from Beijing's optimistic attitude towards the EU and has resulted in China's willingness to strengthen bilateral relations with European states.

3. Delimitation of interests regarding the directions of Sino-European cooperation

China's direct involvement in the recovery of the EU from the economic crisis had caused some discussions and comments regarding the reasons and interests behind its highly altruistic government in Beijing. However, China appeared to be open in supporting the European Union and generated a powerful optimism in investing efforts in the regeneration of the European area.

China's development is conditioned largely by exports. The drastic decline in demand in the United States, European Union and Japan due to financial crisis had an immediate impact on Chinese foreign trade. A large number of companies whose business was focused on export faced bankruptcy and more than 20 billion workers became unemployed.

The European Union, which has highlighted itself as the leading destination for Chinese exports, is an opportunity for future Chinese investment. Rescue and preservation of the euro as a reserve currency is in the national interest of China. China's active involvement, as the main source of help, is a small price to pay in order to ensure economic growth and financial stability in Europe, that is essential for China's growing economy in the long term.

²¹ Axel Bugge, *China Three Gorges buys EDP stake for 2.7 billion euros*, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/23/us-edp-threegorges-idUSTRE7BM04V20111223>, accessed on 31.03.2015.

²² Cf. Nicola Casarini, *How the debt crisis can advance Sino-European relations*, 27.09.2011, available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-p./article/how-the-debt-crisis-can-advance-sino-european-relations/>, accessed on 23.03.2015.

However, some academics argue that the euro zone crisis that swept the Europeans do not affect demand for Chinese products as long as major European economies do not collapse.²³ Not even the depreciation of the euro would affect the Chinese economy that much, the statistics showing that 80% of China's foreign trade is settled in dollars.

The value of European direct investment in China is an important part of Sino-European cooperation in strengthening China's economic system. With the deepening economic crisis, European investment in the "Middle Kingdom" decreased significantly. Direct Chinese investment in the European Union is based on strengthened trust in the economic prosperity and has seen a rise since the economic crisis begun. This is another reason for concern to ensure the stability of the euro, which could produce greater losses in China.

China's involvement in the European Union's recovery had not only well-established economic reasons but also political ones. China's aid to the European Union was used in order to reiterate political objectives as the desire to strengthen bilateral relations and having its market economy status recognized by EU.

China's support for its European partner to advance the crisis has resulted in the purchase of bonds, increasing investment in European companies and the allocation of other resources in securing the euro. However, the optimism displayed by the Chinese government has implemented a cautious attitude, limiting its implications and economic support in order to avoid possible domestic problems that could arise in Chinese society because of the low standard of living in rural areas.

Conclusions

The economic crisis that began in July 2008 quickly spread all over the world, affecting most major players on the international scene. Among the main causes of the crisis are abundant liquidities and low interest to the manifestation of a possible risk. The emergence of some imbalances on the balance of payments as exaggerated disproportionality between pay and work product, and expanding financial sector over the needs of the economy have contributed to the occurrence of the crisis. The insufficient legislation concerning the economic system and uncontrolled development of financial innovation led to the development of a destabilized banking system and to an increased concentration of the financial institutions.

The effects of the economic crisis spread in the European Union, becoming increasingly difficult to manage. The European Union has found itself in front of a major economical collapse and a fierce destabilization of sustainability and development. In order to address the consequences arising from the economic crisis, the European Union established effective tools and policies of mutual aid.

The economic crisis was also felt in the eastern part of the Asian continent. Although the crisis had little direct impact, China has been more affected indirectly by the austerity imposed by its partners as a response to the crisis. During the crisis, China has recorded lower economic growth than in the past. In the context of the crisis, in addition to the economic growth, China has decided to increase the value of investments and military force. It can be said that the crisis has reinforced the importance of China in the world.

China has played an important role in strengthening the European Union's capacity to deliver effective crisis management and to find economic stability. China has been involved through various means and methods in supporting the European economy, addressing both bilateral cooperation with some members of the European Union and also cooperation with

²³ Mamta Badkar, *What China Really Hopes To Get In Exchange For A European Bailout*, 14.09. 2011, available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/wen-jiabao-china-europe-debt-2011-09>, accessed on 31.03.2015.

the community structures in Brussels. The help brought up by China was a defining point in strengthening European economic stability.

Cooperation between the EU and China is materialized into a desire to guarantee a stable international environment, by working together to achieve the goal of sustainable development. China took an active role in the European Union's crisis management by deepening trade relations, increasing Chinese investment and purchasing bonds.

China's involvement in European Union's crisis management was based on economic and political reasons. China's economic growth depends on relations with its partners and the stability of their economic system.

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE–INSTRUMENT FOR ARCHIEVING ROMANIA’S ECONOMIC SECURITY

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Abstract: *The national security economic dimension is the support for achieving security objectives, while performance and sustainability are a condition for other dimensions functioning and development: military, political, social and environmental. “Economic intelligence” or “State level competitive intelligence”, a relatively new subject regarding international intelligence concerns, aims to augment economic competitiveness and to create synergy between state and private interest, for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the competition for resources and markets. Information, as a production neo-factor, when it is properly processed and valued, has the potential to significantly contribute to the growth and consolidation of the national economy.*

Keywords: *Economic security. Economic intelligence. National interest. Risks. Opportunities*

Introduction

Although, traditionally, the economic side played a major role in the development of a society or region, or within state actors competition, placing the economic component of security in the forefront of a state or international organization institutional concerns has occurred only in the last part of the twentieth century. The struggle for access to vital or strategic resources (water, food, precious metals, natural gas, oil, etc.) took shape, historically, in various ways, specific for the time and place when and where it happened. While, for centuries, the competition had been primarily conducted through military means, in the twentieth century, the approach suffered changes, through the outline of plans and strategies, meant to lead to risk mitigation and national interest promotion, primarily by using economic mechanisms. The free market facilitated then, and it still does facilitate the resource transfer to interested third parties, therefore a lack of adequate protection might lead to limited access of a state – as the representative of the nation – to the necessary national security resources.

Since in the second part of the last century, the economic risks started to be perceived by states on the same importance level as the risks rising from military threats – including the ones associated with the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, organized crime and terrorism –, in relation with the impact they can have on national security. That was the turning point when the states started to adapt their national security strategies to the new risk configuration, regardless of their nature. Sustainable economic development emerged as the key to ensure the national power potential allowing to set up a network of effective protection on the medium and long term.

It is obvious that security has an economic dimension and that security can be seen in a directly proportional relationship with security system investments, just as insecurity is directly proportional with poverty. Without a long term efficient and sustainable economy, security, prosperity and stability can’t actually exist, as the economy has a direct impact on the military, public order and safety potential, therefore on the security potential.

Regarding the other dimension of security, there is no political power compatible with the democratic life norms, outside of a developed economy with a long term sustainable growth, as well as any economy needs political support for a normal development. Also,

military power can not exist without economic power. All these components are interrelated, but, in the security equation, economic aspects seem to outweigh all others in importance. Therefore, economic power is becoming, in fact, the center of gravity of any security system¹.

At national level, it is the state's responsibility to efficiently manage the economic factors that favor and affect security, by maximizing the positive ones and mitigate or, if possible, even eradicate, the negative ones².

The developments which occurred within the last decades in the international security environment, at both micro and macroeconomic level, highlighted the fact that information plays an important role in enhancing a company's competitiveness, and also that of the national economy on a regional/global scale. Developed states have adopted national programs to support their economies with relevant information regarding potential or active markets. The example of France is relevant in this matter.

Consequently, Romania should place itself in this international trend, as quickly and appropriately as possible, given the fact that other states already possess net competitive advantages and the global opportunities and risks widening range make the adaptation of our country to the new security environment a stringent matter.

1. Economic security – an important national security component

The word "security" has roots in antiquity, originating from the Latin word "securitas", meaning "peace, calm, lack of danger". In the Romanian language, it was first encountered in the work "Hronicul" by Gheorghe Șincai³, with the meaning of "being sheltered from any danger", "being safe", "having a sense of confidence and tranquility due to the absence of danger".

Over time, there have been various types of approaches, both of the "security" concept and of some of the subsequent/associated concepts – "national security" and "economic security".

1.1. Progressive highlights in addressing the concept of "security"

Being introduced in international relations after the Second World War, "security" represented, by the end of the Cold War, the paradigm that evaluated the military forces prepared for the conflict between the two ideological founded blocks of states. Traditionally, a significant part of the specialized literature was based on the "power" and "peace" concepts. The "power" centered approach – a continuation of Realistic School of International Relations⁴ – is represented, amongst others, by E. H. Carr⁵ and H. Morgenthau⁶. The main supporters of the "peace" centered approach – associated with the Idealistic School – are A. Zimmern⁷ and N. Angell⁸. The two views have dominated the currents of opinion in the security field until the 80s, a fact that contributed to the increased polarization of the approaches, which sent the security concept in the background. Therefore, the concept was reduced due to the lack of a war threat.

The end of the Cold War led to a paradigm shift in the field, and therefore, in a resolution on Security Policy, adopted by the European Parliament on June 10th 1991,

¹ Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, *Factorii de natură economică: factori generatori de securitate sau insecuritate?*, Strategic Colloquium, no. 14/2005, Center of Security and Defense Strategic Studies, p. 2.

² *Idem*, p. 1.

³ Romanian language dictionary, new series, volume X, part II, letter S, Academy Press, 1987, p. 635.

⁴ In this context, "realism" in international relations should not be confused with the philosophical school with the same name.

⁵ Edward H. CARR, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, Macmillan, London, 1946.

⁶ Hans MORGENTHAU, *Politics Among Nations*, Knopf, New York, 1973 (fifth edition).

⁷ Alfred ZIMMERN, *The League of Nations and the Rull of Law*, MacMilan and CO, Londra, 1936, second edition.

⁸ Norman ANGELL, *The Great Illusion*, United Kingdom, 1909.

“security” was defined as “more than simply preventing war, because it relies on economic, environmental, demographic, technological, social interaction and international aspects”⁹.

Nowadays, there are two currents when addressing security dimensions and roles: neorealism and postmodernism. Neorealism, according to Professor B. Buzan¹⁰, emphasizes the important role of the state as a provider of security, while postmodernism, in the opinion of Professor K. Booth¹¹, emphasizes the interrelationship between non-state actors.

1.2. National security and its economic component – theoretical guidelines

Similar to the the notion of “security”, the concepts of “national security” and “economic security” have various definitions in the specialized literature, depending on the specificity of the approach.

At the end of the World War II, political and academic circles in many countries have emphasized that the fundamental interests of a state can be seriously damaged, not only by military means, but also by other ways of varied nature: political, diplomatic, economic, informational, psychological, biological, environmental, etc. As a result, a new concept emerged and was consolidated: the concept of *national security*, which, however, did not lead to a clear and precise form. It covered a wide variety of risks, about whose occurrence probability too little was known, but also some contingencies whose nature could hardly be perceived¹². However, many authors have tried to define national security – such as J.E. Moroz¹³, W. Lippmann¹⁴, I. Bellany¹⁵ etc. –, without achieving a clear, generally accepted delimitation. A key landmark in shaping the concept in its current form is associated with the disappearance of the “Iron Curtain” and the Warsaw Pact alliance, when a number of countries in the Eastern Europe developed and formally adopted programming documents concerning national security. “National security” remains, as Prof. B. Buzan termed it in the 80s, “a vague concept”.

Broadly, the concept of “national security” includes determining a risk and opportunities inventory, associated with a “protected item”, but also setting the countering tools for prevention and threat and vulnerabilities, as well as, respectively, national interest preservation/promotion tools. The materialization of this concept generated politics, strategies, systems, structures, institutions, doctrines, theories, plans, mechanisms, etc.

Considering the concept given meanings, we can say that “national security” means *the status achieved through political-diplomatic, economic, military and otherwise actions, guaranteeing the state – as the representative of the nation – independence and national sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and own system value practice.*

“Economic security” appears in unresolved and highly politicized international debates, particularly in connection with the relationship nature between the political structure of the anarchy and the economical one of the market¹⁶. The most relevant approaches reflect the vision on whether the state, the society or the market should have priority, or the private

⁹ *List of security and defense definitions and additional terms*, released by the organizers of the NATO meeting on „*The strategy and defence policy*”, Bruxelles, 22-23 October 1996, p. 1.

¹⁰ Barry BUZAN is an International Relations Professor at the London School of Economics (United Kingdom), Professor at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark) and at the Jilin University (China), being the founder, along with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, of the Copenhagen School).

¹¹ Ken BOOTH is a Professor of Wales University, International Politics Department.

¹² Charles SCHULTZE, *Conținutul economic al securității naționale*, Foreign Affairs, 51:3, 1973, p.529-530.

¹³ John E. MOROZ, *Beyond Security: Private Perceptions among Arabs and Israelis*, International Peace Academy, 1980, p.105, *apud* Barry BUZAN, *Popoarele, statele și teama - o agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională de după războiul rece*, Cartier Publishing, Chișinău, 2000, p.28.

¹⁴ Quote from Arnold WOLFERS, *Discord and Collaboration*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, p. 150, *apud* Barry BUZAN, *op.cit.* p.28.

¹⁵ Ian BELLANY, *Către o teorie a securității internaționale*, Political Studies, 29:1, 1981, p. 102, *apud* Barry BUZAN, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

¹⁶ Barry BUZAN, *op.cit.*, p. 230.

economic actors should have their own security requirements that have to be considered in relation to the market verdict.

An idea of economic security is especially difficult to grasp, both in theory and in policy-making. On the one hand it is always seen as closely interlinked with other security sectors. On the other, however, it is commonly agreed that it is pointless to search for any economically secure reference object since a certain degree of insecurity is an inherent attribute of almost any market-related activities. Attempts to define economic security in a more detailed manner differ from similar efforts in other security sectors. The reasons for differences are fourfold¹⁷.

- *Firstly*, insecurity in economic activities must not always be viewed as negative. Competition at all levels of societal hierarchy creates insecurity, but at the same time it is the source of dynamics, and as such may not be *a priori* negatively assessed.
- *Secondly*, such ideas as economic aspects of military security, economics of defence and the like, not always can be directly linked with the concept of economic security.
- *Thirdly*, the broadened concept of security implicitly refers to dependence of economic activities and security in other sectors.¹
- *Fourthly*, after the introduction of the concept of economic security into *International Relations* (IR), and into related areas, security studies, and peace research, discussions about that sector have been extended from state-oriented economic security to the level of individuals, e.g. conditions of living as an essential component of human security.

However, the discourse on economic security cannot be focused solely on macroeconomic and institutional issues, but must also include systemic interpretations of circumstances in which economic security is considered. Such attributes of security as threat, risk, vulnerability, securitization and the like, must be analysed with the use of ideas drawn from systems thinking and from more advanced analytical apparatus of economic theory drawn both from macroeconomics and microeconomics¹⁸.

The economic element of national security, national economic security, would similarly be broadly defined as the ability of a nation to pursue its national interests, including its economic interests, any place in the world using national economic policies to do so if appropriate. In other words, national economic security is the ability to pursue political, military or socio-cultural interests through the use of economic policy, or to pursue economic interests using military, political or social instruments of policy¹⁹.

Sorin Cozma defines “economic security” as a state of the national economic system, grounded on prosperity, legality, balance and economic stability, based on the market economy principles, expressed through the rule of law and ensured through economical, political, social, juridical and otherwise actions, in order to ensure economic freedom and fair competition, to protect public and private property, to develop national scientific and technological research, while respecting copyright, the proper functioning of financial and banking system and the creation of a favorable environment for the use and exploitation of natural resources²⁰.

¹⁷ Czeslaw MESJASZ, *Chapter Economic Security*, in *Globalization and Environmental Challenges – Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century*, Vol. 3, Hans Günter BRAUCH, Springer, Berlin, 2008, p. 569.

¹⁸ idem, p. 570.

¹⁹ Jacques PELKMANS, *National Economic Security: perceptions threats and policies*, Ed. John F. Kennedy Institute, Olanda, 1982, p. 51.

²⁰ Sorin COZMA, *Securitate economică: concept și determinări*, „Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy Publishing, Bucharest, 2010, p. 20.

2. National security through economic intelligence

According to some assessments/recent studies (such as the one from Watson Institute for International Studies²¹), the maximum risk for a state is to become a failed state, mainly due to economical and social factors: impoverishment of the population, lack of economic stability, failure in providing social assistance or personal security, proliferation of organized crime, failure of state legitimacy (weakening the state's capacity to implement rules, to collect taxes and to have the monopoly on violence control) etc.

A state whose economy can not sustain population prosperity and the institutions meant to ensure social interests harmonization (defense, order, health, education, pensions, etc.) loses its reason to exist. In fact, democratic state citizens give up a part of their income – through taxes – and some of their freedoms – by subjecting themselves to the law – to benefit from good state services. This is possible only under a strong economy, allowing the collection of taxes at a sufficient level.

Economic intelligence or state level competitive intelligence, a relatively new subject in the international intelligence concerns, aims to augment economic competitiveness and create synergy between state and private interests, for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the global competition for resources and markets. The information, as a new factor of production, properly processed and valued, has the potential to significantly contribute to the growth and strengthening of the national economy²².

Economic intelligence is a set of steps performed in the public-private partnership for searching/collecting, processing and distributing useful information to economic operators to be implemented in their business strategies. Useful information for economic operators are those needed for the consistent establishment and implementation of the strategies and courses of action enabling them to achieve their positions in the competitive environment²³.

In the context of globalization and global competition exacerbation, economic intelligence – as a way of obtaining useful strategic information – is obviously becoming a necessity. Economic operators, regions and states can not ignore and even must impose and exploit this feature essential for strengthening markets, guaranteeing quality and, more recently, ensuring sustainable development²⁴.

2.1. Highlights of the “economic intelligence” concept evolution

The competitive environment allows the market to operate efficiently, but ensuring their overall economic competitive performance requires monitoring the economic relations and making adjustments through public policies. States are forced to constantly adapt their economies, resulting in the permanent need of relevant and updated information. In order to prevent and combat the unwanted effects of competition in a global market, economically advanced countries use systems to increase their own economy competitiveness, within which collecting, processing and analyzing data and information are important tools.

Some countries – Japan, France, USA, UK, Germany etc. – chose, in the postwar era, to develop and implement true power strategies, which enabled them to face the challenges associated with global economic competitiveness.

Shortly after the World War II, Japan developed a comprehensive system for collecting and processing economic information, in which the focal point was the Ministry of Industry

²¹ Watson Institute, *Security Matrix*, Pennsylvania, USA, available at: http://www.watsoninstitute.org/gs/Security_Matrix/ (accessed on 21.03.2015).

²² Valeriu IVAN, *Analiza informațiilor: de la intelligence competitiv la componenta economică a securității naționale*, Romanian Academy (PhD thesis), Bucharest, 2014, p. 29 și p. 30.

²³ Henri MARTRE, coordinator, *Rapport du Commissariat au Plan consacré à «l'intelligence économique et la compétitivité des entreprises»*, La documentation française, 1994, p. 16-17.

²⁴ Christophe DESCHAMPES; Nicolas MOINET, *La boîte à outils de l'Intelligence économique*, Dunod, Paris, 2011, p. 6.

and Trade, succeeding, thus, to catch up in many areas: shipbuilding and automobile industry, machinery industry, computers, automation etc.

Since 1994 – along with the “*Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises*”²⁵ report –, France granted great importance to the economic information, establishing a genuine national system for collecting, processing and use of relevant information in order for the economic operators to implement their business strategies.

Since 1995, the US security strategy is based on three pillars: military, economic and cultural²⁶. Therefore, the Washington administration invests heavily in the “supply” capacity of the government and enterprises regarding economic information.

Since 1998, the UK has placed the information issue in the center of the economic strategy – defined in the „*Our competitive future: building the knowledge driven economy*”²⁷ report –, aiming at changing government policies to assist UK companies.

In the 90s, Germany also linked the state/provinces interests with those of the economic operators (big, medium, or small), through systematic dialogue on topics related to Competitive Intelligence, ultimately resulting in a strong system linked to the ordo-liberal economic doctrine.

Other countries in Europe have not successfully aligned corporate goals with the official state policy ones, so they have not yet defined economic intelligence national strategies, but the important economic actors in these countries – such as Spain, Italy and Portugal – have complex Competitive Intelligence programs.

China lacks a western sense formalized economic intelligence national strategy also, but Beijing has realized that the global competition specter is mainly economic, so, since the late 90s, the Chinese government pursues an information-based policy, mainly aiming at the control of future technologies. The results are visible to anyone, anywhere.

The States of the former communist bloc don’t have national programs or any significant initiatives to align with the practices of economically developed countries. Domestic political competition in these countries made it impossible to outline some key concerns that would guide resources towards the creation of a real economic competitiveness growth system. Moreover, due to the lack of a solid administrative capacity and to state segments corruption tendencies, within the last decades, major errors were committed in the domestic economic plan, emphasizing the gap between them and the countries that understood with what type of arsenal current territories and human minds are conquered.

2.2. Romania’s economic security through economic intelligence

In the current international context, consolidating and improving the activity of institutions and market economy specific mechanisms, based on the free competition and social solidarity principles, have become a priority for Romania’s economic security. This is the basis for a healthy economic development, capable of achieving important objectives such as: effective state integration in the regional or global economic organizations, proper framing within globalization exigencies, adequate access to international markets resources and also resilience to major economic fluctuations.

Sustainable economic development, capable to attract strategic investments, to generate jobs and produce resources for social protection, represents the only way to significantly reduce the gap between the Romanian economy and the European economies.

²⁵ Henri MARTRE, Philippe CLERC, Christian HARBULOT, *Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises*, France, Commissariat general du plan, 1994 – available at <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/074000410/index.shtml> (accessed on 21.03.2015).

²⁶ Seal of de the President of the United States of America, *A national security strategy of engagement and enlargement*, 1995 - Document available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf> (accessed on 21.03.2015).

²⁷ UK Government, *Our competitive future - building the knowledge driven economy*., The UK Government's Competitiveness White Paper, December 1998.

The European Union is an advantage Romania has, so far, failed to fully benefit from, since the country's accession in 2007. The 2008 economic crisis has greatly contributed to this delay.

On the other hand, our country must become truly competitive, and this goal is conditioned by the existence of a well-educated society, knowledge-oriented, able to optimally protect and exploit its intelligence and creativity resources, starting from the belief that a well-trained and flexible workforce is the key to the success of European integration and of seizing the opportunities offered by globalization²⁸.

The changes in the security environment make Romania's fast adaptation to the respective efforts stringent. In this process, the intelligence activity may confer several economic advantages, at both micro and macroeconomic level. At a micro-economic level, the stake is to identify each operator's information need, the place or environment where it can be collected from, the analysis techniques best suited to the pursued aim and to find the best way to present the intelligence product, in order to help reducing the uncertainty in which top management decisions are made. Briefly, added value is needed, in order to achieve competitiveness. On this level also, it is possible to identify informational vulnerabilities, acts or omissions of certain persons who, in the absence of intelligence culture, manage to challenge major companies.

At a macroeconomic level, intelligence can provide estimates and scenarios for contingency plans compilation. For example, Romania doesn't have, at this time, current and updated programming documents (strategies, development plans or programs) in key areas of the national economy (industry, energy, natural resources, agriculture, etc.), making the fruition of intelligence assets urgent. Diagnosis analysis and scenarios can be the foundations for outlining such essential documents, that would allow Romania to fully manifest itself on regional and international markets, exploiting the opportunities conferred by the EU and NATO membership (access to the single market, allocation of european funds, etc.), including in terms of turning operational all the instruments designed for rapid reaction to challenges or unforeseen circumstances (external crisis, natural disasters, etc.), and for the optimal management of the negative consequences they produce.

The need and opportunity of shaping a national economic intelligence system in Romania both lie in the fact that, after a specialized analysis, on the one hand, it can reveal the main areas where Romania can perform in the coming years and the measures to be taken, in order to boost competitive advantage in those directions and, on the other hand, action strategies can be designed in order to allow the Romanian capital or the local entrepreneurs to enter and consolidate on various foreign markets.

Alternatively, it is essential to consider two major challenges that could significantly affect the efforts to ensure Romania's economic security, in general, and turning public-private partnerships operational, in order to support economic competitiveness of local operators. First, it is important to avoid economic shocks and to achieve sustainable state development. Such goals are correlated with a better management of natural resources, in order to help avoiding, on medium and long term, the import dependency, especially in the strategic branches of the economy (food or energy industry, for example). Finally, enhancing the adaptability of the national economy on market demands, or proper crisis management, can prove useful, through an analysis of trends in various markets dynamics, by various means: regional comparisons, harnessing past experiences (how other economies reacted during crisis, how much can an economic sector or an economy be affected, as a whole, by certain macroeconomic measures implementation).

²⁸ Romania's National Security Strategy, 2006, pp. 45-46.

Conclusions

Economic security relates to all the rules and activities that ensure the proper functioning of a state's economy, with reverberations on the communities and individuals economic security, namely on the financial and economic quality of life.

Economic security aims to ensure the conditions for maintaining economic activity within normal parameters, to fix vulnerabilities (such as strategic area dependence or corruption), to counter numerous types of attacks (financial frauds, electronic crime, industrial espionage), and to ensure strategic protection (maintaining control on national strategic assets, namely on some strategic important sectors – such as critical infrastructure, natural resources, defense industry and information technology –, and also market, businesses or jobs protection).

The economic, social and environmental systems sustainability form the general framework from which secured items for reformulating the national security concept can be selected. The security strategies from the past decade contained elements of sustainable development, without being correlated and without being embodied in subsequent documents or concrete actions.

Promoting the national interests in the current geopolitical context requires a paradigm shift in the Romanian strategic thinking and practice, within Romania's reform and modernization policies. One of this transformation direction involves adopting a proactive political behavior, by promoting an integrated management risk and the national interest associated opportunities and by using multi-source information analysis, simulation/modeling and decision support tools.

Being a vital domain for survival in the global nations' competition, the economy is the "battlefield" on which contemporary wars are won or lost. The access to resources, the technological advance, the control of the needed market products volumes, or the domination of certain markets, all these represent objectives – frequently national – that once achieved, create competitive advantage and enrich nations that understand present realities and probable future prospects.

In the culture of performing organizations, the idea that, in order to be competitive, they have to correctly anticipate the changes within the general scope of activities, or the general context in which they operate is already consolidated. Also, they know that, in order to obtain this competitive advantage, they need resources to allow data and information transformation into intelligence products – analysis, synthesis, evaluation, which will underpin decision making in low uncertainty circumstances.

The economy transformation project into one based on information and knowledge is not only about the adoption of these new tools and concepts, but also about the creation of an institutional framework enriched by the use of those activities, all these goals can be achieved through structures like the on-line experts community, informational decision-making infrastructures and on-line intelligence community.

By avoiding surprises through early warning and the proper management of risks/opportunities generated by the business environment dynamics, the shown practices and instruments allow acting on the market, instead of reacting, as a player aware of the rules, of its own potential and of that of its competitors. By using these practices at a governmental level, it is less likely for the economy to be "surprised" by the external impact of the economical or other nature crisis. By better understanding what it is happening in the market and through a proper strategic/tactic impact assessment of the monitored actions, the system supports a continuous calibration of the competitive strategies and tactics for companies, the economy or the economic sectors.

The challenge of the moment seems to be detecting the dominant values of the globalized future and those of the states and surnational entities that may be influence vectors.

At least for now, there is no vector more appropriate than the economy, in order to shape human behavior in different societies.

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CONTRIBUTION OF ROMANIAN INDUSTRY TO IMPROVING EFFICIENCY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES' SURVEILLANCE – MOBILE INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (MISS)

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Abstract: *An acerbic fight for traditional spaces is doubled by a ruthless and fascinating competition for the control of halls and routes of transportation and/or consolidation of the points of access to routes and determining heads of bridge towards new areas, in a region marked of deep reclaiming mutations. The new regional geopolitical context entails necessarily the reorganization of control instruments of critical infrastructures, as much as it is expected that the origin and complexity of threats and risk of military, social, economic and cultural nature, as well as those terrorist to the address of security determine essential transformations. The fast technological progress that we have felt acutely in the last decades brings new challenges and opportunities for specialized industry in Romania that has performed, for the first time countrywide, an advanced mobile integrated surveillance system for the efficiency of control of its critical infrastructures.*

Keywords: *routes of transport, points of access, crisis effects, critical infrastructure, mobile integrated surveillance system.*

Introduction

A huge pressure comes today from eastern over the space that represented for many decades the conflict and geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic stake of great empires which, in time, due to the extension or reduction of any of them, they contested and conquered these wide territories between Baltic Sea and Black Sea.

The Black Sea appears on the map of the world as a lake, being connected to the planetary ocean by the two straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelle, a continental sea which, together with the outfalls of Danube represented that area claimed for more than three millennia as “mare nostrum” by Helens, Romans, Byzantines, Genovese, Ottomans and Russians, being called over the time “Byzantine lake”, or “Ottoman lake”, or “Russian lake”.

The Danube, the second as size in Europe, is currently an economic axis of European integration incompletely activated and which has the potential to become in the future the axis of euro Asiatic integration, if we think in terms of globalization.

”Black Sea – states the author Gh. DRAGOMIR – is at the confluence of Europe and Asia; of two religions: Christians and Islam; of three families of people: Indo-European,

Ural-Altai and Caucasian, determining the geopolitical importance of it and the influence over the strategies of great global and regional powers, in the last two decades.”¹.

Area of confluence, as well as barrier between civilizations, this inseparable whole constituted by the Black Sea and the basins of all rivers discharging therein represent, sine qua non, one of global political centers which concern with interest this ” *strategic hall*”, marked today by several areas of conflict.

We assert at the beginning of these lines that a great pressure is felt from east. Also, another high pressure is opposed to it from western and Romania is today, again after only few decades, in a focal with high temperature, a focal which may have negative significantly consequences on its development, in the absence of some major decisions related to security and defense.

1. Nature of new risks and threats at the address of Romania security in the current regional geopolitical context

1.1. Considerations on current regional geopolitical context

As its neighbor status at the Black Sea, Romania cohabits in this region with Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia (with its separatist pro-Russian region Abkhazia), Russia (de facto occupant of much craved peninsula Crimea), Ukraine with its ”territories temporarily under occupation”² and Moldova Republic on whose territory the seeds of conflict are frozen for more than two decades (Transnistria, Gagauzia). In extenso, considering the natural connection of two large rivers, Danube and Dnepr, connects to the Black Sea, we may imagine the access to this area of: Germany, Czech, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Serbia, Belarus, as well as of the other Caucasian countries.




Figure no.1 provides a representation of the current regional conflict situation and suggests pertinent answers to the questions: when this fire roll is going to stop, which are the forces that may oppose to the occupation by Russia of Baltic – Black Sea corridor and which are their strategic interests, which are the consequences of generalization of this conflict over the security of Romania?

The past centuries were marked, geopolitically, geo-strategically and geo-economically, by disputes and conflicts between Russia and Europe, without eluding in any way the other interests to Black Sea. The XXI century brings on the stage of interests at the Black Sea another global player, the United States of America, valuing its own ”sketch” superposing to the interests of European allies and contravening the interests of Russia, its strategic adversary for over 50 years.

Currently, Romania has elected its historical track and of adhesion to occidental values, upon the integration to NATO and subsequently to EU, building its own track relying

¹ DRAGOMIR, Gheorghe, *Romania between the American anti-missile shield and Russian Katiuša– Time and destiny*, România în Lume Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 206.

² Agency AGERPRESS, <http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2015/03/17/parlamentul-ucrainean-declara-donetsk-si-lugansk-teritorii-aflate-temporar-sub-ocupatie--18-58-11>, access at March 17th, 2015.

on the principles, norms and rules encountered already formulated and which, sometimes with painful efforts, it implements in its own society.

With respect to this track, the Russian geo-politician A.G. DUGHIN asserts: "*Romania has on its hand two geopolitical options: being one of the countries of "New Europe", country with old European identity, may decide for the continentalism, that would entail the elaboration of an amiably policy opposite to Russia, or Euro-Atlantic orientation of "sanitary corridor" conceived by England in the XX century to prevent a possible Russia-Germany alliance and currently developed by USA which means not only directing anti-Russia, but also a discrepancy opposite to continental geopolitics of Europe itself*"³.

For a scientific documentation, we recommend as well the opinion of the Romanian geo-politician prof. I. BĂDESCU PhD in postface to the work of A.G. DUGHIN *Fundamentals of geopolitics and geopolitical future of Russia*⁴.

In his approach to clarify Dughin's position of the two options they grant Romania, the author underlines that should be considered Mackinder's thesis that "identifies the main candidates to geopolitical competition for control of the island heartland and then covering Asia World Europe and Africa [...]. They are mainly two, Russia and Germany and it is understood that the counter they need to England, that the third candidate to geopolitical hegemony. This tool is none other than Rimland. Who controls can manage the relationship between candidates Rimland geopolitical global competition."

1.2. Particularity of risks and threats to the address of Romania security in the current regional context. Elements of impact on critical infrastructures.

*The strategy of security of Romania*⁵, as well as the *National strategy related to the protection of critical infrastructures*⁶ accurately defines both the range of vulnerabilities, risks, threats and dangers, and the nature, character and importance of critical infrastructures under their impact and thus we will himself as such.

Our work intends to reveal, briefly, their particularities, in relation to our preoccupations and with the technical and technological support that we, as private company, may provide to the institutions of Romania in the field of premature discover and prevention of some actions directed over the elements of critical infrastructure.

In the work "*Romania between the American anti-missile shield and Russian Katiușa – time and destiny*"⁷, the author observes: "*The region of Black Sea will not be avoided by risks and threats which may move from the area of classical military conflict in asymmetrical dangers and threats generated by poverty, terrorism, illegal migration, political instability, organized crime ...*". It is highly probable that this huge piston from east, as well as from Middle East, to push towards Romania a huge wave of refugees and immigrants, as well as diversionist elements camouflaged ingeniously, which, on the background of uprooting and poverty (some) or having clear objectives (others), knowingly or not, with or without the support of some local elements, may turn to a wide range of asymmetric actions, with a major impact on critical infrastructures from the theft of copper cable of an electrified railway for

³ DUGHIN, A. Ghelievici, *Foundations of Geopolitics and Russia's geopolitical future*, eurasitica.ro Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 23.

⁴ BĂDESCU, Ilie, Postface to *Foundations of Geopolitics and Russia's geopolitical future*, <http://www.ziaristionline.ro/2011/01/23/exclusiv-ilie-badescu-despre-dughin-si-bazele-geopolitice-cea-mai-importanta-analiza-despre-rusia-din-ultimii-20-de-ani/>, access at March 20th, 2015.

⁵ ***, *Security strategy of Romania*, <http://presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf>, p. 15, access at March 20th, 2015.

⁶ ***, *National strategy for critical infrastructures protection*, Official Monitor Publishing House nr.555 from 04.08.2011, pp. 9-14.

⁷ DRAGOMIR, Gheorghe, *Romania between the American anti-missile shield and Russian Katiușa– Time and destiny*, România în Lume Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 214.

selling it and procurement of food, up to sabotage/blocking actions of some ways/nodes of communication of any kind.

Turning to the theses formulated in the work „*Critical infrastructures. Dangers, threats on their address. Systems of protection.*”⁸, we may assert that „*critical infrastructures do not represent an actual fact, they become critical only when relevant for society*”, are vulnerable and subject to risks and threats and must be protected. “*They present a certain dynamic; some may become critical, others, once secured, may get out of this category.*” And thus „*the responsibility of identification, evaluation, protection and security of critical infrastructures, under the conditions of increase of interdependences, accentuation of vulnerabilities and proliferation of threats at their address, acquire international valences and values, becoming a vital issue for good functioning of society.*”

2. Place and role of specialized industry in Romania in order to provide the required "tools" for the protection of critical infrastructures

The year 1989 marks the beginning of a new era in the development of Romania and the past order bequests a strong industry of defense (among the first in the world on such date, considering the "turnover"), however technologically tributary to another century. The inheritance received addresses mainly to the war in space and time, without links to the future, a war of military blocks, a war where predominate analogical technology and human factor.

The first signs of a new digital technology change completely the surrounding world in a very short time and the Romanian state industry of defense, loose the start of renewal, and the open competition on a global market makes that a range of facilities, famous in the past, to reduce the production or even to be closed.

2.1. Romanian private investments in research – development of the elements of the critical infrastructures control and protection system

It shall be noticed the fact that the research activity, the knowledge and results gained by the researchers and engineers who used to work in the defense industry before 1989, have started to provide results upon the initiative of some of them who understood immediately the technological and economic deep change and took the decision to invest, with precaution, as well as decisively, in order to create a new industry, not in competition, but in complementarity to traditional industry.

Most of the time, the lack of information, political and economic instability, errors of privatization processes of big infrastructures, mistrust of Romanian authorities in inland products linked with external procurements, most of the times without maintenance contracts, the inter-institutional communication gaps, the defaults of governmental strategies directed towards real solutions in the future (plans, "master-plans" or "driving logbooks"), as well as the inherent difficulties of a new cognitive, economic, logistic, financial beginning, as well as in relational plan with the potential suppliers and clients, have represented and still represent few of major challenges of entrepreneurs who invest in this new industry in Romania.

We notice that private industry has started to generate results and regardless the nature of risks and threats to the address of security of critical infrastructures of Romania, the private industry may provide solutions both for defense needs, and for security in general.

In our opinion, the highest benefits that this industry brings to the security environment are its huge potential of fast adjustment both to technological progress, and challenges of a market that generates permanently new products and systems, as well as its capacity to

⁸ Dr. ALEXANDRESCU, Grigore, Dr. VĂDUVA, Gheorghe, *Critical infrastructures. Dangers, threats to their address. Systems of protection*, Publishing House of National University of Defence „Carol I”, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 17-18.

generate solutions for the future, concomitantly to proper infusion of capital. These aspects should be reevaluated by national authorities.

2.2. Considerations related to Romanian intellectual property over the systems of protection of critical infrastructure

The new challenges to the address of critical infrastructure security determine the authorities in charge to designate new technical solutions and to elaborate new plans of endowing with products, equipment and technologically advanced systems, able to provide premature surveillance of infrastructure elements subject to risks.

Indubitably, the global market may provide a wide spectrum of equipment and systems that may cover the most advanced needs of society on the globe, however we may notice that the one holding technology and software, holds as well the control of this system, and probably, the most significant control is over the software that integrates a wide range of equipment and subsystems, analyses and processing the dates and provides information and solutions to the decision makers.

The external solutions are usually "closed" solutions that, usually, do not allow modifications or regardless the modifications made, the costs usually exceed the value of product and are not to be neglected the exorbitant costs of maintenance of such systems.

The specialized Romanian industry could represent a winning alternative in this competition of perfecting the capacities of protection of critical infrastructures relying on the premises of intellectual property over technology and software which allow you anytime to repair, to modernize, to adjust or to perfect your own systems, in a mutually advantageous collaboration between the supplier and the beneficiary of solutions.

3. Mobile Integrated Surveillance System (SIMS) – contribution of Romanian industry to the efficiency of control and protection of critical infrastructures

The Romanian specialized industry, part of national industry of security and defense, operates with the same terms when it comes to the new challenges of security environment, revealed by academic, scientific and institutional environments in Romania, European Union or on global level and reacts in consequence, providing investigation and development of those instruments necessities to the authorities to secure the elements of critical infrastructure or reduce their vulnerabilities.

Such demarche undertaken in Romania is performed for the first time on Mobile Integrated Surveillance System – SIMS, a pilot project for Romania, elaborated by a Romanian company through a co-financed program of the European funds. This system could represent an indispensable component of the national system of protection of critical infrastructures in Romania.

3.1. Overall presentation

The project „*Mobile Integrated Surveillance System – SIMS*” is performed within the Operational Sectorial Program of Increase of Economic Competitiveness ”Investments for your future”, co-financed by the European Fund of Regional Development, priority axis 2 ”Competitiveness for research, technological development and innovation”, Operation 2.3.3 ”Promoting innovation in enterprises”.

SIMS integrates on a mobile platform a wide range of sensors which allow the detection of intrusions on a radius up to 10.000 m around it.

The mobile platform of sensors includes two vital components, as follows:

a. Terrestrial component, constituted on a mobile chassis, where are encountered the sensors for terrestrial surveillance, as well as the equipment of command-control;

b. Air component, constituted of sensors for air surveillance, installed on an air platform type drone (UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle).

The terrestrial system is located on and inside a container which may be located on a trail and carried to the work point. For the increase of the radius of action, the main sensors are mounted on a telescopic mast with electric driving which elevates up to the height of 6m: field radar with electronic scanning and pan tilt platform with two side arms on that are mounted two sensors blocks. One of the blocks integrates an advanced thermal camera and a CCD (Charge-Coupled Device) camera, and the other block integrates an EM CCD (Electron Multiplaying CCD) camera and a laser telemeter. The pan tilt platform provides the movement of the two sensors blocks on horizontal 360° continuously and vertically from -60° to + 60°. The field radar performs its scanning of 90°.



Figure no. 2, Mobile integrated surveillance system – project phase

The operation of the system is provided by a team formed of two individuals with ergonomic job positions, endowed with several displays on which appear both the images taken over by cameras, and the digital map of the area of surveillance, on which appear all targets supervised by SIMS.

The supply with electric power of the system is provided by an electric generator group and a photovoltaic system of solar boards providing functioning autonomy of minimum 4 days.

The container has besides the work positions, facilities of rest and food for the team for long term operation.

The multirotor air platform is endowed with advanced sensors specialized for the operation in air and provides air surveillance on a radius up to 10 km opposite to the point of origin and from a height up to 5 km opposite to soil. UAV is equipped with two cameras for video surveillance, one of which high resolution CCD camera and an infrared one. The platform may be directed by remote from inside or outside the container SIMS, and the technical data of flight, as well as the video data is received, processed and displayed on the consoles of operators serving the SIMS.

3.2. Structure and the advantages of using the mobile integrated surveillance system - SIMS

SIMS has a modular structure integrating on a mobile platform formed of one container positioned on a trail a multirotor mobile platform, a wide range of sensors of different kinds as well as the newest technologies related to the technique of the systems of surveillance. In the figures 2 and 3 one presents different stages of development SIMS project, from design to final integration. An efficient system of elevation of container allows the detachment of it from the trail and the positioning of it at the work point.

SIMS integrates the following sensors and subsystems:



Figure no. 3, Mobile integrated surveillance system – assembly phase

- Field Radar with electronic scanning;
- Two sensors blocks, block of sensors BS1 and block of sensors BS2, as follows:
- BS1: integrates a thermal camera, a CCD camera and boards for image fusion and video tracking;
- BS2: integrates a day-night camera type L3 (Low Light Level), as well as a laser rangefinder;
- System of air observation based on multirotor drone;
- GPS system of positioning and digital compass;
- Scanner laser for close protection;
- Wireless geophonic sensors;
- System of acknowledgement of own staff performing in the area of surveillance;
- Pan tilt unit of locating the two sensors blocks;
- Telescopic mast with electric operation for elevation on work height of pan tilt unit with the sensors blocks and field radar;
- System of management of the power stored in the batteries of accumulators;
- Electric diesel generator and photovoltaic system for providing the operation of the system for a longer time;
- PC system with software for management of information received from sensors (terrestrial and air) and for management of GIS (Geographic Information System) application;
- Block of command and control with multifunctional joystick which with the PC system provides control and orders necessary for the operation of the entire system.

The mobile integrated system of surveillance was designed so as to solve as many problems as possible faced currently by the users of complex surveillance systems. Comparing it with the existent system, this product presents some similarities as well as new elements, such as:

- a. *Increased efficiency of surveillance activities* – integration of a range as wide as possible of sensors that mutually complete;
- b. *Mobility*, but without the limitation of a certain type of chassis (machine) – mounting on container;
- c. *High autonomy* – supply with electricity from accumulator battery, which may be charged from the network, electric generator group, generator with solar boards;
- d. *Exploitation under insulation conditions* – work and rest spaces for a team of 2-3 individuals;
- e. *Versatility* - modular structure with the possibility of waiving/adding subsystems depending on the mission to be executed;
- f. *Easiness and safety in exploitation* – software interfaces as friendly as possible, usual orders doubled on switchboard and touchscreen;
- g. *Fast repairing* – all subsystems with built-in test, repairing menus for the maintenance staff;
- h. *Moral use as low as possible* – open architecture allowing the up-grade for the main subsystems;
- i. *Universal connectivity* by providing interfaces to the systems of command-control C2I by channels of communication by satellite, radio, optical fiber etc.

3.3. Fields of application

Considering the design of the mobile integrated surveillance system of within an open architecture, able to integrate a wide range of sensors and to be reconfigured easily, the system may be used in different domains that have in common the need of gathering

information, processing, storing and retransmitting it, as well as for managing some specific activities, such as :

- a. Border security;
- b. Surveillance and protection of some big industrial objectives or of some perimeters of special importance – oil and gas pipes, high voltage lines, infrastructure of terrestrial, air, fluvial naval transport, airports, harbors, military units etc.;
- c. Surveillance and diagnosing different works of art, such as: bridges, viaducts, barrages, dams, as well as the ways of access to/from these etc.;
- d. Supervision of the activities in the areas with forest exploitations;
- e. Surveillance of natural areas of special interest, such as natural reservations;
- f. Interventions on natural calamities of high dimensions – floods, forest fires, industrial pollutions.

Conclusions

The new regional geopolitical evolutions increase and intensify the vulnerabilities, risks and dangers to which are subject the critical infrastructures from Romania, on the background of social causes (poverty, immigration, refugees) or pursuant to terrorist actions.

The need for updated information, computer analysis, real-time information processing for release to the decisions makers of the vital elements necessary for the protection of critical infrastructure, equipment requires increasingly sophisticated, able to work simultaneously in multiple areas (land, air , water), the complementary spectrum (audio, visible, infrared, etc.), mobile and / or fixed, capable of multichannel communications, able to ensure operation under all time, season and weather conditions.

The specialized private industry in Romania is constituted as a component of national industry of security and defense and provides technical solutions for protection of critical infrastructures in Romania. The Mobile Integrated Surveillance System - SIMS is the first complex product designed to protect critical infrastructure in Romania, entirely manufactured in our country, developed to ensure surveillance of critical infrastructure elements.

The key of consolidation and efficiency of protection of critical infrastructure is represented by the partnership between the governmental institutions and the private companies manufacturing specialized equipment, with a view to harmonize the demand and offer of such systems, concomitantly with a fundamental reduction of procurement costs, modernization and maintenance of technical systems.

Romanian governmental agencies can look with confidence to the results generated by the Romanian private companies and their ability to create new systems tailored to the present and future needs of their critical infrastructure protection.

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THE SOCIAL MODEL - BASIS OF ECONOMIC SECURITY

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Abstract: *Economic security as a key national security, which provides resources and dynamic balance of the other components, involves creating a social model as a link between the economy and social systems. Correspondence between needs and possibilities subordinates respect for human rights and economic development rests on social cohesion. Economic security, in essence, aims at ensuring conditions for maintaining economic activity under normal and countering various types of attacks, of which the most important are: financial fraud, strategic dependencies, cybercrime, industrial espionage, corruption and underground economy.*

The new social model of Romania should be a model of social action that contributes effectively to manage the difficult economic and social situation. The model must take into account integration policies, equal treatment, the open method of coordination, and increased financial resources.

Keywords: *economic security, social model, social security, threat, social policy*

Introduction

Economic security in our opinion should be understood as an important factor security that provides resources and dynamic balance of the other components of the system. The limited and uneven distribution of resources - be it energy resources, raw materials and food and water, seriously affecting the natural balance of the world by environmental degradation, resource development asymmetric demographic, disease, extreme poverty, lack of education and degradation its perfection, acute imbalances between the rich and poor countries on north-south axis of the planet are as many vulnerabilities, with a potentially explosive insufficiently assessed vulnerabilities that manifests itself in two ways: internally, the consequences can mark a sharp instability, and externally, export can not be stopped, but, at best, only managed. Economic dimension will be fundamental security and national interests will function as a bed of Procrustes.¹

In it,,s very generally accepted meaning of the term, and condensed or general content and more complex, the center of gravity is placed increasingly in the economic area. Economic security can be understood in the *stricto sensu* as economic foundation of military power, *largo sensu*, as a complex security dimension. Welfare is equivalent to the potential mobilization, if not in the short term, at least over the medium term. Economic security is synergistic and essential, as they gather around the same concept and integrates all other dimensions of power - human, cultural, social, informational and military - giving them the strength and consistency. Economy without anything to diminish the role of power, a

¹ Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian, Lumea 2011 Enciclopedie politică și militară (studii strategice și de securitate), Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2011, pag. 15

generator and a supporter of state power and armies, moves to a new dimension, internationalization and globalization of power sources. So far, this internationalization is discontinuous and fractal, but already looms just not reassuring reconfiguration of the new pillars and new areas of strength.

This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the economic strength of a nation is inevitably a latent threat to its opponents, and within this logic, one can consider that it is not advisable to contribute to the economic development of opponents / opponent - but rather Let them establish trade embargoes.²

The limited and uneven distribution of resources - be it energy resources, raw materials and food and water, seriously affecting the natural balance of the world by environmental degradation, resource development asymmetric demographic, disease, extreme poverty, lack of education and degradation its perfection, acute imbalances between the rich and poor countries on north-south axis of the planet are as many vulnerabilities, with a potentially explosive insufficiently assessed vulnerabilities that manifests itself in two ways: internally, the consequences can score political instability increased military and externally, export can not be stopped, but, at best, only managed.

Therefore, economic security is a key national security, which provides resources and dynamic balance of the other components of national security. As a condition of the national economy, security is the source and foundation of eradicating poverty, hunger, social and economic inequalities between individuals and between different regions of a country.

Economic security also means economic vulnerability to hazards that should not be generated by a hostile state, but that is generated by the operation of the system, not a specific malicious agent, which can lead to dilemmas of social security. International financial crisis, the international economic security deterioration can be evidenced through the social situation. Social recovery is performed slower than economic, so economic security in each country will be subject to social policies at national and international level.

1. The social model-basis of economic security

Economic security as a key national security, which provides resources and dynamic balance of the other components involves creating a social model as a link between the economy and the social. This involves systems, processes and institutions on the one hand, and on the other hand a high level of social protection, existence of social dialogue, promoting equal opportunities, education and health system performance covering the needs of the population as well as possible.

Economic Security is the result of interaction between internal and external factors which enhances production processes, distribution and consumption of goods and services produced in a national economy. Thus by creating an effective social model which involves appropriate economic policies, performance in terms of education, health and social services a state manages to reduce economic insecurity. Without a social model built to ensure economic security performance through education, proper health and equal opportunity, there can hardly exists constructive and continuous involvement of citizens in community governance.

The *social model* covers the following main objectives:

- protecting individuals and groups of economic and social risks of life and changes in society,
- ensuring an adequate income and conditions to live in human dignity and the most possible participation in society,

² MØLLER, Bjørn, „The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction”, in: Sava, Ionel Nicu, *Teoria și practica securității*, p. 80.

- to combat discrimination and to create equal opportunities for all, avoid marginalization and to integrate the socially excluded, to destroy the vicious circle of poverty transfer from one generation to another,
- diminish to some extent extreme gaps in the distribution of wealth in society.

It reflects past history, culture and traditions of the country and provides specific nation-state legitimacy, playing an important role in this. It also involves basic belief that fundamental social rights policy is a major prerequisite for functional participatory democracy, while a system is indispensable for modern and effective social protection.

Analysis of current social systems, based on future requirements at European, national, regional and local level for each domain that belongs to the social model and the non-state actors play an important role in achieving economic security at every level mentioned.

Because of the low level of trust in state institutions, recent economic convulsions caused by the current global crisis, central and local government inefficiency, poor state of education, health, social security requires radical measures to ensure economic security and remove the highlighted need for a social model for Romania, which starts from the socio-economic realities of the state.

The link between economics and social systems through socially responsible market economy, tries to combine competition with solidarity and social justice and aims to economic growth and strengthening social cohesion. This model combines the different roles of the main actors in European society - the state at various levels, market economy and civil society: state alone has the capacity to guarantee fundamental rights to its citizens, to protect the general interest, to create an environment cohesion social rules and social systems; economy is an efficient and effective provider of services for people in a free market; civil society is called upon to represent the voice of the people needs to be their advocate.

The social model will facilitate the transition to the knowledge society. Investing in the human resources to improve knowledge and skills, creating opportunities for continuing training, ensuring their full participation, increasing the adaptability of workers and increase the sustainability of social protection are ways designed to reduce economic insecurity and beneficial effects in terms of national security.

2. The need of a Romanian social model

The development of Romania in the European context requires compatibility with EU strategies and policies and the adoption of principles, guidelines and Community rules as a necessary for integration to the single market. At the same time, global perspective on development in a globalized environment requires Romania to look to the next step and expand the reference system by developed countries of the world and rallying to the strategies, policies and procedures consistent with national ambitions and opportunities.

Romania, along with other Central and Southeastern Europe, former Eastern Bloc countries, are distinguished from other European countries by several features³:

- return to the social security system founded by Bismarck - a common element of the welfare state (welfare state) market economy;
- full access to old-age pension, sickness, invalidity benefits;
- radical social reforms in order to increase individual initiative, effective management, including benefiting from the advice and expertise of external experts and organizations;

³ Golinowska Stanisława - „The national model of the welfare state in Poland. Tradition and changes”, in *Diversity and Commonality in European Social Policies: The Forging of a European Social Model*, Warsaw, 2009;

- big labor market problems resulting from the restructuring of the economy in the context of globalization and fears of rising unemployment;
- population migration often in search of better paid jobs. The newer EU countries are primarily responsible for the migration;
- aspirations of the young generation, have a high level of education, higher than in the old European countries;
- demographic movement accelerated in comparison with other European countries;
- NGOs with little influence;
- corruption;
- efforts to reduce poverty and social exclusion on solving problems.

These countries need to make considerable efforts to achieve economic convergence and social cohesion and structural funds can contribute to the development of human and physical capital. They can opt for their own decisions in accordance with its own advantages and limitations in the field - *"the challenge is to apply the principles of the European social model to their own economic, institutional and social"*.⁴ Given the fact that integration is a process that takes place in social structures, good governance is necessary, because this social process is accompanied by appropriate policies from public authorities. Within competencies in the various Member States, local and regional authorities have political, regulatory and financial must use the appropriate social policies.

Developing social model in Romania⁵ involves shifting the focus and the process of social integration that takes place at various levels of social life: family, organizations (work, school, institutions, clubs and sports associations, the structures of the armed forces), society as a whole, with reference to the values of our identity, culture and national and European security.

The Romanian social model is characterized as a mixed social model with common characteristics with both Mediterranean social model-where the importance of the family in society and by the large share of agriculture in the economy and the social democratic model in terms of coverage of different social needs. Due to the weak capacity of the state to fund social programs, a series of reforms in key areas such as health and education have been postponed, and when they started, however, could not be completed. This led to social unrest, several social categories initiating protests against these changes. Building a Romanian social model compatible with social models in the EU and convergent principles and guidelines of the new European social model (currently in the process of reformation / reconstruction) is becoming a necessity for Romania because of the following reasons:

- contribute to greater economic security and achieving the objectives that are based on fundamental values such as greater internal market, opportunities for growth, investment and increased profits, all leading towards ensuring individual economic security
- Develop mechanisms to respond to the challenges of globalization of markets, capital mobility (including human) - associating social mobility solutions such relocation activities, outsourcing ;.
- operationalization of appropriate instruments of national management of global issues, primarily social ones generated by demographic aging of the population, especially the population of developed countries of Europe - the dissolution of the labor market, labor migration - major-correlation between demand and supply trades, professions and qualifications marginal segments of the labor market (skilled and unskilled workforce high), etc. As such, building

⁴ Karppinen, J. Social policy- a toole for productivity and competitiveness, , director's diary, communiqué, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and working conditions, issue 9, October 2006

⁵ Cătălin Zamfir, Laura Stoica - *O nouă provocare: dezvoltarea socială*, Ed. Polirom, 2006;p. 23.

legal and institutional system components Social Model (SM) should be associated with operational implementation mechanisms consistent with good management and financial sustainability.

The overall objective of Romanian social model should be, in our opinion, to create a system of articulated and efficient policies for social inclusion and social protection active minimal social support system (compulsory education, health care package, special services risk individuals etc.), developing social responsibility and involvement of civil society in developing a *culture* of social behavior.

Along with the overall goal, building a social model in our country requires specific objectives such as:

- approach attitude and responsibility of the role, place and nature of social policies in Romania;
- providing a solid foundation for national programs aimed at strengthening coherence or interacting with social sector;
- outlining some common strands of the main social actors, acting as a collective agent of changing. It is necessary to strengthen social cohesion by ensuring and guaranteeing universal access to a minimum package of services and income and to consider transparency, high quality safety and security services to consumers.

The main risks⁶ to be avoided refer to:

- financial instability shocks or financial viability of models created to withstand shocks such as aging, the slowdown in labor productivity growth, macroeconomic fluctuations. This kind of "turbulence" are usually impossible promotion / development in the promised social services, in particular social assistance, non-contributory;
- misconduct and adverse effects on measures of social reform model components. In this regard, it is noted that the inconsistency social reforms and poor service quality has led the development of behaviors of "adaptation" to avoid participation in social security systems (evasion, unregistered economy, processes substitution of inputs etc.). Lack of necessary connections and correlations between economic and social can lead to "conflict" between the social and the efficient allocation of resources and the use of inputs (including labor) to a high capacity;
- lack / poor flexibility of model components present and future social change (such as increasing participation of women in the labor market, unemployment, raising the average level of education of the population, increased international economic integration), with important consequences for the organization of social services. Experience of European countries in managing these risks promotes the idea that "there are significant needs and opportunities to improve the performance of various European social models - in terms of employment, benefits and social services programs. The question is whether politicians are willing and want to capitalize on opportunities, which often involve both courage and skill in building coalitions."⁷ Social security⁸ aims to reduce economic uncertainty, risks and vulnerabilities,

⁶ Assar Lindbeck, Improving the performance of the European Social Model – the welfare state over the cycle, seminar paper no 717, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, febr 2003,

⁷ Lindbeck, A, 2003

⁸ Beasley, Timothy, Robin Burgess și Imran Rasul definesc „safety nets” (rețelele de securitate) ca „intervenții publice ce sunt destinate să îndeplinească două funcții cheie: să joace un rol redistributiv transferând resursele către membrii mai săraci ai societății pentru a-i scoate din sărăcie, să furnizeze oportunități sporite pentru indivizi, pentru a îndepărta și micșora riscurile unor evenimente neprevăzute.” Această definiție include asistența și asigurările sociale, ca și o gamă de servicii sociale. „Benchmarking Government Provision of Social Safety Nets,” London School of Economics, Department of Economics, London, 2001.

particularly those that exceed certain limits, normal market economy and providing appropriate treatment - services and material aid to those in need.

The major challenge in reforming the system, congruent with the human rights agenda, is the relevance of the company's response to growing social problems and their integration. The foundation of a social security network performance must be firmly established in many directions and from this perspective the realization of a social model, in our opinion implies:

- *economic and social plan* - flexible functioning of the labor market, reducing segmentation, creating and strengthening social dialogue institutions, promoting participatory management and entrepreneurial attitude towards their individual work capacity, development of a modern and efficient service flexible and tailored regional / local tools to support the development of active protection, community involvement and social development of a culture, partnership and volunteering.
- *education plan* - turning lifelong learning into a way of life, culture change, a new culture of social behavior and not least, a significant financial effort from interested parties;
- *health* - development of preventive measures, broadening access to general and specific risk groups, upgrading infrastructure and improving quality of care, promoting mixed forms of insurance and partnership in the provision of health services

You should also aim to promote a gradual guaranteed package more developed - services and material support - responding to various social needs; proximity services need to facilitate access and prevent their exclusion. Another direction refers to the cooperation of individuals and civil society organizations and public and private institutions, including religious ones.

Sustainability, funding and governance of the system are also a key element of the Romanian social model. Romania, can not afford waste, consequently efficiency of any policy options should be a criterion.

The advantage of Romanian social reforms in relation to western countries, is the experience gained during the democracy and market economy, coupled with efforts to adapt to European requirements. It is generally recognized that greater economic openness drives the innovation and productivity growth that in turn help create jobs and prosperity on which well-being and ultimately a better quality of life. Dialogue is the driving force that ensures the success of economic and social reforms. Negotiations between the social partners are the best way to develop positively on issues related to the modernization and change management. In addition, the European trend for stronger coordination and unity of the modeled values and freedoms, focusing on a socially cohesive society, responsible and fair⁹.

Another argument justifying the need to modernize the social model of our country is the social dimension of globalization. Amid a global market, the system interacts with the social economy. The increasingly social influence of economic growth, competitiveness and resilience of the economy both on a European and global level.

Socio-demographic and economic developments indicate the need to increase the amount of the sums necessary for the implementation of social policies in the long term. Also there is a need to reword "basic coordinates of the Romanian social system and social protection system."¹⁰ In the first phase our country needs to modernize the social security system,

⁹ Comisia Europeană – *Consultare privind viitoarea strategie „UE 2020”*, noiembrie 2009, pp. 2-4.

¹⁰ *Institutul European din România*, ” Studiul nr. 4 - MODELUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN – IMPLICAȚII PENTRU ROMÂNIA”, 2006, p. 34.

education system and health system to cope with the evolution of society in the post-accession to the European Union.

Romanian social model must reward work and protect vulnerable social groups. We identify the main lines of action to increase the efficiency of social programs in our country ¹¹:

- eliminate fragmentation of social programs - often for solving the same problem deals with several institutions, their powers interfering with no coordination between institutions;
- coverage by the social system of those types of social problems ignored or not covered so far;
- developing a long-term plan regarding social protection, which would allow better management of financial resources and training professionals to implement it;
- development of minimum quality standards;
- monitoring and evaluation of service quality;
- creating an accountability framework specialists where quality standards are not violated. At the same time needs pragmatism and flexibility. Cooperation between social parties should be constructive and to increase economic competitiveness and labor productivity. The budget allocated to social policies must take into account the possibilities of the national economy, but must achieve the main goal, helping the disadvantaged population groups with high social efficiency.

The social model through its specific costs - insurance, contributions, fees, and by the impact of labor, health and education on human resources development, growing stronger influence growth and its chances, especially competitiveness and resilience of the economy to the demands of globalization. The social model challenges Romanias problems due to the backwardness of social reforms in relation to the economy.

Good governance of social systems, sustainability, financing, efficiency stakeholders are essential factors of a modern social model that Romania as a EU member state with low economic development must take into account. The new social model in Romania must be a model of social action that contributes effectively to cope with difficult economic and social situation. The model must take into account integration policies, equal treatment, the open method of coordination, and increased financial resources. The combination of economic dynamism with social justice will consistencies new Romanian social model.

Optimism on the success evidenced by the desire to flex institutions, key structures in constant motion, open to change.

Conclusions:

Area of confluence between economic and social dimension will occupy a central place in the next decade. The future benefits of the knowledge economy will depend directly on employment, entrepreneurial culture and innovation capacity. Flexicurity is the concept that will dominate the instrument that can adequately respond to the challenges posed by filling jobs.

Delayed reforms in education, inadequate correlation between the world of work and lifelong learning, anticipatory weak character of the educational offer, are just some of the obstacles that restrict individual performance in working life, generates tensions on the labor market, increase the demand for social services and duration dependence system (long-term

¹¹ *Idem*, p. 35.

unemployment, discouragement, poverty) can also cause social exclusion and migration phenomena.

The economic security of Romania is influenced by the pressure resulting from an aging population, exacerbated by negative incentives in the public sector, thus threatening the financial pressure on social security budgets. The political pressures affect the economic security of the country, so due to the pressure of this kind, pension cuts and aid was not explicitly. In this context have been used inflation, income support, began a slow process of increasing the retirement age, have tightened eligibility for certain benefits.

The social model will facilitate the transition to the knowledge society and the changes it will make human resources to be the center of government policies. Investing in these resources to improve their knowledge and skills, creating opportunities for continuing training, ensuring their full participation, increasing adaptability of workers and increase the sustainability of social protection are ways designed to implement the European concept of public services and to allow full employment labor

Development of Romania in the European context requires compatibility with all union strategies and policies and the adoption of principles, guidelines and Community rules as a necessary, but insufficient for integration to the single market. At the same time, global perspective on development in a globalized environment requires Romania to look to the next step and expand the reference system by developed countries of the world and rallying to the strategies, policies and procedures consistent with national ambitions and opportunities .

The European social model, should become an example to follow, and the adoption of minimum standards to be socially viable not only economically but also comparable to existing industrial relations and public institutions of social protection capabilities.

Although the centenary of the European welfare state model based on the spirit of solidarity begins to lose power before the American model of society - "every man for himself" - with neoliberal supporters in Europe, the European idea of the welfare state remain valid. The state remains the guarantor combating extreme poverty, socio-economic security for all citizens, reduce inequalities of income and approximately equal access to social services of high quality and public health infrastructure.

The economic dimension of security stems from the fact that without a modern and powerful, and there can be no real security, prosperity and stability. Often the insistence of the ways suggested or required more or less direct output of Keynesianism (elimination of all forms of state intervention in the economy) is not related to natural tendencies to boost the economy, to implement methods modern and efficient growth through rapid adaptation to the actual economic situation and concrete, but something more subtle expression of economic warfare. The fall of the national economy has very serious effects on all levels, from the individual and family economic security and continuing to decrease its economic security of the state, the action potential and reaction in case of conflict, and vulnerabilities gain political, economic , military and social state. A strong state is economically stable if allows political and strategic initiatives.

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DEMOGRAPHY – FROM FACTOR OF GEOPOLITICAL POWER TO VULNERABILITY FOR ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Throughout the history of the Romanian people, demography has been one of the most important factors of power, capable to support its major geopolitical objectives, such as the survival as a nation within a space placed at the crossroads of cultures and geopolitical interests and the forming of an unitary Romanian state. The present research aims to bring into attention the most important demographic aspects at geopolitical level in their historical evolution, but also in their actual and probable future evolution, with the goal of highlighting the two valences of demography as a power factor: the valence of natural power potential of demography (as a result of population's natural evolution) and the valence of demography's intervention generated power potential (by means of well defined population policies, colonization, genocide, etc.). Another important objective of the present paper is highlighting the high importance demographic evolutions have to our country, thus underlining the seriousness of the actual vulnerabilities from this perspective.*

Keywords: *demographic evolutions, ethnic structures, colonization, migration, genocide, population policies, power, vulnerability.*

Introduction

Demography is a power factor which might turn either to a power potential or to a vulnerability in the equation of geopolitical power, depending on its evolution.¹

For the actual case of Romania, demography has represented one of the essential factors for the nation's existence and survival within this space since the oldest days. On the other side, throughout history, in the attempt to exert geopolitical power over it, there have been invasions of nomad populations, but also actions and attempts of colonization on its territory. Nevertheless, the demographic evolution of the autochthonous element allowed its further existence within this space and later the formation of an own national state. This is the reason why, for the Romanians, an "obsession for population" (as Paul Dobrescu calls it) has existed.

The more recent history clearly demonstrates how much importance has been accorded to this power factor: artificial interventions in order to shape this factor for the communist ideology geopolitics, starting with the roots of Communism, which based its constitution upon the genocide of certain population categories for the goal of creating the desired "new man" and later in its period of glory giving a high importance to population as a resource of the country, by means of its fundamentally pro-natality policies.

History demonstrates that within this space, demography has distinguished itself as a power factor especially by means of its natural evolutions, but also as an exploited power factor by means of interventions either by other geopolitical entities (as is especially the case of colonization of this territory) or by the Romanian state, especially during the Communist regime, through pro-natality policies.

Reaching the present days, given the fact that Romania's development evolution after 1989 has been quite tortuous, especially from the socio-economic perspective and that the state

has stopped to offer a frame of support for policies of positive demographic development, we may observe that our country is facing some vulnerabilities from this perspective.

The transformation of demography from power factor to vulnerability through history, from the ancient times until nowadays (and advancing further with the most probable trends), is the key subject of the following analysis. This will be structured taking into consideration the most important historical periods for the typology of the demography-geopolitics nexus.

1. The demographic power factor in the Romanian space, from the most ancient times until the desideratum of National Unity.

In a complex study over the Romanian geopolitics, with a predominant geographical and historical approach, Vasile Cucu asserted that „we are the oldest people of Europe, in the entire space defined today in geopolitics as the central south-eastern Europe”, motivating that our present neighbors „entered in this area 6-10 centuries later than the date of the Dacic kingdom affirmation.”¹ On the other hand, one can consider that the survival as a people represents the „Romanian miracle”, taking into account its rich history in events that not only could have changed the ethnical composition of the space occupation, but that could have even endangered its existence as a people.

One of the most important geopolitical actions for power in this space was displayed by the Roman empire. What is interesting at demographic level is the fact that romanisation is maybe the oldest far-reaching pattern, within this space, which used specific policies in order to maximize the potential of the demographic power factor with a clear geopolitical goal.. Here we refer at the colonization policies. These along with the administrative ones and taking into consideration the superiority of the roman culture, have modified irreversible „the nature of the ancient Dacia”.² In a previous research, we remarked that no other future attempt of this kind, referring strictly at colonizations, would have the effects that romanisation has had as a molding force of the autochthonous people.³

Regarding the Roman colonization, the historian Ioan-Aurel Pop asserts: “The Roman authorities have carried on, in Dacia, a massive and organized colonization, «from all the Roman world», for populating cities, tilling the land, or for extracting the ores ... It can be said that Dacia’s romanization has been realized mainly by the simple colonization, by the mass of Lateen language speakers, brought and came by their own will from the entire Roman Empire.”⁴

But this romanization reveals us another aspect. Besides its impact at population level and its valence of geopolitical power factor exercised by the Roman Empire, it had a nature that today can emphasize the strength of the people it came in contact with. This strength is based also on the quantitative aspect of population, without which it would have been impossible, basically acting as a natural power factor for the indigenous people (Thracian-Geto-Dacians⁵). This fact emerges very clear from the assertion of V. Cucu: “the Roman expansion, the Daco-Roman cohabitation, with its multiple forms, demonstrates the fact that Geto-Dacian people and in general the Thracians from the left side of the Danube did not disappeared with the abolition of the state and Decebal’s disappearance, in the 106 d. AD. The following centuries attest an active process of ethnogenesis of the Romanians ... The Roman grafting did not decimate the ancient substratum, which has lasted both after the colonization of Dacia and also after Aurelian.”⁶

¹Vasile CUCU, *Fragmente din Geopolitica României*, Transversal Printing House, Trgovishte, 2007, p. 21.

² Ioan-Aurel POP, *Istoria românilor*, Litera Printing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 30.

³ Communication entitled „Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitica Românească” and presented within The Nationa Contest for Scientific Communications – with international participation- "Ștefan Procopiu" , 2014 April, Section - Science.

⁴ Ioan-Aurel POP, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁵ Idem, p.43.

⁶ Vasile CUCU, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

Immediately after the Aurelian withdrawal (271 d. AD.), history provides us a long period in which again for the autochthonous population (now the Daco-Romans) the demographic power factor plays a crucial role in the survival of the people. This is because “the Aurelian withdrawal has left an open way for the most cruel Asian invasions and incursions of other European people. ...In the period after the great migrations, the Romanian ethnic hearth is subjected to the most terrible pressures.”⁷ Therefore, the age of migrations, begins after the Aurelian withdrawal and it is defined by the Gothic invasion (the end of 3rd century, in the north of Danube), Hun invasion (the year 376, in the north of Danube), Gepidae invasion (the 4th – 5th centuries, in south, the space between Tisa, Mureş and Apuseni Mountains; they were fully assimilated at the end of the 8th century by the Romanian population), Avar invasion (8th-9th centuries, in the south of Danube⁸), Bulgarian invasion (engaged by the migration of Avars), Slavic invasion (6th century; in the South of Danube; their assimilation at north of Danube is due to the superiority of the Romanian civilisation, but also to the "compact and dense" Romanian population), Hungarian migration (9th and 11th-12th centuries), Pechenegs invasion (the campaigns from 1027, 1032, 1036, disappearing in 1046), Uzis invasion (1064-1065, in the Wallachian Plain and Dobrogea), Cuman invasion (the 12th century at the east and south of Carpathians; “cultural and ethnic” assimilated by the Romanian population), Mongol or Tatar invasion (1241-1242).⁹ Nevertheless, the autochthonous element has resisted to the pressures, Simion Mehedinți asserting: “in Dacia was the dawn of history for many tribes: the Carps, the Carpodacians, etc. Over them came all sorts of intruders from the sunrise (the Scythians) and sunset (Celts) and from the north: the Bastarns, the Goths, the Gepids, etc., but all the intruders perished without a trace. The Dacic stem and the Roman graft have remained unshakeable.”¹⁰

From all this, perhaps the most important one, with marks even today, is undoubtedly the hungarofila migration. The infiltration is achieved in stages until 1077-1095.¹¹ Vasile Cucu considers that in the 10th century, due to this migration, “Romanian ethnic hearth is subject to the most dramatically trials”¹² which it manages to resist. Here there are two relevant aspects regarding the demographic power factor: its valence for the Hungarian population as a power factor to fulfill the geopolitical goal of conquering Transylvania and its valence for the Romanian population as a factor to fulfill the geopolitical objective of survival as a people. Regarding the first valence, Ioan-Aurel Pop provides us some essential demographic data by asserting: “The demographic Hungarian reservoir was however reduced even in the Pannonian Basin. All the migratory Hungarians, that came in 896, did not exceed apparently 120.000-150.000 people, and the territory where they wanted to dominate was too large, about 300.000 Km². In order to fill this gap, to have loyal workforce and subjects, which to be grateful and to provide their support in ruling the conquered populations and in exploiting the respective countries, the Hungarian kings have colonized foreign groups almost in all kingdom.” While the conquered, by the nature of situation, were hostile to the conquerors, the colonized ones had to be and were faithful to their benefactors, namely to the Hungarian kings.”¹³ Therefore Transylvanian Saxons (sași) and Székelys (secui) were colonized in Transylvania, thus endeavouring a colonization of Teutonic Knights in Burzenland (Țara Bârsei), the latter failing because of conflicts in which they entered

⁷ *Idem*, pp. 37; 39.

⁸ *Idem*, p. 40.

⁹ Vasile SIMILEANU, Radu SĂGEATĂ, *Geopolitica României*, Top Forum Printing House, Bucharest, 2009, pp. 28-29.

¹⁰ Simion MEHEDINIȚI, *Antropogeografia pentru clasa a VI-a secundară: Cap II Etnografia și geografia politică*, 5th Edition, Terra Printing House, Focsani, 2007, p. 283-284; data utilized also in a previous study entitled „Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitica Românească”.

¹¹ Vasile CUCU, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

¹² *Idem*, p. 42.

¹³ Ioan-Aurel POP, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

with the Hungarian ruler who brought them.¹⁴ Vasile Cucu names these colonizations as occurring in Transylvania with Saxons and Székelys as massive, stressing that, ‘the last called still under King Geza II, 1141-1161 ... were entrusted with the defence of the eastern and southern borders.’¹⁵ As concerns the space in question, in another paper Ioan-Aurel Pop asserts that around the year 900 ‘‘ Hungarians conquerors from the region of «dismounting» or of «country occupying» could have been almost 200.000 and the pre-existing populations about 400.000.’’¹⁶ This helps supporting the second valence, to this argument being added the observation of Simion Mehedinți regarding the reason of pre-existing population survival: ‘‘first of all the cause was the large number of inhabitants, then, their bound to the land, language and their flair – superior to the to the invaders one.’’¹⁷ Therefore demography was an essential factor for the presence of the Hungarian population and its geopolitical actions, but on the other hand was one of the most important power factors responsible for the resistance of the Romanians in this space.

In what concerns the situation from the medieval period, Vasile Simileanu and Radu Săgeată estimated that the population of Moldavia was around 800,000 inhabitants, Muntenia’s around one million, at the horizon of 1562. For the 16th century, Transylvania together with Banat and the Partium counties accounted for around 1.800.000 inhabitants, with 500.000-600.000 only in Transylvania.¹⁸ They argue that from the perspective of the ethnical structure ‘‘the majority of the inhabitants from the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space’’ had Romanian origin, and that ‘‘Romanian ethnic compact mass over the whole forefathers land was an essential factor of the historical evolution in this fidget period, making possible, along with other factors, the Unification performed by Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazu).’’ Hence, the first foreshadowing of the second geopolitical objective, the one of unification, had a great support in the demographic Romanian power factor. Regarding the situation in Transylvania, that even nowadays makes the subject and object of at least political disputes, the autochthonous demographic factor served as a power factor for our people taking into consideration that ‘‘in Transylvania have been continuing to cohabit with Romanians, which have always been a majority, the Hungarians, the Transylvanian Saxons and the Székelys,’’¹⁹ so Romanians being the majority, as argued.

Overall, as S. Mehedinți remarks, ‘‘population has registered increases and decreases, along history.’’²⁰ However, at a general level, we can assert that it had an increasing evolution in its temporal dynamics, if we add to the following systematization also the evolution of the population after 1800 until 1990. Returning to the period covered by this chapter, L. Zăpârțan offers a systematization of this evolution as it follows: ‘‘If in the Roman age, Dacia had a population of several million, being at least as populated as Galia, in the age of invasions a decline in population has been reported in the country as in the whole Europe. In the 13th and 14th centuries the Romanian population increased again, so that, at the end of the 16th century, to reach numerically the one of the Daco-Roman era. Beginning with the 15th century the population decreased again, registering dramatic levels especially during Phanariots period. After the census of 1831 it has been found that in Moldova were living 831,000 Christians and 37,000 Hebrew, and in Muntenia 1.650.000 Christians and 3.300 Hebrew. The end of the last century was marked by a favorable period for population growth (in 1849 were 4.000.000; in 1880 were 4.550.000; in

¹⁴ Idem, p. 61; data utilized also in the 2014 research: ‘‘Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitica Românească’’.

¹⁵ Vasile CUCU, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁶ Ioan Aurel POP, *Românii și maghiarii în secolele IX-XIV –Geneza statului medieval în Transilvania*, Tribuna Printing House, Cluj Napoca, 2003, p. 92.

¹⁷ Simion MEHEDINȚI, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 283-284., data utilized also in ‘‘Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitica Românească’’.

¹⁸ Vasile SIMILEANU, Radu SĂGEATĂ, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁹ Idem, p. 142.

²⁰ Liviu ZĂPÂRȚAN, *Geopolitica în actualitate*, Eikon Printing House, Universitas Collection, Bucharest, 2009, p. 336.

1890 there were 5.300.000; in 1900 there were 6.045.000, and in 1912 were 7.230.000). S. Mehedinți makes the correlation between population growth and the political affirmation of the state, considering the 1880-1917 period was “the era of state rising”. In his view «the power of a people stays in a direct relation with its density and homogeneity, to which the economic, sanitary, administrative, school, religious, cultural ones develop.» For S. Mehedinți the demographic growth is a product of a complex of conditions that must be accomplished (social, cultural, economic) and in this sense, is a synthetic indicator because it represent the true sign of a nation, being the priority of a state.”²¹ It is very clear the fact that if the Romanian population wouldn’t have held a majority in this space, it could not have reached the desideratum of national union.

2. From unity to dramatic territorial losses. 1940-1944 period.

In this period demography is one of the most important factors in the geopolitical Romanian equation of power, but also through it some geopolitical actors aimed to artificial maximize it for their own geopolitical purposes. L. Zăpârțan sees the population as the main “support for the geopolitical options” of this period.²²

The dramatic territorial losses suffered in 1940 (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, Transylvania and Quadrilateral) had no demographical support (except Quadrilateral). “Romania lost 43.492 kilometers square and 2.667.000 inhabitants being Romanian in their majority.”²³ But however, as we asserted in a previously study, the geopolitical context was essentially a wicked one. The “dramatic circumstances”, started with the `30, “when the ascension of Adolf Hitler takes place in Germany, and the Soviet Union, led by Joseph Stalin and The Hungary of Miklos Horthy intensify their efforts of dismantling Greater Romania (România Mare).”²⁴ Detailing, we can observe that the ethnic structure of this space is essential in order to counter the efforts of dismantling Romania, especially by Russia and Hungary.

Therefore, before the territorial losses, Romania had over 71 % Romanians of its population and in 1940 their number increased with 2 procentual points. Regarding the overall territorial losses, the Romanians were again the majority in 1930 and then after in 1940.²⁵ This fact can be observed in by figure no. 1, where the ethnic composition of Romania and also of the territorial losses can be found for both 1930 and 1940.




Figure no. 1. The Ethnic structure of Romania and lost territories for 1930 and 1940 Source: The Author, 2015.

²¹ Liviu ZĂPĂRȚAN, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 336-337.

²² Idem, p. 336.

²³ Ion MARIN, *Geopolitică și securitate globală*, Semne Printing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 64

²⁴ Idem, p. 62.

²⁵ Vasile SIMILEANU, Radu SĂGEATĂ, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 218

As we previously stated, there have existed attempts, in geopolitical purpose, to use population artifices in order to attenuate the Romanian demographic power factor and to increase the number of other populations. Sergiu Tămaș makes an essential observation on this line: “the tolerant attitude of the Romanian state (including over the policy of the Horthy regime of massive Hungarian population bringing on the occupied between 1940-1944, in Northern Transylvania) have led to the increase of the Hungarian ethnic element in Romania. In Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Romanian population was subject to deportation and denationalization intended to be converted from a majority group into a minority group. All around Romania, we observe negative rates in the Romanian population evolution. As a researcher on the matter remarks, the Romanian element has decreased without exception in the states around Romania.²⁶ Today, in many neighbor states the quality of national minority it is not recognize to Romanians.”²⁷ ... “In Hungary, the Romanians left outside of the national borders were, after 1918, between 200 000 and 500 000 (according to different statistics). Subjected to intense magyarization, they constitute today only a few thousands people”²⁸ Also Vaile Simileanu și Radu Săgeată discuss about these policies of denationalization and colonizations from the eastern and southern Transylvania and Banat. They argue: “The territorial concessions were accompanied by a cruel repression of the Romanian population, in order to artificially change the ethnic composition in favor of the Hungarian population and thus justify the eventual permanence of this regime. Immediately after the Horthy troops have crossed the border (September 1940) and until October 1944 there has been implemented an entire mechanism of oppression resulted in thousands of victims, devastations, maltreatments and expulsions, for determining the Romanians to leave their homes and households and to refuge in Romania.”²⁹ Also the observation of Andrei Korponay is more than eloquent both regarding what demography meant for the Hungarian objectives and for what demography meant for our national unity: “Could we imagine that Transylvania and the southern territories would remain again ours, as long as the Romanian people and the Southern Slavic one would maintain their actual advantage in the increase? ... If the Hungarian people maintain themselves at the current growth of 6 per thousand, and the Romanian masses and the Slavs will increase further with 12 per thousand, then after 200 years the number of Romanians and Southern Slavs will be 4 and a half times bigger than the one of Hungarians.”³⁰

Similar positions, regarding the artificial action on the demographic factor, happen also for the case of Bessarabia, this case by Russian intervention, mostly through colonizations (process begun even during the war 1806-1812)³¹ and deportations (the deportations from 1941-1953), but of course not necessarily within the specific period which we address in this chapter, namely 1940-1944.

Basically, throughout history, “the population obsession” (as named by Paul Dobrescu) for Romanians had a purely geopolitical connotation for the survival and unity of its people and state. We appeal directly to the assertions of P. Dobrescu. Basing its analysis on S. Mehedinți arguments, he asserts: “the pursuits of the Romanian specialists in the field of population growth are not at all uncommon in this space. «The population obsession» represents the expression of discovering an essential truth. ... In this region it represents the key of the geopolitical equation.”³² “Those kind of reflections could only appear in a space in which the history has warned that the main support of a people is its number, and the main fulcrum of a state, is its

²⁶ Ion CONEA, *Transilvania, inimă a pământului românesc*. În ”Geopolitică și geoistorie”, nr. 1/1941.

²⁷ Sergiu TĂMAȘ, *Geopolitică - O abordare prospectivă*, Bucharest, Noua Alternativă Printing House, 1995, pp. 139-140.

²⁸ Idem, p. 139; data utilized also in „Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitică Românească”.

²⁹ Vasile SIMILEANU, Radu SĂGEATĂ, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 197, 238)

³⁰ Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BĂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitică*, Comunicare Printing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 96; data utilized also in „Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitică Românească”.

³¹ Ion ȚURCANU, *O Istorie ilustrată a românilor*, Litera Printing House, Bucharest- Kishinev, 2007, p. 584.

³² Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BĂRGĂOANU, *Geopolitică*, Bucharest, Comunicare.ro Publishing House, 2001, p. 95.

population. This means a narrow geographic space, a space wished-for along history, a space as subjected to various pressures, including of demographic nature. This is why the primary mean of survival would be population increase, the increase of the autochthonous element. Internal density appears as the most proper form of counteracting the external demographic pressure, of preventing various dangers with which a small state, placed in a space of demographic interferences, would always be confronted with.”³³

3. The demographic factor as a power factor for the ideological geopolitics of the communist regime.

This period is marked by ample interventions at the demographic power factor level.

In a first stage, the one of new regime settlement, the most important interventions may have been those aimed to change the group mentality; these interventions were done in the first phase with a high impact on the demographic dimension, especially by means of genocide, detentions and deportations.

These interventions made their presence noticed at the army, the peasants, the intellectuals, the clerics levels. As far as the army was concerned, “the old army had been replaced, the majority of the officers – arrested, with almost 200 generals, of whom a great number died in prisons.”³⁴ Regarding political detention, over 130 prisons and other detention places served to this purpose, with a “total capacity of the Romanian Goulag” estimated at 104 000 places. The most intense period from this point of view was between 1948-1964.³⁵ For this period, a number of 600 000 prisoners was estimated, to which another approximately 100 000 “prisoners” captivated at Iasi by the Soviets, 81 000 political prisoners confined for one year and those arrested and confined for periods shorter than 3 months are added: 1945-1948: 80 000; 1948-1964: 780 000. On the other side, regarding the deportations, 150 000 German ethnics were deported and approximately 200 000 people have been deported to Baragan and Dobrogea, as well as to other regions of the country, between 1949-1962. Thus, from the estimations of AFDPR (the Association of the Former Political Detenees from Romania), „2000 000 people have passed through the prisons, camps and other places of detention or deportation of the country.”³⁶ Among these, the number of those who died due to the very harsh conditions of political detention is very hard to estimate (although an important part of the Romanian elite was affected); the same source claims that: „regarding the numbers of those who died in arrest, those executed, murdered, abolished, the torturers had such an advanced technique of erasing the traces and the archives remained so incomplete and inaccessible, that these numbers will never be known.”³⁷

On the other side, in a second stage of the Communist Regime, a great accent was placed on demography as a power factor which had to be stimulated, especially by stimulating the growth of the numeric dimensions, but also its mobility.

Thus, during this phase of the Communist Regime, the demographic policy was a fundamentally pro-natality one as an integrated part of the socio-economic policy, having as a goal „reinforcing the family as the core of society.”³⁸ Maybe the most relevant example in this direction is the 770/1966 Decree, banning abortions, which emerged in a period when, at

³³ Idem, p. 114; data available in a study to be published in the first number/2015 of The Strategic Impact journal, “Carol I” National Defence University, entitled “Romania’s demographic vulnerabilities with possible geopolitical effect”,

³⁴***, *Genocidul din România Repere In Procesul Comunismului*, studiu disponibil la <http://www.procesul.comunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/rechizit.htm>, Accessed la data de 02.03.2015.

³⁵***, “Genocidul comunist în România, disponibil”, *Revista Memoria*, la http://revista.memoria.ro/?location=view_article&id=1060, Accessed at 02.03.2015.

³⁶Idem.

³⁷ Idem.

³⁸Vladimir TREBICI, Ion GHINOIU, *Demografie și Etnografie*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Printing House, Bucharest, 1986, p. 6.

international level, the West was promoting the family planning and policies aimed to reduce the fertility levels worldwide.³⁹

Regarding mobilities, the internal ones had as a goal, according to Tudor Pitulac and Adriana Bondor, „ensuring the social and political stability” of the regime by „annihilating any form of community”⁴⁰, including the ethnic ones. Basically, they served an objective of an ideology, the Socialism, which was based on the following steps: „eliminating the enemy, assimilating him and homogenizing the society”.⁴¹ The first stage, the one of deportations, labor camps, forced residence, detentions is the one associated to „eliminating the enemy”, followed, during Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime, by the theory of homogenizing specific to the next stages. Tudor Pitulac and Adriana Bondor consider that this theory of homogenizing was aiming at erasing every specifics and the alignment of the whole society, in order to reject any alternance in a last instance.⁴²

Returning to the external mobilities, these were under the incidence of an extremely restrictive policy, especially for the Romanians (thus many of them choosing to emigrate illegally) and less for the minorities: „Those who applied as emigrants at the embassies from Romania had their social and economic rights revoked; they were stigmatized and harassed by the authorities.” ... „a relatively large number of permanent emigration took place during that period... ethnic minorities such as the Jews, the Germans and the Hungarians were well represented at that time.”⁴³ According to the INSSE (the National Institute of Statistics)⁴⁴, between 1975-1989, the emigration from Romania had the following ethnic structure: 35,5% Romanians, 44,2% Germans, 12,8% Hungarians, 5,5% Jews and 2.1% other people.⁴⁵

The period of the Communist Regime is one of the most representative historical phases where the state was involved in a concrete way in the growth of the demographic factor’s power potential, maybe even a singular phase at historical level from this point of view. Certainly, the situation would radically change after this period, transforming from a power factor into a vulnerability factor, as we can observe in the following chapter.

4. Demography, from power factor to acute vulnerability. The post-revolutionary period.

After this period of forced measures, including in the spectre of demography, after the aggressive measures of the regime to change the group mentality, after the 1989 revolution, the social transformations affected the country’s demographic evolutions. The family had basically almost no real support at state level as the fundamental cell of society. As well as Ioan Marginean also points out, the demographic policies changed from the pro-natality ones into ones of no intervention.⁴⁶ All these lead to drastic evolutions as far as the number of population is concerned

³⁹ Warren C. ROBINSON, John A. ROSS (Ed), *The Global Family Planning Revolution: Three Decades of Population Policies and Programs*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Tudor PITULAC, Adriana BONDOR, „Practici totalitare de luptă împotriva comunităților etnice din România”, *Societal and Political Psychology International Review*, volume 3, no. 2/ 2012, pp. 69-76, pp. 69-70, available at http://www.sppir.uav.ro/pdf/sppir_v3-i2.pdf#page=69, Accessed at 01.03.2015.

⁴¹ *Idem*, pp. 70-71.

⁴² *Idem*, p. 71.

⁴³ ***, *Migration in Europe- A brief history and a useful glossary*, Education and Culture DG Lifelong Learning Programme ”Cross perspectives on exile” Comenius Project, Transversal Printing House, Targovishte, 2010, p. 33-34.

⁴⁴ *Idem*, p. 35.

⁴⁵ Data available in a previous research: „Influenta Demografiei ca Factor de Putere în Geopolitica Românească”

⁴⁶ Ioan MĂRGINEAN, „Oportunitatea Politicilor Demografice În România”, *Calitatea Vieții*, XII, no. 1-4, 2000, pp. 3-6. p. 5, available at <http://www.revistacalitateavietii.ro/2000/CV-1-4-2000.pdf>, Accessed at 20.04.2012.

(decrease of population, extremely large number of abortions, massive emigration, the brain drain phenomenon) but also to sombre estimations regarding its structure (population aging).

Starting with 2013 a series of personal researches⁴⁷ have aimed to identify the most important demographic vulnerabilities that can have effects at geopolitical level. It has been observed that some of these have old historical roots (the irredentist tendencies of some national minorities), but other, as we previously asserted, have recently installed, immediately after 1989 (the demographic decline, the excessive number of abortions, the trend of population aging, the massive emigration). Therefore, currently, the most important findings that we can emphasize from demographical perspective of actuality and trends are the following:

- Our country has one of the lowest total fertility rate (TFR 1,3)⁴⁸ in comparison with the regions of interest⁴⁹ (clearly much lower than those of the West and of all averages of the regions of interest), but also worldwide. This fact explains how Romania will exceed all the averages of the regions of interest (except the region of the direct neighbors) in demographic decline by 2100 (its population is likely to drop with 42,34% by 2100, recording so one of the largest population decreases not only regionally but globally). Experts point to the criticality of the situation, V. Gețău naming it “demographic crisis”, and Vasile Cucu “dramatically ebb.”⁵⁰

- Romania is among the source states of emigration, unlike the West- which is a destination for migration-, so enrolling in the negative trends rather characteristic for the states of regions of interest within Central and Eastern Europe (state from the former Eastern Bloc region, the direct neighbors – aside from Hungary, the Black Sea Zone – except Turkey and Russia, though Turkey for example is a great exporter of human resource for the European Union, but has also positive values of population growth rates), although it doesn't has a surplus of population which would allow an export of human resources, as we mentioned in previous studies.⁵¹ The massive emigration affects both the numerical dimension of population (contributing to the decline) and structural one (contributing to aging through the active age segment emigration) or the qualitative one (contributing to destabilize family and bringing consequences for the children implicated in this process, and losing a very valuable resource by the high qualified emigration – brain drain).

- Although it is a majority Orthodox country, the rate of abortions exceeds the averages of the regions of interest (except The Black Sea Region), even being in the very forefront among its neighbors. This contributes to the declining population but also has the potential to endanger the health and even fertility of those that pass to such experiences, as asserted by Cătălin Georgescu.⁵²

- Regarding the demographic aging, one must observe that its indicators (median age and the old-age dependency ratio) show that Romania has a good position within the regions of interest, but has a worst situation among its neighbors. But a clear perspective in this matter is only given by reported at the internal situation, which shows that better values of this indicators at

⁴⁷ Study entitled „O altfel de criză: criza demografică românească, simptome, evoluție și consecințe” and published in *Revista de Antropologie Urbană*, no.2/2013, Bucharest, Oscar Print Printing House, pp. 59-76; the study to be published in 2015 entitled “Romania’s demographic vulnerabilities with possible geopolitical effect”.

⁴⁸ An indicator extremely relevant in geopolitics; the level of 2.1 it is considered stability (responsible for the generational replacement), the values under this level having vulnerabilization valence.

⁴⁹ In the study to be published in 2015, we offered a vision about the regional context, comparing the most important demographic evolutions of Romania with the satiations of the regions relevant for Romania from geopolitical perspective (European Union, the Former Eastern Bloc, NATO, Black Sea Zone, the region of the direct neighbors states).

⁵⁰ Vasile CUCU, *op. cit.*, 2007, p. 149.

⁵¹ For more details to be seen the study from 2015 and also “The post-communism Romanian emigration. An analyze of its characteristics and its effects on security”, 10th Edition of the International Conference „Strategii XXI” - *Strategic changes in security and international relations* Proceedings, volume 1, 10 – 11 April, 2014, Bucharest, “Carol I” National Defence University, pp. 389-405.

⁵² Cătălina TODOR, 2013, *op. cit.*, p. 64. Apud Călin Georgescu în Vasile GHEȚĂU, 2012, *Drama noastră demografică- Populația României la recensământul din octombrie 2011*, Compania Printing House, Bucharest, p. 6.

regional level can not transform into a more favorable position within the regions of interest. And this is because: currently with a dependency ratio of 22.3 (2015), faces budgetary difficulties, also this being reported to the one of the lowest GDPs of the European Union. Certainly, the following question arises: how will the situation be at the horizon of 2050 or 2100, when the dependency ratios will double compared to 2015, when our country will reach ratios of 48.8, respectively of 51.0.⁵³ All this taking into account the fact that, unlike Western countries of the Union which started to concern with amelioration actions for the future population aging's effects, Romania is not yet bringing real efforts in this direction and, as the situation present itself at the moment, we are not hopping for spectacular increases of GDP in the future.

- From ethnic- structural perspective there are two elements of vulnerability and a possible evolution to take into account, even though nowadays Romania is a highly homogenous country compared at the level of regions of interest, but also globally. The first element has historical roots and concerns the relation with the Hungarian minority; in a recent study⁵⁴ we have correlated the existence of this minority with the fact that our country is among the countries that recorded a low intensity conflict on its territory (intensity level – dispute: according to Heikdelberg Intitute`s Conflict Barometer 2014). The irredentist tendencies are yet unresolved. The second element is the possible numerical evolution of the Rroma people at the horizon of 2050, given the fact that they have a tree times higher total fertility rate than Romanians. This is even though the experts argue that the effect of actual emigration towards West of Rroma and the rise of their education level can not be predicted, at the moment, in terms of fertility. A third element is nowadays just is the stage of possibility, not probability, and refers at immigration. Here academia⁵⁵ warns that on the long term it is possible that Romania transforms from a country of transit into a country of destination, and in this context it is to be seen if our country will fallow the trends in multicultural challenges, that are a reality today for the West.

Hence demography, from a very important power factor which supported the most important historical geopolitical objectives for our people (the survival, national unity), in 2015 it constitutes one of its biggest vulnerabilities, mentioned even in The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy.⁵⁶ As a result, this research field is crucial for future observation of the demographic sideslips , but it also should be vital for the political environment, because the actual state impose to movement from noninterventionist demographic policies to at least reactive ones in the area, if not proactive (as a reaction to the actual severe demographic crisis, policies to ameliorate the possible repercussions on the medium and long term).

Conclusions

Since the early history of the Romanian people demography has been an essential power factor in this space. The character of its natural evolutions offered a consistent support to the most important geopolitical objective of the Romanian people: the survival one and the national unity one.

The present research, by observing specific key moments in history, brings into attention the dual valence of this factor, from two perspectives: 1) from the perspective of actors, as a power factor for the autochthonous population and as a power factor for the diverse peoples that have tried to exert their geopolitical supremacy over this space; 2) from the perspective of the

⁵³ ***, World Population Prospects The 2012 Revision - Volume II: Demographic Profiles, New York, United Nations, 2013.

⁵⁴the study to be published in 2015 within The Strategic Impact journal.

⁵⁵ Silviu NEGUȚ, Luigi di COMITE, Marius-Cristian NEACSU, „Immigration – socio-economical implications. The case of Romania”, *Amfiteatru Economic Journal*, Vol XII, No. 28, iunie 2010, p. 577. data utilized also within the 2015 research.

⁵⁶ As can be observed in the previous study from 2015.

approaching evolution of this power factor, which can be a natural one (the number of population and its ethnical structure as a result of natality and mortality) or artificial one, by those actions meant to transform the demographic factor, as for example were, in history, those geopolitical actors actions of colonization, deportation or even desnationalization, but also those action specific to the autochthonous geopolitical actor, mostly if we refer at the ideological geopolitics of the communist regime by detentions, deportations, and pronatalist policies and mobilities.

Given the observation over historical events of the Romanian people related to the demographic factor, the last part of this research emphasize the current vulnerabilities, and stresses the dangerous evolution of this kind in a space and for a people in which and for which demographic evolution has been essential in order to speck today about Romania a state.

Therefore, the demographic evolutions of Romania should be of a real interest for the decision makers of this new 21st century.

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- 6 ***, *Genocidul din România Repere In Procesul Comunismului*, studiu disponibil la <http://www.procesul.comunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/rechizit.htm>.
- 7 ***, *World Population Prospects The 2012 Revision - Volume II: Demographic Profiles*, New York, United Nations, 2013.

HUMAN SECURITY AND LIFELONG LEARNING

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Abstract: *Different types of state crises, economic, family, cultural, ethnic are affecting the world. All these crises are puzzle pieces of a fundamental crisis, the crisis of contemporary human being. Religion, philosophy and medicine have tried to help the human being for a better self-understanding. However, the human society is still confused. The hunger, repression, terrorism, ethnic tensions, dividing the world into rich and poor, drugs, pollution, migration, massive urbanization, unemployment, global warming are some of the aspects that make human security a universal problem.*

In the evolution of every society, education occupies an important role. It plays an important role in each generation, but also in the preservation of security. The education is a general concern of the whole world and can be seen as the best investment in the human capital. It is a long-term process and proves, in different circumstances, especially in critical ones, the quality of human being. The lifelong education can be considered a solution for solving the world's essential problems.

Keywords: *global problems of the contemporary world, human security, lifelong education, education for change*

Introduction

Humanity has reached a critical point in its evolution; the necessity of a radical change of mentality and human behavior in the social group and in the whole society is needed. The increase of needs and life quality of human beings led to the intensification of production and natural resource depletion.

The most important problems from the list of ongoing concerns of each country and the international communities are human security and national security, which certainly are in a constant interdependence and interaction relation. The basis of a strong society that is represented by its population. A society that is based on strong values as integrity, honor, patriotism, competitiveness can be built only through education. An educated society with a strong safety culture is difficult to manipulate, a nation that has a strategic vision can guarantee the rule of law, security and national security. A lots of state crises, economic, family, cultural, ethnic, shake the world. All these crises are puzzle pieces of a fundamental crisis, the crisis of contemporary human being. Human security was¹, is and will be a desideratum, and in this context, the role of education acquires new dimensions for the years to come.

The destruction of national values through incompetence, lack of safety culture and strategic vision makes impossible the consolidation of democracy. The vulnerabilities, which are affecting our country in this moment,² have the main sources in: prolonged transition through which our country is passing, the economic gap to Western countries, the authorities failure to manage the organized crime, corruption, and human being trafficking.

¹ Plinio Correa DE OLIVEIRA, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, Traditions Publisher, Bucharest, 1995, p. 25.

² Ion BĂLĂŢEANU, Florin RĂPAN, Iulian MARTIN, Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU, *The strategies interaction in modern armed conflicts*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publisher, Bucharest, 2010, p. 11.

In such a context, many questions have preoccupied humanity and certainly will attract attention for a long time from now on. Who is the human being? What are the major problems of contemporary human being? What is new orientation of modern human being? What is its novelty and the revolutionism of the human being? The human society is still searching answers to these questions.

The social security, the individual security- elements of modern world security

Destruction of national values through incompetence, lack of safety culture and strategic vision makes impossible the consolidation of democracy. The destruction of national values through incompetence, lack of safety culture and strategic vision makes impossible the consolidation of democracy. The vulnerabilities, which are affecting our country in this moment,³ have the main sources in: prolonged transition through which our country is passing, the economic gap to Western countries, the authorities failure to manage the organized crime, corruption, and human being trafficking.

There are other threats to the security of the individuals and population besides the military threat, which have as their objective the destruction of a society from inside, by deteriorating the life conditions, the safety and the peace of population.

The modern human being is not caught in the clutches of unconscious. The human being is "the fundamental element of the society, represents the source and resource to any form of social organization. The human being transcends all the boundaries between areas and levels of the social system"⁴. A world where the individual destiny doesn't find its place and is sacrificed for the seek of achieving some self-purposes...it's an absurd world⁵.

The human being as individual, it is bringing not only the individual race, sexual affiliation, its identity is multidimensional and all "its dimensions" can not be isolated from its social, global, political, organizational and security context. The german philosopher Schopenhauer in the work *The World As Will And Idea*⁶ states that: "the principal source of the greatest evils that hit the human being is the human being itself ". The world is facing a number of problems such as: natural disasters, economic crises, xenophobic or separatist extremist phenomena, aging and migration of people, scarce of natural resources, smuggling, enhance of corruption phenomena, persons and resources trafficking, financial crime, illegal migration, which, unfortunately, we discover that we are not able yet to formulate solutions and often even manage them.

The profound changes in the population structure and the demographic phenomena have an impact on economic and social areas. The decrease in birth rate to an alarming level brought changes in the population structure. This is a source of imbalance in the education system and labor market. The permanent emigration in Romania is relatively low according to statistics. Dominant is the temporary migration⁷. The departures to work abroad are mostly family type, which brings inevitable and emigration of schoolchildren who are accompanying their parents abroad. After Romanian EU integration it has been a moderate increase in temporary emigration abroad (from 2.2 million in 2006 to about 2.7 million in 2007) and a

³ Ion BĂLĂCEANU, Florin RĂPAN, Iulian MARTIN, Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU, *The strategies interaction in modern armed conflicts* , „Carol I” National Defense University Publisher, Bucharest, 2010, p.11

⁴ Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *The human being subject of national and international security in vol. Challenges to security and strategy at the beginning of XXI century*, „Carol I” National Defense University Publisher, Bucharest, 2005, p. 61.

⁵ Melu ZLATE, *The human being facing the world*, Albatros Publisher, Bucharest, 1988, p.83.

⁶ Alexandra SARCINSCHI, *The human being subject of national and international security in vol. Challenges to security and strategy at the beginning of XXI century*, „Carol I” National Defense University Publisher, Bucharest, 2005, p. 145.

⁷ Marian PREDA, *Social risks and inequities in Romania* , Polirom Publisher Iași, 2009, p. 288.

change in the composition of migration flows, with an increasing share of high skill categories (doctors, for example) and those with low qualifications or with low potential for labor market integration in destination countries.

Human resource is a creative force, generating in the effort to achieve the objectives subsumed defense policy of the state. The ensuring of a sustainable development contributes simultaneously to the increasing of level of personal security, and to ensure the necessary resources for security sector reform and modernization as a whole. The education is a general concern of the whole world and can be seen as the best investment in the human capital. It is a long-term process and proves, in different circumstances, especially in critical ones, the quality of human being. The fact that "human being is in a perpetual change process, its bio-psycho-social development, achieved under the influence of heredity, environment, and education, it traces his whole existence, is almost a truism that never would have shown"⁸.

Education and Contemporary Society's vulnerabilities

Education plays an important role in every generation and in maintaining security. It can offer solutions to pressing problems of humanity, if it "has organically integrated education systems in global social systems, in the report that is structured and continually adjusts itself"⁹.

Analyzing the Security Strategy of Romania, we can affirm that the promotion and safeguarding of national values and interests can be achieved by treating" the security and prosperity as inseparable terms of the same equation"¹⁰. As for the two terms to remain in the same equation we need to modernize the educational system, that will lead to the development of a competitive economy and the increase of welfare of the citizens.

The human capital of a country can be compared with the natural wealth of the country, it is valuable, it has to be discovered, cultivated and understood at its true value. The new mutations in economic and social life, politics and culture have led to a significant change in the economic and social status of the people. The Bologna process contributed to the opening of Europe borders, encouraging mobility, increasing the chances of success of individuals. Investing in education and research we create a workforce well trained and varied which can cope with a world, which is in a constant change.

The level of education of the population increases the competitiveness of a nation. Education as a complex activity begins in infancy and continues throughout life through three forms: formal, informal and non-formal education. Lifelong learning is dependent on formal education because the human beings need training to learn *how to learn*. The principle of lifelong learning must be placed in direct relation to individual and social product.

If globalization has opened the world, we must recognize that brought with it new threats to human security. In order to avoid being marked by an eventual *imagology aggression*, we must use education as a *mean of individual protection*, an informed person can not be manipulated easily, but also as an *international passport* with which it can be integrated into any society. The society offers to the people the chance, they must see the education as a motivation. Having a permanent basis education prevents oneself of being self-sufficient and helps to release the barriers in training and development of its personality. A major importance in educating the individuals has the community, the social groups, and the

⁸ Alexandra SARCINSCHI, The human being subject of national and international security *in vol.* Challenges to security and strategy at the beginning of XXI century, „Carol I” National Defense University Publisher, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 61, 143.

⁹ Ioana JINGA, *Education as an investment in humans*, Encyclopedic and scientific Publisher, Bucharest, 1981, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Romania's National Security Strategy*, Bucharest, 2007.

whole environment. A release factor of the individuals is the lifelong education, which is the democratization of education.

The main functions of education are: integration, innovation and mutual adaptation of the individual and society, because the aimed purpose of education is to improve and to raise the welfare conditions.

Inside every generation, we find significant inequalities, which are the main reasons of unrest¹¹, insecurity, frustration, stress, violence, education reforms, trade, corruption, failure regimes. "The human being will be able to sleep peacefully only when the whole globe will create a system of social relations that exclude the possibility of a catastrophic development of events"¹².

In the present framework, we can find a large number of people who no longer are satisfied by their employment, students who feel alienated from the educational system, drug, painkillers, antidepressants¹³ and alcohol consumers, but also a large number of suicides especially among the working age population¹⁴. Psychologist Jean M. Hiltrop states that in an uncertain world "there is no job security. The employee will remain employed as long as it adds value to the organization and staff responds finding new ways to add value. Instead, the employee is entitled to claim a work interesting and important, have the freedom and resources to do it well receive a fee reflecting his contribution and gain experience and training needs"¹⁵. Moreover, Emile Durkheim recommends that: "professional life has to become a moral environment, under the influence of which it has to be achieved the social cohesion in societies where the stability is lacking".

The security "has become a major factor in ensuring the welfare of a society. The citizens want to live in security and to enjoy their freedoms and security is in itself a fundamental right"¹⁶. Education is preventing us from early aging in terms cerebral and psychosocial, it maintains the spiritual youth and strengthens our self-esteem.

Conclusion

Time seems to compress, but life does not wait. The explosion of knowledge due to scientific and technological developments, leads to the rapid perishability phenomenon of the knowledge, changes in the demographic structure of the population highlights more than ever the importance of lifelong learning.

There is no magic formula to solve these problems, but there is the educational system that can help us to become flexible and creative. Scientific and technological progress will lead, in time, to the elimination of certain occupational areas and the apparition of others. There is already a *pact between generations* and this helps the elderly to adapt more easily to new discoveries. The adult population from Romania was not educated to see change as something beneficial and no existing legislation failed to create a sense of stability.

The image collage reflecting aspirations, hopes and dreams that oneself has at maturity allow him to be selective based on personal reasons, ambition, personal and professional experience and to cope with the changes. If we open to new opportunities, there is a chance for one of them to change our lives positively. One problem of the traditional education is the relatively narrowed vision over individual abilities.

¹¹ Emile DURKHEIM, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, London, 1957, p. 11.

¹² Valter, ROMAN, *Limits or turning*, Encyclopedic and scientific Publisher, Bucharest, 1981, p. 21.

¹³ http://www.ana.gov.ro/rapoarte%20nationale/RO_RN_2014.pdf, seen in 01.05.2015 at 13:30.

¹⁴ <http://www.revistasociologie.ro/pdf-uri/nr.5-6-2014/02-SRadulescu.pdf>, seen in 03.05.2015 at 11:30

¹⁵ Cf. Jean. M.HILTROP, Sheila UDALL, *The essence of Negotiation*, 1995, pp.108

¹⁶ Mihaela-Ramona ISTRATE, *The European citizenship and its implications on security*, „Carol I” National Defense University Publisher, Bucharest, Bucharest, 2014, p. 50.

Unfortunately, people in present Romanian society came to a state of living and working by rote, they have a repetitive style and any new thing scares them. When they are familiar with a certain context, they enjoy an improved intellectual and emotional stability; they do not need to be in a permanent tense state, waiting for unpredictable, unknown elements to dictate a different behavior than usual. The jaundiced view that there is only a certain period in human life when one has to learn is obsolete. In order to enjoy individual security in the present world changing context, we need educated, relaxed people, with positive mental self-control that can only be achieved through a permanent education.

Education is a world in itself, but simultaneously its reflection, also. Education reforms, on national scale, have to reach the following objectives: ensuring the education access to all citizens, no matter of the environment, but also the development of lifetime education concept. To be competitive means to align to European systems for education and professional development, i.e. quick modernization of public and private educational systems.

Society shapes the individual in correlation with his needs. Through education, the man earns experience. Experience, being educational, gives power and value orientation to said individual. Thus, through educational process, an “experience reconstruction or reorganization” takes place.

The new trends in education will lead to modifications in people mentality. We have to use the past and future reforms to give the dimensions of existence back to the education, rethinking space and time. Beyond the diversity of acceptance for educational concepts, there is the contemporary man who, in his responsibility of building his own reality, has to make choices and to discover and rediscover himself through the choices made. The absolute and permanence are replaced with relativity and change. Education is one-step ahead of time. It has foreseen and tries to foresee what will come to pass. The request in permanent education knows a term switch. After “learning to learn” comes “willing to constantly perfect thyself”. Only a population with access to education and information is strong.

Self-acceptance and changing of self-perception develop individuals who are constantly open to change, who will be self-anchored. Human security is not self-standing, but always part of global security. For people well being, there is a need of a global project, in which all nations will sit on discussions in order to find solutions for human beings. Starvation, ecological disasters, drugs, criminality, job insecurity, terrorism are problems for our all concern. We have to get rid of fear, to find ourselves, to live beautifully in this world. The international community (The Millennium Report, 2000) has to act for achieving “the liberty to have a shelter at need” (development agenda) and “freedom of fear” (security agenda).

The human faith is no longer a problem for their home countries, but one for regional and international organizations. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in USA affected the entire world through various effects in all parts of life and human activities.

In order to feel safe, the human has to enjoy security in economics, food, physical protection, psychology, medicine, ecology, social life and politics. Placement of human beings in center of actions means also reshaping of international help politics, by its alignment to human development. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) states that human security has nothing in common with weapons. The concern for life and human dignity is more important than weapon distribution for security purposes. Kofi Annan, at UN Millennium Summit (September 2000), emphasized as Secretary General of United Nations, “the need for a more human-centred approach to security”.

The quality of life, security and educational needs are realities of our everyday life. We cannot talk about security without a good quality of life, which we can achieve through education. If the global security system involves an overlap of six systems: politics, economy, social, culture and ecology, then I dare to state that the seventh is education.

The new culture of human security has to have as foundation: education for change, education for peace.

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INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *Education and scientific research are vital for the achievement of a security culture involving intellectual creativity and abilities of thorough study. A solid security culture contributes to the maintenance of a proper degree of national security.*

By field's specialists education and also civilians' education on security issues there is provided the public awareness over the military institution role and is facilitated the adaptation of national defense needs and the efficient development of security sector in order to answer to the new risks and threats came from the international security environment. Under this context, the military, public order and information education needs the continuous modernization and adaptation aiming the achievement of a higher ratio of compatibility of the national educational programs with the NATO and EU member-states programs.

Keywords: *Security, education, human rights, public international law, security culture*

1. Right to security

The human right to security although is not a consecrated *expresis verbis* right in the profiled Romanian law it is, *de facto*, the center of gravity of all the human rights and liberties and without them no right can be exercised.

Right to security is different from the individual liberty as is provisioned in Article 23 of the Romanian Constitution (2003) which refers to “individual liberty and personal safety”, in our consideration this refers to the *safety* and *protection* of the person, prerogatives being part of human security. If we synthesize what human security means, we can use two words: *safety* and *protection*, transposed in *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*,¹ and *freedom to live in dignity*.² Human security is strongly related to national security and completes it, human is in the core of its preoccupations.

Referring to the human rights we remind these are fundamental, universal, indivisible, unalienable, interdependent and equalitarian liberties, immunities and benefits settled in conformity with the humanity values, absolutely essential for the development of human being, for his/her wellbeing and progress which each human being indifferently his/her nationality, sex, race or ethnical origin, social position, religion or belief, disabilities, age or sexual orientation is inherited to pretend and receive them from the society he/she leaves in³.

¹ *National Defense Strategy (Strategia națională de apărare)*, București, 2010, pp. 23- 24.

² In March 2005, in his final proposal for United Nations reforms, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, while not making specific reference to the term “human security”, nevertheless uses its three components: “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want” and “freedom to live in dignity” as the main thematic principles of the report entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”. Available at <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/HSU%20Strategic%20Plan%202014-2017%20Web%20Version.pdf>, p.8. and http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005, accessed on: 15.03.2015.

³ Louis LENKIN, *The Age of rights*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p. 38 (the working definition to the level of United Nations system adapted by this article's author).

National security considered as an imprescriptibly right⁴ by its nonmilitary dimensions and reference fields also integrates human, cultural and social security *inter alia*, and their relation is of mutual influencing and integration of parts in the whole.

To their confluence there's human without needs and fears enjoying the possibility for full exercise of the fundamental rights and liberties because without democracy, state of law and state order we cannot speak about security, and consequently neither human rights, development and affirmation of human dignity into a proper social environment and a state responsible for his/her fate⁵.

If the national security identifies with the stage wherein the territorial unit, values grounded on moral and ethical standards transcend religious, ethnical and linguistic differences and the common beliefs, democratic life, economic and social wellbeing, fundamental rights and liberties are guaranteed and protected and all these are achieved with the support and in the benefit of all citizens of the state, human security identifies with individual security, with the decent life each individual should live, measurable in material and social wellbeing grounded on some minimum social protection standards (food, water, house, health, environment and education) guaranteed by the state.

Human security promotes individuals' freedom to take their own decisions without being influenced or manipulated to develop in a manner he/she wants in achieving its desiderates,. People can exercise their rights and liberties only in safety conditions and freely and they have the opportunity and also the responsibility to take care about their life contributing actively to their personal development but also the development of society and country they dwell⁶.

Individual – society – state trio sets rights and obligations which must be responsibly assumed thus everybody's interests to be protected and the eventual conflicts calmed down. Between the individual, society and state there is the law order, the balance providing equilibrium and avoiding the escalations of each part and which contributes to the human development and implicitly to the provisioning of national security⁷ and the diminution or counteraction of vulnerabilities, risks and threats against it.

⁴ *National Security Strategy of Romania* (Strategia de securitate națională a României), 2007, p.7 (adopted by the Supreme Court of Country's Defense by the Decision no. 62 on April 17, 2006), „National security is, at its turn, an imprescriptibly right deriving from the full sovereignty of the people and grounded on constitutional order, achieved in the context of European construction, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and global evolutions”.

⁵ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948 stipulates in Article 22: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality” and in its Preamble line 1: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.

⁶ *National Security Strategy of Romania* (Strategia de Securitate națională a României), 2007, p. 55.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 9, “Under the circumstances when in modern life security and prosperity are inseparable terms of the same equation – progress, prosperity and national security of Romania cannot be but the major result of a complex process for the promotion and guarantee of national values and interests. This process regards essentially: radical modernization of educational system and efficient valuation of human, scientific and technological potential; growth of citizens' wellbeing, their level of life and health; affirmation and protection of culture, national identity and spiritual lives of Romanians in the conditions created by the European Union framework.

2. Education – a guaranteed right and an obligation that must be assumed in the context of national security provisioning

In Romania, *the right to education* is guaranteed by Article 23 in Constitution⁸ and Law no. 1 of national education provides the legal framework for the organization, functioning and development of education and also the fundamental right to lifelong education⁹.

In the contemporary era, the right to education appears as a social need, individual training is never complete and the need for a continuous lifelong training is requested by the evolution of the society we live in, the changes taking place globally on all the levels of social life. By Protocol 1 of European Convention of Human Rights, the need for education as social need was transformed in a right, respectively the right for education¹⁰, *which cannot be refused by either individual*. In the same idea, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that “everyone has the right to education”, and Article 14 in the Charter of European Union Fundamental Rights provisions inclusively the access to professional and continuous formations.

Thus, whether we speak about the right to education, training or learning the references essentially concern the individual’s life as human fundamental right. The values and attitudes of a person grounded on freedom, liberty, tolerance, courage, patriotism, non-discrimination along with the history, traditions, culture and habits of his/her nation cannot be learnt or acquired by the individual but by proceeding a formal or non-formal educational process. By education, the person can develop personality, to acknowledge and understand which are his/her rights and liberties, but also duties as state’s citizen and inhabitant of Terra¹¹. Each generation corresponds certain environment wherein the individuals form, develop and affirm; these have in common certain beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, and the educational process is influenced by factors as: geopolitical, historical, cultural, economic, social or environmental¹².

The right to education is considered an economic, social and cultural right as well as civil and political right and this offers us the opportunity to appreciate education is actually is an indicator showing the ration of civilization and development of a country, its possibilities of evolution in time and from different perspectives social, political, economic, military etc., as well as its capacity to confront threats, risks and vulnerabilities indifferently their nature which can damage its security.

⁸ In Article 32 of the *Romanian Constitution (Constituția României)*, 2003, it is provisioned: *„the right to education is provided by compulsory general, middle school and professional education, by superior education as well as by other forms of training and improvement ...”*.

⁹ Law no. 1/2011 regulates the structure, functions, organization and functioning of national particular and public educational system.

¹⁰ Roxana Alina PETRARU, *Protecția drepturilor fundamentale ale omului în jurisprudența CEDO*, Editura Lumen, Iași, 2010, pp. 101-104.

¹¹ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948, art. 26, (1) *„Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit”*. (2). *“Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace”*.

¹² In regard to the theory of Neil Howe and William Strauss American sociologists generations elaborated in 1991 and published in the book *„Generations: The History of America’s Future, 1584 to 2069*, Published by Harper Collins, 1992.

If the state has the correlative obligation to guarantee and provide the nondiscriminatory access to education for all its citizens, individuals have the unwritten obligation to educate themselves, to self-educate (self-induced behavior to the individual level) thus by the acquired knowledge, competencies and abilities to contribute not only to own development and affirmation but also to the progress and development of his/her country, to its guarding and defense in need. “Strategic factor of present and future development of a state is achieved by its contribution to the multidimensional education of human capital. Education is perceived as mean toward sustainable development which actually is a process of social learning in finding innovative solutions”¹³.

3. Educational dimension of national security

„Education is the strongest weapon we can change the world, can protect and develop”¹⁴. Thus, between the national security and education there is direct relation of mutual influence resulted from the fact that one state power is not granted only by its military dimension but also by its human capital which by a high level of education creates a strong state. Education when is qualitative and efficient becomes an instrument stimulating positively changes in societies directing them to progress, an instrument forming to the individuals a behavior meant to provide them a security climate.

About the importance of education and the indissoluble relation between it and security Barack Obama, the American president spoke on January 7, 2010 in an interview posted by John Moravec¹⁵. In this video from the uptake forwarded to Education Futures from Bring Me the News, president Obama speaks on the relationship between education and national security, on the topic of „education is a national security issue”. Speaking about the American society, the American president showed youngsters going out from the schools desks do not have the abilities and competencies either intellectual and creative abilities to allow them to adapt to the new social, environmental, political, economic and technological conditions in continuous change and to integrate on the labor market. In his opinion, this will implicitly affect the national security.

In the same order of ideas, a workgroup lead by the former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Joel Klein, the former chancellor of scholar system in New York City have warned over the fact the national security and economic prosperity are endangered if the USA educational system and education do not suffer major changes. In their perspective, the young Americans should be prepared to confront the continuous changing world in an era of globalization. They should master knowledge from fields as: the ones comprised in STEM¹⁶ and to know the English literature and grammar, diplomacy, the set of national values and interests, threats and risks the country’s security can be submitted to¹⁷.

¹³ *National Strategy for Sustainable Development of Romania. Horizons 2013-2020-2030* (Strategia Națională pentru Dezvoltare Durabilă a României Orizonturi 2013-2020-2030), București 2008, available online at: http://www.stpse.ro/atasamente/066_Strategia%20nationala%20pentru%20dezvoltare%20durabila%20a%20Romaniei%202013-2030.pdf, p.82, accessed on: 15.03.2015.

¹⁴ Nelson Mandela, see: Paul MELINTE, *47 de citate inspiraționale care îți vor schimba viața*, august 20, 2014, available online at: <http://paulmelinte.com/citate-inspirationale-despre-viata/>, accessed on 25.02.2015.

¹⁵ President B. Obama interview, available online at: <http://www.educationfutures.com/2010/01/07/obama-education-is-national-security-issue/>, accessed on 22.02.2015.

¹⁶ STEM is an acronym referring to the academic disciplines of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.

¹⁷ Joel I. Klein, Condoleezza Rice, Chair, Julia Levy, Project director, *Independent Task Force Report No. 68, U.S. Education Reform and National Security*, Council on Foreign Relations, United States of America. 2012, See: <http://www.education.com/magazine/article/failing-schools-national-security-threat/>, accessed on 26.02.2015.

The problems in the educational system also damage the USA defense system structures. Almost 75 % from the youngsters graduating different forms of education do not have the necessary qualifications to be recruited by the USA armed forces, and 25% cannot be employed not even as professional militaries. Along the lack of adequate education, the American youngsters confront criminal antecedents and poor physical training and many suffer by obesity. Also, there is seen a deficit of absolvent, without competencies in the field of engineering and sciences, specialists necessary to the military armament industry or any other field's structures. It is obvious the lack of specialists in the field of communication and informatics, US risks to become vulnerable against the cyber-attacks and without people to know the foreign languages, civic education, diplomacy, history, culture and civilization, science, defense, and airspace fields, it risks to lack specialists in communication, internal and external affairs, diplomacy or information and to have very small recruiting basis.

In the appreciations of Condoleezza Rice and Joel I. Klein, there is not enough to have military power because in this century, *the human capital can bounce the balance of power* and could determine US to lose their position as world leader if there are not taken urgent measures regarding to educational strategies and policies. Without firm measures in the field of education it is possible for the democracy, economy, safety and national security, national interests, intellectual property, American unity and cohesion to be seriously damaged¹⁸. In the experts' opinion, manifested in 2012, an adequate measure would be public recognition of the inadequate level of education and performance and the adoption of some large educational reforms to re-orientate USA to the crossroads.

In regard to Anne Marie Slaughter¹⁹, national security defense can be also done by educational means and the worries of Americans after the apparition of the Islamic State, Russian policy of enlargement and China ascension is represented by the incapacity of the country to provide adequate education and care to all the children²⁰.

The conclusions of the American experts referring to the direct influence of education on national security as well as the impact and devastating consequences on long term it might have a poor and ineffective educational system on overall security are available for US but also for any other state, implicitly for Romania too.

As regards Romania, from the content of the national defense strategy it is seen that not only education, research and security culture²¹, but also their effects influence and potentate the national security. The approach in the academic, middle schools and even primary schools environment of the diverse topics on security as well as the formation of specialists in the security field can essentially contribute to the achievement of *good governance and growth of citizens' life quality*. It is important the strategy also regards the whole education system makes punctual references "to a new quality of military education", which can be adapted and put into consensus with the similar education from the partner states in the Euro-Atlantic organizations"²².

¹⁸ Joel I. KLEIN, Condoleezza RICE, Chairrs, Julia LEVY, Project Director , Independent task force report no.68, *U.S. education and national security reform*, Council of foreign relations (CFR) , pp. 3-13.

¹⁹ Anne-Marie Slaughter is now the President and CEO of New America. She is also the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor Emeritus of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. From 2009–2011 she served as Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State, the first woman to hold that position. Available online at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/>, accessed on: 15.03.2015.

²⁰ Anne-Marie Slaughter, *La sauvegarde de la securite nationale par l'education*, December 1, 2014, available online at: <http://www.medias24.com/chro150899La-sauvegarde-de-la-securite-nationale-par-l-education.html>, accessed on 28.02.2015.

²¹ *National Defense Strategy of Romania* (Strategia Națională de Apărare), 2010, p. 29: „By security culture we understand: norms, values, attitudes or actions determining the understanding and assimilation of security

The security culture allows and imposes to the citizen by the security education to: acknowledge and understand the national and international security environment; acknowledge and exercise in the legality limits of fundamental rights and liberties; knowledge of security policies; enhancement of a participative behavior; conscientious assuming of responsibilities; development of capacities of correct appreciation of the ratio of governing and achievement of strategic goals assumed by politicians and, not in the last, the manifestation of a developed civic feeling.

Conclusions

The country's level, the competitiveness of the nation is granted by its level of education and population capacity, flexibility and training and country's development greatly depends by this issue. Therefore, there are needed measures to support in an integrated and coordinated manner of education, research and innovation as well as population life long training, by programs of studies for continuous professional training. But, without a proper living environment grounded on peace and security criteria, the human development and dignity affirmation cannot be done in any field, not only education.

The future generations should acquire a security culture and in this regard they must be educated in the spirit of responsibilities to the country, development of decisional capacity, respect for human rights and liberties, respect for linguistic and cultural diversity, solidarity, of peace, progress and country development and whole world²³.

If we speak about security culture, its opposite take the shape of security uncultivatedness manifested in different forms among which there are: lack of reaction of citizens to the infringement of rights and liberties, corruption, poor governance, disrespect of obligations assumed by politicians in their electoral campaigns, theft in all its forms, from the public property, lack of responsibility and responsiveness of political factors installed in different functions, lack of coherent public policies to provide sustainable development on long term in Romania and high standard quality of living for Romanians.

Security culture comes to counterbalance the security uncultivatedness and lack of education in the strategic field as security. The trio individual – society – state is called to know its role in the equation named security, which has also unknown as the asymmetric threats and can hit anytime and any place without asking if the individual, society or state had time to prepare and are able for a proper feedback.

concept and the others derived concepts: national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, cooperative security, security policy, etc.”.

²² *Ibidem*, „Country's defense and the achievement of national security situation primarily suppose a creative intellectual initiative wherein are also important education, research and security culture ... Education is the first pillar allowing the national security and security sector to adapt in order to answer to the new challenges. We need a new quality of military, public order and information education and this presumes the full compatible educational programs of NATO and EU countries”.

²³ *Universal Declaration on Human Rights* (1948), in Article 26 stipulates: “Education must aim the full development of human personality and the strengthening of respect for fundamental human rights and liberties. It must promote understanding, tolerance, friendship among all the peoples and all racial or religious groups ...”.

Events happened to the global level, peculiarly near our borders, respectively in Ukraine, come to strengthen the paradigm in regard to which security is a fundamental right for the human and essential value of inter-human relations²⁴. Life is a prized gift for which we do nothing but we get, which just from time to time we price and its value we aware in serious moments, when we might lose it. This right is undeniable in neither situation and is strongly related to liberty and security.

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²⁴ Gheorghe TĂTARU, *Valențele conceptului de securitate*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2008, pp. 9-10.

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DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

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Abstract: *Linked to the effects of globalization, terrorism was amplified by society's dynamics and circulation of information. The consequences of globalization can be analyzed through the various forms of terrorism: ideological, ethnical or cultural-religious, but international terrorism could be defined as the branch that affects the global security environment. Since Black September Organization and attacks at the Olympics in Munich in 1972, global terrorism has been identified with radical Islam. An unpredictable evolution occurred in 2014, when the ISIL organization, which operated in the territory of two states, declared independence as a new Caliphate. This unprecedented action was labeled as "the new era of international jihad", alerting the security organizations. The globalization subdues the economy and political system to pressure and by their undermining, insurgents could gain access to alternative organizational strategies. Globalization becomes a framework for international terrorism expansion opportunities, but also offers solutions for the fight against it.*

Keywords: *international terrorism, globalization, Islam, ISIL, al-Qaeda, jihad*

Introduction

Globalization is one of the most discussed phenomena of the last two decades and it can be defined as the international dissemination of economical, social and cultural perceptions. This indicates a stage where economic and political barriers between nations lose their effects and the dynamics of workforce and people amplify the cultures' interactions¹.

The study "The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?"² considers globalization as a major factor in the involution of the state actors. In this context, the main effect of mitigating the borders is the alteration of the terms that define a state, directly affecting the monopoly on borders and services. In the absence of border control, border security becomes the first state's task throughout of the members of the international agreement. Globalization requires its own power pole: the law, creating situations in which the international community has responded by taking over the responsibilities of a state. The most eloquent examples arising from relatively recent crises occurred in the Middle East or North Africa, where coalition forces have restored public order or participated in the elections.

The effect of interdependence already transformed security and insecurity in a global problem. Regarding the continuous decrease of energy resources, a situation of insecurity, even an isolated one, requires channeling efforts and resources in that direction, creating an imbalance of all other users. Also, engaging members, whose exposure to this risk may seem small, in treaties, security organizations and alliances challenges them to assume the global fight against international terrorism.

¹ L. Korobeynikova, *Tolerance in the Context of Soft Globalization* in *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2015, pp. 626-630.

² N. Gnesotto, G. Grevi, *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?*, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/NGP_01.pdf, accessed on 19.03.2015.

An *US National Intelligence Council* report, released in December 2012, stated that the current international environmental organization is unipolar, dominated by the United States. Targeting medium and long terms, the report claimed that the hierarchy will not be structured and that it will be divided between the old and emerging great powers: US, Russia and respectively, China, for example. The novelty of multipolarity will be the diffusion of power from states to the non-state actors³.

In fact, this report considered the competition for resources as the main issue which may cause conflicts. If at this time, non-state actors are big energy companies, the future could reserve the entrance of the large non-state actors for military purposes. There are so many categories that may be involved: NGOs, ethnic or religious minorities, terrorist organizations, military and economic alliances with spectacular developments in future global context. Currently there are non-state actors with a significant role in the world, whose importance has fluctuated, but provide models of success, especially in the context of globalization. The current organization provides models or franchises that can boost the international security environment by reshaping or enlarging the area of action.

1. Globalization and terrorism

Terrorism is an act based on asymmetric information about the place, time and number of casualties caused by an attack. It is formed by violent actions meant to induce fear on the civilian population and influence decisions or political systems⁴.

In correlation with the effects of globalization, the question rises whether global terrorism has grown through exchanges, social dynamics or by the circulation of ideas. The biggest manifestation of this phenomenon has been observed with the China's opening to the international market since 1978⁵ and the fall of the Soviet bloc in the late 80s and early 90s⁶.




Figure no. 1. Deaths caused by terrorism (2011). Sunni extremism covers all major groups: Al Qaeda and affiliated groups within Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb, Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban or Al Shaabab in Somalia; Political/anarchist terrorism is mainly represented by: FARC in Colombia, India and Philippines' Communist Parties or PKK in Turkey⁷

³ United States National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, available at <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/global-trends-2030>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

⁴ E. Zimmermann, *Globalization and terrorism* in *European Journal of Political Economy*, 2011, pp. S152-S161.

⁵ Y.H.D. Wei, I. Liefner, *Globalization, industrial restructuring, and regional development in China* in *Applied Geography*, 2012, pp. 102-105.

⁶ N. Negrea, *Fenomenul globalizării și implicațiile sale asupra societății* in *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, 2005, pp. 88-98.

⁷ National Counterterrorism Center USA, *2011 The report on terrorism*, available at <https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

The analysis of the consequences of globalization can be done through the various forms of terrorism: ideological, ethnic, cultural or religious separatist, but international terrorism can be defined as a branch involving victims of a country other than the home of the terrorist organization, regardless of the territory on which it occurred. Since Black September Organization and attacks on the Munich Olympics of 1972, global terrorism has been identified with radical Islam⁸. For example, Sunni Muslim extremist groups have caused 8886 deaths out of 12,533 deaths as a result of the terrorist attacks in 2011 (Figure 1).

Al Qaeda has caused about 2,000 deaths in 688 attacks, while the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have caused an estimated 1,900 deaths in more than 800 attacks. By comparison, the guerrilla organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC), a leader in terms of non-Muslim terrorist actions, was responsible for 377 attacks of a total of 1926.

Radical Islamic world has provided numerous demonstrations of force and premiers, history recording groups' progress in geographical context, migration to the political arena or the use of various forms of attack. However, the rise of a certain group is very interesting and shows the terrorism's expression in the context of globalization. Founder of al Qaeda, but also agent for British Intelligence MI5 and MI6, Aimen Dean explained that the leaders of al Qaeda were radicalized during the 90s, closer to the West than the Middle East. The catalyst was the conflict in Bosnia⁹, a major influence on the organization that allegedly has exported franchise in no less than 20 countries. In 1999, the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad was founded under the lead of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which affiliated al Qaeda in 2004, becoming the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2006, by incorporating other Sunni insurgent groups, it became ISI (the Islamic State in Iraq), and in 2013, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, it was announced the merger between the ISI and al-Nusra Front in Syria, under the name ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). The statement was a premiere announcing "a new era of international jihad"¹⁰.

This merger brought some problems to the radical community in the Middle East, because al-Nusra Front's leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, refused affiliation, but also because Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's replacement on "The Base's" command, required ISI organization to concentrate within Iraq and to continue the work on distinct lines from al-Nusra Front. The answer to al Qaeda arrived on June 29, 2014, when ISIS proclaimed the restoration of the Caliphate abolished in 1922 with the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire. By assuming the leadership, at least on spiritual level, of the whole Islamic world and proclaiming the Muslim leader al-Baghdadi as the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, this bold move had a significant meaning, difficult to be accepted. This decision has managed to generate the split of the radical Islamic world, with unpredictable consequences. The fact is that the Islamic State (IS) manages to disturb the most important leaders of extremist groups, mainly through ignorance of Islamic law that the Caliph should be chosen after consultation of all Muslim scholars.

It becomes obvious that this statement has managed to attract a major capital of attention and began to expand its own network. First declared affiliation came from Nigeria,

⁸ E. Inbar, H. Frisch, *Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 181-183.

⁹ G. Reybolds, *Aimen Dean's al-Qaeda story: dramatic but hard to swallow*, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/11447999/Aimen-Dean-al-Qaeda-review.html>, accessed on 20.03.2015.

¹⁰ A. Withnall, *Iraq crisis: Isis declares its territories a new Islamic state with 'restoration of caliphate' in Middle East*, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-declares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-as-emir-removing-iraq-and-syria-from-its-name-9571374.html>, accessed on 24.01.2015.

where Boko Haram's leader, Abubakar Shekau acknowledged the existence of the Caliphate and forwarded the idea supported by the IS, that the Muslim world need to split between "groups of Islam" and "other Muslims"¹¹. Another proof of the export of specific ideologies are the recent attacks in Yemen, which targeted three Shiite mosques and succeeded in two attacks which killed more than 100 people. From this perspective, the guidance of the Muslim world is made by discriminating the different categories of Islam, the attack on the "other Muslim" receiving harsh criticism even from al Qaeda. However, it seems that IS has been successful in extending at least to Nigeria and Yemen¹².

The fight against the Boko Haram insurgents, by coalition forces that meet African soldiers of Nigeria, Niger and Chad is closely related to the current security environment and the mitigation effect of the importance of borders. Testimony of the loss of monopoly on security services is highlighted by the division of responsibility between coalition forces stated above. Chadian army has become an offensive tool in the northern part of Nigeria, which could be observed during recent operations¹³. Featuring more experienced soldiers and better equipment, but also interested in the security of its own borders and preventing an extension of Boko Haram, Chad has taken in 14th and 15th of March 2015 an offensive on the Nigerian city of Damasak, which was under insurgents' occupation. The paradox is that although the action took place in Nigeria, the armies of Chad and Niger acted without asking an approval from Abuja, nor had any local contribution among combatants. After securing the objective, the neighboring military forces announced the success of the operation and remained quartered for the local army to take over.

2. Causal relationship between globalization and terrorism

A decreasing trend of terrorist acts is closely related to timeliness and cost arguments. International terrorism is growing in developing countries, but mainly targeted victims are those in developed countries¹⁴. Terms of deprivation of rights and lack of social equality, with no alternative, facilitate the recruitment of terrorists to attack developed societies and thus influence the security environment. Globalization-terrorism relationship should not be excluded because globalization subjects economy and political system to pressure, thus undermining the system which determines insurgents' access to resources and superior organization strategies.

By the free movement of people and ideas, different foreign cultures, possibly flawed, can reach within the borders of the state, increasing the mobility of both refugees and terrorists. Militant groups may collect financial aid from supporters, be it governments, Diaspora and political supporters, and can disseminate information and promote their own ideology.

Propaganda has a major role through modern means of communication, the Internet effectively representing the fastest and most common means of information. Promotional films produced by charismatic leaders have a global audience and can indoctrinate and recruit different social groups. Al Qaeda franchise network is based on the use of hate speech with the potential lasting effect on youngsters with social adjustment problems. In terms of media distribution, area and the transportation of information to audiences, they are developing

¹¹ B.al-Bouchr, *Boko Haram, ISIS don't represent Islam*, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/culture/2014/05/islam-islamic-groups-boko-haram-isis.html#>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

¹² M.A. Kalfod, K. Fahim, *Bombers kill 100 at two mosques in Yemen* in International New York Times, 21-22.03.2015, pp. 6.

¹³ A. Nossiter, *One-sided defeat of Boko Haram* in International New York Times, 21-22.03.2015, pp. 6.

¹⁴ T. Krieger, D. Meierriecks, *What causes terrorism?* available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148682, accessed on 24.01.2015.

spectacularly, and therefore, the information presented can often lead to a misperception, amplified on the real support of the benefit terrorist organizations¹⁵.

Another aspect of this causality is the issue of new immigrants and minorities which provides bridgeheads for terrorist groups, an aspect that needs major attention. Muslim immigration to developed countries is not considered an important phenomenon any more, but there are two positions that can be underlined: the optimistic vision based on integration and assimilation, which strengthens the economy and the pessimistic one, represented by the *domination* of the adoptive country. In the first place, immigrants accept even unwanted or poorly paid jobs in the hope of social development. This is the rational choice, but alternative scenarios show the second position: absence of integration gives rise to a class of workers who, without education or qualification, adhere to extremist views, assuming the values of radical Islam¹⁶. Understanding the potential to mobilize these groups in order to put them in the service of international terrorism, involves multivariate analysis of political, social, economic and cultural aspects. Recent examples had shown that the offspring of immigrants in France can be recruited as radical terrorists and the fact that the conversion was rapid, with a stunning efficiency is shown by reports which described Kouachi brothers as ordinary persons with no visible intentions of their criminal actions¹⁷. This fact is perhaps the essence of international terrorism: three French citizens of foreign origin (Algeria and Mali) organized in the French capital, as individual level cells, attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda and Sunni Muslims beliefs from Middle East. Moreover, there are indications that associate the brothers Kouachi to a former al Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origin¹⁸. The extent of the phenomenon generated in the context of asymmetric ratio of the involved forces, confirmed the potential impact of this type of unpredictable actions and imposes a review of preventive-offensive counterterrorism side.

3. Interferences

The 9/11 attacks still represent the most important landmark in terms of the potential of international terrorism. The decrease of this parameter is the direct effect of security measures introduced subsequently by the developed countries, which have limited the success of the Al Qaeda and the other terrorist organizations^{19,20}. Regardless of their affiliation or involvement, the costs to be covered by these groups increased substantively and, in some Islamic countries, public support has decreased. Sympathy for terrorism amongst the Muslim

¹⁵ D. Rohner, B.S. Frey, *Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media* in Public Choice, 2007, pp.129–145.

¹⁶ M. Aleksynska, *Civic participation of immigrants in Europe: assimilation, origin, and destination country effects* in European Journal of Political Economy, 2011, pp.566–585.

¹⁷ Spiegel Staff, *Terror from the Fringes: Searching for Answers in the "Charlie Hebdo" Attacks*, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/charlie-hebdo-attackers-radicalized-in-search-for-identity-a-1013475.html>, accessed on 19.01.2015.

¹⁸ A. al Mujahed, *Yemeni official: Said Kouachi visited Yemen in 2011, linked up with al-Qaeda*, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemeni-official-said-kouachi-visited-yemen-in-2011-linked-up-with-al-qaeda/2015/01/09/12397f9a-983f-11e4-927a-4fa2638cd1b0_story.html, accessed on 28.03.2015.

¹⁹ *Human Security Brief 2007*, available at <http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSB2007/2007HumanSecurityBrief-Chapter1-DeclineInTerrorism.pdf>, accessed on 25.01.2015.

²⁰ *Human Security Report 2013: The decline in global violence: evidence, explanation, and contest*, available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2013/HSRP_Report_2013_140226_Web.pdf, accessed on 25.01.2015.

population in Iraq, Egypt and Algeria has registered a downfall, while in Afghanistan or Pakistan it cannot be drawn a conclusion²¹.

| INTERVAL REGION | 1970- 1979 | 1980- 1989 | 1990- 1999 | 2000- 2009 | 2010- 2013 |
|---------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| GLOBAL TOTAL | 9837 | 31168 | 29529 | 24985 | 30316 |
| SOUTH AMERICA | 996 | 9698 | 5852 | 1150 | 561 |
| SOUTHEAST ASIA | 188 | 1086 | 1690 | 2707 | 2610 |
| SOUTH ASIA | 51 | 2873 | 4899 | 8008 | 12507 |
| MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA | 1086 | 2929 | 5685 | 8089 | 10084 |
| SUBSAHARAN AFRICA | 237 | 1575 | 2745 | 1721 | 2945 |
| FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS | 1 | 7 | 618 | 1096 | 773 |
| REST OF THE WORLD | 7178 | 13000 | 8040 | 2214 | 836 |

Table no. 1. The global evolution of terrorism between 1970 and 2013²²




Figure no. 2. The global evolution of terrorism between 1970 and 2013²³

Terrorist events of the past 40 years had shown a predominant orientation for the victims of international terrorism in countries that are not yet fully integrated into the global economy. According to the Global Terrorism Database, created by *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism* from U.S.A., the regions most affected by terrorism, in 2013, have problems adjusting to the global economy. In these regions, the trend of the last 40 years, is an upward (Table 1 and Figure 2), the last 30 years revealing a major influence on the global scale. There is a direct link between low economy and the inefficiency of the states in managing their own security issues, a phenomenon manifested through corruption and participation in illegalities²⁴. There are also cultural tensions and other caused

²¹ *A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World. Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries* available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/07/24/a-rising-tide-lifts-mood-in-the-developing-world/>, accessed on 24.01.2015.

²² National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, *Global Terrorism Database*, available at <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>, accessed on 08.04.2015.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ G.T. Abed, S. Gupta, *Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance*, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2002/govern/>, accessed on 22.01.2015.

by the lack of political legitimacy, a major influence being constituted by the relationship between high population density and inefficient supervision for aggressive groups²⁵.

The demonstration of the immediate impact of globalization on groups involved in international terrorism can be achieved through objective analysis of their manifests. The objective of Al Qaeda, for example, is to liberate Islam's sacred territory of Western influence, particularly the US, and global fight against infidels. The Taliban aim, besides introducing Sharia, is to banish all intruders, who in their view are the infidels. IS claims Muslim world, its purification and spiritual guidance.

The declared war against international terrorism, and targeting efforts on some organizations, such as al Qaeda and IS, must be done after understanding their ideologies. The refusal to recognize the political factor, regardless of its legitimacy, loses its effect by fighting against it. The war against terrorism is a long war, so the enrolment in it is demonstrating that the enemy is real, whether or not his influence is recognized.

Continuing the fight notifies the world that the political importance of the actor is sufficiently large that it consumes the attention and resources of the international community. In this way, governments, organizations and individuals across the globe who tend to oppose a system or model, either American, French or other origin, will find in al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization the ideological and material resources to oppose. In practical terms, globalization has created a system where a synthesized version opposes US and al Qaeda. Many groups that reject the policies of the United States and NATO will try to resist, and as long as al Qaeda or other similar organizations will have the ability to attract NATO and the US in conflict, those interested will join Islamic radicals²⁶.

Conclusions

International terrorism has registered a slight decline due to security policies adopted since 9/11, but it was still influenced by numerous attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. Globalization is a framework and proposes opportunities for both amplification of international terrorism and the fight against it, making the conflict of ideologies and access to financial resources and the necessary weapons possible.

It becomes difficult to analyze the ideological struggle, given that it opposes in some cases branches of the same thinking. Disputes between the "Base" al Qaeda and of the self-proclaimed Caliphate of the Islamic State can bring unexpected consequences in the future, as the struggle against a common threat can ally traditional enemies. In this triangular conflict, international antiterrorist coalition could be tempted to reduce its intervention in the Middle East, but unable to set their selves up as arbitrators in such a confrontation, NATO or the UN cannot ignore the situation created. The ability to adapt to the current globalization organization and diplomatic ability used to achieve common objectives can bring unforeseeable resolutions. Except terrorists motivated by global jihad, terrorism seems influenced by local circumstances, as in the case of FARC from Colombia, or movements in India, the Philippines and Turkey.

There are countries where, even if the conditions are favorable for the development of terrorism, these symptoms are not present, but there are unfavorable situations in which terrorist groups operate. Conversely, there are frames in which they prefer to miss the opportunity and not act. Regardless of the strategy and claims addressed by various groups, terrorist crimes remain voluntary.

²⁵ National Counterterrorism Center USA, *2011 The report on terrorism*, available at <https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf>, accessed on 21.03.2015.

²⁶ C. McIntosh, *Ending the War with Al Qaeda* in *Orbis*, 2014, pp. 104-118.

The causal relationship between globalization and terrorism cannot be directly quantified, being influenced by a wide range of variables related to social inclusion which should be carefully analyzed: education and knowledge of the local language by immigrant groups, labor law practice in relation to them or access to social services. All these aspects should be monitored and sanctioned if there are found discriminatory policies. Without a permanent threat from radical groups, European society is the exponent of anger at the freedom of opinion. There is fear that certain social categories unskilled tend to adhere to the radical guidelines, and that is why the social boundaries are a reverse against the elimination of physical borders, and it feeds inequality trends regarding the right to work and the right to an opinion.

One way to combat international terrorism is reducing vulnerability of the target. On contrary to current globalization, administrative decentralization, limiting the areas of influence of the media and implementing tools to prevent terrorism may represent real solutions. Immediate effects can be achieved by accelerating the integration of migrant populations through education. Promoting values of tolerance and self-improvement as superior to the sacrifice of oneself and of others, focused on young people can bring long-term effects.

In the radical spirit, the cost for terrorist acts hierarchically subordinate supreme values to be respected and they are not showing any alternative. Discouraging this thinking is done by reason, and reason is that a criminal act, regardless of amplitude cannot radically change the world. Therefore, by the channels that globalization has created, there must be emphasized the preventive-offensive side. It should not be forgotten the contribution of the currently global commitment to fight terrorism by limiting attacks and their effects.

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ONLINE ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: *Specialists viewed social movements from different perspectives: as a trend, as a response to social strains and as a direction throughout the society. This is a reflection of individual dissatisfaction in the modification of organizations or institutions. Protests from Romania in 2013 and 2014 become a social movement calling for the protection of nature.*

Also, exploring the dynamics of online activism for expressing resistance to a powerful society, had developed a critical mass approach to online activism. With the help of online activism, collective actions can be organized and amplify the conditions for revolutionary movements to form. Also, the access to the internet is simple and cheap for practicing social activism.

Keywords: open sources, online activism, social, movements, internet, national security.

Introduction

Online activism has become a subject of public debate in recent years, even stirring the interest of national defense, public order and national security institutions as, whether acting independently or as representatives of an extremist organization or of extremist social-political movements, activists can show indiscipline and insubordination to the state laws and forms of organization, and can reflect on social discipline.

It is worth noting that environmentalism has significantly influenced radical environmental movements and the anti-globalization movement. Nowadays, radical environmental structures are constantly evolving, and resort to novelty items generated by social dynamics in the information age, and, therefore, technological discoveries can be real advantages for the coordination of their activity.

1. Concept and History

Activism is based on the idea that all life forms are natural creations that must be protected and cherished, irrespective of their importance. Moreover, all resources that are part of the living environment of man and animals, by supporting and ensuring their existence and development, require the respect and care of humans, and, when their use becomes necessary for the existence and development of man and animals, it should be guided by adequate knowledge that can prevent their depletion and/or destruction.

Activism first of all develops at the same time with the idea of self, the idea of belonging to a group, even if the temporal starting point is not the same. An environmental identity involves the awareness of the impact that one's own self has on the environment, as well as the actions taken to protect it. Most often, they are accompanied by personal sacrifice to preserve nature.

Specialized literature (Gan, Pizmoni & Peled, 2002) describes the process behind the creation of such an identity type as starting from admiration for the environment, and interest in knowing as many sides of the subject as possible, leading to the forming of an attitude that is open to taking action, finally resulting in embracing activism. This stage marks the passing

from individual to group, as it not only involves an activity to one's own benefit, but also in what the activist perceives to be to the benefit of others. To this end, actual campaigns are launched, both on the streets, and virtually, which are most often supported by theories of individuals sharing the same values.

There is extensive literature available online on the topic, and authors concerned by the subject find inspiration in the practices of radical activist movements, and use nicknames as a way of protecting their real identity, and, in most cases, are, in fact, followers of the cause. The materials are then promoted through social media, generating new trends and the fast spreading of popular support.

Supporters of this trend believe that an educational necessity of dire interest is the systematic information of the population and, particularly, of children and young people, on the situation of the environment and of animals at a national (as well as an international) level, on the urgent need to reject all economic activities with a negative impact on the environment and life (such as the generation of nuclear power, the exploitation of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing, the exploitation of cyanide deposits, the non-environmental storage of waste and toxic waste) and to promote environmentally-friendly solutions in all spheres of social activity.

Practically, they aim to stop technology and modern industrialization and "return to nature". They are interested in promoting, either by themselves or together with other groups or organizations sharing their convictions, any fair causes relating to the environment, resources and animal protection, both locally, and nationally and internationally.

Despite the fact that it is a trend that supporters claim occurred as early as the first technological evolutions, online activism registered a very strong development following the establishment of "Greenpeace", protesting against nuclear testing and whale hunters¹.

The movement adapted to current issues, such as global warming, overpopulation and genetic engineering. One of supporters of activism concerned by the environment believe man is a threat to Earth, and want for the population of the world to be reduced, and be located in certain habitats, while the rest of Planet Earth will remain uninhabited. More often, activism supports start their activity with small, local projects (such as a selective collection system, cleaning public areas or various protected areas, craftsmanship using recyclable materials, ecological education projects or advocacy campaigns) and they mostly succeed in launching national social movements.

Several philosophies promoting environmental protection have developed from the radical trend, amongst which the most famous are: *deep ecology*, promoting "an eco-philosophical and normative movement inspired and consolidated, on the one hand, by our experience as humans in nature, and, on the other hand, by environmental knowledge"; *ecofeminism*, operating based on a parallel between "the oppression of women in patriarchal societies and environmental oppression"; *social ecology*, claiming that, to "save the environment", human society needs to copy the structure of nature and become both socially and economically decentralized; *bioregionalism*, dealing with the implementation of the social ecology thesis and promoting the development of a lifestyle and constructions that follow the ecological systems².

One of the models trying to deal with the issue concerning the development of social and environmental identity is entitled "From admiration to action" (Gan, Pizmoni & Peled, 2002). The model suggests four development stages leading to radical environmentalism: *a sense of wonder* – a positive feeling towards the environment; *knowledge of environmental*

¹<https://act.greenpeace.org/ea-action/action?ea.client.id=1827&ea.campaign.id=27009>, accessed at 17.04.2015

² Annie, Booth. *Ways of Knowing: Acceptable Understandings Within Bioregionalism, Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, and Native American Cultures*, disponibil la <http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/145/170>, accessed at 19.04.2015.

issues – the need to become acquainted with the environment, to learn and know more; *critical thinking* – this stage stands between knowledge and willingness to take action. At this stage, the student has to choose and develop a desirable attitude; *environmental activism* – the final stage.

Currently, most studies subordinated to the phenomenon are written by environmental activists and disseminated on social-media. The authors behind such works borrow from the practices of radical activist movements and use nicknames, as a way of protecting their real identity.

2. Social Sensitivity, a Favorable Foundation for the Spreading of Social Movements

As an important trigger of social movements is remarkable social sensitivity. Social sensitivity involves an empathic ability to correctly understand the feelings and thoughts of others and to follow social rules, norms and roles, as well as social inference skills. They mostly refer to the way in which society or certain social groups are sensitive to specific occurring changes.

The concept is closely related to the efficiency of the team and the satisfaction of its members. Therefore, individuals with high social sensitivity tend to be more open to new ideas and more willing to ensure a positive environment for the generation of new ideas, determining very high collective performance.

The concept is part of social intelligence, from which it has taken over a series of particularities, so that: undertaking certain responsibilities on certain social issues, showing interest on the topic of global business, as well as the consolidation of a common state of mind, are characteristic for socially sensitive individuals (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, pp. 185-211).

Social sensitivity is the common belief of a group that all members acting individually use their abilities towards a given scope. Therefore, the members of the group with high social sensitivity, also hold a high level of collective intelligence. In such a group, individuals try to perceive the emotions of others as well as possible. Moreover, groups consisting of a large number of women register a higher level of social sensitivity, as well as of collective intelligence, compared to those with less women.

Individually, individuals with a high level of social sensitivity accept the different behaviors of others and are characterized as good listeners. Moreover, they establish social relations with ease and quickly adapt to various social situations.

The essential stages taken by social movements before blowing out, are listed below: *structural conductivity* (a complex met by permissiveness, allowing the occurrence of collective behavior; examples: the geographical proximity of individuals, the extent to which they are centrally coordinated, etc.); *structural constraint* (the existence of factors creating a foundation for dissatisfaction; example: relative deprivation - where a group believes it is being deprived of something whose rightful holders they are, while another group has that certain something); *the increase and spreading of a generalized belief* (examples: mass hysteria, finding a “scapegoat”); *the existence of generating factors* (specific events confirming the generalized prior requirements); *the mobilization of participants to take action* (through leaders or through a dramatic event); *the existence of social control forces* (state instruments fighting against the abovementioned elements, such as public order forces, the army, intelligence institutions)³.

³ http://www.academia.edu/10215491/Sociologia_educatiei, accesat la 17.04.2015

The analysis of the various mixes between the stages listed above can provide answers to questions on the causes behind the occurrence of a social behavior or the suppression thereof.

3. Expression in Romanian

A phenomenon that, in the long run, could cause important changes in our country, is developing in the Romanian territory. Despite being based on the motivation of improving social dysfunctions or inequity, violent protests can lead to the aggravation thereof, and collective acts of violence can impact the state of balance of the community. Moreover, large masses of people are susceptible to the fast spreading of collective panic and hysteria. The use of social media instruments has increased the level of social sensitivity to disruptive inputs. Therefore, under the effect of the high capacity of data, information and messages concerning social causes or agendas of going “viral”, the availability to participate in protest movements of communities has increased. Street demonstrations are lead and maintained by representatives of the new generation who, in most countries of the world, have determined people to take to the streets and build a protest-culture.

Therefore, in the context of the protests against the “Roșia Montană” project, the subject of activism with important effects on the national interests was brought to the forefront. If a specific limit concerning the occurrence of anarchic or violent phenomena is crossed, it will attract the interest of national security. An argument to this extent are the strategic registries on the national economy and, from a much wider temporal perspective, on a medium- or long-term, in the context of the depletion of classic resources, a definition must be provided for economic evolution in such a vital area for the power of the state, the economic power of the state, together with its strategic weight in the global economic world.

The respective demonstrations began in 2013, in Bucharest, and subsequently also developed to cover other important cities in the country. The organizers, participants or simple supporters of such events were mostly represented by non-governmental organizations fighting for environmental protection and human rights.

Based on high social sensitivity, also mostly maintained by the development of social media components, protest actions have generated the formation of cores subordinated to environmental and civic activism. For the demonstrations carried out against the Roșia Montană mining project, the online world was the center of visibility, dissemination, communication and mobilization of the population.

The protests against the Roșia Montană mining project show a new type of hybrid collective behavior concerning online viral movements and the street action-based component.

Protesters were very active, particularly online, but also offline, through the organization and participation in street demonstrations against the Roșia Montană mining project, a topic that can be classified as environmental activism. The organization and mobilization were carried out particularly on Facebook, the online social platform, where pages were created to promote the street demonstrations. The activities carried out online are characterized by a series of common elements, and the organization and mobilization strategies thereof adopted the western foreign pattern. Such strategies include: creating a Facebook event page, the organization and participation in a series of street protests, the design of information pamphlets, the promotion of fragments from volumes written by famous authors, the use of hashtags on “Facebook”, the creation of cultural events, concerts, movie projections, crafts workshops, exhibits, media support provided by online publications, the organization of flashmobs, the creation of promotional materials, the sending of open letters, and the signing of online petitions to determine positive changes.

In terms of the role played by communication channels, aside for the pages dedicated to each event, it was noticed that the protests dedicated to the Roșia Montană project have benefitted from the support of common online community pages. Online communities such as “United We Save”, “United We Change” and “United We Can Save Roșia Montană”, created on the Facebook online platform, represented extremely important channels of communication, inside of which various messages and information concerning such topics were posted.

Conclusions

Radical environmental diversions can cause confrontations and street violence between the police and citizens. Environmental entities, that can organize or participate in such events, also determine the occurrence of acts of hooliganism. Moreover, virtual communication is an instrument that can serve the existing communities, showing their critical thinking concerning the world and society we live in, through actions taken in the offline world.

For the Romanian territory, the online world can be an important route in the development and spreading of online activism. The tendency of individuals to borrow from foreign beliefs and practices, as was the case for the Roșia Montană protests, are also added to the context. Virtual technological evolutions thus involve a series of risks and vulnerabilities that are also more numerous due to the technological impact that individuals or groups holding interests in such area hold available.

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INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION – SHARING SECRETS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

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Abstract: *What is the impact of intelligence globalization? Previous research has shown that full cooperation is unlikely, having great chances to do more harm due to the risk involved by sharing classified information. Even so, multilateral intelligence cooperation must exist, especially in the context of the inherent threats. The paper will examine the intelligence cooperation at the European Union level in the context of the globalization of the threats and of the previously unthinkable events that became part of the daily life in recent years. In our effort, we will start from the institutional theory in order to identify new dimensions and models of cooperation based on interdependency and good practices established in international relations. To do so, we will examine the errors behind the policing actions that occurred after the January 2015 Paris shootings.*

Keywords: *multilateral cooperation, intelligence, European Union, France, security arrangements*

Introduction

In the intelligence world, there is often said that there are friendly countries but not friendly intelligence agencies, nevertheless, the globalization of threats brought us in front of the great challenge of security and intelligence cooperation. The rise of transnational threats has put the intelligence community in front of the need for a closer cooperation that was unimaginable just twenty years ago. Given their nature the intelligence communities have a long tradition of low permeability, information sharing and cooperation and therefore, demand robust oversight.¹

The perils of spreading insecurity and criminality no longer come from conventional statist threats, terrorism, drug trafficking, narco-corruption, smuggling and money laundry are today the preeminent threats to national and regional security. Combating these has always been a difficult task and a priority for national governments. Nonetheless, it is impossible for a single government to tackle by its own entire transnational networks, that even if we only consider the legal aspects of such a task. The legal systems should provide a comprehensive framework to facilitate the fight against these threats in the timeliest manner as some threats to life need to be addressed with utmost celerity. The controls of the transnational threats are in most cases direct subjects to political will, and the actions of the respective national leaders are directly influencing the policies of cooperation in sensitive areas where professionals should have the leading role.

In this struggle intelligence agencies can't address the issue by themselves even at their own national level, thus resulting a double chain of cooperation at the national and international level. Taking into account in our case the European Union, we see a multilevel

¹ United States has overseeing mechanisms at Congressional and White House levels, notable being the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The European Union countries had developed national mechanisms of checks and balances tailored to their intelligence communities. Romania has established joint parliamentary committees for the control of each independent intelligence agency.

structure at European, national and in some cases departmental levels². So far, the European Union as institution has developed a series of formal institutions in the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security that address the issues of information sharing. On a voluntary basis, we have the “Club of Berne” that gathers the intelligence community of the 27 member states in a forum that exists ever since 1971, however, this doesn’t have an institutional structure.³ Other important aspects which have to be considered are the level of cooperation, how much states are willing to share and how this is to be done, and last but not least. What is the degree where cooperation interferes with their interest beyond the common goals.

At the national level the checks and balances mechanisms ensure the protection of private life as well as of human rights. Extensively we can say that in an international arrangement, they are guarding the national interests and are trying to prevent any damages to institutions and people.

1. European Union intelligence cooperation

The foundation of intelligence cooperation on the EU level was set in 1976 by the establishment of the TREVI Group⁴ with the main purpose of targeting the terrorist threat. It comprised all the twelve members of the European Community (at that time). Cooperation within the group was largely an intergovernmental one, the EC institutions being for the time left outside the bubble. The evolution of the international system lead widening of the competences to the inclusion of other transnational crimes.⁵

Nowadays, intelligence cooperation on the EU level tends to become an ever increasing component of the common policies. The mechanisms of establishing the defense, security or judicial cooperation policies have led in the establishment of community institutions for intelligence sharing. Currently, we can identify: The EU Centre for Intelligence (EU INTCEN), Intelligence Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (INTDIV), European Centre for Satellite Control and EUROPOL.⁶

We will try to argue that the union doesn’t necessarily need another institutional construction but rather a reshaping of the institutions in order to enable them the possibility to produce functional intelligence for the EU institutions. We agree with Smith that states don’t see themselves as having the same interests and will try to adapt their foreign policy to those interests.⁷ However, we believe that an impulse is needed to promote better bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the EU member states – a task that until today resided exclusively to the national governments.

We begin from the assumption that states began exchanging intelligence when they realized that it (the exchange) was significantly more viable than running very expensive intelligence operations abroad. The European Union is perhaps the most complex regional organization that has ever existed who put together a huge set of regulations, directives, treaties conventions and agreements which member states are obliged to respect. The Lisbon Treaty brings intelligence cooperation to a new level, instilling a community approach on such a sensitive area. Although there are no mandatory instructions given directly to the

²By department we understand the administrative units of the federal states, Eg. Landesbehörden für Verfassungsschutz (English: State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution; Germany).

³Federal Department of Justice, Switzerland, “Club de Berne” Meeting in Switzerland,” http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/dokumentation/mi/2004/ref_2004-04-28.html (accessed March 20, 2015).

⁴Terrorism, radicalism, extremism, international violence.

⁵ *Vezi* Tony Bunyan, “Trevi, Europol and the European State,” *State-watching the New Europe*, 1993.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Michael E. SMITH, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: the Institutionalization of Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 18.

Community institutions, this provides the basis of intelligence cooperation step by step, starting from the sharing of information from open sources and advanced technologies such as satellites.

We will try to illustrate the need to expand the capacity / skills of the EU INTCEN starting from the operational errors occurred in addressing the January 2015 Paris shootings. We consider this case a good example to demonstrate the need to increase intelligence cooperation but also to demonstrate security flaws within the interior of the Schengen area. Due to space limitations of this paper we will focus on what EU INTCEN could have done in respect to the Paris shootings and their aftermath and how security policies should include intelligence cooperation at EU level. The centre was integrated to the Office of the High Representative and to the Secretariat of the Council. It currently works using data collected by the national intelligence agencies, with the purpose of monitoring potential regional crises, terrorist attacks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to provide assistance to the Council. The centre doesn't have an official legal status, however it was modelled initially after the sister structure of NATO, where the member states gather together intelligence on a voluntary basis.⁸

INTCEN brings together experts specialized in domestic and foreign intelligence from each EU member state. It hosts between forty and eighty analysts, however this number can increase as result of successive EU enlargements.⁹ Currently we can distinguish two major areas of operation: (1) putting together intelligence from the member states; and (2) providing strategic threat analysis to the High Representative and the Council, based on its own data as well as from that collected by EUROPOL. This seeks to increase the analytical capacity of its three units: Operational, Analysis, Consular Affairs.¹⁰ Another important element of the cooperation is the establishment of a formal environment for the meetings of the heads of the intelligence agencies, within the Anti-terrorist Group, as well as for providing intelligence support to EUROPOL.

2. Non-conventional threats against the European Union member states

The end of the Cold War has brought into attention the need for redefining the concept of security, widening the threats and introducing the so called non-traditional or non-conventional threats. This has become widely accepted as countries redefined their national-security strategies through years.¹¹ Leaving aside terrorism, criminal offences such as drug trafficking, narco-corruption, smuggling and money laundry are producing more damage to the national security of the EU member states. Nonetheless, the first earned a front row place on the agenda as it's the most visible and produces the strongest disturbance to the ordinary way of life.

It must be underlined that Europe has benefited in general of a good security environment. However, this is difficult to be said of its surrounding areas. The European security environment is unquestionably linked to some of the most vivid security zones in the world, such as the Middle East, North Africa and the Caucasus. The link between insecurity and the poor economic and political performance of these regions only strengthens the threat to the fabric of the respective states. Considering all these it is of utmost importance for the

⁸ Cecile WENDLING, "Explaining the Emergence of Different European Union Crisis and Emergency Management Structures," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 18, no. 2 (2010): 74-82. p.77.

⁹ Mai'a DAVIS CROSS, "EU Intelligence Sharing" (prepared for delivery at the 2011 Meeting of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, MA, March 3-5, 2011.).

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Eg. Romania's law 51/1991 concerning national security doesn't make references to non-traditional threats, these being regulated only when terrorism became widespread, the first law to address it was enacted in 2004.

European Union to have a clear image of the developments in its. Due to the nature of their governments, a majority of these states are more concerned with the survival of the current political regime rather than investing in fighting against transnational criminality.

The circulation of goods and the movement of people and capital are one of the most important features of the union and at the same time one of the most important challenges for its internal security. The first challenge that arises is that allows a greater space for the development of the criminal organizations that can expand without the limitations of intra-union borders. Coming together with that is the elimination of the possibility to detect criminal threats at the national borders, the only border remaining outside the Schengen Area. Thirdly, the introduction of a single currency facilitates not only the economy but also can make easier for criminal and terrorist groups to engage in large money laundry operation and other illicit activities. The free movement of people makes easier for the criminal groups targeting one state to seek safety in other member states once they have been identified. It also makes easier for them to communicate and better coordinate their actions inside the union¹².

The second pillar in building intelligence cooperation through the European Union was the common foreign and security policy. It is extremely difficult to address such a task in the absence of information sharing. This is currently regulated in Chapter 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, providing a progressive frame for a common defense policy, which might lead, if necessary, to a common defense, although today the major differences between the opinions of the Member States concerning the security and defense capabilities have not fully achieved that goal¹³.

The objectives and general guidelines for the CFSP are determined by the European Council, and are articulated through specific legal instruments (decisions and joint actions) adopted unanimously by the Council of the European Union based on those general guidelines, the exclusion the adoption of legislative acts¹⁴.

The Lisbon Treaty strengthens the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in order to bring more coherence and efficiency in the Union's external action and improve the role and visibility of the EU in the world. Additionally, acknowledged a *solidarity clause* which states that the members of the Union should act in cooperation in cases of natural and man-made disasters or in cases of terrorist attacks.¹⁵

3. Paris shootings and France's response

France's security was tested by terrorist movements a number of times during the last half of century, several attacks preceding the ones of 7-9 January 2015. Charlie Hebdo was constantly the subject of death threats due to its politics and anti-clerical stance. In the first week of 2015 when most French were just coming back to their regular schedule France was shocked by one of the most powerful terrorist attacks of the last thirty years. It was deadly well planned. The attack took place around 11.30 in the morning when the journalists were preparing for the weekly briefing. Eyewitness reported that the shooters asked for some of the journalists names. They described the attackers as *cold* and *probably wearing bullet-proof vests*, walking with no rush to their gateway vehicle. Footage shows the attackers screaming

¹² See James WALSH, "Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough," *JCMS* 44, no. 3 (2006): 625-43. p. 627.

¹³ See European Union, "Foreign and Security Policy," *Europa.eu*, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (accessed May 21, 2013).

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

we avenged the Prophet Mohammed, and *We killed Charlie Hebdo*. On the way to their escape, they killed at a short range a wounded police officer nearby.¹⁶

On January 9, Amedy Coulibaly together with Hayat Boumeddiene, armed with a machine gun, an assault rifle and two other handguns attacked a kosher hypermarket in Porte de Vincennes, Eastern Paris, killing four and taking several hostages.¹⁷ The latter managed to flee Paris to Madrid and later Syria through turkey without raising any concerns. Despite having an European arrest warrant, the judicial and police cooperation was not perfect and no action could be taken against her.

The guns used by the terrorist cell to kill seventeen people in and around Paris, as well as the financing and preparation of the attacks originated outside France, although the authors were domestic terrorists. All these are leading us to the conclusion that exchanging intelligence and police data can lead to a better picture of the elements that can generate potential threats, and to a better interpretation of questionable behavior that can raise legitimate suspicion.

In this moment, it is difficult to say how important the error of judgement was in the French national-security system. Although the suspects were known to have visited Middle Eastern countries, they were not on any terrorism suspects list. We have to remind that it is extremely difficult to keep track of several thousand western European citizens who joined terrorist groups in the absence of an extensive surveillance program. France only has over a thousand of nationals – both by birth and by naturalization – that travelled to Iraq or Syria to join the jihadist movements and more recently the Islamic State.¹⁸ French intelligence agencies are among the most powerful. However, no agency has the legal authority nor the resources to conduct an intrusive and constant surveillance of thousands of citizens who never committed any felony nor were they ever charged.

The challenge is to identify which individual networks deserve more attention from the security agencies, taking into account that the intelligence resources are scarcely limited. This halves proportionally if we exclude the link between nationals and countries of potential high risk. Therefore, would be unfair to blame exclusively the French intelligence and police agencies for not monitoring Said Kouachi after his return from Yemen, in the absence of reasonable threats. In other words, before we can claim a failure of French intelligence. We must first understand the wider picture and the resources involved in a mass surveillance project.

There are reasons to believe that the French authorities were unable to gather all the necessary data to tackle the problems caused by the Kouachi brothers, otherwise a red flag should have been risen by their large stockpile of weapons and ammunition. This, however, is rather a policing failure rather than an intelligence one and also a display of the bad relationship between the local Muslim communities and authorities.

Conclusions

Despite all the progress, one might say that intelligence cooperation has a long way to go in what concerns the institutional dynamics and efficiency in order to have more accurate information and analysis. Even though at this moment, the EU INTCEN makes use only of the information provided by the national agencies, and of the TechInt and GeoInt made available by the same member states, this might not be the case in the near future as the Union advances to a closer cooperation. Indeed, this might represent, as some argue, the *birth* of a

¹⁶ “Charlie Hebdo attack: Manhunt – live reporting”. BBC News. 9 January 2015.

¹⁷ “Charlie Hebdo attack: Manhunt – live reporting”. BBC News. 9 January 2015.

¹⁸ “Charlie Hebdo attack: Manhunt – live reporting”. BBC News. 9 January 2015.

European CIA.¹⁹ However, as academics it is unfortunate for us to notice how little is being said about this important component of the European Union, therefore, being difficult to gain a complete image and make realistic evaluations.

Sharing information and a closer cooperation comes as a natural result in the process of construction of the European common areas. What have started sixty years ago as the community of coal and steel has evolved into a set of complex regional mechanisms designed to promote national interests of the member states and the common goals of the union. Trans-border cooperation is done through a series of regional models and mechanisms that involves the forthright cooperation of regions or municipalities. Even in important matters such as justice and home affairs we see the predisposition for a direct exchange between the agencies, sometimes mitigated by European arrangements such as EuroPol or EuroJust, going beyond the *traditional* governmental framework.

The years that followed the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon had seen an increasing cooperation and the creation of a better institutional framework at the level of the union. Intelligence remains a sensitive issue, and it will long be a sovereign attribute of the states. Nonetheless, they have shown the willingness to adapt themselves to an ever-changing international environment and to threats that can no longer be addressed locally.

Extensively we can say that economic and social integration across the union had also *integrated* the risks and threats that states had to deal with. In this environment, it is easier for a national problem to gain regional and union-level prominence, a strategy of containment being possible only through a close cooperation of the state mechanisms that address these issues.

The fight against terrorism will be lost in time if we pretend to ignore history, motives and psychology of the perpetrator. Alternatively, while the answer to simply stigmatize millions of people, generating more discrimination, hatred and terror. And we cannot ignore the fact that terrorism is terrorism, because nothing incites more to war than injustice. For this purpose, it should be established a communication network of information at EU level. We must not neglect and technical and political challenges involved in implementing such a network. The support of the intelligence community is imperative in creating a framework for addressing transnational threats. We believe that to achieve a closer union cooperation is necessary to increase the capacity of national intelligence agencies.

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¹⁹ Cecile WENDLING, *op cit.*

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THE IMPACT OF HIGHLY COMPLEX SECURITY CONTEXTS ON INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract: *Correctly identifying and characterizing the overall security medium and the multitude of factors, big and small, specific and general, that impact daily the international security context represents a continuous challenge for specialists and casual observers alike.*

In the 21st century, intelligence communities have become aware that a traditional approach, centered on industrial age organizational and cultural models, no longer "cuts it" in a highly complex world.

Although new models have started to emerge, there are no generalized solutions ready to be implemented. This leads to vulnerabilities both new and old that cannot be mitigated with powerful, albeit lamenting, speeches alone.

This article aims to answer some of these questions by correlating emerging security trends with different solutions put forth by thinkers in the domain of structural adaptation.

Complexity theory plays a pivotal role in this approach of counter exposing theoretical and practical facets in the field of change management.

Keywords: *security, intelligence communities, structural adaptation, Complexity, management*

1. Theoretical Guidelines in Complexity – Decision Making Relationship

The study of complexity concept is accompanied by a series of dilemmas, in terms of both quality - ambiguity of defining the phenomenon - and quantity – the first level of a complex system. As it results from the interaction of system components, complexity becomes manifest within the system itself. The distinction between complex and simple depends sometimes on the "distance" you put between you and the system.

Paul Cilliers warns about the risk resulting from the "dissection" of a system, namely that "the analytical method destroys what it seek to understand", a situation that can be avoided by using advanced computer modeling techniques that allow us to simulate the behavior of complex systems without having to understand them. We can do with technology what we cannot do with science¹.

Although his confidence in technology is considerable, experience in areas where analysis backed by the support of IT tools, in particular the economic field (as Nassim Nicholas Taleb wrote in his work *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder*), proves that the analyst's

¹ Paul Cilliers, *Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems*, New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 3-5.

expertise is essential in the process of integrating analytical conclusions into an appropriate formula to be included in the decision-making cycle².

The explanation of the difference between the two approaches lies in the degree of formalization. Economists are the most addicted to observing certain rules, while historians and political science experts sit at the opposite pole, when it comes to describing a sequence of specific events, especially diplomatic, military or legal issues, or other decisions. The specific technique used by supporters of a strongly formalized approach is sheer mathematics. It is assumed that they are aware of their preferences regardless of the circumstances. In the case of markets, for instance, the patterns point to participants' eagerness to get a particular asset or service that is sought by all in any supply conditions. When the approach is not formalized, there is no attempt to define key terms or advance hypotheses. This approach is often called the „historical” method, when used along with methods for dating specific events.

A promising development was represented by emergence of studies holding an intermediate position in terms of formalization degree: in political science, Herbert Simon "pioneered" the shift from mathematical models to the one described above.

The "historical" approach was amended by researchers who applied a scheme of categories when comparing certain cases. This step was made towards applying a systematic method, as the terms appearing in such a list were general concepts. However, in the absence of a definition of terms, the degree of formalization is not high. Systematic methods go beyond the definition of key concepts, formulating hypotheses to be tested through empirical investigation³.

In fact, some researchers have specifically pointed to the relationship between analysis and decision-making. Having gained experience in various management positions within the *intelligence*, Richard K. Betts has shown that, in most cases of intelligence failure, the most serious mistakes were seldom made by raw intelligence collectors, occasionally by experts who produce the final analysis and most often by decision makers who were the beneficiaries of information products⁴.

In his argument, Betts says that many constraints occurred during the optimal information processing process lie in the structure of authority and allocation of time and resources. One problem is that the domination of operational authorities over intelligence professionals and the compromise between objectivity and bias impact on the quality of *intelligence* products. Operators have more influence in the decision making process, but are less able to impartially analyze the records as they are mainly interested in the operation success. Independent analysts are less interested and more objective, but have no influence. Decision makers do not trust or do not take into consideration analysts' arguments, giving more weight to information from operational sources⁵.

Decision-making dynamics does not favor analytical refining. During a crisis, data and political decision-making surpass analysis, the consultation process being overtaken by events and cautious assessments cannot be analyzed in due time. In the decision making process, *modus operandi* should meet a series of requirements - or constraints – in order to be accepted. In some

² Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragil. Ce avem de câștigat de pe urma dezordinii*, București, Ed. Curtea Veche, 2014, p.216-230

³ Harold D. Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity", in *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1955, pp. 381-399.

⁴ Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are inevitable", in *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, October 1978, pp. 62-63.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

cases, some requirements are regarded as the aim of the action. But choosing between a plurality of constraints is arbitrary, and in many ways, it is preferable to take into consideration the entire set of requirements. This conclusion is applied to both individual and organizational decision making process.

One cannot always assume that the set of possible actions is already known by the decision maker. In most concrete situations, one must identify, shape or synthesize the possible courses of action. In the process of identifying a satisfactory solution, the pursued goals - namely constraints to be applied along with the solution - can play an important role at two levels: the objectives can be directly used to synthesize the proposed solutions (alternative generation); or they can be used to test the reliability of the proposed solution (alternative testing)⁶.

In short, a compressed version of the decision making process could be formulated as follows: participants (with different value perspectives) using basic values through various strategies interact in an arena to influence outcomes and impacts⁷.

2. Complex System Analysis

The notion of advanced analysis was theoretically introduced to create the link between the two areas. It is regarded as a field of knowledge and a mental discipline designed to support the decision making process in complex environments. It also aims to help analysts to be bold and seek, find, and take the lead. Advanced analysis represents the sum of high-level cognitive processes that lead to specific and deep reasoning and understanding of the operational environment as well as superior knowledge to that of the opponent. It comprises 14 cognitive elements: decomposition; critical thinking; link; pattern; trend; anticipatory character; technical characteristics; anomaly; trend; cultural features; semiotics; melting analysis; recomposition; synthesis⁸.

This model is necessary to make data and nonlinear behavior situations in a complex environment operational. "Nonlinear" is considered the element whose behavior is described by a set of nonlinear equations and whose output is not proportional with the input⁹. A nonlinear problem has disproportionate effects as compared to its causes, being thus intractable and often impossible to predict with a high degree of certainty.

In a complex environment, less important activities or events can cause more harm than the triggering event. It is important to understand that in order to manage the process of anticipating and understanding the secondary or tertiary effects.

A complex environment appears chaotic because everything is in constant motion and change. The mix of individuals, machines, organizations, religions, and cultures contributes to emergence of movement. However, there is order in chaos; nevertheless, individuals need to get familiar with the environment in order to be able to identify the basic order. A complex

⁶ Herbert A. Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal", in *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1964, pp. 1-22.

⁷ H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, *apud* Harold D. Lasswell, "Current Studies of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity", in *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1955, p. 382.

⁸ Gary Citrenbaum, Wayne Michael Hall, *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*, Washington, DC, Praeger Security International, 2010, p. 2.

⁹ ***, "Define Non linear at Dictionary.com", available at <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/non+linear>, retrieved on December 15, 2014.

environment has sensitive variables, which lead to change. This occurs through provocation or stimulation and sometimes it can be stable or comprehensible. But when talking about sensitive variables, nothing is stable or comprehensible. In some cases, the very presence of sensitive, volatile variables is the catalyst for exponential leaps in terms of results/ effects/ consequences (as in the case of secondary or tertiary effects). Moreover, beside these variables, there may be windows of opportunity for bias. Also, complex adaptive systems can be found in complex environments, which represent a dynamic network consisting of multiple agents (cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) working in parallel, operating and reacting to other agents' actions. Control of such a system tends to be deeply dispersed and decentralized. Coherent behavior in such a system is due to competition and cooperation among agents. The general behavior of the system is the result of the enormous number of decisions made every moment by many individual agents¹⁰.

In this mix of variables, seemingly difficult to be introduced in a coherent analytical pattern, one of the solutions comes from the effort of synthesizing knowledge about complex systems, an effort initiated by Herbert Simon. He highlighted that the attempt to look for common features among several types of complex systems is useless. It is useful to study the behavior of adaptive systems in terms of feedback and homeostasis and to analyze resilience in terms of selective information theory. The idea of *feedback* and information, as well as of evolution, relativism, and operational and axiomatic method provides a reference framework for studying a wide range of situations¹¹.

In his 1962 study, Herbert Simon lays out a series of elements observed during the study of complex systems encountered in behavioral sciences. Thus, he defines complex system as the system consisting of a large number of parts that interact in a *non-simple* way explained by the formula "the whole is more than the sum of its parts". The central theme is the idea that, frequently, complexity takes the form of hierarchy and hierarchical systems have certain common properties independent of their own content. Hierarchy is one of the central structural schemes used by an "architect" of complexity. A hierarchical system is that system consisting of interconnected subsystems, each of them having, in turn, a hierarchical structure to the lowest elementary subsystem level. That percentage is arbitrarily established in the case of most systems found in nature.

Simon refers to the systems in which there is no relationship of subordination among subsystems - such as, for instance, "human" organizations. In Simon's vision, this hierarchy means complex systems analyzed in successive sets of subsystems¹². He also says that of all possible complex forms, hierarchies are the only ones that have time to evolve. The hypothesis according to which complexity is hierarchical does not distinguish between linear hierarchies (crystals, tissues, polymers) and intermediate forms: both forms exist in the complex systems found in nature. Complex systems evolve from simple ones more quickly if there are stable intermediate forms.

An advantage of his theory is the ability, detected in hierarchical systems, to distinguish between interactions among subsystems, on the one hand, and interactions within subsystems, on

¹⁰ John Holland and M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity*, New York, Touchstone Books, 1992, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complex_adaptive_system, *apud* Gary Citrenbaum, Wayne Michael Hall, *Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments*, Praeger Security International, 2010, p. 11.

¹¹ Herbert Simon, "The architecture of complexity", in *Emergence: Complexity & Organization*, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, 2005, p. 139.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

the other hand. Interactions at different levels may be of different magnitudes. In a formal organization, there will be, on average, more interaction between two staff members of the same department than between two persons from different departments¹³.

3. At the Boundary between Complexity and Chaos. Current Security Environment

Building a solid research-based approach in terms of correlation with the current security environment requires an analysis of today's society, especially of those components with an impact on *intelligence*. Despite its downward trend, one of the visions that gained ground globally is specific to realistic school that generated and developed the theory of blocks over the last century, according to which security is a concept specific to the military field. From this perspective, the main actors are states, while national interest is defined in terms of power.

The realistic model was gradually replaced by integrative perspectives from the threats point of view, starting from the idea that, in the context of globalization, many of them occur at transnational level. Thus, the dimensions (political, economic, social, military, cultural, environmental, information, etc.) of security are separately assessed. Subsequently, they are integrated into a vision whose focus is citizen and community safety. The result was the construction of private or integrative theories (realism, liberalism, "balance of power", "polarism"), whose relevance in today's society is subject to permanent interpretation.

Besides equidistant approaches, we are facing a *summum* of extreme and subjective interpretations lacking scientific support, given the fact that various political actors, "invoke, under the cover of national security, - depending on circumstances - a wide range of actions and political activities"¹⁴.

Taking as starting point the multiplicity of interpretations and views on those elements impacting on the security situation, based on experience and studied theory, we resorted to our own classification that facilitates analytical processing, which distinguishes between systemic and volatile factors.

Correlation between systemic factors is achieved through the general coordinates of international environment, being more stable in terms of temporal developments and therefore easier to predict. However, the inflections that have seen an upward trend lately, leading to shorter development cycles, require a more careful monitoring and rapid response when dangerous trends are identified. The most relevant systemic factors are the following:

- *Geopolitical and geostrategic coordinates* are substantial and, at the same time, with a considerable impact in terms of global security, they translate into: successive transfer from bipolarity to unipolarity and then to pluripolarity or even nonpolarity; volatility of political commitments; reshaping of development axes; resurgence of non-political actors; return to challenging certain international law rules aimed at blasting security balance to an unprecedented level since the end of World War II.

- *Global economic characteristics*. Concrete elements include: financial crisis that has shaken the foundations of global economy; dispute over energy and resource control due to imbalance between providers and consumers and use of resources as instruments of political and security pressure; shifting the development pole towards the Asia-Pacific region, resulting in reconfiguration of economic and trade flows, and movement of security interests towards those

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁴ Ioan Bidu, Cristian Troncoță, *Coordonate de securitate*, București, Editura ANI, 2005, p. 9.

areas; expanding consumer society to areas that were formerly autarchic and built on subsistence patterns; pernicious allocation of resources according to interests of small groups of decision makers.

-*Technological progress.* Communications revolution has produced a fundamental change in the security context by democratizing access to information. Computerization of some consumer goods used in everyday life generated a huge impact in terms of individual privacy, which generated substantial concern due to potential threats posed by a "surveillance society".

-*Social reconfigurations.* Although progress at all social levels is considerable, poor-rich disparities are rising, involving also destabilizing effects such as revival of exclusion phenomena and rejection of otherness, translated into escalation of religious extremism, xenophobia, and nationalism; more vehement expression of social discontent, including protests or actions aimed at destabilizing the authorities deemed responsible.

On the other hand, imposing democratic standards and their social impact see a fluctuant trend. One could notice an offensive of authoritarian, totalitarian or fundamentalist views, all based on the idea of annihilation, sometimes physical, of individuals with different ideas, perceptions or opinions.

Another direction more and more difficult to ignore is increasingly prominent shift of social interaction from offline to online activities, namely by expanding platforms for social interaction. Several recent examples prove the ability to influence, in terms of action, the opinion trends or cyberspace-based initiatives with an impact on the security environment.

- *Strengthening the military component.* The use of military force has become a privileged solution to solve political disputes. Large-scale military operations resulting in many casualties are sparking in more and more areas, including Europe, which has been so far considered protected by postwar security treaties. One of the immediate effects is escalation of a new arms race. Success seen by atypical and asymmetric threats against traditional approaches represents an increasingly serious reason of a concern.

- *Security policies.* The opening period that began after 1989 is about to come to an end. Giving up cooperation and shifting to disputes and even confrontations, on a much larger scale, have seen a rising trend in recent years. This process results in a change in emphasis in terms of security actions, which shifted from prevention to countering, and therefore in an increase in the weight of operational components, respectively the tactical component over the strategic one.

Considering the dramatic impact of developments in Ukraine, we are witnessing, at least among vulnerable actors of international law, which cannot allocate major resources to ensure their long-term strategic needs, a resurgence of the need to be part of an alliance providing a security guaranty. The immediate effect is, at least in Europe, a decline of neutrality as security solution. Another material consequence is the increase in the allocated resources, after a long period of cost-cutting.

On the other hand, by their subjective and random nature, volatile factors are mostly those producing strategic surprises. It is difficult to include them in analytical assessments through common methodologies, as it is impossible to standardize their identification, description, and assessment.

A reasoning that may be issued from the perspective of a neutral observer of current security developments is that we are witnessing an increasingly rapid succession of events, processes or transformations posing potential risks that take policymakers by surprise and therefore are not followed by appropriate countermeasures. The explanation is that, by its nature, the decision maker can act effectively and programmatically only on systemic elements.

In the past two decades, the possibility for a subjective element with low relevance at global level or included on private agendas of interests to affect global security has increased significantly due to major social transformations - globalization and democratization of access to information.

On the one hand, the greater role of media in shaping public perception has significantly increased the risk of manipulation. Media pressure has the ability to cause rapid changes in priorities, so that vectors with broad access to media sources can become agents of transformation in the security environment as opposed to real interests of the community or system evolutions.

At the same time, there may be particular agendas of some policymakers, particularly in societies with precarious democratic control or during times of crisis, triggering actions opposed to national, regional or global interest and promoting their own interests as state political reasons.

The existence of volatile factors and their role in history are well known for their influence in various crucial moments.

Their impact is, however, emphasized in contemporary society by the global realities described above. For this reason, it becomes increasingly clear that in case of a consistent analytical approach, it is very difficult to quantify these factors, leading to difficulties in assessing trends and hence alternatives available to decision makers.

Conclusions

Facing a model difficult to be quantified according to traditional knowledge standards, the society is about to reconsider its perspectives on managing challenges it faces, including in terms of security.

If in a first stage, the main concern was to understand the context and new mechanisms characterizing the system, which remains a highly promising research direction, the need to identify solutions adapted to the new model of development has become more acute.

A thorough study of the specialty literature, especially the fundamental one, points out that, at least in intelligence area, resources provided by research on decision-making theory are considerable.

These resources are due mainly to the fact that, at least theoretically, during technological expansion, societal models were built based on the rational theory despite the fact the decision-makers' action was rather incremental.

In order to see to what extent the systemic contradiction has expanded at the level of intelligence activity, we need to get familiar with the existing organizational models and understand their functioning as the intelligence community faces challenges caused by the gaps between current practice and requirements of a society undergoing an unprecedented transformation process.

One of the priorities will be to see whether theorizing efforts in the intelligence field, which started in the mid-20th century, focus primarily on knowledge or are aimed at finding answers or only temporary solutions, designed to provide practitioners with a certain sense of comfort in dealing with immediate problems.

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NATO AND AFGHANISTAN'S PROSPECTS

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Abstract: *NATO played an important role in democratizing Afghanistan. This paper aims to analyse the main issues that occurred in this process and how they influenced the design of ISAF's mandate. It will start by examining the concept of security and will build the matrix of the main security concerns based on the perspectives of the three actors analyzed: NATO, the United States and Afghanistan. This will be done by outlying the collective understanding and the prospects of the Alliance, and the resources that have been involved up to today. We seek to find the major elements of the policy makers and military leaders and how these are framing the country's role in the international arena. A secondary element observed will be how international security policy shapes the domestic security discourse. The issue of identity will play an important role in examining specific actors, the context and the priority given by certain actors to specific goals.*

Keywords: NATO, United States, securitization, Afghanistan, ISAF

Introduction

For more than half of the last century the highest threat to the Western world was considered to be a large scale invasion or a pin-point strike, however this changed in the years after the end of the Cold War. The shift of the geopolitical allegiances at the beginning of the 1990s created a more vibrant and complex system of threats in which some states chose to sponsor irregular threats and paramilitary organizations involved in the spread of terrorism. Weapons proliferation and black market sales, drugs and failed states became increasingly relevant to the security of European states. In this article we will examine to what extent NATO's involvement in Afghanistan contributed to the advancement of the local security environment and to the security of Europe itself in a larger sense. The methodological approach is mostly quantitative. We will analyze the threats as they are identified in the policy documents and the security strategies.

After the end of the East-West conflict, there was an increased tug of war between the US President and Congress. The US was a *world power without an opponent*, which also meant that those threats' context was omitted, which had been used by US President for decades in order to justify their exclusive claim to leadership in the formulation of American world policy. As a result, the determination of national interests became increasingly affected by a *tug-of-war* between the White House and the Capitol¹, had subsided since the interest of the American public on foreign policy issues clearly².

The shockwave of September 11, 2001 dramatically shifted the agenda and the debates on the international relations stage from the relatively calm of the 1990s to a more active one

¹ Jeremy D. ROSNER, *The New Tug-of-War. Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC 1995.

² See, James M. LINDSAY, *The New Apathy. How to Uninterested public is Reshaping Foreign Policy*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 79 (September / October 2000) 5, page 2 -. 8

focused on brute actions. The events moved the understanding of security from a so called “social agenda”³ to a more neo-conservative approach and classic concept, in which Al Qaeda and the new wave of terrorism became the main threat. Given the declaration of the then President G.W. Bush the United States were at war with terrorism⁴, we can extend this by saying that counter-terrorism became an active part of the United States foreign policy. To justify the intervention against the Taliban regime, the United States had proclaimed an axis of evil of the countries they related to the severest of the global threats⁵.

Nonetheless, it may be incorrect to judge the US foreign policy solely on their war against terrorism; one may say that the events of 2001 might have represented a window of opportunity to project *Pax Americana* outside America’s *comfort zone*. If we believe that there cannot be order without authority and the US were the only ones that could provide security and stability at the international level, then we have to question the multipolar world itself. In addition, it must, given the intrinsic superiority of its values and institutions. US hegemony would be, in short, both a political necessity, and a moral imperative and must therefore be accepted by everyone. That intention is clearly expressed in a new national security doctrine of the United States, known as the *Bush Doctrine*. This doctrine is intended, first, to deter any state support networks like Al Qaeda, and that *exemplary* purpose is one of the keys to the war in Afghanistan. However, it is also proposed that, given the new threats of global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deterrence is not effective, and the only way out of this dilemma is the *preemptive strike*, unilaterally against those states which are considered as a *potential* threat.

Henry Kissinger has argued that this doctrine is *revolutionary* rather than *conservative* as a means to leaving behind the founding principles of the present international system, in particular the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, and standards relating to the right to self-defense⁶.

The terrorist attacks in the September 2001 in the United States lead to the enactment of the UNSCR 1368 and 1373, putting counter-terrorism in a top spot of the public agenda. These two resolutions refined the UN conventions in the field, some of them as old as the 1960s. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution submitted by the United States on combating international terrorism through the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in particular Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Romania engaged in the stabilization of Afghanistan as early as 2002, two years before the country became a full member of NATO, its efforts increasing steadily during the operation Enduring Freedom⁷. Its commitment is described as directed towards the success of the operation and for ensuring a stable environment in Afghanistan, which is essential for the Afghan people to live in peace and have a choice, without the oppression of drug traffickers⁸.

1. The early years (2001-2005)

“On October 7, 2001, the United States launched military strikes against the Taliban regime in retaliation for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, said to have been masterminded by bin Laden from his base in Afghanistan. Shortly after the September 11

³ See George W. BUSH, State of the Union, 2002.

⁴ James M. LINDSAY, *op. cit.*

⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁶ 9 KISSINGER, Henry. “The Politics of Intervention. Iraq 'regime change' is a revolutionary strategy”, Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2002.

⁷ Romanian Permanent Delegation to NATO, *Romania in Afghanistan (ISAF)* <http://nato.mae.ro/en/node/371> accessed 30 March 2015.

⁸ *Ibidem.*

attacks, the US demanded the Taliban surrender Bin Laden to the appropriate authorities, but the Taliban rejected the ultimatum. US military intervention followed. At the UN-supported Bonn conference in December 2001, representatives from four Afghan factions agreed to establish a broad-based interim government. The US-backed Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai, exiled under the Taliban, was installed as Afghanistan's new interim president⁹.

The Anglo-American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was transformed within a short time in a NATO operation behind the formal justification of an Article 5 intervention. However, it is just to be observed that the most difficult part of the intervention was yet to come, with NATO embarking to the hard task of stabilizing Afghanistan and supporting a central government and the rule of law. The early ISAF mandate was focused on Kabul and its vicinity, rather than on the stabilization of the entire country.¹⁰

Its mandate initially concerned only the Afghan capital Kabul and its suburbs in the immediate vicinity; however, the picture would be changed when the United States had turned their attention elsewhere, leaving the allies to assume combat missions in Afghanistan for them. Once that happened, the role of ISAF and consequently that of NATO in Afghanistan became by far the clearest and the United States then decided to divert much of its military resources to Iraq in 2003. In direct correlation with the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, on 11 August 2003, the command of ISAF was officially hired by NATO.

2. The strategic purpose

First, Afghanistan constitutes a geo-strategic hub that goes to link Iran, the former Soviet Union and China, making it quite palatable. Throughout its entire history this region has served as a buffer between Iran, India and China. Later, after made independent from Iran, Afghanistan has served the same function between Iran, Russia (then the USSR) and India, at that time still subject to British colonial rule, then divided between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan is the perfect place to drive a wedge between the major Eurasian powers and to establish a permanent military presence from which to launch future operations across the continent¹¹.

Secondly, it is the gateway to the Central Asian countries rich in raw materials, which bypasses the territories of Iran, the Russian Federation and China. This is a factor of considerable importance because it allows extra-regional forces like the US or the UK to use this country in order to circumvent these rival powers in the region. For years, one of the most important projects for Washington and its economic interests was an energy corridor that would pass through Pakistan and Afghanistan, starting from the oil fields and natural gas reserves of Central Asia¹².

The combat missions were concentrated largely in the southwest and in the northwest of Afghanistan, just where was designed the way of a strategic pipeline that was carrying oil and natural gas from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. Before 11 September 2001, Washington had been involved in fruitless negotiations with the Taliban government in order to ensure security for this energy corridor in the design. US interests on the passage of oil and natural gas in Afghanistan had a direct consequence when it came to establishing the new

⁹ Global Policy Forum, *US Military Expansion and Intervention in Afghanistan*. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/26365-us-military-expansion-and-intervention-in-afghanistan.html>, accessed 27 March 2015.

¹⁰ See David P. AUWEAWALD and Stephen M. SAIDEMAN, *Nato in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (n.p.: Princeton University Press, 2014).

¹¹ Stephen TANNER, *Afghanistan: a Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009).

¹² *Ibidem*.

political Kabul after the ouster of the Taliban, in addition to the influence on the location of the combat troops of NATO. Its offensives in the western sector of the country could be seen as operations to secure the territory deemed necessary for the emergence of the strategic pipeline that connects Central Asia and Pakistan through Afghanistan. It seems that there are even plans to change the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan to facilitate the passage of oil and natural gas from Central Asia to the shores of the Indian Ocean.

The control of Afghanistan is important to determine the future balance of power in Central Asia and across Eurasia. The consequence of this is that those who manage to control Afghanistan also ensure the influence on the Eurasian landmass and energy resources which abound. Afghanistan is also a major center of opium production, which then develops the illicit trafficking in drugs abroad. This is particularly significant in economic terms, considering that the illicit trafficking of drugs is ranked third in terms of trade movements worldwide, just after the oil market and the sale of weapons. The production of opiates, in any case, is not organized in a manner to bring economic benefits Afghanistan¹³.

The opium and illicit drugs in general have played a part unknown to most, but historic and central, both in the world economy, in international relations. To fully understand and to properly assess the role of Afghanistan in the world market of drugs we must turn back to look at the history of the opium trade. Some wars of great importance have been declared in the past precisely because of this substance. In the Far East and South-East Asia opium represented an integral part of the commercial network interwoven with the countries of Western Europe. During its peak in the mid-eighties of the nineteenth century, opium was even one of the most valuable assets among those circulating on the international market. British exports of opium from the Indian subcontinent had systematically helped to decrease the strength of China against foreign powers or colonial and had also helped the UK economy to rebalance the huge trade deficit with Beijing. The major trade groups of British administered India not only forced the Chinese government to let grow unchecked, in fact, drug addiction among its citizens, but also destroyed the traditional farming systems of Indian farmers, in fact obliged to intensively cultivate opium¹⁴.

The heredity of the opium trade in Afghanistan is the commercial network historically supported by the British, and the devastation of the country which occurred with the war against the Soviets, which began at the behest of the United States and Pakistan. It was during the conflict with the forces of Moscow that in Afghanistan opium cultivation was launched on a large scale, thanks to the support and protection of the Pakistani and US intelligence agencies. These exports were directed mainly towards the heroin markets of North America and Western Europe. The economic principles in effect at the time of the Opium Wars are still the same today. The drugs are becoming a commodity of great economic value and a key component of trade carried on the black market¹⁵.

The opium grown in Afghanistan plays a slice widespread within the global drug market, as estimated by the United Nations in an amount ranging from 400 to 500 billion dollars yearly. Not only the strategic position then, but also the opium trade is a premium extremely beneficial to anyone who can control Afghanistan.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Jonathan GOODHAND, *From war economy to peace economy? Reconstruction and state building in Afghanistan*, Fall 2004, vol. 58, no. I.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

3. The price paid

After more than thirteen years, the combat operations of the NATO contingent in Afghanistan has ended, since January 1, 2015 the country's security is entrusted to the local army. Never the United States have been engaged for so long in a conflict. US President Barack Obama speaks of a *reasonable conclusion*, an expression devoid of triumphalism that photographing a budget well in gray of a military mission long, costly, bloody and that leaves the field still too many, questions unresolved¹⁶.

The war began with operation Enduring Freedom in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. United States and the Great Britain launched the attack on 7 October 2001 to hit the Taliban regime in Kabul, considered guilty of having given shelter to Al Qaeda terrorists. December 2011 has seen the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, which passed under the command of NATO with help and cooperation from 43 nations and deploying field a maximum of 150 thousands men. The death toll of the foreign soldiers, according to data from the independent portal icasualties.org, was around 3,485. The Americans killed were 2342 and 453 for the British.

| Year | US | UK | Other | Total |
|-------|-----|-----|-------|-------|
| 2001 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 2002 | 49 | 3 | 18 | 70 |
| 2003 | 48 | 0 | 10 | 58 |
| 2004 | 52 | 1 | 7 | 60 |
| 2005 | 99 | 1 | 31 | 131 |
| 2006 | 98 | 39 | 54 | 191 |
| 2007 | 117 | 42 | 73 | 232 |
| 2008 | 155 | 51 | 89 | 295 |
| 2009 | 317 | 108 | 96 | 521 |
| 2010 | 499 | 103 | 109 | 711 |
| 2011 | 418 | 46 | 102 | 566 |
| 2012 | 310 | 44 | 48 | 402 |
| 2013 | 127 | 9 | 25 | 161 |
| 2014 | 55 | 6 | 14 | 75 |
| Total | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |

Figure no. 1: Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, Icasualties.Org <http://icasualties.org/oef/> accessed 28 March 2015.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

| Total | US | UK | Canada | France | Germany | Italy | Denmark | Australia | Poland | Spain | Greece | Netherlands | Romania | Average |
|-------|------|-----|--------|--------|---------|-------|---------|-----------|--------|-------|--------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 3487 | 2357 | 453 | 158 | 86 | 54 | 48 | 43 | 41 | 40 | 34 | 27 | 25 | 21 | 18 |

Figure no. 2: Coalition Military Fatalities By country of origin, Icasualties.Org <http://icasualties.org/oef/> accessed 28 March 2015.

Conclusions

For over 4000 years, Afghanistan has been a crossroads for migrations, conquests and trade between Western, Southern and Central Asia. The population has evolved into an ethnic and linguistic mosaic of groups with different customs. The dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns, represents about 40 percent of the residents. A quarter of Afghans are Tajiks and in the north are also Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kirghiz. Hazaras are a Mongolian people in the Central Highlands. There are also a large number of smaller ethnic groups. Almost all are Muslim and 85 percent are Sunnis. Hazaras and part of the Tajik is Sheeahs. Only towards the end of the 1800s made the country a reasonably functioning central government.

The Afghans, particularly in rural areas, did not experience any major improvements during the first years of a democratically elected government. In the south and southeast could more and more Taliban, who have returned from Pakistan, move fairly freely and win new supporters - even though the villagers in many cases were lured with money or subjected to threats. The profitable opium poppy cultivation more than doubled after the fall of the Taliban, and Afghanistan now accounts for about 90 percent of the world's opium. Various attempts to persuade the farmers to grow other crops have had only limited success.

In the provinces in the south and east, it was from 2006 increasingly clear that the conflict would last. The Taliban carried rockets and outright military attack against the army and foreign troops. Following the example of Iraq, they also began carrying out suicide attacks, which often affected civilian population. Even employees of the UN and international aid organizations ran into murder and armed assault. In 2006, NATO took over the main responsibility for the military operation in most parts of the country. Despite billions of dollars in aid have Afghan people rarely experienced any significant progress - substantial parts of the aid has been misappropriated. There have also been problems with the lack of coordination and mistakes in the inserts from the outside world.

While the US and its allies prepared its military retreat from Afghanistan, the country has pledged continued financial support until at least 2024. Afghan army and police's ability to protect society, however, is questioned and Western powers dare not completely trust their loyalty.

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ROMANIAN SMART INDUSTRY IN THE NEW BORDER SECURITY EQUATION

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Abstract: *Developments in eastern Ukraine entitled us to believe that Russia will not stop the offensive on the Black Sea. The reality of the three "bridgeheads" pro-Russian orientation: Donetsk-Lugansk, Crimea and Transnistria and the existence of strategic communication path Poltava-Dubăsari can represent elements of analysis for structures with responsibilities in the field of security and defense in Romania. New risks and threats of economic, social, cultural and military proximal its borders determined Romanian authorities to find solutions to a new equation of state border, connected with the EU and NATO borders. After more than 25 years, a new "smart" private Romanian industry develops complementary to state industries, offering modern and technologically advanced solutions to the new challenges of the border challenges. Romanian intelligent industry can offer, in this context, appropriate technical support to maintain and improve Romania's border control and our role is to make known these issues.*

Keywords: *Black Sea, Russia, border control, refugees, immigrants, smart industry*

Introduction

The current definition of the border line accepted by the literature is that it represents a "natural or conventional line which separates the territory of a state from the territory of other states or waters not part of its territory"¹, however modern historiography, referring to border, identifies at least six concepts elaborated rather based on modern ideological options², as follows: national border, state border, colonisation border, border society, militarised border and expansion border.

The current geopolitical realities, where an Islamic state claims its existence on the territory of several states or some frozen conflicts are restarted along an indefinite corridors that connects Baltic Sea and Black Sea, with still unsuspected consequences, where the „conventional lines” established during the WWII are eluded and breached and other „borders” are drawn on the limits of some territories occupied „de facto” (Crimea, Osetia, Abkhazia), „temporarily under occupation” (Donetsk or Lugansk etc.), or „frozen conflicts”, not started yet (Kharkov, Zaporojenie, Transnistria, Gagauzia, Kaliningrad etc.), determine a new approach of the equation of national border of Romania.

¹ ***, DEX ONLINE, <http://dexonline.ro/definitie/frontier%C4%83>, accessing: 24.03.2015.

² Acad. COMAN, Marian, *Power and territory*, Polirom Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 89.

The border is often said to represent the „epidermis of a nation”, an epidermis characterized by fragility and sensitivity both inside and mainly outside, often bleeding. In the most fortunate cases, we may appreciate that the balance between the internal and external environment, on both sides of the border, is stable, however this situation is applied discretionary when we talk about the balances on Romanian borders. New „colonisation” or „expansionist borders”, with military, economic, social, cultural, ecologic or religious connotations, are redrawn today on the map of the world, a map of the world where economic strategies, strategies targeting the access to resources or other facilities in domination scope, play a primordial role.

Less than three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall that divided Europe into two, the importance of border acquires new meanings, so states, such as: Ukraine on its border with the Russian Federation, Poland on the border with Kaliningrad region and Bulgaria on its



Figure 1, Europe's new "Iron Curtains"

border with Turkey implement new projects for border security (Figure 1) by building "iron curtains" made by wire and barbed wire "in the purest former Soviet style" that will separate again "the neighbors who seemed to have finally found after 1990."³

Under the conditions of a limited capacity of reduction of causes, the only viable option, for Romania authorities, is the reduction or diminishing of consequences and, in this case, we appreciate the validity of the following alternatives:

- a) Acceptance, without complications, sparing and involvement, of external aid for increase of border impenetrability;
- b) Undertaking, without equivocal, by Romania the role of manager of national border;
- c) Increase of internal capacities, requiring the balance on border and incontestably undertaking of the quality of Romania as guarantor of the borders of European Union and NATO.

In our country, the smart Romanian private industry meets the needs of governmental institutions in the field of border control and provides cutting-edge technical solutions in national property as a result of the investment, research, development and Romania intellectual capacity utilization.

1. Opinions about the border. Risks and threats.

In the current sense, relying on a hypothesis according to which the borders of "knowledge" have been, are and will be traced by the scientific limitations *only to be overcome*, the "living", realer borders, traced in the "game" of political, social, economic and financial lines will be overcome and redrawn in the strategy of interaction both of "civilisations", and political-military interests.

Knowing, seeing, analysing and forecasting what happens and what will happen on own border entails seeing beyond the border, analysing and disseminating the events passed on other borders or other spaces, where new threats appear, regardless the future manner of manifesting them.

³ ***, <http://www.evz.ro/din-groaza-de-putin-si-de-teroristi-cortinele-de-fier-brazdeaza-din-nou-europa.html>, access at: 27.04.2015.

In the perspective of symmetry on types of threats previously identified, the European documents in the field provide for an integrated concept of management, concept gathering the following dimensions:

- Control on the border (verification and surveillance), as defined in the Code of Schengen borders, including the pertinent risk analyses and the information on criminality;
- Discovery and investigation of border criminality in coordination with all competent authorities of law enforcement;
- Model of access structured on four levels (measures in third countries, collaboration with neighbouring countries, control on border, measures of control in the space of free circulation, including return);
- Collaboration between the governmental agencies for managing borders (Border Police, Customs, Police, National Security agencies and other competent authorities) and international cooperation;
- Coordination and coherence of the activities of member states and of institutions and other bodies of Community and Union.

The coherence between these dimensions and the manner of enforcement by the Schengen states represent the keys of success of the *concept of integrated management of borders*⁴.

For the correct application of the concept of integrated management, the specialists/analysts must be fully informed related to paradigms, interests, threats and risks to which the „borders segments ” or the range of border are subject, when the risk is associated to the same kind of border.

In practice, a structure masters and knows in detail the operative situation on border, if in the binomial space-time is very well determined the “unknown factor” given by the premature discovery of the hints of preparation of illegal crossing the border, the identification of moving targets and detailed analysis of the movements previously detected.

Under such reserves, it is measured the capacity of an authority to detect the border movements and encounter solid reasons to take measures of control.

In real time, the awareness of the situation proves the manner how the authority/ authorities with duties on border define the period of time and space required for the execution of three functions: *discovery of the movements which may represent attempts of illegal cross of border, identification of the targets noticed and analysis of the targets previously analysed, in due time*⁵.

Thus, pursuant to the end of first stage of awareness of situation, it is permanently quantified the *capacity of reaction-intervention on borders*⁶, the capacity measuring the time of reaction -intervention, in case of discovering the elements in attempt of illegal cross of the border, as well as the speed and manner of reaction in atypical situations.

The border management must have a capacity of reaction, so as the assignment of resources to be done properly, if any, and the reserves, the staff and technical means are available to react to the changes appeared on targeted border.

In a graphical representation, the risks and threats on border may be grouped three-dimensionally in a pyramid where every “storey” is in close interdependence with the lower levels.

⁴Schengen Catalogue, <http://www.schengen.mira.gov.ro/Documente/utile/catutil/Catalogul%20Schengen%20actualizat%20a1%20UE.pdf>, p. 18, access at: 22.03.2015.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 4.

⁶ In terms of the manner where encountered, in the current typology, the “borders” are classified in three types: terrestrial border, maritime borders and air borders.

The main risks directed on border are generated by border organised criminality and activities associated thereof, respectively illegal migration, drug traffic, traffic of weapons, traffic of false currency, wide tax evasion and contraband. A high level of border threats is provided by terrorism and proliferation of the weapons of destruction in mass, assimilated to CBRN, which by dimension and impact, have become and are major challenges of national security.

The missions of structures with border attributions should be permanently adjusted to face all challenged determined/derived from the main risks and threats, and for each there should be standard procedures of action, staff properly trained and technical means with superior capacities of detection, analysis and communication.

2. Contribution of Romanian intelligent industry to perfecting the surveillance of Romanian borders

The most important role in influencing contemporary life is held today, incontestably, by technology. The power of technological environment has become so obvious, as the systems feel a crushing pressure from a wider integrating system. The activities are permanently analysed in the light of efficiency. Technology includes all rational models integrated in the generation of a new system built by operational rationality, with a maximum efficiency in all fields of activity.

In his work *Technology and contemporary society*⁷, the author A. LEMENI PhD., uses the ideas formulated by Jacques Ellul in its book *The Technological Society*, that promote two theses: the first refers to the fact that technology holds the most important role in influencing contemporary life, the second entails that current technology is highly different than traditional technique, not having nothing in common to it.

The power of current technological system has become so wide and obvious since each of us, regardless the field of activity, feels a crushing pressure in the daily existence from an integrating system.

The current technological system is not reduced to *"a gear structured exclusively by technological factors, but involves an environment integrating different procedures, rules, directives, organisational sequences structured by exercising an operating rationality, having as determining motivation efficiency"*⁸. Nowadays, there was about doing things efficiently.

We have used this brief presentation of the determinations caused by technological revolution, just to outline the requirements and premises of occurrence of a new, intelligent and efficient industry, able to provide, in due time, fast solutions and adjusted in real time to the challenges and opportunities of a new era: the informational era.

When we talk about intelligent industry, in relation to the technological revolution of the new informational area, in terms of contribution to efficiency of border control, we consider that it has to entail few directions of action, as follows:

1. *Providing operational capacity in collecting, processing and valuation of information* – development of the capacities by using all technological resources available to provide anticipative knowledge of the evolution of risks and the integration of information from multiple sources in informational relevant and opportune products.

2. *The use of technology as competitive advantage* – performance of an infrastructure integrated by communication and information technology and providing the technological tools to increase performance of the activity of border control;

⁷ LEMENI, Adrian, *Technology and contemporary society*, <http://ziarullumina.ro/religie-si-stiinta/tehnologia-si-societatea-contemporana>, accessing 23.03.2015

⁸ *Idem*, p. 7.

3. *Opening new perspectives on border control* – integration of the most modern technologies, consolidation of expertise methods and improvement of technical-scientific determinations for accomplishing the objectives, as well as the support provided to other national and international institutions.

5. *Use of technology as instrument of cooperation* – extension of knowledge and forecasting the evolution of security environment and management in collaboration of the risks and threats at the address of national interests and of those Euro-Atlantic.

6. *Extension of scientific research and technological development*

Implementing of scientific clusters or partnerships between users, researchers and providers for creating a complex research-development environment in order to increase the border control performance.

2.1 *Opinions on the importance, role and place of Romanian private companies in the Romanian specialised industry*

The geographical position of Romania on the confluence of four geopolitical regions: Aegean Sea, Danube, Caspian Sea and Dnepr, on the east limit of the south flank of NATO and the eastern border of European Union, on the track of terrestrial strategic, fluvial, naval and air transportation East-West and North-South, as well as on that of the other ways of internal communication, determines the Romanian authorities to provide major importance to the exigent border control, as much as, considering the new challenges on regional level, the range of risks and threats on border has significantly increased.

Obviously, the Romanian authorities have looked and are still permanently looking for new solutions and implement, independently or in collaboration with specialised bodies of European Union, the most sophisticated strategies of control of the border, which in the majority of cases entail an advanced technical and technological support, meant to provide prior warning on potential threats and risks, as well as controlled penetrability of border, regardless its nature.

As a consequence of globalisation, the Romanian industry of state defence, inheritance of past century, holds low capacities to provide the equipment required for border control in an advanced technological world and with access to global information, able of extreme acts to provide the basic human needs and up to carrying out terrorist actions for political, religious and military group ideals.

The beginning of democracy in Romania and the needs to adjust to the new requirements of border control, on the background of an obsolete technological level of previous governmental industry, have determined Romanian authorities to look for technical solutions beyond the border, solutions which may be provided only by foreign companies, technologically developed always in the world elite of the manufacturers of security equipment for border and which have influenced somehow the technological track of the last decades of this industry.

Upon the adhesion to NATO and European Union, the Romanian specialists in the field of border control, as well as from other related fields (systemic analysis of phenomena and process, research-development, planning, engineering, design, technology, standardization, production, human resource, information, operations, logistics, economy, finance etc.) have enjoyed an informational support without precedent and thus one has opened the gates of knowledge of particularities which involve the implementation countrywide of own capacities for development of the required systems to border control.

Although facing the inherent difficulties of a pioneered activity, due mainly to the lack of information, and human, economic, logistic, financial difficulties, as well as in the plan of relations with potential suppliers and clients, the trust of Romanian authorities in local products in addition with the external procurements and the lack of communication between

authorities and suppliers, there are however Romanian entrepreneurs who have started private businesses, in the majority of cases financed by own funds, meant to put the bases of a new, intelligent industry, creating visibility and trust, providing complementarity to the existent system, co-generating advanced technology and covering the increasingly special needs from national sources.

The new smart industry in Romania, the legitimacy of which it is defined in the Resolution no. 1157/2013 on approval of the Strategy of national industry of security⁹ and is to be ruled by Law on national industry of defence and security (project initiated by the Ministry of Economy)¹⁰, it is noticed, despite all challenges, as being a significant source of human and technological capabilities providing countrywide the support for developing the required capacities (subassemblies, systems, systems of systems and software) for border control. More than that, in a world of alliances and unions where values, principles and capacities are put together, every country must be strong by itself and able to manage with own forces the national border and contribute then to the management of common borders.

2.2 Some particularities concerning the contribution of Romanian companies to the development of the systems for border surveillance

The border control is an extremely complex activity entailing, at least, two wide actions, as defined in the *National strategy of integrated management of state border of Romania 2007 - 2010 of 28 March 2007*¹¹:

- a. *control of border crossing* - represents the controls performed on the points of crossing the border to secure that the individuals and objects held by them, as well as the means of transportation may be authorised to enter on the territory of member states or may be authorised to leave it;
- b. *border surveillance* - represents the surveillance of border between the points of crossing the border and the surveillance of the points of crossing the border beyond the hourly interval, to prevent that individuals avoid the control of border crossing, and relies on the analysis of the risks for internal security and threats which may affect the border security.

Given the complexity of fact, we shall focus further on in our paper, on a sole direction, considering the surveillance component, it itself complex and wide, like that of the assembly constituted.

The border surveillance involves an elaborated activity, with wide spreading, in different environments, characterized by criteria of human and technical performance, on a perimeter area which develops:

- 681 km with Moldova Republic (between Cuzlău on north and Giurgiulești on south);
- 649.5 Km with Ukraine (between Cuzlău and Triplex Confinium Tur on north; between Giurgiulești and Musura channel (on Chilia) on east);
- 631 Km with Bulgaria (between Triplex Confinium Pristol on west and Vama Veche on east);
- 546,5 Km with Serbia (between Triplex Confinium Pristol on south-east and Triplex Confinium Beba Veche on north-west)

⁹ *** <http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gm4donruha/hotararea-nr-1157-2013-privind-aprobarea-strategiei-industriei-nationale-de-securitate>, access at: 27.03.2015

¹⁰ *** http://www.minind.ro/PROPUNERI_LEGISLATIVE/2014/Lege_INApS.pdf, access at: 27.03.2015

¹¹ *** *National strategy of integrated management of state border of Romania between 2007 - 2010 dated 28 March 2007* <http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/securizare/strategie.php>, access at: 23.03.2015

- 448 Km with Hungary (between Triplex Confinium Beba Veche on south-west and Triplex Confinium Tur on north east);
- 193.5 Km in the Black Sea along continental platform (245 Km of littoral).

Leaving from the strategy base claimed, of *"analysis of the main trends of evolution of transborder criminality, relying as well on the concept of integrated management of border, developed based on the disposals of Schengen Catalogue <Control of external border, extradition and readmission: The best practices and recommendations>, adjusted to the conditions in Romania"*¹², any Romanian company part of the smart industry, must consider at least the following objectives, when determining own strategies related to the investments in creating systems dedicated to border surveillance, deriving from the above mentioned document:

1. *Providing the equipment proper to the type of border and operative situation, useful for development of the actions of surveillance and control, according to the requirements of Schengen;*
2. *Realising or modernising, if any, of the communication systems and informational systems compatible and interoperable with the systems existent on European level;*
3. *Permanently maintaining the high readiness of the System of surveillance and observation on Black Sea - SCOMAR and providing interconnection and interoperability with the systems of surveillance on Black Sea implemented by the Ministry of Transportation, Construction and Tourism, VTS/AIS, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Development, system of surveillance by satellite of fishing vessels;*
4. *Implementing the Danube Observation System - SOD along the Romanian sector of Danube from Baziaş to Mosura (Chilia channel) and up to Sulina (Sulina channel) and providing interconnection and interoperability with the systems of surveillance on Danube RO-RIS, developed by the Ministry of Transportation, Construction and Tourism.*

Considering the elements of analysis defined in this article, we consider that intelligent specialised industry in Romania has reached obvious maturity and has the capacity to generate itself integrated systems, technologically advanced and competitive worldwide, for surveillance of national border.

The new equation of the border involves as need, the research, development and implementation of viable and effective systems able to provide:

- *Increased efficiency of surveillance activities* – integration of a wider range of sensors meant to mutually complete, in the terrestrial, air and naval environment;
- *Maximum mobility*, both terrestrial, air and naval;
- *High autonomy* – multiple sources of supply with power and complementary sources, which may provide the supply of system regardless the location, under different conditions of time, season and weather; the sources of supply may be: electric network, generators with fuel or sources of renewable power, providing thus continuous functioning, by an integrated system of power supply;
- *Exploitation under conditions of isolation* – spaces of work and rest for a team of 2-3 individuals;
- *Versatility* - modular structure with the possibility of waiving/adding subsystems, depending on the mission to be executed;

¹² *Idem*, 2, pct.12

- *Easiness and safety in exploitation* – software interfaces as friendly as possible, usual orders doubled on switchboard and touchscreen;
- *Fast repairing* – all subsystems with built-in test, repairing menus for the maintenance staff;
- *Moral use as low as possible* – open architecture allowing the up-grade for the main subsystems;
- *High degree of integration* – a percentage as high as possible of subsystems to be realised in society.

A special aspect on this new equation is represented by the „national ownership” on production, capacities, performances of systems, software for integration and direction of development and their adjustment on the future, in relation to potential risks and threats on border.

All these considerations and many other ideas, studies, concepts, plans and strategies have been analysed when we have chosen, as representatives of the Romanian intelligent industry, to develop the concept, find financing and start the implementation project of a dedicated system for national border control entitled "*Mobile Integrated Surveillance System - SIMS*" (Figure 2), project co-funded by the Sectorial Operational Program



Figure nr. 2, *Integrated Mobil Surveillance System*
– Assembly Phase

"Increase of Economic Competitiveness", program co-financed from the European Regional Development Priority Axis 2 "Competitiveness through research, technological development and innovation", Operation 2.3.3 "Promoting innovation in enterprises".

SIMS project to be completed and released in the middle of 2015, more information about the stage of development and additional information can be obtained on the web site: <http://sims.electro-optic.ro/>.

Conclusions

The new regional geopolitical evolutions will have an increased impact and the effects on national borders will generate special consequences in the next two decades or more.

The remodelling of counteracting strategies of the effects of the new range of risks and threats on border represents a permanent process, continuously adapted to future solutions.

The main key to strengthening and streamlining Romania's border control is represented by an open partnership at national level between the authorities with dual quality: responsible for developing strategies and users of systems and the smart industry representatives that manage the new technology in this modern era.

Romanian governmental agencies can look with confidence to the results generated by the Romanian “smart industry” and their ability to create new systems tailored to the needs of current and future national border control and protection.

A Romanian public-private partnership could develop that required "tools” to meet the needs of border control with major financial benefits for both sides by reducing

purchase prices and increasing employment of local labor force and strengthens national ownership of the systems and software.

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THE ROLE OF OSINT IN ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING SECURITY

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Abstract: *The beginning of the 21st century has coincided with the unprecedented development of the information technologies and the expansion of global information interconnection, currently generating the continuous flow of daily new information, flowing fast, constantly updated, which complements or totally reinvents itself, invaluable sources of knowledge available to general public, also useful in the specific activities undertaken by the authorities in keeping and preserving national and international security.*

Both national and international level, information has an important role in preventing and handling the security events and crises, through the intelligence products generated by their analysis activities. for preventing and countering the main vulnerabilities, threats and risks to the national and international security, as well as to develop certain authority decisions, by providing diagnoses, estimations and predictions, which are meant to reduce the inherent uncertainties (either epistemic or induced), to reduce or to eliminate the strategic surprises, to identify and take a maximum advantage from different kinds of opportunities.

Keywords: *security, data, information, OSINT, intelligence analysis*

1. Security

Although over the years many security definitions have been set, I believe that one of the best would be the one that states *no threats to national interests and values*.

From the point of view of the binomial international relations - security studies, there are many views on academic status of security studies, presently. Alan Collins, for example, believes that "security studies are sub par excellence of International Relations. Security Studies are the core of international relations"¹.

Paul D. Williams has a different opinion from that of Alan Collins, considering that security studies are an autonomous field *which revolves around a set of interrogations: What is security? Whose talking about security? What could a security issue be considered? How can security be achieved?*²

Writing about International Security Studies, in 2009, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen sustained that *irrespective of which at first started as an autonomous field, it has been rather quickly absorbed as a subfield of International Relations*³.

Edward Kolodziej has seen the security issue as a political one, by definition, quoting that *security is a special form of politics and that security emerges as a central feature of political disputes when actors threaten or use force for getting what they wish from one*

¹Collins, Allan, *Contemporary Security Studies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 2, apud Dungaciu, Dan, *Securitate, Relații Internaționale și Studii de Securitate* – <http://revista.ispri.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/5-15-Dan-Dungaciu.pdf>

² Williams, Paul D. (ed.), *Security Studies. An Introduction*, London and New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 5, apud Dungaciu, Dan, *Securitate, Relații Internaționale și Studii de Securitate* – <http://revista.ispri.ro/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/5-15-Dan-Dungaciu.pdf>

³ Buzan, Barry, Hansen, Lene, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 2009

another⁴.

Security issues are not fixed, on the contrary, have changed over time. During the *Cold War*, security was defined in military terms, thus reflecting the main concerns of the two opposing blocs. Subsequently, the scope of the concept has been expanded, including non-military dimensions, as well⁵.

Barry Buzan defines international security on three main elements, postulating that states must be considered objects of reference first, that all systemic conditions in which states evolve will determine international security and that security can only know workaround⁶.

Security status is highlighted by the security environment. In this sense, the state of security or insecurity can be defined from the analysis of vulnerabilities, threats and risks, expressed in economic, political, societal, military or environmental (Copenhagen School taxonomy).

According to the *National Security Strategy of Romania*, among the main vulnerabilities and malfunctions are found “*dependence on inaccessible vital resources; persisting negative demographic trends and massive migration; high level of social insecurity, persistent chronic poverty and increased social differences; low percentage, fragmentation and insufficient involvement of the middle class in the organization of economic and social life; fragility of citizenship and solidarity; poor infrastructure and insufficiently protected; poor condition and low efficiency of the healthcare system; organizational flaws, lack of resources and difficulties of adapting the education system to the demands of society; inadequate organization and management resources scarcity crisis; insufficient commitment of civil society in the debate and handling of the security problems*”⁷.

The threat is a declaration of an intention to harm someone, intimidate, or getting something from him. Threats can be actions, statements or stands of an opponent inside or outside the country, carried out directly on the overall security system⁸.

Risk is the possibility of reaching a danger, facing a possible danger⁹, preventing from materializing it. From the mathematical point of view, the risk can be defined as a product of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences, quantified in terms of likelihood and impact.

Among the main security risks exhibited internationally we can remember the resurgence of terrorist actions, violent manifestations of extremism and intolerance, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, violent actions of entities that are asking for ethnic autonomy or proliferation of transnational organized crime networks.

According to the *National Security Strategy of Romania*, the main risks and threats, “capable of jeopardizing the safety of the citizens and Romania's national security, its values and interests as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community are international terrorism structured on cross-border networks; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; transnational organized crime; weak governance”¹⁰.

Given the concern of states to ensure their security in relation with the risks and threats expressed internationally, the management of the security dilemmas should also be considered. Conceptually, the *security dilemma* has been addressed in security studies in the 50s, closely linked to the efforts of maintaining and achieving the security status. In 1978, Robert Jarvis said that security dilemma occurs when a State seeks to increase security by

⁴Kolodziej, Edward A., *Securitatea și Relațiile Internaționale*, pag. 36, Polirom, Iași, 2006.

⁵Sarcinschi, Alexandra, *Elemente noi în studiul securității naționale și internaționale*, Editura UNAP, București, 2005.

⁶Buzan, Barry, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, Editura Cartier, Chișinău, 2000

⁷SSNR, București, 2007

⁸Academia Rom. nă, Institutul Lingvistic “Iorgu Iordan”, *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române*, ediția a II-a, revăzută și adăugită, Editura Univers Enciclopedic Gold, București, 2009.

⁹*Ibidem*.

¹⁰SSNR, București, 2007.

making use of certain means which can lower the security of another state¹¹.

In this paper *The Security Dilemma Revisited*, Charles Glaser identifies three perverse effects of the security dilemma i.e.: *the military capacity reduction* of the state initiating the security dilemma, because of the fact that, theoretically, the opponents will be in the position to arm themselves strongly afterwards; *the expansion*, seen as a source of security increasing on short term, but on a long term insecurity, because of the opponent's reaction, feeling threatened; *high resource consumption*, even waste, leading to insecurity¹².

2. About intelligence

According to the *Russell Ackoff* theory and model, the content of the human mind is structured in five levels i.e. : *data*, that are represented by words, symbols or numbers; *information*, resulting from data processing, answering questions *Who? What? Where? When?*; *knowledge*, resulting from the application of data and information, answering question *How?*; *understanding*, resulting from combining data, information and knowledge, answering the question *Why?*; *wisdom*, consisting in understanding, beliefs and knowledge bases, combined and evaluated¹³. Unlike the first four levels, referring to the past or to what is known, *wisdom* relates to the future, unknown at present.

According with the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*¹⁴, there are four categories of information i.e.: *data* (Open Source Data - OSD); *information* (Open Source Information - OSINF), which are based on correlated and processed data, to make public information, generally having a large area of distribution; *information from open sources* (Open Source Intelligence – OSINT), from the processing, filtering and analyzing OSINF and OSD, in order to respond to an inquiry and contribute to the integrated development of the final product; *validated information from open sources* (Open Source Intelligence Validated – OSINT-V), information that has a high degree of certainty.

It should be noted that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between *data* and *information* and between *intelligence* and *information*, as the terms are not interchangeable. Data become information only to the extent of being organized on different criteria, processed and correlated. Similarly, intelligence is based on the data and information from different media (both public and secret), being the result of processing, combining and analyzing them accordingly.

The term intelligence can be translated as "*wisdom*" also naming the intelligence structures created by the state, the processes taking place within them and the informative products. This notion is closely related to *intelligence cycle*, a phrase that describes a process by which raw data and information are converted into *intelligence*, through the succession of several phases, which are collection, filtering, processing, analysis and dissemination. The intelligence product should have an actionable value, in order to meet the needs of a specific consumer, being important to be confirmed from multiple sources, preferably in a *crossover trial*, given that the underlying information may be *true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, relevant or fanciful*¹⁵.

Over time, the term intelligence was given several definitions.

Sherman Kent, for example, defined intelligence as *data that our civilian and military,*

¹¹Jervis, Robert, *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*, in World Politics, 1978

¹²Glaser, Charles, *The Security Dilemma Revisited*, in World Politics, 1997

¹³Ivan, Ion, Marinică, Mariana, *De ce Intelligence?*, Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence nr. 1-2, București, 2009

¹⁴*NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, 2001

¹⁵Medar, Sergiu, Lățea, Cristi, *Intelligence pentru Comandanți*, Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2007

*from the top hierarchical levels must possess in order to safeguard national welfare*¹⁶.

US Department of Defense defines intelligence as *the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of existing information on other countries or regions, and information and data about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis or reasoning*.

David T. Moore believes that *analysts and analysts only create intelligence*¹⁷. Essentially, intelligence analysis plays an important role in preventing and countering vulnerabilities, threats and risks to the national security, while having the role to support the substantiation decisions of state authorities, through *diagnoses, estimates and predictions* meant to relieve the uncertainty of and reduce or eliminate strategic surprises.

The central element of communication between the information manufacturer and its beneficiary is the national security information, *the intelligence product* resulting from the analysis focused on the transfer of new knowledge in relation to the background.

The main objectives are subsumed into the intelligence security functions, being represented by: *knowledge*, in order to identify trends of those phenomena that generates consequences in terms of security; *anticipating* threats and possible ways and means of embodiment; *preventing*, seen as reducing or removing the sources that are generating threats to the national security; *counter threats*; *support and promotion* of the national values¹⁸.

3. OSINT in the knowledge society

The beginning of the 21st century has coincided with the unprecedented development of the information technologies and the expansion of global information interconnection, currently generating the continuous flow of daily new information, flowing fast, constantly updated, which complements or totally reinvents itself, invaluable sources of knowledge available to general public, also useful in the specific activities undertaken by the authorities in keeping and preserving national and international security.

Both national and international level, information has an important role in preventing and handling the security events and crises, through the intelligence products generated by their analysis activities. for preventing and countering the main vulnerabilities, threats and risks to the national and international security, as well as to develop certain authority decisions, by providing diagnoses, estimations and predictions, which are meant to reduce the inherent uncertainties (either epistemic or induced), to reduce or to eliminate the strategic surprises, to identify and take a maximum advantage from different kinds of opportunities.

To paraphrase Ionel Nițu, the author of *Intelligence Analysis*, information can be defined as a coherent and unified assembly of epistemic meanings that brings a new element to prior knowledge, proving its usefulness in achieving a goal, which is based on a need or interest¹⁹.

Sherman Kent, who is considered the father of intelligence analysis, sustained that most *foreign intelligence collection activities high-level effective must be achieved through observation and open research, direct and realistic*²⁰.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is the *intelligence* that is based on publicly

¹⁶Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton University Press, 1949

¹⁷Moore, David T., *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis*, National Defence Intelligence College, Washington DC, 2007

¹⁸Onișor, Constantin, Bălan, Mihail, Prună, Cristian, *Intelligence și Management Strategic Modern*, Editura Academiei Oamenilor de Știință din România, București, 2012

¹⁹Nițu, Ionel, *Analiza de Intelligence*, pag. 35, Editura Rao, București, 2012

²⁰Kent, Sherman, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, pag. 3-4, University Press, New Jersey, 1949, apud Shulsky, Abram N., Schmitt, Gary J., *Războiul tăcut: introducere în universul informațiilor secrete*, pag. 74, Polirom, Iași, 2008

available information (open source), information that individually does not have the value of a informational product, in the absence of linkage with other data and information, processing, filtering, validation and their careful analysis.

The main open source categories are: *Internet* (including *new media*), where we have a vast amount of information from multiple domains through websites, blogs, forums, social networks, business networks, encyclopedias, libraries or online news agencies; *traditional media* (satellite television, for example, facilitates viewing of national and international programs on various topics of interest and geographic areas); *information from different academic backgrounds*; *official data*, the most commonly used reports and statistics, presidential or governmental, academic and work of experts, press conferences or public debates; *gray literature*, with reference to the information provided by think-tanks, corporations or NGOs; *images from commercial satellites*.

In addition to the enormous amount of information from various fields, quantity that increases exponentially from one year to another, the *Internet* offers a wide range of search options to them, being able to choose different search engines (they can search for information using different operators - Boolean, query, proximity, etc.), video portals, maps, forums, blogs, archives and social platforms, language barriers being overcome with the development of several online machine translation solutions.

In 2010, Eric Schmidt (Google CEO) stated that "*today, every other day, mankind is creating more information than mankind has made since the beginning of civilization until 2003*"²¹.

The main types of OSINT products are represented by *briefings* (oral communication, most often, or written information in a very synthetic manner), *newsletters* (containing data on a particular issue of interest, which has a regular character, in general), *notes* (developed for reporting vulnerabilities, threats and security risks), *synthesis* (bringing together different phenomena and interpret the status quo, containing evaluations and diagnostic conclusions type) and *analysis* (descriptive, explanatory and predictive, which include considerations of possible developments of events, details of the context, developments and their consequences).

In developing and evaluating OSINT products there are revealed two categories of criteria, discursive and meta-discursive. Discursive criteria are related to the form and content of the material, focusing on clarity, accuracy and completeness. Meta-discursive criteria are related to resources involved in obtaining the product of intelligence (intelligence product must be obtained with an optimal cost-benefit level) and the product reporting to the moment of its dissemination (ie, the product must be disseminated at the right time, with the danger of its obsolescence and therefore of its uselessness).

Depending on the size information, the OSINT products may be of *diagnostic* (descriptive and explanatory) or *forecasting* type (early warning, strategic evaluations, etc.).

It should be made clear that into the process of collecting data and information from open sources, relevant to the requirement of a beneficiary, validation of all these sources is very important, this approach being mandatory. In this sense, when we talk about the validation process we must primarily concerned with open source type, i.e. if we talk about a classic open source or about one of the virtual environment.

Data and information collection from unvalidated sources augments the possibility of confrontation with an intelligence failure, given the increased risk of using, into the analysis process, data and information outdated or wrong.

Validating classical open sources must take into account mainly the *title*, which might help us to form a first opinion on the subject and the complexity of the exposed ideas; *author*,

²¹Cofan, Sorina-Maria, *Analiza Informațiilor. Manual*, Editura M.A.I, București, 2014

with emphasis on the expertise and reputation; its *publication date* in order to determine the timeliness of the material (the novelty); *content* and *targeted audience*, in order to determine the intentions of the author and to determine whether the material is a primary source or not (useful documentation process); *bibliographic sources*; *logical organization and reviews*.

Validation of open source virtual environment (*Internet*) must consider, in particular: *checking the URL*, including domain registration, country of origin; *source evaluation* aspect (simple or complex, layout etc.), which can help us create a first opinion on the professionalism of the owner; determining *the frequency* of posting articles (checking the date and time of each post); *evaluation* of the posted information (new or original, old or taken from other sources, the manner in which they are presented and synthesized etc.); *logical organization*; *history* of prior consultation of the source (e.g. if the source has been used in the past etc.).

4. The impact of OSINT on the intelligence analysis

Intelligence analysis can be defined as a complex, dynamic cognitive and a specialized approach to knowledge on a specific issue of national security, in which different methods and techniques are used, aimed at making diagnoses, estimates and argued predictions, useful in decision making state authorities. Therefore, the intelligence analysis is a prerequisite for achieving objectives and truthful answers²².

OSINT neither replace nor compete with traditional sources, used by the intelligence communities, coming only to supplement them. In the recent years the intelligence products mainly obtained from open sources have an increasingly high share, some analysts being of the opinion that a new model of intelligence should focus on a wider use of information from open sources, while others believe that OSINT should be regarded only as a component of the multi-source analysis²³.

The development of information technology, in terms of the multiplicity of available information sources, the increase of the speed of information dissemination and the expansion of the Internet, highlighting the technological progress of recent years, require a transformation at the intelligence level, in order to adapt to new realities.

One dimension of this transformation is related to the expansion of open sources of information, coupled with the ease of accessing them, thanks to the Internet, intelligence showing a growing interest for OSINT. Therefore, there were initiated several projects, such as *Open Source Center* (USA), *Open Source Intelligence Branch* (Netherlands) or those of NATO and the EU²⁴.

OSINT gives decision makers access to information that does not have the same strict security regime, that can be very useful in certain cases, such as the development of documentation to be disseminated to the media outside the secure (symposia, conferences, press conferences etc.)²⁵.

One of the great challenges of community information is the fact that in addition to using traditional sources of classified information, *analysts need to extract critical information from a potentially large amount of data publicly available* through the development of information technologies that we remembered²⁶.

²²Nițu, Ionel (coord.), *Ghidul analistului de intelligence: compendiu pentru analiștii debutanți*, Editura A.N.I., București, 2011

²³Galaon, Raluca, *OSINT astăzi: deschis versus secret*, apud Maior, George Cristian (coord.), *Despre Intelligence*, pag. 94, Editura Rao, București, 2014

²⁴Mitu, Daniela, *Intelligence Postmodern*, Editura A.N.I., pp. 62-63, București, 2014

²⁵*ibidem* pag. 63

²⁶Posaștiuc, Cristina, *Repere ale intelligence-ului contemporan*, apud Maior, George Cristian (coord.), *Despre Intelligence*, p. 37, Editura Rao, București, 2014

At the level of intelligence organizations, due to higher number of open sources and their easy accessibility, there is a growing need for intelligence collectors and analysts, the analysts often working to collect this information, according to the specific needs of the work they perform, despite the existence of a multitude of software that allows automatic filtering of vast amounts of information from open sources (most experts believe that OSINT is responsible for more than half of the information needed by the multi-source information analysts)²⁷.

Basically, technological progress, electronic means of collaboration and production (collection, processing, analysis), at the *intelligence services* level, help in some extent overcoming conditionings, limitations of space and time, but does not eliminate the need for continued engagement of specialized human resources, at the process level.

Presently there is a need for closer cooperation both inter-agency and between intelligence and civil society to address specific issues from as many angles as possible.

OSINT is a true *nexus* that promote a safety culture capable of providing a continuous flow of information between organizations and between civil society and private organizations with responsibilities in the field of national security, *intelligence services* being directly responsible for the development and promotion of safety culture. OSINT can form the basis of developing a participatory intelligence, developed in the interest of citizens, state of engagement of specialized services and contribution of private actors. However, OSINT is a component of intelligence indicated and necessary to attract academic knowledge, which can be exploited by outsourcing certain activities including analytical intelligence organizations²⁸.

Conclusion

Amid the successful completion of the traditional sources of information gathering, I consider that the impact of OSINT on the analytical process is mostly beneficial, as the open sources may help developing a participatory intelligence, given that currently the OSINT cover more than half of multi-source information needed by the analysts. In this context, in the future, we can expect that the OSINT role in achieving and maintaining security to grow in importance, thanks to the continuous development of the new technologies and their everyday implementation in our lives.

Since the amount of globally generated information is skyrocketing from one year to another, one of the main challenges is the current process of all information collected from open sources, which should be set the degree of veracity and relevance, in relation to different national security issues, for inclusion in the intelligence products, that are so necessary in order to achieve and maintain the national security.

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²⁷Galaon, Raluca, *OSINT astăzi: deschis versus secret*, apud Maior, George Cristian (coord.), *Despre Intelligence*, pag. 92, Editura Rao, București, 2014

²⁸Stan, Mariana, *Organizații de intelligence, mediul academic și societatea civilă: OSINT ca nexus*, apud Maior, George Cristian (coord.), *Despre Intelligence*, pag. 230-234, Editura Rao, București, 2014

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OSINT ROLE IN DETECTING MANIPULATION ACTIONS WITH EFFECTS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: *The premise from which we start in this paper is that data information offered by open sources, regardless of the form in which it is found, can hardly shape the perception of reality, influence public thinking and behaviour and require currents of opinion on various topics and subjects.*

Media institutions are influenced by the goals and interests of trusts and of financial elits that manage them, of topics covered by other publications, but also of the relationship with the buyers of advertising space and the target audience.

in this equation, a distinctive use of open source intelligence work is the identification of potential shortfalls media items or information war conducted by the adverse party, which could affect national security.

Keywords: OSINT, manipulation, national security, transformation, influence

Introduction

Even since they have been put to use, by security or diplomatic governmental structures, open sources represent an information collecting environment. Despite the fact that the first well organized operations using open source exploitation, involving clear methods, have been put into practice after the Second World War, open sources have been recognized as an INT – OSINT – after 1990, as policymakers began to confirm OSINT’s contribution to their degree of information.

Given this, the present paper utilizes the OSINT term as it is defined by the NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook as ,OSINT is the unclassified information, discovered, selected, filtered and disseminated by purpose for a specific audience in order to response to a certain request of information.




Figure no.1. Human manipulation

For a better semantic accuracy, we shall use further detail offered by defense scholars¹ in a report² for the American Congress in 2007, according to which OSINT derives from newspapers, magazines, radio and television, and also, the Internet, including public academic work (documents, conferences) and governmental publications (reports, demographics, hearings and speeches).

Since the advent of mass media, especially television and radio, the role and functions of these have been the subject of numerous research studies in the social, political and military and aroused numerous public debates. Regarding connection with national security, until the 1990s most visible line of research aimed using the media as a means of propaganda, disinformation and manipulation.

As the present paper focuses on underlining the manner in which OSINT can help identify informational war elements driven by adversaries in certain operations, the concept of 'informational war' shall be used as described by Eric Hrovat in his volume *Information Warfare: The Unconventional Art in Digital World*.

According to Eric Hrovat, informational warfare is the 'offensive and defensive use of informational systems in order to eliminate, exploit, corrupt or destroy the adversary's information, informational processes/ systems or computer networks, meanwhile protecting one's own'³.

In 1996 NATO doctrine, information warfare is defined as the action "whose aim is to achieve information superiority in support of international military strategy, by affecting adversary information and information system, while defending their own ones."

Such actions are designed to dominate enemies and they take place at an operational, tactic and strategic level during peace, crisis, surges in crisis, conflict, war, end of the war and reconstruction.

In regard to actors involved in this type of conflict, we shall outcome the traditional perspective which included only military structures, and, in accordance with the security

¹ Richard A. Best, Jr., specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Alfred Cumming, specialist in Intelligence and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense.

² disponibil la <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf>, accesat la 18.03.2015

³ Eric Hrovat, *Information Warfare: The Unconventional Art in a Digital World*, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room, iunie 2001, p. 2, disponibil la http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/warfare/information-warfare-unconventional-art-digital-world_787 [11.09.2014].

environment's evolution, we shall enlarge the area of adversaries that may provoke informational wars affecting security to non-statal actors such as terrorist organizations and organized crime groups, hackers and corporate pressure groups⁴.

1. Manipulation and informational warfare through open sources

Open source information collection and use for tactic advantages have always played an important role in playing conflicts, the only important observed changes being the types of communication.

During the 20th century, open source collection has significantly evolved. For instance, during the Second World War, besides the tactical changes – the use of strategic bombing and nuclear warfare – a turning point was using radio waves for information. Observed progresses in communication lead to a need for tactic change (towards a defensive direction – Germany used encryption methods as it implemented the Enigma machine, in order to send codified messages to troupes, or an offensive one – Allies used informational warfare in order to intercept and decipher the Germans' messages and send toxic messages).

During the Gulf War, mostly considered a victory for information rather than a warfare triumph, the maneuvering of both military and commercial satellites assured for coalition forces the necessary communication, surveillance and warning data for advantages. The lack of proper defense measures in information warfare contributed to the defeat of the Iraqi forces⁵.

It's a well known fact that open sources can be, and in most cases, are easily used for manipulation, disinformation and the transmission of toxic data. Even in the case of press agencies, that we refer to as objective sources, there are cases in which these can transform in drivers threatening the public agenda. It's sufficient to bring into discussion the decision of pointing out an event which in turn becomes a major press subject. In specialised literature, this procedure is called media agenda construction.

Furthermore, only because press agencies discuss and event, this does not mean that information is accurate and it invokes real facts: history has shown that media is prone to disengage from its own purpose. Under these conditions, from the national security perspective and the need for clear, accurate information sent to the customer, open source information should be verified using covert sources.

The viceversa situation is also true, with only one 'but': covert information validation by open sources can be at most a confirmation or a dismissal, not a certain approval.

2. Case studies – disinformation, manipulation

Considering the above, we can conclude that open source is a useful resource in supporting operational components used in the process of achieving national, regional or international security.

Based on their potential for rapid and comprehensive dissemination of information, open source can be a tool used in countering the actions developed by various media outlets actors, even if they are working in the political, economic, social, financial field, for inducing currents adverse opinion or for the messages transmission aimed at testing the social side.

⁴ Patricia A H Williams, *Information Warfare: Time for a redefinition*, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 30th November - 2nd December 2010, disponibil la <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=isw>, accesat la 20.03.2015

⁵ Eric Hrovat, *op.cit.*, pp. 3-4.

Examples for this kind of actions are the attempts, from 2000 and, when an external financial entity tried to destabilize a bank which operated in our country or to induce a rapid devaluation of the national currency.

Press actions have great potential to influence the population in the first case, from 200, but immediate concerted reactions of the authorities managed to reduce the amount of financial damage.

In such media actions, open source information could become a real weapon in countering the acts. The only condition is represented by the correct evaluation of goals and objectives targeted by opposing parties, because the messages built to counter information need to be disseminated to the same audience, at least through the same media.

The most recent situation likely to cause systemic damage was in the summer of 2014 in Bulgaria, when a series of information circulated through social media, on YouTube and Facebook, have caused a real problem for the banking system. The action of the Bulgarian National Bank categorized as a "deliberate systematic attempt to destabilize the banking system", was done by sending bank customers -FIB First Investment Bank and Corporate Commercial Bank - CCB, emails and SMSs, asking them for an urgent withdraw of savings, placed in both banks. Accompanying those messages, had been diffused information about liquidity and organized crime interests of the shareholders of the two financial institutions.

Moreover, one of the emails sent argued that also other banks, including those owned by Italian giant UniCredit, faces major problems, that has involved loss of depositors' funds. Desinformation action in Bulgaria got the attention and public confidence due to the clients tendency to relate to the axiom of of history repeating: between 1996-1997 the Bulgarian banking sector went through a period of crisis, so 14 banks were closed⁶.

As a benign communication medium, the Internet has altered the security environment through aggressive and difficult to counteract forms of computer sabotage, in all its forms (cyber attacks, computer fraud, malware, spyware, etc.). Cyber weapons can be used for disruption chains of command and control systems for critical infrastructure damage, economic espionage and aggression classical times to spread information (propaganda, influence, manipulation, poisoning).

Media and literature abound in many situations exposure of cyber attacks on computer systems on government agencies or private companies of Western, especially US, whose origin goes, most often toward China and the Russian Federation.

„Red October” operation, initiated in 2007, is by far, considered one of the greatest acts of cyber espionage carried out so far, in which they have been targeted countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Central Asia, but also India, Japan, Switzerland and Spain. Targets were institutions involved in research and nuclear energy, as well as companies in the oil and gas.

There are a few recent examples that signal the need for decision makers, through intelligence structures to manage threats coming from this area. The costs that states incurred following cyber attacks, accounted for in financial, psychological, human, image, political, economic resources are huge. According to a study by McAfee in 2014, the annual cost of global economy from cybercrime are over 400 billion dollars⁷.

In another dimension, technology information has eroded the monopoly that intelligence agencies had on intelligence. Public access to the Internet, databases, media, applications, academic papers etc., complemented by the access to technology offered by commercial satellites determined that secrets to be hard to keep and generated numerous security flaws, so their opponents operate immediately⁸. We include in this category: "Wikileaks" scandals that affected the American intelligence since 2010; Edward Snowden's

⁶ ***, *Bulgaria. Why the run on banks?*, available at www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/07/bulgaria, accessed at 29.03.2015

⁷ <http://www.mcafee.com/mx/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime2.pdf>, accesat la 14.03.2015.

⁸ Stephen H. Campbell,, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

failure to Russia after revealing the most comprehensive information monitoring program conducted by the National Security Agency (USA).

3. Challenges in identification the elements of Informational War

Without having any reluctance to support the idea that traditional open sources (press, radio, television) are effective disinformation tools, however, we can appreciate that the main vulnerability is found today in virtual domain, an easy manipulator instrument. The most telling example is represented by the new media and social media, where anonymity or the author ability to hide are extremely high.

From the storage of data referring the profile till to the unable to completely delete the posted information, the user loses control of his own identity and he can not exercise the right on the data.

In the case of terrorist or extremist entities, from recruitment and training to propaganda, radicalization process is not expensive anymore, "grace" technological revolution that facilitated the presence or even the creation of forums, blogs, media departments and even the exploitation of hidden web.

The idea that "on the Internet you can find anything" was gradually corrected, leading to the conclusion that the virtual environment "is neither international nor gigantic capacity", it is difficult to use and not just to "Google".

However, exclusion of data flow circulated by virtual environment would be removed from the calculation of current data sources impressive at their disposal, even if they should be evaluated and analyzed to be eliminated errors of judgment and misinformation.

We cannot have the same conclusion when talking about the information contained in specialized analysis websites, think-tanks, prestigious publications, academic research centers or gray literature. When it comes to all reliable sources, the passing of time and analytical expertise become defining judges of value. Even if they are part of the public domain, open sources should not be confused to those being available to the public. Some pieces of information and quality analysis are obtained after paying a fee, which could be another source of validation.

Using gray literature as a source, is viewed with reluctance, since it is difficult to find, identify and obtain information crucially depending on the ability (financial, logistical, technical) to access to this resource; the large volume of data makes it difficult to separate "the signal" from the "background noise"; it is difficult to work if data about the author, subject, or publisher are not there.

The abundance of information has also negative aspects, and one of them is the lack of filters. Since anyone can make a web page, on the Internet one can find documents whose quality varies at different degrees, and with diverse origin. The result is that some extreme qualitative resources can join with the doubtful ones.

Other difficulties observed in the identification and validation of online sources are generated by Internet features and facilities offered by the online space, for example, the relative anonymity of the users and the (re)sending of information that may be relevant.

Evaluation criteria of important open sources, called also traditional, can be used as a guide for evaluating online sources. In his " Authoritative Guide to Evaluating Information on the Internet ", Alison Cooke⁹ claimed the idea of using evaluation criteria and traditional modes of validation of open source in the validation of online sources, with some variations, represented by those methods and techniques necessary to establish the identity of the owner, the source of the server, the location of the hosting server, the affiliation, the membership in online communities, the software used by the author, the e-mail of the author, traffic source, the provenance of the audience etc.

⁹ apud Dan Barbu, Sanda Gavrilă, „Validarea surselor, fundament al OSINT”, în *Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence*, nr. 4, 2010, pp. 71-78, p. 75-76, disponibil la <http://www.animv.ro/files/RRSI--4-.pdf> [15.09.2014].




Figure no.2. Information and source validation criteria

Conclusions

The development of globalization, the Internet, cyberspace connections made that information to become the weapon of inter-state geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic competitiveness, and for obtaining this the stakeholders sometimes resort to World War.

At the same time, technological progress has led to increased vulnerability to a range of increasingly diverse and disparate sources.

In a society where knowledge means added value, OSINT plays a key role in the positive meaning between innovation and quality. Stake of OSINT development is closely linked to the development of information and communication technology, so in this respect is necessary to adapt to a dynamic online environment.

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APPLYING MODELS OF EMERGING AND RE-EMERGING DISEASE CONTROL IN THE MANAGEMENT OF BIOTERRORIST INCIDENTS

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Abstract: *Both public health interventions that aim at emerging or reemerging diseases and responses to bioterrorist incidents can benefit from the foresights provided by certain epidemic models. Mathematical models of disease transmission based on the epidemiological features of various infectious agents can be valuable tools, because such models can give quantitative insights into patterns of disease spread and the efficiency of control measures. The accuracy of such predictions is sometimes altered by uncertainties. The experience gained during large historical epidemics (smallpox, poliomyelitis) has a limited use for predicting future outbreaks, due to major changes in human populations, mobility and patterns of social interactions in the last 30 years. We believe that an adequate management of bioterrorist incidents should imply using epidemic models in association with the knowledge we gained through recent health events created by some emerging and reemerging diseases.*

Keywords: *bioterrorism, emerging and reemerging diseases, epidemic model, epidemiology, infectious agents*

Introduction

In 1994 the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program offered, for the first time, a broad definition for human security that included the concept of health security in addition to personal, environmental, economic, political and community security. This modern perspective was accompanied by the emergence of new threats to individual, national and international safety after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. Along with the democratization of Central European countries and efforts to restore peace in the Middle East, the number of terrorist attacks - important sources of insecurity - decreased dramatically. But the collapse of political, traditional (state sponsored) terrorism did not lead to the total elimination of security threats, whilst many nations began to face new challenges such as ethnic and religious terrorism or "gray zone phenomenon" attacks.¹ The importance of securing human health is justified by the major changes in demographics and the increasing mobility of the population in recent decades that have strongly influenced the spread and severity of diseases caused by infectious agents. In addition to individual health risks, infectious diseases may lead to a loss of confidence in the capacity of governmental response and can have a negative economic impact, along with catalyzing regional instability, disrupting the social order and representing a strategic threat in the case of a bioterrorist incident.

Over one quarter of all global annual deaths are estimated to be directly linked to infectious diseases. The burden of morbidity and mortality associated with them falls greatly on people living in lower developed countries, where infants and children are most often affected, but also on some ethnic groups and disadvantaged minorities that are part of

¹ Ionescu C. *Terrorism in the New Millennium* in *Stabilitate și securitate regională*. Vol. 3. "Carol I" National University of Defense Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 50.

developed nations. History has witnessed many epidemic waves such as the *Black Death* which is thought to have been triggered by *Yersinia pestis*, causative agent of the systemic invasive infectious disease classically referred to as plague. Some papers even mention earlier cases of bioterrorist attacks, such as the intentional infection of American Indians through smallpox-contaminated blankets sent by British troops during the Seven Years' War (1754–1763). The development of the germ theory of disease has eventually led to the creation of antimicrobials and vaccines.² The widespread use of penicillin, the success of vaccination campaigns against poliomyelitis and the possibility to treat and cure tuberculosis will make the Surgeon General of the United States to proclaim in 1967 the victory against the threat of infectious diseases, suggesting that his nation should turn its attention and resources to the more important threat of chronic diseases.³

Contrary to those expectations, according to current estimates, since 1980 approximately one to three new human infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Legionnaires' disease or hantavirus pulmonary syndrome have been identified each year.⁴ On the other hand, traditional, thoroughly known diseases experience today a major resurgence due either to the development of microbial resistance to antibiotics (as in tuberculosis, malaria, etc.), or to decreased vaccination coverage among the population (e.g. for diphtheria, pertussis, measles).⁵ These are only few of the many events that cast a shadow upon the remarkable success we achieved in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases in the last hundred years. The risk of a bioterrorist attack should be reassessed periodically as threats to national and international security are, as has been shown in recent decades, a serious problem in the context of accelerated globalization. Advances in biotechnology and biochemistry have simplified the production process of biological weapons and the agents used may be more potent than conventional chemical weapons. Such an attack would not only cause illness and tragic deaths, but also a generalized panic in the community, its ultimate goal being to undermine the major economic, social and political actions pursued by the threatened nation. The best example can be traced back to 2001 during the anthrax attacks in the United States when letters intentionally contaminated with spores of *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax) caused casualties and resulted in a strong psychological impact on the population.⁶

1. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases

Emerging and re-emerging diseases are probably the best study model when evaluating a bioterrorist incident. Of course, preventing an attack in which biological weapons are used usually benefits from numerous interdisciplinary research directions in the field of military science: strategy, operational art, tactics, practice of war, security and defense etc. But any microorganism, regardless of how it gets to spread in the population – naturally or by human intention - can be identified, isolated and characterized using "classical" epidemiological concepts of communicable diseases and using common medical tools and infrastructure or, in

² Morens DM, Folkers GK, Fauci AS. The challenge of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. *Nature*. 2004 Jul 8; 430(6996):242-9. doi:10.1038/nature02759

³ Fauci AS. Infectious Diseases: Considerations for the 21st Century. *Clin Infect Dis*. (2001) 32 (5): 675-685 doi:10.1086/319235

⁴ Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Global Health Policy Paper. The U.S. Government & Global Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response. Available at: <http://kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-global-emerging-infectious-disease-preparedness-and-response/>. Accessed March 2015

⁵ National Institutes of Health (US); Biological Sciences Curriculum Study. NIH Curriculum Supplement Series [Internet]. Bethesda (MD): National Institutes of Health (US); 2007. Understanding Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases. Available at: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20370/>. Accessed March 2015

⁶ Riedel S. Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review. *Proceedings (Baylor University Medical Center)*. 2004;17(4):400-406. PMID: PMC1200679

special cases, high performance devices and secured facilities (such as biosafety level 4 - BSL4 laboratories).

Emerging infectious diseases are defined as diseases that have never affected the humankind (such emergence is difficult to determine and probably rare), have affected a small number of people in isolated areas in the past (AIDS, Ebola hemorrhagic fever) or have affected humanity in its history but have only recently been recognized as a distinct clinical entity caused by an infectious agent (Lyme disease caused by *Borrelia burgdorferi*, stomach ulcers caused by *Helicobacter pylori*).

Re-emerging infectious diseases are diseases that once were major health problems globally or in a particular country, and then declined dramatically, but are again becoming health problems for a significant proportion of the population (malaria, tuberculosis, yellow fever).⁷ It should be noted, however, that this classification is not used very accurately in the medical literature, as the complicated nature or evolution of certain infectious diseases allows these conditions to be placed in different categories according to the personal opinion of different experts. For example, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) is considered an emerging disease a decade later after it disappeared while MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome), which is caused by a new agent of the same family of coronaviruses, belongs to the same category.⁸

The impact of emerging diseases on public health is undoubtedly overwhelming. The expertise provided by experts and the organizations responsible with the control of communicable diseases are the main strategic resource when trying to manage a potential bioterrorist event. Infection with influenza (A)H1N1 (swine flu) was identified in 2009 and since then has caused over 250,000 deaths globally. Ebola virus has infected approx. 20,000 people and was responsible for over 7,000 deaths. Although SARS has affected less than 8,000 individuals it has generated an estimated economic loss of 30 billion US dollars. Table 1 shows the estimated global impact of some important emerging disease of the recent decades.⁹

| Emerging Disease | Year Identified | Estimated Global Impact | |
|---|-----------------|-------------------------|------------|
| | | Cases | Deaths |
| Ebola Virus Disease | 1976 | 19,568 | 7,653 |
| Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) | 1981 | 78 million | 39 million |
| Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD or “mad cow disease”) | 1996 | 229 | 229 |
| H5N1 Influenza (“bird flu”) | 1997 | 668* | 393* |
| Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | 2003 | 8096 | 774 |
| H1N1 (2009) Influenza (“swine flu”) | 2009 | unknown | >284,500 |
| Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) | 2012 | 699 | 209 |

⁷ *Idem* 4.

⁸ Morens DM, Fauci AS. Emerging Infectious Diseases: Threats to Human Health and Global Stability. Heitman J, ed. PLoS Pathogens. 2013;9(7):e1003467. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003467

⁹ *Idem* 4

| | | | |
|---|------|-----|-----|
| H7N9 Influenza (“bird flu”) | 2013 | 453 | 175 |
| NOTES: Cases and deaths reflect the cumulative number of cases and deaths (as of October 17, 2014). * indicates cumulative cases and deaths from 2003 to present. | | | |

Table 1. Selected Emerging Infectious Diseases Since 1975 (from The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Global Health Policy Paper)

2. The surveillance and control of emerging infectious diseases - "knowledge into action" for the response to bioterrorist incidents

International efforts to create a network of interconnected systems to prevent, detect and combat emerging diseases have resulted in a guiding framework developed by the World Health Organization: the International Health Regulations (International Health Regulations, IHR 2005). The IHR is a legally-binding international agreement among member-states of the World Health Organization (WHO) that requires countries to develop a minimum level of capacity to “detect, assess, notify and report” potential outbreaks and other public health emergencies and that outlines the processes for reporting, investigating, and responding to these threats at the international level. Its goal is to provide a response to the international spread of diseases, strictly limited to the risk to public health and avoiding interference with tourism and international trade. The countries that have ratified the regulation are required, within 5 years after entry into force, to develop legislative capacities, infrastructure and staffing able to monitor, detect, analyze, report, and take appropriate steps in response to any health event, regardless of its source or origin (biological, chemical, nuclear), that could endanger public health and has the potential to spread across borders.¹⁰ The Global Alert and Response Network (GOARN) links together over 70 separate information and diagnostic networks around the world. GOARN uses both informal sources (such as various non-governmental organizations) and also formal sources represented by 191 WHO member countries, together with WHO regional and country offices and WHO collaborating laboratories located throughout the world.¹¹

The SARS experience has shown us that we cannot think of emerging infectious diseases only as a health issue, but also as an administrative and governmental challenge requiring close coordination of several areas such as transportation, immigration, communications, finance, water supply and sanitation, national defense and education. The decision making process must involve a chain of feasible commands that should be carried out accurately and at the right time.

Many countries have developed customized response plans based on the WHO guidelines and have been using them during the 2009 pandemic of (A)H1N1 (swine flu), or later during epidemics of influenza (A)H5N1 and (A)H7N9 (avian influenza). Some authors consider that such events can give us more insight on possible malfunctions or failures that may occur in these programs. For example, screening passengers at airports practiced extensively in 2009 proved to be less effective, because a large number of states did not identify any cases of infection with influenza virus by this method. The same applies to the thermal scanners that could detect people with febrile syndromes, but ultimately proved to have an insufficient cost-efficiency. Travel restrictions are also intensely debated because beyond what seems a reasonable measure during an epidemic such regulations could actually

¹⁰ Romanian Ministry of Health. Fundament Note on the approval of International Health Regulations 2005. Available at: <http://85.120.75.151/upload/articles/106491/nf-hg-758-2009.pdf>. Accessed March 2015

¹¹ WHO. Global Alert and Response FAQ. Available at: <http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/faqbioagents/en>. Accessed March 2015

cause major damage to the economy of the countries already affected due to the epidemic itself. Moreover, such restrictions could hinder international healthcare insurance or even the deployment of humanitarian aid to disadvantaged areas.¹²

A very important factor in controlling the epidemic is the attitude of the population as a whole. Medical decisions are influenced including by risk-benefit assessment for certain public health interventions, but a person without specialized knowledge cannot correctly perceive this delicate proportion, or may come to believe that the measures proposed by the authorities are even more dangerous than the health threat itself. Recently, the Israeli state was faced with a similar extremely important and difficult decision that was met with skepticism among a segment of the population.

In 1988, when the Global Polio Eradication Initiative was founded (a public-private partnership involving Health and the World Health Organization), the poliovirus caused over 350,000 annual cases of paralysis. Since that date, the number of cases decreased by 99% due to the systematic mass vaccination of children. However, the disease is still endemic in three countries: Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. In 2002, the WHO declared the European Region *polio-free*.^{13 14} In Israel, the last case was documented in 1988, when 15 infected people developed paralytic poliomyelitis due to wild poliovirus importation from northern Egypt. Between 1990 and 2005, according to the National Vaccine Schedule children were administered both inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) and oral polio vaccine (OPV which uses live attenuated viral strains). OPV vaccination was discontinued 3 years after the certification of the polio-free status. The OPV vaccine produces a local immune response in the lining ('mucous membrane') of the intestines - the primary site for poliovirus multiplication. The antibodies produced there inhibit the multiplication of subsequent infections of 'wild' (naturally occurring) virus. This intestinal immune response to OPV is probably a reason why mass campaigns with OPV have been shown to stop person-to-person transmission of wild poliovirus. The Inactivated polio vaccine only provides individual protection. Therefore the oral polio vaccine is still recommended in countries where wild polio virus persists. The big disadvantage of OPV is nevertheless the risk of vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) cases, estimated to 1 case per 2.7 million vaccine doses (first dose). Although very low, the risk is considered too high for polio-free countries. The current epidemiological situation is, unfortunately, in a state of a very fragile "unstable" equilibrium.

In April 2013 in the north region of Israel, as part of the regular environmental surveillance, the authorities have detected the presence of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) in some sewage treatment facilities.¹⁵ The same strain had been isolated a year ago in the city of Cairo, Egypt, and is also a circulating strain in Pakistan. Although vaccination coverage in the Israeli population is optimal, the reintroduction of wild poliovirus in a country where the disease is eradicated represents a major public health threat. Competent authorities established a series of rapid responses, initiating an information and awareness campaign about the presence of wild polio virus in sewage water, promoting the improvement of personal and hand hygiene. The experts also decided to initiate a vaccination campaign with oral polio

¹² Hill-Cawthorne Grant. Analysis: How SARS pandemic offers lessons for Ebola. CNN. Octombrie 2014. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/16/world/asia/ebola-asia-sars-hill-cawthorne-analysis/> Accessed March 2015.

¹³ Pițigoi D, Ciufecu C. *Chronology of polio eradication in Romania*. Viata Medicala nr. 32 (1178). August 2012

¹⁴ WHO. 10 facts on polio eradication. Available at: <http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/> Accessed March 2015

¹⁵ Anis E, Kopel E, Singer SR, Kaliner E, Moerman L, Moran-Gilad J, Sofer D, Manor Y, Shulman LM, Mendelson E, Gdalevich M, Lev B, Gamzu R, Grotto I. Insidious reintroduction of wild poliovirus into Israel, 2013. *Euro Surveill.* 2013;18(38):pii=20586. Available at: <http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=20586> Accessed March 2015

vaccine, the first of its kind in the last 8 years – all children born after 2004 who had already received at least one dose of inactivated vaccine were considered eligible, unless they had contraindications. The campaign is similar to the original program of vaccination (pre-2005), and is considered to have an exceptional safety profile.

Shortly after the campaign's start in August 2013, the director of Izun Hozer (approx. translation "return to equilibrium"), a local organization which claims to "promote health education", submitted a petition to the High Court of Justice demanding the Ministry of Health to halt the vaccination campaign because they think the "solution might prove more dangerous than the problem doctors are trying to solve" and parents have not received all the data needed to make an informed decision.¹⁶ The Court rejected the request promptly after state representatives submitted their arguments. They mentioned the unacceptable health risks that could arise in the absence of revaccination, and the possibility that other countries will issue travel warnings for the state of Israel. In addition, the vaccination campaign was endorsed and recommended by international experts.¹⁷ In September 2013, more than half of the 1.2 million eligible children were already vaccinated with OPV. The campaign was not interrupted and has succeeded perhaps to prevent the reemergence of polio in a polio-free region.

3. Epidemiological predictions. Epidemic models

Epidemic models are used to describe the transmission of infectious diseases in the population and rely on mathematical formulas. Basically, they represent a systematic method to process the assumptions and available epidemiological data on pathogens and make predictions based on this analysis of the geographic, demographic and temporal evolution of the epidemic. An important role of such evaluations is the potential to implement or adapt public health interventions according to their estimated impact.¹⁸ A 2006 study concerning the delaying of the global spread of pandemic influenza virus showed that the virus will spread around the globe within a few months unless travel restrictions exceed the unrealistic level of 99.9%, rendering partial restrictions useless.¹⁹ Such information can provide us with valuable arguments when the proposed measures have a controversial social impact or generate economic and financial disturbances.

The simplest model is the deterministic SIR model, developed in 1927. It divides the population into three categories, called compartments: S (susceptible), I (infected), R (recovered / removed). $S(t)$ is used to represent the number of individuals not yet infected with the disease at time t , or those susceptible to the disease; $I(t)$ denotes the number of individuals who have been infected with the disease and are capable of spreading the disease to those in the susceptible category and $R(t)$ is the compartment used for those individuals who have been infected and then removed from the disease, either due to immunization or due to death - they cannot be re-infected and neither do they transmit the infection to others. Of course, there are models incorporating other variables such as SEIR, where E (exposed) is the number of people that are infected but are not able yet to transmit the disease, marking the characteristic lag phase of certain diseases. Among other parameters we can define γ

¹⁶ Shamah David. Polio vaccine debate hits High Court. The Times of Israel. 21 August 2013. Available at: <http://www.timesofisrael.com/polio-vaccine-debate-hits-the-high-court/> Accessed March 2015

¹⁷ Siegel Judy. High Court rejects request for interim freeze of polio vaccine campaign. Available at: <http://www.jpost.com/Health-and-Science/High-Court-rejects-petition-to-cancel-polio-vaccine-campaign-323959> Accessed March 2015

¹⁸ Wu JT. Basic epidemic theory. University of Hong Kong, School of Public Health. Available at: <http://sph.hku.hk/shortcourse/2011/section2.pdf> Accessed March 2015

¹⁹ Cooper BS, Pitman RJ, Edmunds WJ, Gay NJ. Delaying the International Spread of Pandemic Influenza. Sepulveda-Amor J, ed. PLoS Medicine. 2006;3(6):e212. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0030212

(recovery or removal rate) or β (transmission). For example, the ratio $1 / \gamma$ represents the infectious period and is determined by epidemiological studies. R_0 is defined as basal reproduction rate; it equals β / γ , and is defined as the number of secondary cases generated by the primary case in a susceptible population. In the case of influenza virus $R_0 = 3-4$; $R_0 = 10-12$ for varicella and $R_0 = 16-18$ for measles. Theoretically, for a closed population, an infectious disease can only invade if there is a threshold fraction of susceptibles greater than $1 / R_0$. These notions are extremely useful for vaccination policies: for example, it is considered that if the proportion of susceptibles is reduced to below $1 / R_0$, the disease could be eradicated.²⁰

Many studies based on epidemic models have been published in the light of the recent Ebola outbreak. Most have attempted, with satisfactory results, to estimate the reproduction rate - the number of new cases generated by an infected person.²¹ An article published in the PLoS Biology journal (*Drake et al.*) offers additional predictions that are based on variable factors such as the number and the bed capacity of hospitals, the location where the infection occurred, the place where treatment is administered, and burial practices. The researchers used a mathematical formulation known as a branching processes - a method for keeping track of all possible epidemic outcomes in proportion to their probabilities - calibrated with newly developed methods. To increase the complexity of the model, data from previous outbreaks of Ebola were used: the number of hospitalized patients, the number of infected medical staff, the transmission rate in hospitals, in the community or during funerals and last but not least the effectiveness of control measures. The model was calibrated using data from WHO and the Ministry of Health of Liberia (second country where cases were discovered after the initial identification of the disease in Guinea) during July-September 2014.²² This allowed researchers to observe and use in their model behavioral changes experienced by the population and public health interventions such as increasing the number of beds in hospital settings (approx. 600 extra during August - September) or the adoption of safe burial practices. According to the most pessimistic scenario, if for example the number of beds remained the same, the authors estimated a total of 130,000 cases by the end of 2014. On the contrary, if the number would be increased until there were at least 1,700 beds we would have totaled 50,000 cases of Ebola. Moreover, the epidemic could be limited if hospitalization rate would reach 85 percent. According to official data aggregated by WHO by January 2015, a cumulative number of approx. 20,000 cases was recorded in the countries that continue to be affected (Guinea, Liberia etc.), but it is generally recognized that these data show only a fraction of the total real cases.²³ In Fig. 1 one can notice the model's accuracy for predicting the epidemic trend based on cases reported during June to August 2014.²⁴

²⁰ Haran M. Introduction to models of disease dynamics. Pennsylvania State University. 2009. Available at: <http://www.unc.edu/~rls/s940/samsidisdyntut.pdf> Accessed March 2015

²¹ Siettos C, Anastassopoulou C, Russo L, Grigoras C, Mylonakis E. Modeling the 2014 Ebola Virus Epidemic – Agent-Based Simulations, Temporal Analysis and Future Predictions for Liberia and Sierra Leone. PLOS Currents Outbreaks. 2015. Available at: <http://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/modeling-the-2014-ebola-virus-epidemic-agent-based-simulations-temporal-analysis-and-future-predictions-for-liberia-and-sierra-leone/> Accessed March 2015

²² EurekAlert. New model predicts Ebola epidemic in Liberia could be ended by June. Januarie 2015. Available at: http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2015-01/uog-nmp011315.php Accessed March 2015

²³ WHO. Ebola Situation Report - 31 December 2014. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/ebola/en/status-outbreak/situation-reports/ebola-situation-report-31-december-2014> Accessed March 2015

²⁴ Drake JM, Kaul RB, Alexander LW, et al. Ebola Cases and Health System Demand in Liberia. Riley S, ed. PLoS Biology. 2015;13(1):e1002056. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002056.




Figure 1. The evolution of the Ebola virus disease epidemic. Estimates based on models compared to total cumulative reported cases

Conclusions

As shown previously, biological weapons are, probably, the only weapons that can propagate themselves, capable of causing disproportionate damage to the amount of agent used in the initial attack. Some authors consider that a highly pathogenic microorganism can be more dangerous than a nuclear weapon because it can extend beyond the geographical area for which it was originally designed on a virtually indefinite period of time. Moreover, the specific incubation period of microorganisms gives them a unique character among different types of weapons: on one hand, this window of opportunity allows e.g. the vaccination of vulnerable individuals and preparing a response plan, but unfortunately it also favors the passage of time and makes it easier for perpetrators to distance themselves from "the scene" and to eliminate all traces.

At present, however, we have a better understanding of emerging diseases and we have gained experience in the field of communicable diseases prevention and control. Epidemic models, as we have proved, are extremely valuable tools for determining the evolution potential of emerging infectious agents, regardless if they are the result of a terrorist attack or not. Watchful waiting may decisively influence the way we mitigate the effects of such an attack. Although undesirable, the epidemics or pandemics of the last decades gave us many possible solutions for the prevention and fight against infectious diseases.

Biological agents can sometimes create more panic among individuals than conventional weapons by their invasiveness due to fear of a possible human contamination. But measures of public health cannot be successfully implemented without the systematic collaboration of those concerned. For example, active immunoprophylaxis through vaccination, a method often used in the control of many infectious agents, must be understood in terms of necessity and risk-benefit ratio by the public. Even if it is a frequently neglected aspect one must always have regard to the general population we want to protect: such people may be the strongest ally in the fight against bioterrorism, but also a destabilizing factor.

Finally, we believe that the arguments presented in this paper support and would certainly justify a more active involvement of military/security-focused organizations (both national and international) in public health efforts to mitigate human security threats caused by infectious agents. The experience and expertise of such structures (NATO, the Departments of Defense and Internal Affairs, even Intelligence Services etc.) can greatly influence the fight against epidemics through close cooperation with specialized medical

institutions. Such joint protocols developed to combat the potential spread of “traditional” pathogens could aid in the development of a rapid and robust response should a bioterrorist incident occur.

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PRECLINICAL EVALUATION OF NEW “BIO-CHEM” DECONTAMINANTS

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Abstract: *The purpose of this paper is to present the preclinical evaluation of new “bio-chem” (biological and chemical agents) decontaminating substances and the results obtained.*

Therefore in the laboratory stage we evaluated physico-chemical characteristics, antimicrobial effects in vitro were tested in the Laboratory of Microbiology, acute toxicity was tested in vivo by intra-peritoneal injections on young laboratory mice and skin tolerance and conjunctival irritation were tested on adult house-rabbits.

For the second stage, micro-polygon (laboratory), the substances were tested in vitro and for the third stage, mini-polygon (in field), the decontaminating effect was evaluated in real life conditions. The final testing stage can be performed in specialized polygon for CBRN training and after the pre-clinical evaluation “bio-chem” decontaminating substances can be clinically tested on sick or experimentally contaminated people.

Covering all mentioned stages we have selected the most effective substances that can be produced in our country for use in military and civilian.

Keywords: *biological agents, CBRN, medical protection, decontamination, preclinical protection*

Introduction

Intentional or unintentional “bio-chem” contamination (with biological and / or chemical agents), represents a real risk, for which we must have an effective prevention and combat management. This risk may be natural (epidemics and epizootics) or artificial (biological accident, biological attack, bioterrorist or bio crime).

1. General Context

The decontamination, subsequent to biological attacks and / or chemical terrorist attacks or industrial accidents with “bio-chemical” agents, is the first measure to be applied for the protection of personnel and the environment, in order to reduce the number of victims and the elimination of the consequences of the event. The products used in microbial decontamination are numerous, but there are very few that meet all the conditions of a good decontaminant. Among these, a series of new “bio-chemical” decontaminants are also part,

produced from oxidizing compounds. The most effective substances, selected after the completion of testing under various experimental conditions, can be produced and used for decontamination in accordance with the law.

“*Bio-chem*” decontaminants are a class of chemicals used for the removal and inactivation of live biological agents (bacteria, viruses, fungi etc.) or nonliving (toxins, biological regulators, etc.) biological agents. The purpose of decontamination can be the *prevention* undergone by cleaning, sanitizing, disinfection or “*health treatment*” of personnel, objects and surfaces after a biological attack or an accident. These substances are used for decontaminating nonliving surfaces (work surfaces, objects, pavements, soils, etc.), objects that come into direct contact with the human being (clothes, shoes, tools) or to decontaminate the body (skin, mucous membranes or internal use). The first obey regulations on *pesticides* (technical use disinfectants, insecticides, repellents, rodenticides, ratifuge, algacides, etc.). The second group and the third group must obey regulations on drugs, including the *Drug Law*, even if it allows “short procedures” to be applied as it is the case for cosmetics. Basically, when the synthesis of new substances with potential decontaminating effect and/ or new decontaminating compositions takes place by means of applied research, this is thoroughly evaluated. And the rules and assessment procedures are just a minimal scale of analysis that are adapted and completed according to the needs and possibilities of the researcher.

2. Material and methods

At the Military Medical Scientific Research Centre, we have pre-clinically evaluated potentially new “bio-chemically” decontaminating substances synthesized by chemists from ICECHIM and ICTTM Bucharest (oxidizing compounds, quaternary ammonium salts, alkyl phosphates, chlorogens etc.). We went through all the necessary steps and we selected the most effective substances with minor unwanted effects and at a low cost price that in need can be produced and conditioned in the country.

We have established a *testing-assessment Algorithm for decontaminants*, by applying working procedures for microbiology, hygiene and toxicology, tailored for the purpose.

In the *laboratory stage*, are evaluated the *physio-chemical* characteristics and possibilities of preconditioning, for testing purposes. Subsequently, follows the *antimicrobial effect* in vitro testing on representative bacteria: gram-positive and gram-negative cocci, gram-positive and gram-negative bacilli, mycobacterial, bacterial spores, on viruses and toxins in accordance with the methods and techniques of the medical laboratory.

After selecting the most effective substance or decontaminant composition, is tested *in vivo* the biological effect on different species of mammals, test animals.

Tests for antimicrobial effect were performed at the *Laboratory of Microbiology* for the diagnosis of biological agents with biosafety level P2+. For the screening of potentially decontaminating substances, were performed bacterial susceptibility tests by using the diffusimetric antibiogram method on several lots. Bacteria were grown on the Müeller-Hinton solid medium, aerobically incubated for 72 hours at 37°C, with daily readings. The measurement was carried out with the precision of 0.1 mm (with calipers under a magnifying glass) on several tests to calculate the arithmetic mean of each substance in each species.

Acute toxicity will be tested by intra-peritoneal injection on young laboratory mice (*Mus musculus albicans*), weighing 18-20 g, healthy, of both genders, 0.5 ml working solution. The lots of mice, consisting of 3-5 individuals are monitored during three days, by supervising the behavior (alertness, agitation, feeding, aggression, etc.), any clinical and mortality symptoms compared to a control group. On the fourth day, surviving mice were euthanized, not to be used in other experiments. It is believed that acute toxicity is very high if

the mice die within a few minutes, high if they die within hours, average if they die on the first day, low if they die in 2-3 days and practically non-toxic if all mice survived the experiment. It is known that almost all pharmacologically active substances are toxic or very toxic, but in this case we are interested primarily in the potential risk to operators who decontaminate and any specific measures for labor protection.

Additionally, we work on adult house-rabbits, of around 2 kg, healthy, of both sexes, on 3 animal batches. For *skin tolerance*, 2-4 areas on the wings will be epilated (with paste waxing or shaving) and bandaged with the working solution, one of them being the saline witness. The local reaction is sought (rash, lesion) and, where appropriate, lesions are harvested for pathological examination. For *conjunctival irritation*, the working solution is instilled in one eye and a saline control substance in the other eye. The local reaction (rash, lesion) is sought that can go up to irreversible destruction of the eye.

In this stage, *in vivo* tests can be performed, by contaminating and decontaminating some epithelial *cell cultures*, and observing the comparison of the cellular “grid” formation, in the liquid culture environment.

Within the second stage – *the micro-polygon* – the selected substances and/or compositions are tested *in vitro* in the laboratory, for the decontaminating effect on the sub-layers experimentally contaminated with the same live micro-organisms and toxins. Related to the purpose of the decontamination agent, the sub-layers can be: different metals, painted auto metal sheet, plastic, rubber, glass, textile, chrome leather or natural, etc. Samples are harvested using sanitary cotton-buds (TIS) for the initial microbial state, after contamination, after applying the decontamination agent (in different intervals, counted in minutes) and after the water-wash. In this stage, the consumption (in gr/dm²), the type of contact and the residual contamination risk can be estimated.

In this stage, the decontaminating effect can be *in vivo* tested on lab animals, experimentally contaminated or decontaminated, to check the decontaminating effect on a living animal skin/fur.

The third stage – *mini-polygon* testing – means evaluating the biologic decontaminating effect, in real conditions, in normal atmosphere, within the secured area with specific equipment. For example, checking the decontamination of a target-vehicle, marked with areas for contamination and decontamination. Samples are harvested from the initial microbial load, after contamination, after applying the decontamination agent (at different intervals, in minutes) and after washing with water. Finally, the residual contamination is checked, on the protective equipment of the operators (especially gloves and rubber boots), on soil and wastewater. If necessary, a final disinfection will be made with a highly effective disinfectant, eg. formalin solution.

Working with animals in free atmosphere is not recommended as they may escape. With the approval of the Ethics commission the decontaminating agent can be applied (without previous contamination) on the skin of healthy volunteers (written informal agreement needed) and under strict medical surveillance. *Primum non nocere* principle shall be respected.

Only if all results are good and there is no possibility the environment can remain contaminated, the final testing stage can be performed, in *polygon specialized* for CRBN defence training (chemical, biologic, radiological and nuclear). As technics, a target-vehicle or a large sized vehicle will be used, and the area will be marked and secured. It is recommended that the entire contamination and decontamination process to be photographed and filmed for documentation.

After the pre-clinic evaluation of the bio-active “bio-chemicals” decontaminating substances, considering the obtained results, clinical tests on sick or experimentally

contaminated people can be proposed, respecting the legislation and with absolutely no health risks for the exposed subjects.

3. Results and discussions

We present below the investigations of new substances with disinfecting and decontaminating "bio-chem" potential effects.

The received substances for testing and evaluation belonging to the following classes: chlorine compounds, alkyl phosphates, quaternary ammonium, oxidizing compounds etc.

The synthesized substances and hereby tested for the "bio-chem" decontamination are effective for the specific action, little toxic, easy to prepare and use, with small costs and supplement arsenal of protection against biological and chemical agents.

We are observed the synergistically effect of some compounds such as oxidizing compounds or quaternary ammonium salts. The results of these assessments were already communicated, published and reported. The most effective selected substances can be made and used for decontamination, according with the legislation.

There is no unique procedure for decontaminating substances, testing and evaluation, due to filed diversity. By the algorithm we have set, new potential "bio-chem" decontaminating substances, chemically synthesized, series of oxidizing compounds and quaternary ammonium salts, etc. have been preclinical evaluated. Covering all mentioned stages, we have selected the most effective substances, with minor undesired effects and with low production costs that can be made and conditioned within our country. Some of the new substances can be conditioned as very-effective "bio-chem" decontaminants that can be used in biological crisis situations or as disinfectants, after approval, according to the legislation, by the Pesticides Commission. Unfortunately, by reducing some of the research facilities and by pensioning some researchers, we are in the situation that there is nobody who can synthesize the substances or condition them as needed decontaminants for national security.

Conclusions

The test-assessment algorithm adapted by us for the decontaminants covers the most important aspects of "bio-chemically" decontamination operations.

By applying this algorithm to the assessment of a series of new substances, potential decontaminants, respectively oxidizing compounds and quaternary ammonium salts, synthesized by chemists, we have selected the most effective products based on complex criteria. These can also be presented for endorsement as new disinfectants.

The preclinical evaluation of new bioactive "bio-chemically" decontaminant substances is important for public health, through the medical protection against biological agents and epidemics.

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CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION FOR CBRN MEDICAL PROTECTION EXERCISE

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Abstract: *The Military Medical Research Center conducted in cooperation with the Simulation Training Center, a series of computer assisted scientific experiments, for practice training by simulation within the BIOAG -15 Exercise.*

The existing infrastructure was used: facilities, hardware and software, including the NATO software for JCATS constructive simulations, the database was loaded and the default scenarios were developed in different versions, with mixed teams.

The modeling and the running of simulations allowed the demonstration and validation of the scientific data resulted from the calculations performed according to the calculation procedures through using constructive simulation, in real-time, under the supervision of a referee. The results are dynamically shown on electronic maps and the calculation of the contaminated troops and civilians is centralized in tables, sequentially displayed according to the movement of the cloud of biological agents.

The experimental IT system model, developed by us to exercise defense against the effects of biological weapons and bioterrorism is reliable and can be adapted for application in situations of massive contamination with biological agents or for military medical education and training.

Keywords: *biological agents, biological weapons, biological attack, bioterrorism, experimental model, CBRN protection, constructive simulation*

Introduction

The Military Medical Research Center (MMRC) collaborated with the Simulation Training Center (STC) in order to conduct a computer assisted experiment named "BIOAG-15". The experiment is a basic tool in a military scientific research project for the optimization and implementation of the military medical management of the biological attack, according to the NATO/EU standards and compatible with the alliance's capabilities and for assessing bioterrorist threats, vulnerabilities and risks. The obtained results will be used in future research to validate data from operational research conducted at a theoretical level. During the experiment, repeated simulations were performed with distinct variations in accordance with the value of the considered variables, yielding a data set extremely useful in the research work within the project. The experiment was organized and led by MMRC that also ensured experts in the participating working groups. S.T.C. has provided the simulation spaces and network as

well as the specialized personnel able to instruct and advise the MMRC structures during the planning and conduct of the experiment both operationally and from a technical standpoint. The work was carried out as planned and communicated throughout the course of preparing the activities of the working groups.

The *experiment* followed the demonstration and validation of the scientific data resulting from the calculations performed according to calculation procedures by using constructive modeling and simulation and involved taking the following steps: making the work tool by modeling the synthetic environment (biological agents, troops and population) under different terrain and weather conditions; epidemiological spread simulation and testing the effects of biological weapons; simulation of the troops and civilians behavior and verification of the predicted effects from the calculations; multicenter data collection for analysis in order to ensure medical logistics.

1. Organising the experiment

The *scenario* of the experiment was fictional and involved the simulation of several biological and bioterrorist attacks on urban areas with various populations and densities, in which military units are deployed. The objective was to estimate the number of victims of primary biological attacks (direct) and the rate of infection (contamination) in time.

The *triggering factor* was specific to the types of terrorist actions, being used the means available for actions of this kind: civilian cars, agricultural machinery, small tonnage ships and commercial air assets. The contaminant agent was a biological agent in two forms: "wild" and "militarized".

The *environmental factors* (such as the temperature, wind direction and speed) and the moments of the attacks were set based on regional statistical data and based on features for the use with ultimate effect of the biological agent.

To *estimate the infected number*, simulations were performed in three situations: without sensors, with military sensors and short distance alarm (in barracks) and a sensor system of the local Inspectorate for Emergency Situations and a village level alarm.

Description of the model used. Modeling the situations described in the scenario, according to the hypothesis of the study was done using the constructive simulation system "*Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation - JCATS*", manufactured by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, USA. JCATS is a flexible simulation system that can model the military actions, civilian emergencies and other complex scenarios involving personnel and equipment that operate in all environments: land, water and air.

The Simulation Training Centre of the National Defense University "Carol I" (STC) uses JCATS in computer assisted training exercises, activities in support of military education, military operational research etc. STC has the necessary expertise to organize activities based on experimental research using constructive simulation. S.T.C. built databases according to the scenario assumptions, the studied maps of the urban centers and specific sensors and has adapted modeling algorithms of CBRN actions.


The experimental work was conducted over a 5 days period after a default work schedule (Table 1). Interdisciplinary mixed work teams were organized from both institutions (MMRC and STC) who actively participated in training support cells, action planning, implementation of the simulation actions, primary data collection and analysis as *operators*. The work was carried out in the presence of an official arbitrator of the General Staff /National Military Command Center.

Table 1. Overall program of the experiment

| HOUR | MONDAY 02.02.2015 | TUESDAY 03.02.2015 | WEDNESDAY 04.02.2015 | THURSDAY 05.02.2015 | FRIDAY 06.02.2015 |
|---------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| 08.00 - 09.00 | Training support cells | V2 Action planning | V3 Action planning | V4 Action planning | Post-experiment analysis |
| 09.00 - 10.00 | V1 Action planning | V2.1 Simulation | V3.1 Simulation | V4.1 Simulation | Preparing a report with the First Impressions (FIR) and drafting a post-experiment Report Project |
| 11.00 - 12.00 | V1.1 Simulation | V2.2 Simulation | V3.2 Simulation | V4.2 Simulation | |
| 12.00 - 13.00 | V1.2, V1.3 Simulation | V2.3 Simulation | V3.3 Simulation | V4.3 Simulation | Conclusion of work |
| 13.00 - 14.00 | Preliminary data analysis | Preliminary data analysis | Preliminary data analysis | Preliminary data analysis | |

The experimentation of the functional constructive simulation model for CBRN medical protection exercises held in specially equipped workspaces for such activities that allowed the development of the experiment. (Figure no. 1).

Figure no. 1 Layout in the workspaces



2. Variations of the study and experiment results

The *study hypotheses* focused on four differently sized urban centers, the military personnel being considered a representative sample of the population considered trained and equipped so as to be able to protect their own. (Table 2).

Table 2. Variations of the study


| Variables | Variant 1 Locality 1 | Variant 2 Locality 2 | Variant 3 Locality 3 | Variant 4 Locality 4 | Variant 5 Localities 1,2,4 | |
|--|--|--|--|---|---|------------------|
| Civilian environment: | 100.000 people | 200.000 | 300.000 | 2.500.000 | The initial conditions of the simulation are maintained | |
| Military structures: | 1 Bg. Mc. (3303 militaries) | 1 Bg. Mc. (3303 militaries) | 1 TG NAVAL (600 militaries, 3 frigates) | 3 Bg. Mc. (9909 militaries) | | |
| Triggering factor: | 1 agricultural equipment 20 km/h speed 10 sprays | vehicle, 40 km/h speed Route1 = 20 sprays Route 2 = 10 sprays | ship, 20 Nd speed (approx. 37 km/h) 20 aerosolizations | plane, 200km/h speed, 200m altitude 10 aerosolizations | | |
| Dispersion alignment | Peripheral artery, the NW-SE direction Route = 2.5 km | Peripheral artery, the NW-SE Route 1 = 6km Route 2 = 2km. | Parallel at 1 km from shore, from N to S, Route = 8,5 km | Salba lakes Colentina, the NW-SE, Route = 11 km | | |
| Agent type | Wild, microdroplets | Wild, microdroplets | Militarized, Dust | Militarized, Dust | | |
| Quantity | 100 l liquid culture, 1/10 diluted in water | 100 l liquid culture, 1/10 diluted in water | 100 kg lyophilized spores, diluted 1/10 in inert powder | 100 kg lyophilized spores, diluted 1/10 in inert powder | | |
| Time (hour of launching the attack and the season) | 04.00, in summer | 04.00, in summer | 21.00, in summer | 04.00, in summer | | 04.30, in summer |
| The wind | from NE, 7 km/h | from NE, 7 km/h | from E, 5 km/h | from NE, 10 km/h | | from NE, 10 km/h |
| Hypotheses | No alarm | | | | | |
| | Sensors alarm in UM (1km) | | | | | |
| | Sensors alarm at ISU (10 km) | | | | | |

The JCATS simulation system provided information in the form of graphics seizures, numerical and graphical rates of the contamination, useful for data interpretation and its application in studies of health management.

The results were summarized in synoptic tables that generated charts which allowed obtaining information related to the rate of contamination. Due to the intrinsic algorithms of the simulation program, during the experiment were recorded differences between the performed simulations, only a part of these being relevant to the purpose of the project.

Variant 1: number of simulations performed: 6; number of simulations considered relevant for the purpose of the research: 3; agricultural machinery, 20 km / h speed, 100 liters in liquid medium cultivated with "wild" agent from the nature, diluted 1:10 with water. (Figure no. 2).


Figure no. 2 Graphical representation of the rate of contamination for Locality 1



a) without sensors b) with military sensors c) with military sensors + ISU

Variant 2: number of simulations performed: 6; number of simulations considered relevant for the purpose of the research: 3; the simulations performed on route 2 are not relevant from the research stand point (the route does not affect the military personnel); van, 40 km/h speed, 100 liters in liquid medium cultivated with "wild" agent from the nature, diluted 1:10 with water. (Figure no. 3).

Figure no. 3 Graphical representation of the rate of contamination for Locality 2




a) without sensors b) with military sensors c) with military sensors + ISU

Variant 3: number of simulations performed: 12; number of simulations considered relevant for the purpose of the research: 5; seagoing vessel, 20 Nd (35 km / h) speed, 100 kg bacterial spores "lyophilized" agent, diluted 1:10 in inert powder.


Hypothesis 1. Military personnel aboard (benefitting from the protection of the ship) (Figure no. 4).

Figure no. 4 Graphical representation of the rate of contamination for Locality 3
(*Military personnel aboard*)




Hypothesis 2. Military personnel ashore (not benefitting from the protection of the ship) (Figure no. 5).

Figure no. 5 Graphical representation of the rate of contamination for Locality 3
(*Military personnel ashore*)



Variant 4: number of simulations performed: 3; number of simulations considered relevant for the purpose of the research: 3; aircraft, 200 km / h speed, 100 kg bacterial spores "lyophilized" agent, diluted 1:10 in inert powder. (Figure no. 6).

Figure no. 6 Graphical representation of the rate of contamination for Locality 4



ISU

Variant 5. Simultaneous attack in the urban centers 1, 2 and 4: number of simulations performed: 3; number of simulations considered relevant for the purpose of research: 3. Since the optimal conditions for the dispersal of the biological agent were not met due to geographical and climatic differences, the results summed for the 3 *simulation hypotheses* (without sensors, with military sensors, ISU) *are only relevant in terms of health management after the biological attack.*

3. Commentary

In the field of defense and national security is very important to be able to estimate the *risk* to public health (civilian and military population). For this, is useful a dedicated software that can be continuously updated, to process a large amount of information and further provide results to assist in making informed decisions in real time.

The JCATS simulation system uses algorithms based on statistical data applied to study populations. The absolute data of contaminations between successive runs on the same model with the same hypotheses and human intervention (operators from the workstations) may vary within limits that can be evaluated.

The collaboration MMRC and UNAp STC has led to the implementation of the working tool for constructive simulation for CBRN medical protection exercises.

The results of the experiment were formed into a computer database very useful for further studies of health management.

Conclusions

The JCATS dedicated software allows the use in other constructive simulation exercises in the field of CBRN.

The constructive simulation for CBRN medical protection exercises is a useful experimental model of BIOAG-15 computer system can be used for the education and training of military personnel and the Military Medical Institute students.

The experimental model for defense exercises against the effects of the biological weapons and of bioterrorism is reliable and can be adapted for application in situations of massive contamination with biological agents or military medical education and training.

The pilot experiment conducted by MMRC in collaboration with UNAp/STC, may be part of the future National Computer System for the Surveillance of Infectious Diseases caused by war biological agents, within the NATO CBRN surveillance network.

Acknowledgement:

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS MODEL – ENERGY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

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Abstract: *The term infrastructure can be considered a structure that is made up of several components, which can be of an organizational, material and informational nature, components that are part of a social microsystem, and with these components can guarantee longevity and thus, being able to ensure the viability and functionality of the entire society.*

In this paper I want to achieve a short description of the infrastructure and to emphasize the importance they, especially the critical ones, have in the management of a state. Infrastructures are the bases, pawns of resistance, of a country, protection and development of them, having particular importance.

Key words: *critical infrastructure, electricity power, security.*

Introduction

Critical infrastructures are those infrastructures which stay underly security and durability of a system. The concept of critical infrastructure is relatively new, but also a great importance for a better existence of a country, which is why interest in this area is increasingly amplified, all countries paying particular attention in the last time to critical infrastructure issues.

When we talk about critical infrastructure, we must also think about increased interdependence between them that is felt especially in times of crisis in which is put in danger the safety of both people and society as a whole.

Currently, a critical infrastructure necessary to progress in society is the energetic. If the power supply stops, the effects on that State may have very serious consequences, affecting both the economy of society and the proper conduct of affairs.

Critical infrastructure and their protection

Critical infrastructure protection needs new concepts and tools regarding vulnerabilities and its impact on other infrastructure with which they are interconnected. For this reason, critical infrastructures can be considered the most sensitive and vulnerable to each process or system. This sensitivity arises from the particular role that critical infrastructure they have in Regarding the structure, the process or system functionality and stability, but also the interdependence because nowadays infrastructure directly depends on another.

In a modern society, proper functioning of the relations is essential, which means ensuring security and quality of services and belongings. Without a functioning essential structures of society can reach a complete chaos, which may involve large economic losses, losses that may have a direct and major impact on national security of the state.

When it comes to protecting people, we think about the ensure the ongoing functioning of essential services of a state, but this operation should be carried out to high standards, in order to ensure continuous and modern development of society. For this reason, disruption or damage to critical infrastructures can get to affect the whole society, and also

may cause loss of life. Critical infrastructures are based on the ability of operators to interconnect the systems to be able to have a global reach to transmit information.

When referring to the interdependence of the main infrastructures of a state, at the onset of an emergency, we can not operate, control or coordinate only from the point of view of a single sector of activity, ministry or local administration, given that it is necessary the existence of a global response, in order to optimize results.

An infrastructure is an assembly which can consist of many different elements (of material, organizational and informational)¹, which belongs to a social macrosystem, and through this system can ensure the viability and functionality of the entire society. Infrastructures can be classified according to the place, role and importance for the stability and functionality of the systems, as well as their safety and security and the processes they belong, in three main categories: common infrastructure, special infrastructures and critical infrastructure.²

Common infrastructures are those infrastructures that help provide the functionality of a particular system. These are basically the basic infrastructure of a company. However, common infrastructure at a time, they can turn into special or even critical infrastructures.

Special infrastructures are infrastructures with a basic role in the smooth running of a process through which is capable of ensuring better efficiency and performance. Such common infrastructures, special ones can turn into critical, special infrastructures are an important element in security processes.

We may use the designation of critical infrastructures when talking about any entity that generates public belongings whose destruction or degradation can have big consequences on people or on country's economic level.

Critical infrastructures are usually those infrastructures which are decisive in terms of safety and security of processes and systems. They have a defining role in the security, the systems operation and of social, economic, informational, political and military processes. In defining critical infrastructure, other factors may occur (contextual, circumstantial possible evolutions), and from here we can conclude that there are criteria of flexibility and unpredictability in identifying and evaluating structures.

The degree of criticality according to a number of different aspects, among which we can mention: its value in relation to functionality of processes (political, economic, military, and others) and systems, complementarity of infrastructure that make up a structure, the responsibility of an infrastructure regarding provide protection, durability and functionality of conglomerates which forms a system, sensitivity level of infrastructure in the face of sudden changes in conditions and situations, high level vulnerable to threats of any kind.

Currently it attaches great importance to cyber attacks because they can destabilize national infrastructure, economy and even national security. When we are in time of peace, it can trigger sabotage on state institutions, on private companies or other strategic objectives. Cyberspace is characterized by the absence of borders, dynamism and anonymity he generates at the same time development opportunities of the information society based on knowledge, but also risks to its operation (at individual, state and even cross-border event).³

In case of war, may be appealed critical infrastructures and basic functions of the economy, thereby trying to intimidate of political leaders. It is essential to existence of some methods to counter such attacks, to avoid happening some events that can have a major

¹ VÂLCIU, Adrian, CHIUȚĂ, Ion, ANGHLE, Elena, *Managementul infrastructurii critice a sistemelor electroenergetice*, Ed. Electra, București, 2009, p. 5

² VÂLCIU, Adrian, CHIUȚĂ, Ion, ANGHLE, Elena, *Managementul infrastructurii critice a sistemelor electroenergetice*, Ed. Electra, București, 2009, p. 5

³ Hotărârea nr. 271/2013 pentru aprobarea Strategiei de securitate cibernetică a României și a Planului de acțiune la nivel național privind implementarea Sistemului național de securitate cibernetică

impact, such as interruption of the functioning of key components, loss of revenue or intellectual property, and what is the More importantly, the loss of life.

In our opinion, the close connection between a state infrastructure leading to a high dependency between national and international levels security. Therefore, the degree of their vulnerable increases in the face of attacks directed at them, attacks that are increasingly more extensive and frequent. Unfortunately, ensuring total protection of critical infrastructure is not possible and so far, has not been found a way to correct this, but only to improve it.

We appreciate that essential nature critical infrastructures of the State are: production of electricity and its distribution; telecommunications systems; transport system; banking and financial system; administration and government and medical emergencies.

In the management of critical infrastructure, a great importance is the government. It must coordinate in an effective protection of critical infrastructure, its management is linked to: the significance shown by the Government of critical infrastructure; legislation in force must be adapted to the current requirements to ensure optimal functioning of the defense system; indications and provisions relating to how future action should be managed in all sectors by critical infrastructure that are found in that State.

Threats and threats to the critical infrastructure

These threats and dangers against critical infrastructures are very difficult to manage, and effects that can be produced on them are unpredictable. Undoubtedly, with the advent of globalization, it has become an important factor in the discussion about threats and dangers due to the fact that because of globalization, interdependencies related to problems of critical infrastructure are a growing and for example threats on a state may recoil on the another state or even on several states. This, in our opinion has great significance and because of this, cooperation between States regarding critical infrastructure has particular value and should be improved whenever is possible.

The threats against critical infrastructures can be supported by a number of factors: a high level of threats flexibility and dangers in terms of critical infrastructures; lack of a level of critical infrastructure flexibility due to their fixed nature; threats and dangers are very unpredictable.

We can talk about following threats that may prejudice to critical infrastructures: destruction or degradation of water transport networks and energy resources, communications, hydroelectric installations and even defense structures against disasters and unexpected events; untreated vulnerabilities arising from approaches which have a high level of risk chemical, nuclear, bacteriological or other nature, that may underlie the occurrence of disasters or calamities; the absence of deposits which ensure population needs in case of emergency or critical actions, or circumstances of a war.

The need for critical infrastructure protection

Capacity of effective operation and continue of infrastructure, especially the critical, their possibility to resist the potential threats and dangers is a sense of security for the population. Because of this, most countries nowadays have a common management for the protection of critical infrastructures and, in this way, can be provided better living conditions for the population.

In our opinion, for the protection of critical infrastructures is required the following steps: choosing the elements which form the critical infrastructures; finding the type of danger that may exist for each element of critical infrastructure; estimating the impact of threats and hazards on critical infrastructure elements; analyzing and assessing risks; selection and

implementation of a program for critical order of infrastructure protection; the study of conclusions learned to get a feedback.

The issue of critical infrastructures is an area around new but with great importance in terms of the good progress of a country and, because of this, we must pay increasing importance. All states are increasing their interest and improve their legislation about critical infrastructure. To that effect also Romania, as a member of the international structures is needed to align international law.

The competent authorities and operators of critical infrastructure must be constantly informed on what's new in this area and ways of protection of critical infrastructure. It needs to be materialized as financial allocations and human nature, as in the chapter "specialists" in the field of critical infrastructure we still have deficit. It is necessary to have qualified personnel in order to align European standards, and in view their ability to face possible attacks of any kind on vital infrastructure in Romania.

We consider it necessary to intensify cooperation with other European countries, and also we need to increase cooperation between the public sector and private sector because most of the critical infrastructures in Romania are private sector. Both the public and the private sector, after consultation, should develop a strategy regarding the protection of critical infrastructure strategy that must involve economic and human elements. Only through implementing national problem related to the importance of the critical infrastructures, we will be able to achieve significant progress in this area.

Energetic Critical Infrastructure

The principles of security policies regarding the energy infrastructure aimed, in particular, in recent years, risk control relating to the wear the physical and moral of most equipment and facilities in this domain, and also operation of the National Power System (NPS) in market conditions free.

When it comes to quality electricity supply service, we believe that it is determined by several factors, among which we can mention: safe operation of the installation and power quality.

The main factors determining the safe operation of the National Power System are: the annual number of interruptions addressed through repairs or maneuvers; the average duration of an interruption; the maximum duration of restoration; the average duration of interruption during a year, and others.

We find different types of interruption of power supply: micro-interruptions (are those interruptions lasting less than one second), short interruptions (outages which lasts between one second and one minute) and large interruptions (lasting more than one minute). It can make a classification in terms of the consequences that a disruption can have: interruptions that may cause loss of life, explosion, fire, or serious damage on equipment; interruptions that may result in stoppage continuous process, major damage by falling production and inability of recoveries; interruptions that may cause fall of production during withdrawal, but can recover.

Currently, the development of society depends on electricity supply and any disruption of it can have immense consequences on the functioning of end users. Because the systems are interconnected, interruptions in operation are relatively rare, because of the top quality equipment they are made.

However, inevitably, there were total system interruptions, and because of this, for a period of time the entire activity of the company was stopped. Supervising electric system is performed by a dispatcher, and electric system stability defines its ability to maintain normal

operations and recovery of steady state under the conditions of damage or in terms of incident.

An electric system has, from a functional perspective, one of the following conditions functionality: normal operation, alarm, incident-destruction and recovery.

At the time of system operation in conditions of warning we talk about the detect possible incidents or failures and taking action, changing the configuration of the grid.

When referring to the operation state of emergency, it is about maintaining attention on the incident, and at this time the system must have reserves to cope with such events.

After this, follows the time of recovery. In case the system has coped well with the situation, to restore power lines or groups who were not affected. When the system was out of service, first must performed significant reconnecting parties of the energy system, and thereafter can recover simultaneously all networks and stations.

Typically, system failures are caused by the succession of adverse events and is characterized by loss of stability, having as effect the collapse of an area or several areas within the system.

Conclusion

Identifying, understanding and analysis of the interdependencies between infrastructures took amplitude in the past decade. Technological development, economic changes and legislative regulations have dramatically altered the relationship between infrastructures and information technology revolution has led to increased complexity and interconnection of infrastructure also at _ centralize their control.

A crucial aspect in distribution systems, supply and emergency response today is to ensure continuity and efficiency in providing services to the natural and manmade threats. If resources are not available of protection to increase the robustness and elasticity of the system it is necessary to identify facilities to protect or strengthen and preserve the functionality of the system as much as possible, in case of sabotage or external disruptions.

Without a well-defined structure of critical infrastructures and their protection, a State can not manage in an efficient manner no response to threats on them. A first step is full harmonization of national legislation after the European, then we can implement a national response system against any kind of attacks. Only in this way, we can reach a higher level of protection of critical infrastructures.

Aknowledgement:

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO WATER, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY¹

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Abstract: *In the present paper, we attempt to briefly present the recent legal connections determined at the level of doctrine and international law, in terms of concepts such as “human security”, “durable development”, “human development” and human rights. Considered to be a fundamental human right, the right to water extends its legal content, with the content extension of the “human security” concept and with the new developments in the international law, in terms of human rights. Water is considered either a cultural item, or an economic item; however, it represents a vital component of the terrestrial ecosystem, conditioning the very human existence and the human civilization, overall, and thus being a major component of the “extended human security” concept, which demands more attention in the 21st century.*

Key-words: *right to water, human rights, drinking water, sanitation, right to an adequate life standard, human dignity, right to life, human security*

Introduction

The right to water, considered to be part of the *category of economic, social and cultural human rights*, but also connected to the civil and political rights (through the right to life, human freedom and dignity), is inherently connected to other fundamental human rights, such as: the right to health, human equality (especially the principle of gender-based non-discrimination), the right to education, the right to life, as well as the right to a healthy and clean environment, or to the human being’s condition of freedom itself. Other major connections entailing this right can also be distinguished also regarding the following: the right to an adequate life standard, the right to housing, the right to food. As noted in the *Outcome of the International Experts’ Meeting on the Right to Water* (Paris, July 7th – 8th 2009)², access to water (sanitation, included³) is qualified as a “*sine qua non* condition”, in order to observe the above-mentioned human rights, in the context in which, according to the reports issued by the UN bodies, almost 900 million people lack access to safe (unpolluted) drinking water and 2.5 billion people, i.e. almost 40% of the global population, do not have access to improved sanitation⁴.

¹ The present article represents only the personal opinion of the author and it does not involve in any form any other natural person or legal entity.

² *Outcome of the International Experts’s Meeting on the Right to Water*, Paris, 7 and 8 July 2009. www.unescdoc.unesco.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

³ The term coined in the official terminology is “access to water and sanitation”

⁴ UNESCO, WHO, *Progress in Drinking-water and Sanitation: special focus on sanitation*, WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water/Supply and Sanitation (JMP), 2008.

1. Legal Enshrinement, at International and Regional Level, of the Right to Water

The legal basis at international level, enshrining the right to water, *directly or indirectly*, as a human right, is formed of a series of international documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights/1945, which *indirectly* refers to the right to water, *by enshrining other rights*, such as “the individual right to an adequate standard for health, welfare, including food and shelter”⁵. Therefore, this right cannot exercise its content, in the absence of the individual right to water and of the individual’s free access to a water source. In addition, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights/1966 refers to the *implicit individual right to water*, since it expressly stipulates certain rights which cannot be exercised in their content, in the absence of the right to water, but it also stipulates that “no one can be dispossessed of or deprived of one’s means of subsistence” and that “each human being has the inherent right to life”⁶. In the same manner, the International Pact on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights/1966 enshrines rights that cannot be exercised without an implicit knowledge of the individual right to water⁷. To this end, the General Comment no. 15 of the Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considers that the right to an adequate life standard, as well as the benefit of the highest reachable standard of mental and physical health, enshrined in this Pact, entail the right to water. In addition, the UN Convention on the Right of Non-navigational Uses of the International Water Courses/1997 stipulates that “special attention shall be paid to the requirements concerning vital human needs”⁸ (implicit enshrinement of the human right to water and hygienic living conditions).

There are, however, *explicit enshrinements* of the right to water, such as the specification in the Covenant on Eliminating all the Forms of Discrimination against Women, stipulating the right of the women in the rural environment to decent living conditions, which includes the right to water. The International Covenant on the Child’s Rights explicitly refers to the right to water, by enshrining the right of each child to the highest standard possible, to reach in terms of health, also guaranteeing the right of every child to clean and adequate drinking water. The Geneva Conventions/1949, in the field of humanitarian law, expressly stipulate obligations regarding the states, in ensuring “an adequate living standard, for health and welfare, for the war prisoners, including the drinking water and the water for personal use”⁹. Additional Protocol I to these Covenants bans the belligerent parties from attacking, destroying, render unusable “items indispensable for the survival of the civilian population”, such as the irrigation systems and the drinking water supplies¹⁰.

In the field of international and regional documents expressly or implicitly enshrining the right to water, we must also mention: the Abuja Declaration, adopted at the first Africa-South America Summit/2006, (stipulating “the right of each of our citizens to have access to

⁵ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1945, art.25. In IRDO, *Principalele instrumente internaționale privind drepturile omului la care România este parte*, vol. I, *Instrumente universale*, ed. a cincea, IRDO, Bucharest, 2002.

⁶ Art. 6. In IRDO, *Principalele instrumente internaționale privind drepturile omului la care România este parte*, vol. I, *Instrumente universale*, fifth ed., IRDO, Bucharest, 2002.

⁷ Art. 11 (right to water being implicitly mentioned within the “human person’s right to a level of living sufficient for her and for her family”). In IRDO, *Principalele instrumente internaționale privind drepturile omului la care România este parte*, vol. I, *Instrumente universale*, fifth ed., IRDO, Bucharest, 2002.

⁸ Art. 10, point. 2. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2015.

⁹ Chap.I II, art. 25, 26, from Geneva Convention regarding treatment of war prisoners, 12 august 1949, <http://www.crucearosie.ro/uploads/images/Conventia%20de%20la%20Geneva%20pdfuri/Conventia%20de%20la%20Geneva%20III.pdf>, accessed on May 3, 2015.

¹⁰ Art. 54. http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.hp_act_text?idt=7651, accessed on May 3, 2015.

clean and safe/unpolluted water and to sanitation”¹¹; the Delhi Declaration adopted at the Third South-Asian Conference regarding sanitation), SACOSAN/2008 (acknowledging that “access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation represents a fundamental human right”¹²; the UN.GA Resolution on the right to development/2000 (acknowledging the right to clean water); Agenda 21/1992 (including an objective of the states to make sure that “the adequate water resources include access to a satisfactory quantity and quality of water”¹³; the Action Program of the International Conference on Population and Development/1994 (expressly acknowledging “the right to an adequate life standard, including water and sanitation water”¹⁴; International Dublin Conference on Water and Environment/1992 (acknowledging that “access to clean water and to sanitation water, at a for an acceptable price, is a fundamental right of all the human beings”¹⁵).

Other resolutions issued by UN organisms regarding the right to water and its implementation at national level, by governments, as well as through international cooperation instruments (including the independent UN experts) are the following: Council Resolution regarding the Human Rights 7/22 dated March 28th 2008 (“Human Rights and the access to safe drinking water and sanitation”); UN.GA Resolution 64/292 dated July 2010, representing *the first formal enshrinement of the right to water and sanitation*, acknowledging at the same time that “clean drinking water and personal use and sanitation water are essential for the exercise of all the other human rights”. We must also mention the Council Resolution on Human Rights 15/9 dated September 2010, establishing the position of the right to water and sanitation, in the international law.

The Council Resolution on Human Rights, under the aegis of UN.GA 18/1 dated September 28th 2011 (« Human right to safe drinking water and sanitation ») determines in an explicit manner the right to safe drinking water and sanitation; at the same time it is considered that *the right in question derives from the right to an adequate standard of living*; the *integrating vision of the human rights* is also considered (by acknowledging that the right to water is inextricably linked to the right to the highest possible standard of physical and mental health, the right to life and the human dignity).

We must also mention the Rio Declaration/June 1992, adopted following the Rio Summit and the UN Conference on the Environment and Development (particularly, chapter 18 of Agenda 21, reminding about the Conference on Water, following which the Mar del Plata Resolution was adopted, enshrining the right of all the people to have access to drinking water)¹⁶. In addition, the UN.GA Resolution 54/175, dated December 1999 (with the title “The Right to Development”), in article 12, makes *an express legal connection* between the right to development and the right to food of the person, as well as the individual right to clean water, *acknowledging their nature of “fundamental human rights”*; the application and promotion of these rights “represents a moral obligation for the governments and for the international community”.

The Johannesburg Summit/2002 regarding durable development finalized with a *political statement*, enshrining *the connection between the human dignity and the human*

¹¹ Chapter VI, point 18 :”We shall promote the right of our citizens to have access to clean and safe water and sanitation within our respective jurisdictions”. <http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Abuja-Declaration.pdf>, accessed on May 3, 2015.

¹² The Third South Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN) “SANITATION FOR DIGNITY AND HEALTH” November 16-21 2008, Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi, India The Delhi Declaration. <http://www.mocc.gov.pk>, Ministry of Climate Change, Government of Pakistan, accessed on May 3, 2015.

¹³ <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf>, accessed at May 3, 2015.

¹⁴ Principle 2. http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/programme_of_action_Web%20ENGLISH.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2015.

¹⁵ *Outcome*, quoted op., p. 3.

¹⁶*The Human Right to Water and Sanitation. Milestones*, www.un.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

access to satisfying basic needs, such as: clean water, sanitation, energy, and care for health, food security and protection of biodiversity. A Project of Orientations for the implementation of the right to drinking water and sanitation (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25) was elaborated in July 2005, used in the report issued by the Special Rapporteur with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and adopted by the Sub-Commission for the promotion and protection of human rights, orientations designed to provide support and solutions for the governmental decision-makers, international agencies and civil society regarding the implementation of the right to water and sanitation¹⁷.

In another view, we could say that the right to water is part of the category of *solidarity rights*, beside the right to a healthy and clean environment, the right to peace and the right to development. In a narrow view, others might consider that the right to water *does not fall into the category of third generation human rights; instead, it could be regarded as an economic right or even as a cultural right* (considering the sense assigned to water, that of “cultural item”, by UNESCO). In the Contribution to the Study of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights regarding the scope and content of the obligations related to the human rights concerning fair access to safe drinking water and sanitation regarding the quality of water and access to water, UNESCO considered that “water was always an important component of the UNESCO scientific programs and it became the priority of the Natural Sciences Sector, at the 21st UNESCO General Conference, in 2001”¹⁸.

UNESCO sees the states ensuring “non-discriminatory access to water and sanitation” as a “precondition for the exercise of other human rights, such as the right to life, human dignity, right to health, right to food, right to an adequate life standard and education”, an integrating vision of the human rights, which was subsequently resumed in its Strategy on Human Rights/2003¹⁹.

2. Continuous Expansion of the Human Security Scope, from the Perspective of New Challenges of the 21st Century (Underdevelopment, Chronic Poverty, Infectious Diseases, Precarious Sanitation, Water Crisis)

The beginning of the 21st century saw a diversification in the global issues for which the states, through international, regional, not only national cooperation, must ensure a solution in due time, through a common vision, in the context in which *not solving this global issues* (including free access to drinking water and sanitation, ensuring non-polluted, healthy and safe water for consumption and certain adequate sanitation conditions, for the population) *leads to a serious impact, down to denial, of an entire set of fundamental human rights*. According to a report of UNPD from 2006, *the lack or limiting of free access to water also results in infringement upon the principle of non-discrimination between sexes, in certain areas of the globe* (since, according to the report, “Millions of women and young girls collect water for their families every day – a practice that reinforces gender inequalities by preventing girls from attending school”)²⁰.

The experts’ reports on exercising this right, in practice, show that the dirty water and the poor sanitation represent the second largest cause of child mortality, at world level, with a ratio of 1/5 (while the HIV virus causes the death of one child, poor sanitation and water for individual hygiene needs cause the death of five children). 10,000 people die each day

¹⁷ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Water/Sub_Com_Guisse_guidelines.pdf, accessed on May 3, 2015.

¹⁸ *Outcome*, quoted op., p. 6.

¹⁹ *Outcome*, *idem*, p. 6.

²⁰ UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, *Beyond Scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis*, 2006, quoted in *Outcome of the International Experts’ Meeting on the Right to Water*, Paris, 7 and 8 July 2009, www.unescdoc.unesco.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

(including almost 5,000 children under 5 years old) because of diseases caused by unsafe water (dirty, polluted) and poor sanitation, on account of absence of water or inadequate water, these reports also read²¹.

The World Health Organization shows in its reports that access to water and sanitation “is not simply a question of water resources, technology and infrastructure, but also of setting priorities, tackling poverty and inequality, addressing societal power imbalances, and, above all, political will.”²²

Human security represents *one of the fields included in the “durable development” phrase*²³, *beside the environment security*. Concerning the right to water, we consider that there is *an indissoluble connection between human security* (through objectives that go beyond ensuring resources of drinking water or sanitation for the population of a state) and *environment security* (non-pollution of drinking water, ensuring the human right to a healthy and clean environment), when the states ensure this right, at national, regional and international level.

The threats to human security, in the 21st century (underdevelopment, chronic poverty, infectious diseases, precarious sanitation, a low living standard, cross-border water pollution, reduction of drinking water reserves etc.) progressively cause *an extension of the human security content*, as this concept has to be connected to the concept of *durable development*. In addition, there is also *another innovative concept* proposed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Program/1994), i.e. the concept of “*human development*” (in the Report on Human Development), which generated a fundamental rethinking of the concept of security²⁴. In addition, the military doctrine also notes the extension of the concept of “human security”, through other conceptual innovations (the “absence of needs” trend, the “freedom to live in dignity” trend or the “freedom to live on one’s own” trend, the “free oneself from fear” trend) introduced by the UNDP Report, in 1994, regarding the Human Development, as well as the Report of the UN General Secretary, “*In Larger Freedom. Towards Development Security and Freedom for All*”/2005²⁵. We must particularly mention (for the major connection determined between the human rights and the human society) *the “absence of needs” trend*, with the starting point in the vision according to which hunger, diseases, natural disasters cause more victims than terrorism, wars and genocide put together, *the first aspects meeting the criteria for the category of threats regarding the extended human security*. Due to the innovative work of the UN organisms (especially UNDP), it was possible to create a strong connection between the human security and the human development, in three fundamental aspects (population, multidimensional perspective of security, identification of poverty and inequity, as sources of individual vulnerability)²⁶.

The innovative concept proposed under the UN aegis (“*freedom of the human being to live in dignity*”) and which led to *the extension of the classic content of human security*,

²¹ UNDP: Human Development Report 2006, *Beyond Scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis*, 2006, quoted in *Outcome of the International Experts’ Meeting on the Right to Water*, Paris, 7 and 8 July 2009, www.unescdoc.unesco.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

²² *Outcome of the International Experts’ Meeting on the Right to Water*, Paris, 7 and 8 July 2009. www.unescdoc.unesco.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

²³ UNESCO’s contribution to OHCHR’s study on the scope and content of the human rights obligations related to equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation. April, 10, 2007, <http://www2.ohchr.org>, accessed on April 6th, 2015

²⁴ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994>, accessed on May 3, 2015.

²⁵ <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=13545>, accessed on May 3, 2015.

²⁶ Sabina Alkire, *A Conceptual Framework for Human Security*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Working Paper, 2, University of Oxford, London, 2003, citată în Alexandru Kiş, *NATO și securitatea umană*, în (coord.) Mihai-Marcel Neag, *Implicații economice, politice și militare asupra securității umane în etapa post-conflict*, Ed. Academiei Forțelor Terestre “Nicolae Bălcescu”, Sibiu, 2011, p. 45.

entails the benefit of certain civil and political rights, such as the right life, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to food, health, education, social protection, work, the right to enjoy the benefits of technology, the scientific progress and its applications. The concept of “*human dignity*”, as construed in the documents and programs elaborated under the UN aegis, connected to the right to life, is also connected to major aspects for the creation of a state of security for the individual (characterized by the absence of any form of privation, such as hunger, ignorance, incapacity, disability and disease), as noted by the specialists²⁷.

3. Content of the Human Right to Water

According to General Comment no. 15 of the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to water as a human right is defined as “the right of each individual to sufficient, safe, acceptable physically accessible and affordable water”), for personal and domestic use. As mentioned in this Comment, water must be of “safe quality and with acceptable colour, taste and odour”, access to water must be “continuous, while the quantity of available water must be adequate for the human dignity, for life and health”, sufficient for drinking, cooking, personal hygiene and sanitation, while the satisfying (fulfilling) nature of the water must not be construed in a restrictive manner, the Commentary reads. The text insists on *acknowledging water as a social and cultural item*, not only as an economic item, referring to the UNESCO’s vision of water (water as a cultural item), *which influences and generates various types of cultures and civilizations, through the human being-environment (water, in this case) relation*, such as: the feeling of affiliation, identity, cultural inheritance²⁸.

Among the obligations of the states considered to have “immediate effect”, General Commentary no. 15 also includes *the obligation to ensure access to a minimum essential quantity of water, at a reasonable distance from the dwellings, based on the principle of non-discrimination and with special protection for the vulnerable and marginalized groups of people*. In addition, the Comment also imposes for the states *the obligation to monitor progress made in exercising the right to water* of the people. For the developing states, these obligations, together with others regarding the exercise of the right to water, entail *the implementation of measures* through mechanisms of international cooperation, international assistance, especially in the economic and technical field²⁹.

According to Comment no. 15, *universal access to sanitation is a fundamental right*, “not only for human dignity, but also for one of the main mechanisms of protecting the quality of water resources.” Adopted in November 2002, this text sets *certain criteria* to ensure a full benefit of the right to water (“the right to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water”)³⁰. According to art. 16 of General Comment no. 15, *target-groups* (the groups which are “traditionally faced with difficulties in exercising their right to water, including women, children, minority groups, indigenous populations, refugees, asylum seekers, people moved internally, migrants, workers, prisoners and inmates”) receive *special attention* from the states, in ensuring the exercise of the right to water³¹.

²⁷Alexandru Kiş, quoted op., p. 45.

²⁸*Outcome, op.cit.*, p. 4.

²⁹*Outcome*, quoted op., p. 4.

³⁰ <https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/escgencom15.htm>, accessed on May 3, 2015.

³¹According to World Health Organization, WHO, *The Right to Water*, 2003, www2.ohchr.org, accessed on April 6th 2015.

Some Conclusions

The right to water has *numerous legal enshrinements*, at international and regional level, *both express and implicit* (being inferred from the enshrinement of certain rights necessarily entailing it, such as the right to life, human dignity, the right to a satisfactory life standard, human freedom, the right to health). Due to *the diversification and increasing number of global issues, at the beginning of the 21st century* (globalization deepening the gap between the developed countries in the industrialized North and the developing countries, especially the countries in the South), *a series of aspects* (such as underdevelopment, hunger, lack of drinking water or sanitation, lack, lessening or pollution of resources of drinking water, diseases related to dirty water or lack of water or poor sanitation, caused by the lack of water or dirty water, chronic poverty) convert into risk factors and threats to the individual, at a higher level, as compared to other ages.

This issue determined *the adjustment of national, regional and international efforts* (especially under the UN aegis) *to extend the content of the concept of human security*, towards new directions, related to the human development, durable development, the “absence of needs” trend, “freeing from fear” or the “freedom to live in dignity” trend. All these aspects have a *rather recent enshrinement*, in relation to the human rights and the classic concept of security and the idea of individual vulnerability, determining both *the doctrine development* on redefining the human security, and *new development directions* of the international law, at the beginning of the 21st century.

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NEW TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY, REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

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Abstract: *In the present paper, we attempt to briefly analyze certain directions of development in international law, resulted from the necessity to enhance legal protection regarding the environment, in the context in which the economic gap and, generally, the development gap between the Southern and Northern countries deepens, as well as in the context in which a way of life based on the philosophy of consumption spreads at global level, a philosophy through which the terrestrial ecosystem, of which the man is an intrinsic part, suffers serious damages, irreparable at times. The need to change the paradigm of the manner in which the human and human civilization relates to the overall terrestrial ecosystem, by disseminating the model of eco-societies at global level, also leads to the need to adjust and develop the international law. In particular, the international environmental law represents a branch of the international law, for which we explore possible developments, in the present paper.*

Keywords: *international law, environment, terrestrial ecosystem, environmental law, rights of nature, global right of environment.*

Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, the international law (defined more as an inter-state law, with *the states as main actors and sovereign, original, principal subjects of law*, in relation with other entities) acknowledges *new lines and directions of development*, under the impulse of recent doctrine evolutions, of introducing new paradigms and concepts. Among them, we mention durable development, human development, human security, environmental security, new fourth generation human rights, such as the human right to housing, the right to happiness etc. A more recent part of the doctrine already introduces ambitious innovations *in the environmental law, through the created connection with human security and environmental security*, extremely innovative legal concepts, for the (already) classic international law (seen as inter-state law). The issue in question is the necessity for the legal protection of *nature* (a more comprehensive legal concept than the phrase “*environment*”, which resumes the inheritance concept of the French Civil Code, dating back to 1804), through special representatives, as well as granting a special legal status in relation to the state, with the corporations and individuals, in the international legal order of the 21st century. From the status of object, submitted to exploitation down to its irreparable destruction, *nature is reconsidered and redefined depending on an integrating relation* (not a schizoid one, as it has been so far), through which *man reoccurs as part of the terrestrial ecosystem, unique and fragile ecosystem, the existence and quality of which is a vital condition for the human existence and civilization*. In the present paper, we specifically explore the directions that lead to a change in the current international environmental law into a *global*

law, representing a superior stage of evolution, in relation to the current legal concept of the man-nature relation.

1. Towards a Global Environmental Law

Through the very phrase “environmental law” to which it refers (a pleonasm), the definition of the environment reflects *a limited vision of nature*, reduced to a set of elements “surrounding it”, with which the human being (from the rigorous interpretation, close to the original sense of the phrase) *does not consider that he/she interacts, does not consider to be directly and inherently connected*. This phrase only reveals a *schizoid attitude*, born from the forming of developed capitalist societies¹ (and, from other perspectives, even from the first societies based on the cult of male war deities², encountered also in medieval or imperialist societies, in full process of conquering their colonial empires³, also being a concept encountered in small, peripheral societies, which had to defend against large imperial predators) – *general perception which led in history to destructive behaviours of the strongholds, states or empires, against other urban settlements and against nature*, also by using destructive tactics in order to guarantee victory in a war – burning down grass lands, poisoning wells, draining or deviating the river flows etc. The “*environment*” phrase, which we consider *inadequate, limited and functionalist*, expresses *a flawed relation, an attitude of breaking from nature* (with the human being “protected” from nature, in an artificial, urban habitat, made of concrete and cement). Nature means “the great wild space, yet to be urbanized and domesticated, which surrounds the human metropolises” (perception generated from the realistic, profound interpretation of the phrase).

*There is a multitude of definitions of the “environment” phrase, preferred in the legal doctrine, instead of the more comprehensive definition of “nature” (which does not have the functionalist, desacralized, consumerist connotation, specific to secular industrialized societies, that of “environment”, which means to suggest a breakdown of nature into “various components and energy, physical, biological conditions, surrounding a being – the being in this case is the human being, n.n.” – or the groups of beings – in this case, human societies, n.n.)*⁴

We note here *the heritage-based conception of environment*, given by the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, on December 30th 1987, according to which the environment is regarded as “*an immaterial item*”, unitary with its various components, each of them being able to separately represent an object of protection, while all the components represent a unity, in their totality”. The same concept reflecting an inevitable functionalist and heritage-based perspective

¹ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Transformări globale. Politică, economie și cultură*, translated by Ramona-Elena Lupașcu, Adriana Ștraub, Mihaela Bordea, Alina-Maria Turcu, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2004, pp. 428-430.

² David C. Korten, *Marea Cotitură. De la Imperiu la Comunitatea terestră*, translated by Mihnea Columbeanu, Ed. Antet XX Press, 2007, s. I., p. 83-90.

³ David Held *et alii*, quoted op., p. 429.

⁴ If we only quote the first part of the definition given to the environment, for example, by scientist Emil Racoviță (it is interesting that only in the second part of the definition do we find *the necessary balance between the functionalist approach to nature* - in relation to the man who withdraws as an active element with exclusive role of domination, exploitation of nature – *and the holistic approach*, finally acknowledging that man is closely connected to nature and that this connection is vital, unique, irreplaceable, a condition for the very human existence on this Earth...” on which their fate depends and whose action causes a reaction in the so-called being” (Emil Racoviță, citat în Ștefan Vancea, *Curs de ecologie generală*, Univ. Al. Ioan Cuza, Iași, 1972, p. 17, quoted in Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., p. 55).

of nature also occurs in definitions included in international documents, in the field of international environmental law, documents such as the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, adopted under the aegis of the European Council, at Lugano, open for signing on June 21st 1993. The environment is here defined as formed of “natural resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the characteristic aspects of the landscape⁵” (where nature is reduced to either a landscape or to resources to exploit, be they biotic or abiotic, either to cultural goods, or to all these aspects, in their totality).

A comprehensive definition, in which the human being is no longer considered a being with unlimited absolute property rights – in the sense of absence of correlative responsibilities – over nature, but a being in close and permanent relation with nature, from within which he/she cannot withdraw without having his/her very existence and civilization threatened, is also definition enshrined by the Council Directive EC 85/337 EEC, dated June 27th 1985, which stipulates that “*the environment includes the human being, the flora and fauna, the soil, water, air, climate and landscape, the interaction among the mentioned factors, the material goods and cultural heritage*”.

In another view of nature, the human being is again separated from it; it is not considered that the human being is part of nature (which is a mere framework surrounding the human being); there is also a distinction between the natural environment and a perception environment (or cultural, artificial). Thus, the environment represents “the totality of elements which, in the complexity of their relations, represent the framework, environment and conditions of human life, *as such or as perceived*”⁶.

A global comprehensive definition (which is not freed from the predominantly functionalist tendencies) is the one given by the Romanian lawmaker (through GEO 195/2005, approved by Law 265/2006), where the “environment”, as a legal concept, incorporates *a complex reality, consisting of atmosphere, biosphere, geosphere, sociosphere and cosmos*. The living beings, human being included, are elements included in the definition of environment, together with “the conditions that can influence the wellbeing and health of the human being” or “the quality of life”⁷.

At the same time, the doctrine draws attention on the fact that the “environmental legislation” is more comprehensive than the “actual environment protection legislation”, starting from the premise that the environmental policy must be treated by the governments as having the same importance as the economic policies of the states.

In the 21st century societies, the concept of “environment” is acknowledged as *a dynamic one*, being enriched as the social and technological progress is recorded, as well as due to the evolution of human views on the relation with nature and through the understanding of the uniqueness and fragility of the terrestrial ecosystem. We estimate that this concept will be *more and more widely interpreted from the legal standpoint*, during the 21st century, reaching the point in which it incorporates, as the doctrine notes, “all the aspects of human activity, in the human being-nature relation, on the same planet Earth, while permanently acquiring new meanings”⁸.

Concerning the occurrence and development in the 21st century of an authentic *global environmental law* (or, better said, “*of nature*”), we must start from the wide doctrine view on

⁵ Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., p. 45.

⁶ Michel Prieur, *Droit de l'environnement*, citat în Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., p. 45.

⁷ Daniela Marinescu, quoted op. pp. 45-46.

⁸ Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., p. 47.

the environmental law, which, although a distinct branch of the law, adds its concepts and principles to numerous other branches of law (international law, real estate law, business law, EU acquis law, peace law etc.), thus creating a multitude of interconnection among them. Moreover, the doctrine has noted *the horizontal character of this law* (covering various sectors of law, such as the private and the public sector), *as well as its interactive nature*, as it tends to influence all the other sectors of law, to introduce the term “environment”⁹. In addition, the doctrine acknowledges the “conceptual, structurally systemic unity”, derived from “*the environmental uniqueness and indivisibility of Earth’s environment*”, between the national and international dimension of the environmental law¹⁰. Thus, through its content and through the nature of the terrestrial ecosystem, the environmental law *exceeds the strict westphalian concept*, that of the world divided into states with sovereign territories, aiming at a global protection of nature, obtained by means of trans-national instruments and regulations. Terms such as “progress” or “poverty” “North-South divide” *actually reflect the global view on the environment*¹¹, strongly and predominantly under the negative influence of the activities performed by industrial and consumption societies, which tend to globalize themselves¹².

In other words, *the occurrence and development of a global environmental law is a response to the global challenges generated by the spread of the consumption society and the capitalist societies model* (societies that are not limited or actually competed against by environmental models of societies; instead, they neighbour so-called “anti-capitalist” societies, which also fail to propose an environmental approach to their environmental policies and to all the human activities, in relation to the requirement of environment protection and preservation). More precisely, the globalization of economy and capitals, the increasing influence of corporations belonging to the large powers or the transnational corporations, the wars, underdevelopment, accumulation of profit at global scale, consumption societies and global warming cause irreparable damages to the nature and human civilization overall, also creating a real survival problem for the human species, in the terrestrial habitat, *unless the human conception of nature and on the relation to nature changes*.

The global law regarding nature, in the 21st century, should comprise a precise set of rules, regulations, global legal statuses and global institutions, applicable to the main actors of the 21st century global society (states, corporations, global mass media). This law shall develop a real environmental-legal responsibility of these actors, towards ensuring the uniqueness and integrity of the terrestrial ecosystem, based on a model of *post-corporate, post-consumerist human society, built on a relation of harmony and protection of nature, not on a relation of exploitation/domination/destruction of nature, as it has been so far*.

The global environmental legislation would comprise “the entire environmental framework, in which the quasi-totality of human activities are performed¹³”, as proposed by the doctrine.

*The global environmental law would include, besides its unification to the component of global ethics regarding the environment*¹⁴, *the current international legal status*, which currently

⁹ *Idem*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

¹² David Held *et alii*, quoted op., p. 437.

¹³ Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., p. 46.

¹⁴ As noted in the doctrine, no human society can withhold in the absence of certain moral principles, of ethics defining the essence of a harmonious society. See Confucius’ conception, quoted as representing one of the ancient

forms the international environmental law: for example, the series of treaties and international conventions signed and ratified by the states, in the field of protecting various environment components, such as the UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage/Paris, 1972; the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters/1998; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance/1971, especially as habitat of the aquatic birds etc.¹⁵

We consider that the set of legal or declarative documents, *which can be progressively developed* in a body of *global* regulations regarding the environment, is the following: the Stockholm Declaration/1972, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development/1992 and Agenda 21, also adopted in 1992, following the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development in Rio, the Development Objectives of the Millennium, adopted through the GA.UN Resolution 55/2, the Johannesburg Declaration on Durable Development/2002 etc.

2. Rights of Nature and Their Protection in Relation to the Human Rights

The environment can be defined in the international relations, as being “the totality of natural and artificial environments, in which the human being is installed, which the human being exploits and sets up, as well as the totality of non-anthropized environments, required for his/her survival”¹⁶. Concerning this definition, we note that it is one considering that the human being is a supreme value in relation to nature, as the human being is self-placed on a superior hierarchical position, in relation to nature, on a position of command and exploitation of nature, modifying it, *according to his/her interests and visions, as an expression of the materialistic ideologies (communist, capitalist), in which the human being considers himself/herself a master of nature and little (or at all) a being in intrinsic connection with nature, being part of the same fragile and complex ecosystem*. For many centuries, especially after the rise of the occidental industrial civilizations, *the human being has knowingly altered the delicate balance of nature*, to change the natural environment inhabited, according to the human requirements concerning the industrial civilization, deforesting huge surfaces, in order to make way for railroads, industrial cities, agricultural plots, changing the river courses and polluting the natural habitats, hunting animals on a large scale, for fangs and furs, polluting nature with industrial and domestic waste products, many of them non-recyclable or toxic¹⁷.

The great industrial civilizations, which have reached their peak point towards the end of the 20th century (although they are currently more and more faced with new concepts of eco-cities and eco-societies), have represented the triumphant expression of *the materialistic thinking*, lacking in the sacred perception and respect for nature. Objectives that today are starting to be considered more and more often, in elaborating the public policies and even represent important discussion points, *on the global agenda*, at the summits of the large industrialized powers, objectives such as environment preservation and protection, have been ignored, minimized or despised by the public actors (developing states, advanced industrial states) and by

conceptual grounds, for the current philosophy of human rights, in Irina Moroianu Zlătescu, *Human rights. A dynamic and evolving process*, Ed. Pro Universitaria, București, 2015, p. 14

¹⁵ David Held *et alii*, quoted op., p.432-433.

¹⁶ Marie Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, *Dictionnaire des relations internationales*, Dalloz, Paris, 2006, p. 201.

¹⁷ Daniela Marinescu, quoted op., pp. 9-11.

the private actors (multinational corporations, national corporations which have represented true empires of economic exploitation or have represented real international trade networks with exotic species, rare metals, their exploitation and hunting deeply and sometimes irreversibly changing natural habitats, in the non-Occidental regions of the globe¹⁸), during the rise of these industrial civilizations.

Only at the beginning of the 21st century, *the materialistic model, based on the irrational exploitation of nature*, by the human being, self-considered master with unlimited rights over nature, which he/she is free to use as he/she pleases, *abusing the power (in the fever of advancement, these industrial societies or societies in process of industrialization mistook possessing nature for destroying nature¹⁹)* begins to be discussed by more and more voices, at national, regional and international level.

From the (legal, political, social) role of “object” (of the will, action, interests of the human being), in the innovative views of the eco-politics, ecology, eco-theo-politics, international environmental law, nature becomes more and more *a distinct legal subject*, beside the classic subjects (natural person, legal entity – i.e. the same corporation).

In the classic view (now brought to discussion by the national and international environmental movements), *the right to property* (of the natural person and especially of the legal entity – state or corporation) was presented by the jurists as a sacred, absolute right, *plena in re potestas* (Justinian’s view) or expressing *an individualist liberal logic, taken to the extreme* (View of the 1804 French Civil Code). Not only the liberalism, *but also the materialistic communist, Marxist of socialist views, centred on progress at any cost*, have created *distorted perceptions of nature*, justifying the right of the human, of the state, of the collectivity to freely exploit nature, in the absolute sense, *without taking responsibility for the future generations, for the current and future quality of the environment. Lack of responsibility* in exploiting and changing nature on a large scale, by the states, corporation (be it in the name of economic liberalism, of profit accumulation and new markets, be it in the name of the people and of an unlimited right to development of the peoples) *has progressively led to serious, often irreversible changes in the environment.*

The very “environment” phrase, a pleonastic phrase, is inadequate, as it reflects the limitations in thinking and perception of an exploitation and consumption age, aimed at nature. The human being is “surrounded” by nature, but the human being does consider that he/she interacts with nature, or that he/she is influenced by nature. The man of the 19th-20th century industrial societies falsely considers himself to be isolated from nature, in his artificial habitat²⁰. *His interaction with nature is one of permanent exploitation, domination and destruction of nature*, using it without limits and liability, as well as using its living elements (even the pigeons in the lofts, the bees in the beehives and the house rabbits are considered “floating assets”)²¹.

The entire flawed view and actions of the human being, in relation to nature, dominating the 19th and 20th century and being discussed only at present, starts from the conception of the human right to property (of the state, of the corporation, of the people, of the collectivity) over nature, as an absolute, sacred, intangible, inviolable and infeasible right, envisaging any

¹⁸ David Held *et alii*, quoted op., pp. 428-429.

¹⁹ Mircea Duțu, Andrei Duțu, *Dreptul la proprietate și exigențele protecției mediului*, Ed. Universul Juridic, București, 2011, pp. 29-30.

²⁰ Coord. Radovan Richta, *Civilizația la răscruce. Implicațiile sociale și umane ale revoluției științifice și tehnice*, Editura Politică, București, 1970, pp. 130-131.

²¹ Mircea Duțu, Andrei Duțu, quoted op., p. 29.

“natural or manufactured, alive or dead, tangible or intangible asset”. As shown in the doctrine, *the spread of the flawed conception of the French Civil Code and of the Roman right (right to property) over the property has led to a change in all the elements of nature into goods with a well-determined commercial value*. Thus, the 1804 French Civil Code stipulated that “property is the right to enjoy and dispose of goods, in an absolute manner, on condition that they are not used in a manner forbidden by law or by other regulations” (conception disseminated in most of the 19th century civil codes)²².

Thus, *nature was no longer seen as anything more than an object, which was in turn divided into a series of elements, each with determined fix commercial value*, over which the human being (as well as the legal entity, such as the state, collectivity, corporation) had the right, as owners, to possess, exploit, dispose of, in an absolute, exclusive and perpetual manner.

In the 19th – 20th century industrial civilizations, both the advanced and the developing civilizations, serious, often irreparable abuses were committed against nature, only on behalf of exercising this conception of the right to property. The human being (as well as the state, collectivity, corporation) become owners with real absolute rights, masters of nature, being entitled, according to the law codes sanctioning such legal vision, to alienate, buy, use the natural resources, freely dispose of them (down to polluting them, changing their nature, irrationally exploiting them, draining the resources of the planet). Thus, the human right to property over nature is converted into an absolutist right *to own nature down to the point of freely destroying the unique elements of nature and modifying natural habitats, in the name of accumulating profit, of the objective of conquering new consumption markets or of economic development*.

Only at the end of 19th century, following the threats to the public goods (including the natural resources of the soil, subsoil) caused by intensive agriculture and chemical fertilizers, the legal conception of “*public field*” started to form, with the latter requiring protection, for the general interest. Thus, for the public interest, the state assumed the right to restrict the scope of private property²³.

Currently the evolution of conceptions regarding the right of property, in relation to the environment, tends to favour *a social and ecologic function of the right to property*, by virtue of which the holder must exercise this right mainly taking into consideration the general interest in protecting and preserving nature, as well as the imperative of ensuring the survival of the human species on this planet²⁴. To this end, there is a consolidation of the international statuses regarding the protection and preservation of the environment, which connects to the concept of “sustainable development”, the concept of “environmental security” and the concept of “good global governance”. All these concepts, innovative for the 21st century, tend to pay special attention to *the common resources, which are in danger of being over-exploited, down to depletion, because they do not fall in the jurisdiction of the private property legislation*.

Far from assuming another flawed conception (that of privatizing the entire environment, in order to avoid the destruction of common goods), global governance, sustainable development and environmental security, as well as global eco-politics pay a closer look at the development of new legal and political methods and means, adequate for the need for enhance protection of nature.

Thus, *giving juridical personality to the nature was a suggestion, in the sense of granting to it the quality of “legal entity”*, at national, regional and international level, with “nature”

²² *Idem*, p. 29.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 30-32.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

benefiting from specific institutions and representatives, acting on its behalf in court, by bringing to justice states, corporations or individuals who failed to adequately exercise their property right. A truly effective protection, which actually balances the legal relation between the human being (but also the state, corporation, collectivity) and nature, takes the direction of granting a set of specific rights, to a legal entity, through which these rights of nature receive acknowledgement and concrete protection, in a court of law and at any level (regional, national, global), against the rival interests of corporations, states and individuals²⁵.

Conclusions

The anthropocentric conception of nature as “an object” of the property right of the individual/state/corporation, conception which places the individual (and therefore the state or corporation, as representatives of certain collective, public or private interests), in a position superior to nature, a position of command and control, *however without developing an environmental ethic, a set of moral values and legal-political responsibilities*, which limit this position of command and control over nature, has led to the development of a systematic, abusive, deeply harmful action against nature, for centuries. Currently, to fix a global situation of injustice and severe damaging of nature, the jurists have proposed a series of environmental rights, to protect nature, which would be categorized as third generation human rights, the so-called “solidarity rights”. From this viewpoint, the jurists propose *a limitation* of the individual rights, in relation to *the environmental rights (regarded as collective rights)*.

However, the *individual* rights are not the only ones that should be limited or strongly marked by *the legal dimension of responsibility regarding the environment*; such limitations should include property rights (public and private) *of the state and of other actors (corporations)* which, through their public or private policies, have direct, significant impact, even if not major, on nature. At this point, *global regimens of environment protection, global institutions of nature protection, with representatives independent* from the states and corporations can be consolidated, to exclusively supervise the protection of nature’s rights, in the framework of a *global environmental law and a law protecting the planet, as an unique ecosystem*.

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